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Do not discriminate against older persons. It seems like a simple mandate. However, the statute creating that mandate, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), has been anything but simple to implement. The details of the ADEA--who can bring a claim, and what kind of claim they can bring--have been extensively litigated since its inception. In 2016, the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, decided that an employer could discriminate against older applicants by having a policy of not hiring people who have been out of college for a certain number of years, or who have a certain number of years of work experience. This has created a rift within that circuit and is a departure from the governing agency's interpretation. This Comment explores the case law and legislative history leading up to the critical Eleventh Circuit case, Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., which addresses the following question: can applicants for employment bring disparate impact claims under the ADEA? This Comment argues that the Supreme Court should hold that the ADEA does cover applicants for employment making disparate impact claims and that arbitrary agebased hiring policies are discriminatory. Regardless of any Supreme Court decision on the question, this Comment also suggests that Congress should amend the ADEA to include language that would allow applicants for employment to bring disparate impact claims, bringing the ADEA in line with Title VII. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents legal developments in marketing with particular focus on the regulation of unfair competition. One of the developments describes the case of the United States v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., which showed that billboard ads for cigarettes that display the government's cautionary warning in letters two inches high are not automatically in compliance with a consent order from the U.S. Federal Trade Commission requiring that letters must not be less than two inches high. Another development discusses the fact that the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) does not fully preempt Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act since it does not immunize credit reporters from the kinds of unfair and deceptive practices that the FCRA does not address.

The article discusses the legal aspects of electronic cigarettes (e-cigarettes) in America in the wake of the 1998 Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) between 46 American states, five U.S. territories, the District of Columbia, and four cigarette manufacturing firms including R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. and Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. Legal restrictions on cigarette advertisements are addressed, along with tort liability claims and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.

The article offers information on decision of the judicial decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in cases of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA and American Meat Institute v. USDA, in which the Court addressed constitutionality of laws regulating the government-mandated health warnings in the U.S. It discusses the commercial speech jurisprudence under the First Amendment protection with reference to ruling in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel case.

In 2010, the Food and Drug Administration passed a rule revising compelled disclaimers on tobacco products pursuant to the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act. The rule required that tobacco warnings include something new: all tobacco products now had to bear one of nine graphic images to accompany the text. Tobacco companies filed suit contesting the constitutionality of the rule, arguing that the government violated their right to free commercial speech by compelling disclosure of the graphic content. Yet First Amendment jurisprudence lacks a doctrinally consistent standard for reviewing such compelled disclosures. Courts' analyses typically depend on whether the regulation compels or restricts speech, how far that regulation extends, and why the government chose to regulate in the first place. This Note seeks to articulate a coherent standard--a disclosure-focused approach--for reviewing compelled commercial speech under the First Amendment. Under this disclosure-focused approach, courts would adopt a lenient standard of review for compelled disclosures of factual, uncontroversial information while reserving more exacting scrutiny for restricted speech or compelled ideological disclosures. This approach centers on the structure and content of the regulation rather than the governmental motive. Accordingly, the disclosure-focused approach aligns with the goal of commercial speech protection--namely, maximizing the information available to consumers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the constitutionality of American graphic-image cigarette warning labels and other commercial disclosure requirements as of November 2013. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit's ruling in the commercial speech-related case R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA is addressed, along with the marketplace of ideas theory and the First Amendment to the nation's Constitution. Deaths from cigarette smoking in the U.S. are examined.

The article focuses on judicial review of the case R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA by the U.S Supreme Court. Topics discussed include the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (FSPTCA), the Graphic Warning Rule enacted by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration that requires tobacco manufacturers to use graphic warning labels on cigarette packages, and the case Central Hudson Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.

The article discusses the authority of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to regulate tobacco products as of August 2013, focusing on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia's ruling in the case R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA which determined that packaging-related graphic image warnings violate freedom of speech rights under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act and cigarette-related laws are assessed.

The article discusses the 2012 U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit case R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Administration (FDA) which deals with American constitutional law, the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and compelled commercial speech in relation to cigarette packaging. The strict scrutiny judicial standard of review is mentioned, along with an examination of the government's interest in discouraging cigarette smoking.

The article discusses the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's implementation of several changes to cigarette warning labels as of July 2012, including information on the U.S. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, lung cancer prevention, and the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia's ruling on graphic label requirements in a case involving the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company Company. Commercial speech and the First Amendment to the nation's Constitution are also examined.

Contemporary health care reformers, like those who promoted the failed Clinton era plan, face opposition from multiple corporate interests. However, scant literature has examined how relationships between corporations and other stakeholders, such as think tanks and advocacy groups, shape health care reform debate. We show how the 2 biggest US tobacco companies, Philip Morris and RJ Reynolds, and their trade association coordinated in mobilizing ideologically diverse constituencies to help defeat the Clinton plan. Unwittingly perhaps, some reform supporters advanced the tobacco industry's public relations blitz, contributing to perceptions of public opposition to the plan. As the current reform debate unfolds, this case highlights the importance of funding transparency for interpreting the activities of think tanks, advocacy groups, and "grassroots" movements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

OBJECTIVE: The aim of the present work was to understand why and how RJ Reynolds and other tobacco companies have marketed tobacco products to young adult social trendsetting consumers (termed ‘hipsters’) to recruit trendsetters and average consumers to smoke. METHODS: Analysis of tobacco industry documents and industry marketing materials. RESULTS: Since 1995, RJ Reynolds developed its marketing campaigns to better suit the lifestyle, image identity and attitudes of hip trendsetters (so-called ‘hipsters’), and Camel's brand identity actively shifted to more closely convey the hipster persona. Camel emphasised in-venue events such as promotional music tours to link the brand and smoking to activities and symbols appealing to hipsters and their emulating masses. CONCLUSIONS: To reach this targeted and socially valuable trend-setting population, public health advocates must tap into hipster psychology and expose to the targeted community the tobacco company's efforts to infiltrate the hipster community to turn hipsters into tobacco-using role models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

CONTEXT: The 1998 Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) restricted tobacco industry advertising practices that targeted teens. OBJECTIVE: To assess whether cigarette-advertising campaigns conducted after the MSA continue to influence smoking among adolescents. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS: Participants were a national longitudinal cohort of 1036 adolescents (baseline age: 10-13 years) enrolled in a parenting study. Between 2003 and 2008, 5 sequential telephone interviews were conducted, including the participant's report of brand of "favorite" cigarette advertisement. The fifth interview was conducted after the start of RJ Reynolds' innovative "Camel No. 9" advertising campaign in 2007. Smoking outcome reported from the fifth survey. RESULTS: The response rate through the fifth survey was 71.8%. Teenagers who reported any favorite cigarette ad at baseline (mean age: 11.7 years) were 50% more likely to have smoked by the fifth interview (adjusted odds ratio: 1.5 [95% confidence interval: 1.0-2.31). For boys, the proportion with a favorite ad was stable across all 5 surveys, as it was for girls across the first 4 surveys. However, after the start of the Camel No.9 advertising campaign,the proportion of girls who reported a favorite ad increased by 10 percentage points, to 44%. The Camel brand accounted almost entirely for this increase, and the proportion of each genderthat nominated the Marlboro brand remained relatively stable. CONCLUSIONS: After the MSA, adolescents continued to be responsive to cigarette advertising, and those who were responsive were more likely to start smoking. Recent RJ Reynolds advertising may be effectively targeting adolescent girls. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: To explore viral marketing strategies for Eclipse cigarettes used by the RJ Reynolds Company (Winston-Salem, North Carolina, USA). Methods: Analysis of previously secret tobacco industry documents and multimedia materials. Results: The failure of RJ Reynolds' (RJR) 1988 "smokeless" cigarette, Premier, was in part due to widespread bad word of mouth about the product's flavour, quality and difficulty of use. In 1994 RJR introduced an updated version of Premier, the ostensibly "reduced risk" Eclipse cigarette. RJR developed viral marketing channels to promote Eclipse using (1) exploratory interviews to motivate consumers to spread the word about Eclipse prior to market release, (2) promotional videos featuring positive feedback from test group participants to portray majority consensus among triers, (3) "Tupperware"-like parties for Eclipse where participants received samples to pass around in their social circles and (4) the Eclipse website's bulletin board as a forum for potential users to discuss the brand in their own words. These strategies targeted the brand's likeliest adopters, recruited informal and credible representatives of the product unaffiliated with RJR, and controlled the information spread about the product. Conclusions: Viral marketing techniques may be particularly useful to promote new tobacco products such as Eclipse that have limited appeal and need a highly motivated audience of early adopters and acceptors. Such techniques help evade the mass rejection that could follow mass promotion, circumvent marketing restrictions, and allow tobacco companies to benefit from health claims made by consumers. Cigarette manufacturers must be held accountable for perceived health benefits encouraged by all promotional activities including viral marketing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines two case studies that illustrate how two different types of actors were involved in a cigarette smuggling-terror nexus. The first case examines R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company's alleged deliberate sales of its products in lraq in contravention of the UN embargo and U.S. law. R.J. Reynolds used criminal actors as suppliers and provided financial compensation to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a recognized terrorist organization, and Uday Hussein (Saddam Hussein's son) to facilitate this transport. The second case examines a Hezbollah cell operating out of Charlotte, North Carolina. The cell trafficked cigarettes from North Carolina to Michigan, reaping significant profits by exploiting the difference in cigarette tax rates between the two states. The two case studies revealed that terrorist financing occurs in the United States and as a result of the actions of a terrorist support cell and a U.S.-based company. In both cases, a legitimate commodity was used for illicit purposes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the role litigation may play in addressing the entrance of cigarette companies, such as Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds, into the market of smokeless tobacco in the U.S. Particular focus is given on health effects and harm reduction of tobacco, legal issues raised by cigarette companies, and the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) which was signed in 1998.

Present-day consumption of little cigars rivals that of the early 1970s when sales of little cigars boomed. This boom was largely attributed to RJ Reynolds, and documents reveal how and why they became a powerful force in little cigar sales. RJ Reynolds designed a little cigar, Winchesters, for cigarette smokers and produced one as close to a cigarette as legally possible. Initially, RJ Reynolds intended to capitalize on the cigarette advertising broadcast ban, but the price and tax structure was more critical to Winchester's success. Today, the tobacco industry is fighting again to sustain its unique application of federal definitions for little cigars. Regulatory efforts are needed to close taxation loopholes for the little cigar. (Am J Public Health. 2007;97:1368-1375. doi:10.2105/AJPH.2006.101063) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the ruling handed down by the Court of Justice on the case R.J. Reynolds Tobacco and Others v. Commission on September 12, 2006. The case addresses the issue of admissibility in actions for annulment initiated by private parties. Specifically, it focuses on the condition that the challenged measure must entail binding legal effects capable of altering the legal position of the applicants. The ruling of the Court was an appeal against the decision of the Court of First Instance in Philip Morris and Others v. Commission. That ruling found the applications brought against the Commission's decision to bring proceedings in the U.S. courts inadmissible.

The article discusses the R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. versus Shewry case which focuses on the banning of cigarette advertising filed in California. It provides an overview on the Tobacco Tax and Health Protection Act of 1998, the Tobacco Control Program and the Tobacco Education Media Campaign (TEMC). The Ninth Circuit Court ruled that the First Amendment allows the government to use funds from taxes to preserve its policies. It summarizes the influence of TEMC on U.S. legislators.

We investigated how industries use front groups to combat public health measures by analyzing tobacco industry documents, contemporaneous media reports, journal articles, and press releases regarding "Get Government Off Our Back," a coalition created by the tobacco industry. RJ Reynolds created Get Government Oft Our Back in 1994 to fight federal regulation of tobacco. By keeping its involvement secret, RJ Reynolds was able to draw public and legislative support and to avoid the tobacco industry reputation for misrepresenting evidence. The tobacco industry is not unique in its creation of such groups. Research on organizational background and funding could identify other industry front groups. Those who seek to establish measures to protect public health should be prepared to counter the argument that government should not regulate private behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Features the radio scripts from the files of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. in the U.S. from 1948 to 1959. Promotion of its cigarette brands over the radio; Role of author Emily Post in marketing cigarettes; Radio hosts featured in the scripts.

Eclipse is a cigarette that primarily heats rather than burns tobacco. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (RJRT) has previously reported the results of in vitro toxicity studies comparing Eclipse with University of Kentucky 1R5F and 1R4F reference cigarettes. To characterize the differences between Eclipse and very low yielding/ultra low-“tar” (vULT) tobacco-burning cigarettes, RJRT conducted a comparative evaluation of the genotoxicity and cytotoxicity of mainstream cigarette smoke condensate (CSC) from Eclipse and three vULT tobacco-burning cigarettes (Now 83 Box, Merit Ultima and Carlton Soft Pack) as well as the leading ultra low-“tar” (ULT) brandstyle (Marlboro Ultra Lights) under four smoking regimens: (1) FTC—35 ml puff volume every 60 s for a 2 s duration (35/60/2); (2) 50/30/2, 0% vents blocked; (3) Massachusetts—45/30/2, 50% vents blocked; (4) Canadian—55/30/2, 100% vents blocked. Ames testing indicated that Eclipse CSC was less (P<0.05) mutagenic than CSC from the four cigarettes under all smoking regimens when compared on a revertants per mg Total Particulate Matter (TPM) basis. When mutagenicity was calculated on a revertants per cigarette basis the mutagenicity of Eclipse CSC was lower (P<0.05) than the mutagenicity of Merit Ultima, Carlton Soft Pack, and Marlboro Ultra Lights, regardless of the puffing regimen. On a per cigarette basis, the calculated mutagenicity of Eclipse was higher (P<0.05) than Now 83 Box cigarettes in the FTC and 50/30/2 regimens but lower (P<0.05) in the Massachusetts and Canadian regimens. Eclipse CSC was less (P<0.05) cytotoxic as measured in the neutral red assay (based on EC50 values—μg TPM/ml media) than the CSC from the four test cigarettes regardless of the regimen used. Collectively, these data demonstrate that the toxicity of CSC from Eclipse is significantly reduced relative to the activity of CSC from the tested vULT cigarettes and the Marlboro Ultra Lights. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

In the fall of 1995, R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company engaged in a public relations advertising campaign that opposed restrictions on tobacco advertising proposed by President Clinton. This essay argues that in spite of the presence of creative and varied Burkean identification appeals in the messages of the RJR campaign, the campaign was fatally flawed by illegitimate presumptions of similarity and an oxymoron that violated Burke's "principle of the oxymoron." The essay argues that this transcendent principle is unidirectional; it must offer a rise in social status for it to provide a motive for identification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objectives. The purpose of this study was to describe RJ Reynolds (RJR) Tobacco Company's strategy for targeting African Americans, as revealed in tobacco industry documents and magazine advertisements. Methods. The authors searched industry documents to determine RJR's strategies and analyzed magazine advertising during 2 periods: the time of the launch of the company's Uptown cigarette (1989-1990) and a decade later (1999-2000). Results. RJR's efforts to target the African American market segment existed before and after Uptown, and the company's strategy was largely implemented via other RJR brands. Advertisements featured mentholated cigarettes, fantasy/escape, expensive objects, and nightlife. Conclusions. To help all populations become tobacco-free, tobacco control practitioners must understand and counter tobacco industry strategies. (Am J Public Health. 2003:93:822-827) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: To examine the plausibility of health claims for Eclipse, a novel smoking article being marketed by the RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co. (RJR) as potentially reducing the risk of cancer and other diseases compared to conventional cigarettes. Data sources: A company product website (www.eclipse.rjrt.com) summarising scientific studies of various versions of Eclipse, and the published review of these studies by an expert panel convened by RJR, an independent study comparing the smoke yields of major carcinogens from Eclipse and two low yield "ultralight" brands (Now and Canton), and an analysis of the levels of these compounds in Eclipse and Premier (its predecessor) over time. Analysis: The overall doses and effects of toxins in the aerosol from Eclipse are smaller than those from most conventional cigarettes on a per mg basis. However, two tests that compared Eclipse on a per cigarette basis revealed that Eclipse was as or more toxic than an ultralight cigarette. Studies show that consumers smoke Eclipse (like they do cigarettes) at puff volumes and puff frequencies far higher than those used for the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) test. RJR's test results, which are based on aerosols generated under FTC conditions, may not reflect actual human dosing, since the operating temperature of Eclipse is highly dependent on these puffing parameters. Even under FTC/International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standard measures, Eclipse smoke carcinogen yields were higher than Now, but similar to Canton. The yields of carcinogens from Premier and different versions of Eclipse have increased overtime. Furthermore, the human studies reviewed by the RJR expert panel do not offer compelling evidence of reduced harm, as they have not been conducted in smokers who have adopted Eclipse. Conclusion: There is as yet unsatisfactory evidence that Eclipse is less harmful than conventional cigarettes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mongoven Biscoe & Duchin, a specialist firm based in Washington DC, has honed a niche as expert intelligence gatherers, helping tobacco companies such as Philip Morris and RJ Reynolds to damage tobacco control efforts, including the WHO's Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is based on the 1998 testimony the author provided for In the Matter of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company as an expert witness for the Federal Trade Commission. After providing an overview of the Joe Camel campaign and the Federal Trade Commission's investigation of it, the author considers consumer protection issues that provide a perspective for assessing Reynolds's acts and practices. He then focuses on an analysis of Reynolds' s competitive position in the cigarette marketplace and why that was likely to influence subsequent marketing strategy and the development of the Joe Camel campaign. The author next discusses, the campaign at some length before returning to an explicit assessment of the campaign and the types of criteria that might be adopted for this purpose. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the ruling of the New Jersey Supreme Court on a product liability case filed against cigarette company R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. Facts of the case; Reasons behind the ruling of the court; Arguments presented by the plaintiff and defendant.

Presents an account of the author's legal battle against the R.J. Reynolds (RJR) Tobacco Co. regarding his research findings on the effect of cigarette advertising on teenagers. Details on the subpoena; Resolution adopted by the Medical College of Georgia (MCG) faculty senate; Excerpts from the American Association of University Professors's (AAUP) deposition on the case.

Reports that the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is considering the recommendation of its staff to sue R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. for enticing minors to smoke with its "Joe Camel" promotional campaign. Controversy over the legal issue of whether it is unfair to promote cigarettes to children too young to legally buy them; Description of the potential legal issues related to the advertising community; Need for the FTC to issue its complaint and hold trial to determine the factual question of whether the Joe Camel campaign actually targets minors.

Comments on talks in the U.S. about legislation to curtail tobacco advertising in light of growing tobacco use among teenagers. Increase in market share for R.J. Reynold's Camel brand cigarettes; Immense appeal of the brand mascot, Old Joe Camel, to teens; Advertising agency representatives' arguments against any imposition of unconstitutional restrictions on advertising.