Search

The article cites two points on nuclear deterrence and a specific proposal based on those points. The first point that the author wants to cite is that deterrence through the threat of mutual assured destruction is not the best strategy for the United States. The second point is that to accept the threat of mutual assured destruction, would mean the creation of mass and deadly weapons. Reducing the level of overkill without requiring or producing any change in the strategy of nuclear deterrence is proposed by the author.

The article reports on the decision of the U.S. government to set apart Peking City from the People's Republic Of China to exclude it from a governance which is deemed as posing a global danger. For almost 20 years, the American government was incharge of all its diplomatic, economic and military affairs to prevent it from staging insurgencies which are in reality are concealed Chinese aggressions. The city is compulsive in its objective to safeguard its territorial integrity and political independence from the Chinese government wherein to prove that, Premier Chou En-lai had invited U.S. Pres. Richard M. Nixon for a possible dialogue together with officials from the Chinese government to make some negotiations and mutual accomodations.

The article discusses the developments in disarmament and arms limitation agreements during the 20th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs held in Fontana, Wisconsin in September 1970. Working Group II of the conference focused on the aspects of the problem of military readiness and complete disarmament. The idea of deterrence was discussed emphasizing the fact that its requirements have been applied as a principle for a continuing development in nuclear weapons stockpiles. According to the article, there is a threat in an unproductive prolongation of strategic arms limitation talks.

The article presents the author's views regarding the role of the military-industrial complex in American life and its degree of influence. He asserts that the notion regarding the large appropriation placed on defense than what is needed depends on whether one thinks the national decisionmaking process tends to misestimate one or more of three variables. These include the decision process which concerns the threat and whether it operates to bias threat estimates, the second variable is the social opportunity costs associated with other public resource claims and lastly, the concern on the efficiency of defense production.

The article discusses some of the difficulties associated with managing United States National Defense. Business management policies employed in a national defense program must be flexible enough to react to fluctuating resource availabilities and changing defense policies. Since there is never an end-point associated with defense strategies, traditional project management techniques do not apply. The author recommends applying resource management techniques to determine military and non-military spending levels, as well as possible nuclear deterrence strategies.

The article discusses recent changes in the United States Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR) maintaining that the U.S. Government will recognize and respect proprietary rights in its contractual agreements, at least those of contractors to the military agencies. In a competitive economy, the most important factor in the allocation of industrial resources and in the generation of business is the expectation of profits. Businessmen and government contractors entering into contractual agreements to supply military goods and services to the U.S. Government can do so with confidence.

The article focuses on the fact that policy failures in the U.S. may be attributed to the limitation of military systems studies and the manner in which policymakers use them. The military systems studies have the self-imposed limitation of playing down the broader political factors is defensible up to a point in the attempt to deal with a critical portion of the overall problem. The chief difficulties arise in the transition from the suboptimized analytical studies to decision making. In this respect, analysts may have been remiss in failing to appreciate the crucial role of bureaucratic structures. The system studies even when stated to be limited and suboptimized were inevitably incorporated a number of non-technical assumptions though typically in a tangential and implicit fashion.

The article discusses the recommendations presented by the White House Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament at the White House Conference on International Cooperation in 1965. In its proposal, the Committee suggested that the United Nations should take the first step in seeking a nonagression pact between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw treaty organizations. Aside from this, the United Nations should also lead its allies in the search for ways to reduce the proliferation of nuclear weapons in and near Central Europe. Lastly, it recommended that an agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union should be formulated to reduce the danger of conventional attacks in Europe.

The article focuses on the legislative report on arms control and disarmament which was discussed at the White House Conference on International Cooperation. The private members of the Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament of the National Citizens Committee on International Cooperation have been given high commendation for their diligence and conscientiousness. The private members included knowledgeable former public servants who are experts in the committee's subject matter. At the White House Conference, the report was discussed by a panel consisting of members of the committee and several officials from the Johnson administration.

The article focuses on the American policy regarding the Vietnam crisis as of April 1965. The decision of carrying the war to North Vietnam amounts in effect to an admission of defeat. It has been obvious to anyone with an elementary knowledge of the situation that the war can only be won or lost in South Vietnam, and that aid from the North, while substantial, is not and has not been the decisive factor. According to experts, it is a guerrilla war, and the winning of such a war requires the allegiance, or at least the passive support, of the population.

The article discusses the peaceful and honorable resolution of the conflict in South Vietnam and Laos due to bold plan for land and water development. Many observers argued that the U.S. government cannot hope to settle the conflict or stabilize the two governments if it relies on military, political and economic assistance policy. However, the possible solution involving on the conflict is to neutralize the international agreement that would establish a peacekeeping force. The land and water development unites factions in four nations of Southeast Asia.

The article explores the extent to which the military can effect modernization among new nations, particularly in its political development. It is believed that military in new nations can intervene in domestic politics because they control the instruments of violence. It is also said that military have the maximum potential for involvement in domestic politics because its establishments are mainly infantry battalions which can be deployed in urban or rural areas. Examining the historical and economic factors which devised the military establishments is considered to be the initial step in an analysis of the military in political development.

The article focuses on the civil defense proposals in the U.S. Accordingly, it should prove useful to discuss here the wide range of questions civil defense raises concerning our national strategy and the arms interaction process. Perhaps the most far-reaching consequence of a civil defense program might be to pile a civil defense race upon the arms interaction process and thus open up, as it were a new cold war front in an area in which there has been something approaching tacit agreement. There would be an increased risk inherent in adding this new dimension to the arms race. A substantial civil defense program would be inordinately tension heightening because it would involve large scale community action.

The author reflects on the possible outcomes when a nuclear war arises between the U.S. and Soviet Union. He believes that the atomic bomb explosion during the second world war had triggered Soviet Union to magnify its own nuclear armaments. It is in his contention that the U.S. must project even a minimal deterrent strategy in response for a possible attack from the Russians. He suggests that the two nations must come to a cut-off agreement in the production of their bombs and rockets.

The article focuses on the security challenges faced by the armed forces of nations across the globe with the advent of the Atomic Age. According to military experts, unless the military professional more quickly grasps the true meaning of the quantum jump in the gradient of warfare, that has resulted from the thermonuclear-tipped ballistic missile and adapts to it, he is likely to become its victim rather than its beneficiary. World powers face the prospect of true strategic warfare which for the first time in history threatens their very existence in the most literal sense and not in the jingoistic sense in which war propagandists previously have used the expression.

The article comments on the article of Pierre M. Gallois about the legitimate argumentation which points that the U.S. seeks to reduce the areas of Western Europe. According to the author, Gallois directly points that modern weapons have outmoded the doctrine of collective security as the foundation of the non-communist world. He also notes that freedom and growth of Europe were important to the U.S. to merit the overseas deployment of the American army and for European economic and military assistance. He adds that Gallois fails to acknowledge that the changes were primarily logical responses to technological developments.

The article focuses on the views of the American people on issues concerning disarmanent. In a democratic governance, the selection of another party into power does not mean a corresponding change of its policies. However, it should reflect the desires of a large segment of the electorate. Consequently, in response to the demands of a large section of the public, there seems little doubt that a new administration should strive to expand its programs on disarmament and efforts directed towards reaching a test ban agreement.

The article presents a perspective of Great Britain on the Western Alliance deterrent power. The author analyzes that dilemman afflicting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He doubts on the capability of the U.S. to protect Western Europe from the formidable nuclear missile power of Soviet Union. The author suggests the first step towards the solution of the NATO problem would involve an examination of the realies of the situation within the Alliance as they exist today. Nevertheless, according to him, it would still be best if the diffusion of nuclear strategic power could be stopped by the negotiation of a system of arms controls which would give the West at least as much security as any practicable alternative can.

The article presents the perspective of the U.S. on the Western Alliance nuclear deterrent power. The explosion of a nuclear device by Frances had generated debate on the British capability to counter nuclear strike. Regarding the future of nuclear deterrence, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has planned to integrate Western deterrent power and disperse the power among members of the coalition. It can be seen that the difference of international perspectives and interests between the U.S. and European counties is an underlying factor which tend to weaken NATO. The author explains the different proposals for the solution of the problem encountered by NATO. He suggests that an allied deterrence would be the perfect solution to the dilemma that now confronts NATO.

The article presents the French perspective on the future of Western Alliance deterrent power. The author contends that the atomic age is not enough to end the history of diplomacy and war among nations. It also appeared that the problem related to atomic arms has been created by strategists and by the governments. France and Great Britain, for example, are spending to discover scientific and technical knowledge already possessed by the U.S. With the formation of the Atlantic Alliance, international opinions has seen this to constitute a relative protection for the European countries.

The article focuses on the need for a limited atomic war of Western powers specifically United States, Great Britain and Soviet Union. The weakness in the British and American policy for the strategic use or limitation of nuclear weapons has failed its plan for disarmament. The concept of limited war would diminished the risk of threat from nuclear destruction and contamination. Details about the proposed tactical and strategic use of nuclear weapons and practicability of the limited war are discussed.

The article focuses on the changes in the British defense policy that would include nuclear weapons such as hydrogen bomb in its policy. Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill was the main proponents of the changes of the policy. Churchill has expressed his concern about the dominance of Soviet Union and its communist satellites in the nuclear warfare. He has suggested a universal agreement of disarmament of nuclear weapons as a solution to the problem. The agreement on cessation of nuclear bomb test would decrease the threat from radioactive contamination.

The article focuses on the author's view on the practical defense system in the U.S. The author argues that the belief that war among the great powers has become impossible, or even if war came, the enemy could not hurt the country, or an effective civil defense is not practical are unsound and dangerous. He believes that the American defense system is not cheap and it is not guaranteed, nonetheless it makes conceivable that a recognizable American society could survive a nuclear war. Furthermore, the system would add considerably to the probability that such a war would not occur. However, it does not guarantee that there will be no war.

The article discusses the possible consequences on the continuance of inventing nuclear weapons by the superpower nations. Each of this nation's aim focuses on national security. The system of thinking based on security through military dominance has been their core strategy in achieving world peace. However, this mode of analysis is becoming obsolete and is far more positively dangerous in that it will bring about catastrophic damages to the humanity. At a certain point, where tests of thermonuclear weapons in the Pacific and Siberia dramatized this transition. Understandably, accidents and misunderstandings are always a possibility should this misadventure continues, thus, the term stalemate.

The article examines the basic assumptions underlying official policy of the U.S. on air defense for atomic war. The official American doctrine on air power, which also informs British policy, assigns an overwhelming proportion of resources available for air power to the strategic air force. A strong Strategic Air Command is to endow the U.S. with the capacity for instant and massive destruction of Soviet cities and industries and for blunting Russian air power, and this weapon is to keep aggression from getting started. Whatever merits this doctrine could claim so long as the U.S. enjoyed a monopoly of, or decisive lead in the development of atomic bombs, it remains the mainstay of policy .

The article focuses on the effects of the Russian atomic explosion of 1949 on the foreign policies of the U.S. that deal with the country's political and military strategies. It is expected that the hydrogen bombing in Russia and the defection of China has an impact on the military and political policies of the U.S. but it has been observed that the government have not dealt to either of these world-shaking events and changed their political and military implications. It was observed that the U.S. military strength in the international scene rely on the quantitative superiority in atomic weapons while its political strength depends on its implemented policies.

The article reports developments related to nuclear weapons in 1954. The testing of the first new series of weapons have taken place at the Atomic Energy Commission's (AEC) Pacific Proving Ground last March 1. The British defense plans are allegedly based on the premise that a prolonged period of tension is more likely now than a major war on a particular date. An amount of $44 million for the construction of power reactor was reportedly asked by the AEC in fiscal 1955.

The article presents a reprint of the article "For a Continental Defense," by James R. Killian, Jr. and A. G. Hill , which appeared in the November 1953 issue of "The Atlantic Monthly." It discusses the major tasks related to military responsibility including the capability to mount a counterattack on the enemy, control of high seas, defense of the North America and others.

The article focuses on the policies concerning the basic relation of research to defense and military readiness in the U.S. According to experts and analysts, it has become difficult to demonstrate that the support of basic science needs attention, when the total annual expenditure for research and development is more than three times as great as it was during the nineteen-forties. In relation to this, the Federal government established the National Science Foundation was established, which was commissioned to develop a national policy in science and supporting basic research and education in the sciences.

The author presents a framework of principles designed to protect and preserve both national security and the civil liberties on which the American democracy is grounded. The first principle deals with words of Charles E. Merrian, "Security without Militarism." The second principle centers on the idea that secrecy is the opponent of both science and democracy. He further explains that secrecy not only destroys the freedom of intellectual life but also prevents the open and responsible management of the affairs of a democratic state. The third principle suggests that National Security should not require suppression of freedom of political and economic thought as well as freedom of association.

The article reports on what the U.S. Navy thinks on naval problems posed by the atomic bomb. Those interviewed include Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Chief of Naval Operations, and senior naval officers designated by him. The Navy's planning in respect to changes brought by the atomic bomb must envisage the needs of three different situations: police functions requiring weapons of precision during peacetime, a war in which the atomic bomb is either not used at all or introduced only substantially after the onset of hostilities, and a war where atomic bombs are available in substantial numbers to both sides.