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Early in his 1993 book Tarrying with the Negative, Slavoj Žižek asks contemporary philosophy to "repeat the Kantian gesture." The implication is that (much like Plato did with the Sophists) Kant accepted the critique of metaphysics made by David Hume, affirming it in an unexpected positive sense. The analogous gesture for a would-be Kant in our time would be to accept deconstruction's insistence on the contingency of meaning while treating contingency not as a failing, but as the very stuff of truth itself. For Žižek this is precisely what Jacques Lacan has already done, and this makes Lacan the pivotal thinker of our era. Yet as we follow Žižek's pursuit of this theme in his recent article "The Parallax of Ontology" (an extract from his book Sex and the Failed Absolute), we catch sight of a new direction in Žižek's thinking. His previous model of parallax in terms of two separate and irreconcilable realities seems to shift toward a new emphasis on the differential becoming of the two, rather than their paradoxical co-existence. A principis del seu llibre de 1993 Tarrying with the negative, Slavoj Žižek demana a la filosofia contemporània que «repeteixi el gest kantià». La implicació és que Kant (com va fer Plató amb els sofistes) va acceptar la crítica de la metafísica feta per David Hume afirmant-la en un sentit positiu inesperat. El gest anàleg per a un aspirant a Kant en la nostra època seria acceptar la insistència de la desconstrucció en la contingència del sentit mentre tracta la contingència no pas com un fracàs, sinó com la mateixa matèria de la veritat. Per a Žižek, això és precisament el que ja ha fet Jacques Lacan, i això fa de Lacan el pensador fonamental de la nostra època. No obstant això, mentre seguim la recerca d'aquest tema per part de Žižek en el seu recent article «The parallax of ontology » (un extracte del seu llibre Sex and the failed absolute), veiem una nova direcció en el pensament de Žižek. El seu model anterior de paral·laxi en termes de dues realitats separades i irreconciliables sembla desplaçar-se cap a un nou èmfasi en l'esdevenir diferencial de les dues més que en la seva paradoxal coexistència. Al principio de su libro de 1993 Tarrying with the negative, Slavoj Žižek pide a la filosofía contemporánea que «repita el gesto kantiano». La implicación es que Kant (como hizo Platón con los sofistas) aceptó la crítica de la metafísica hecha por David Hume al afirmarla en un sentido positivo inesperado. El gesto análogo para un aspirante a Kant en nuestro tiempo sería aceptar la insistencia de la deconstrucción en la contingencia del significado mientras trata la contingencia no como un defecto, sino como la sustancia misma de la verdad. Para Žižek, esto es precisamente lo que Jacques Lacan ya ha hecho, y esto convierte a Lacan en el pensador fundamental de nuestra era. Sin embargo, a medida que seguimos la búsqueda de Žižek de este tema en su reciente artículo «The parallax of ontology» (un extracto de su libro Sex and the failed absolute), vislumbramos una nueva dirección en el pensamiento de Žižek. Su modelo anterior de paralaje en términos de dos realidades separadas e irreconciliables parece cambiar hacia un nuevo énfasis en el devenir diferencial de las dos en lugar de su coexistencia paradójica.

This article intends to indicate a propositional use of the notion of image of thought, present in the work Diferença and Repetição by Gilles Deleuze, because according to this reference, repetition is typical of asserting itself, allowing the emergence of what differs. On the other hand, the notion of image of thought occurs in Deleuze's philosophy on three occasions, in the works Nietzsche and Philosophy, Proust and the Signs and in Difference and Repetition and in these works, this perspective does not always coincide, moving from a more critical use for more positive use. In strategic terms and methodological, it is precisely this last approach, of a constructive nature, that we will base ourselves on. The discussion revolves around an affirmative image of thought in philosophy in the face of difference in the act of repetition, which means that difference in philosophy would bring with it, in its movement, an internal process of differentiation, whose power repeats it, but not of the same way, if not transmuting it into other possibilities of what it means to think. Este artigo tem a intenção indicar um uso propositivo da noção de imagem de pensamento presente na obra Diferença e repetição de Gilles Deleuze, pois de acordo com esta referência, é típico da repetição afirmar-se, permitindo a emergência do que difere. De outro modo, a noção de imagem do pensamento ocorre na filosofia de Deleuze em três ocasiões, nas obras Nietzsche e a filosofia, Proust e os signos e em Diferença e repetição e nestas obras, nem sempre esta perspectiva coincide, deslocando-se de um uso mais crítico para um uso mais positivo. Em termos estratégicos e metodológicos, é justamente sobre este último enfoque, de caráter construtivo, em que nos apoiaremos. A discussão gira em torno de uma imagem afirmativa do pensamento em filosofia face à diferença no ato da repetição, o que significa que a diferença em filosofia traria consigo, em seu movimento, um processo interno de diferenciação, cuja potência a repete, mas não da mesma forma, senão transmutando-a em outra possibilidade do que significa pensar.

This article is configured as an attempt to present the perspective of thought present in the proposal of the dramatization method by Gilles Deleuze, which is done by a positive valuation of the idea of ​​difference and simulacrum. Therefore, we will present the Platonic considerations around the passage of time and the permanence, present in the theory of forms, that support the search for truth in the representative thought method, as well the criticisms of this model, made by the philosopher Gilles Deleuze under discussion contained in the appendix of the work “Logic of the sense” (1969), with its proposal of to reverse the Platonism. Then, we bring the text “The dramatization method” (1967) to extract from it the presentation of a new way of thinking that, based on the proposal of valuation the pure difference, breaks with a will to truth based on transcendent and moral foundations, and presents a condition of thought immanent to existence, valuing the body, its encounters and its experiences., Este artículo se configura como un intento de presentar la perspectiva del pensamiento presente en la propuesta del método de dramatización de Gilles Deleuze, que se realiza mediante una valoración positiva de la idea de diferencia y simulacro. Para ello, presentaremos las consideraciones platónicas en torno al paso del tiempo y la permanencia, presentes en la teoría de las formas, que sustentan la búsqueda de la verdad en el método de pensamiento representativo, así como las críticas a este modelo, realizadas por el filósofo Gilles Deleuze en una discusión contenida en el apéndice de la obra “Lógica del sentido” (1969), con su propuesta para revertir el platonismo. A continuación, traeremos el texto “El método de la dramatización” (1967) para extraer de él la presentación de una nueva forma de pensar que, a partir de la propuesta de valorar la pura diferencia, rompe con una voluntad de verdad fundada en fundamentos trascendentes y morales y presenta una condición de pensamiento inmanente a la existencia, valorando el cuerpo, sus encuentros y sus vivencias., Este artigo se configura como uma tentativa de apresentar a perspectiva do pensar subjacente à proposta do método de dramatização de Gilles Deleuze, que se faz por uma valoração positiva da ideia de diferença e do simulacro. Para tanto, apresentaremos, rapidamente, as considerações platônicas em torno da passagem do tempo e da permanência, atreladas à teoria das formas que sustentam a busca pela verdade no método do pensamento representativo, bem como as críticas a esse modelo, realizadas pelo filósofo Gilles Deleuze em discussão entre simulacro e filosofia antiga, contida no apêndice da obra “Lógica do sentido” (1969), com sua proposta de reversão do platonismo para, então, adentrarmos no texto “O método de dramatização” (1967) e, por conseguinte, extrair dele a apresentação de uma nova forma de pensar que, a partir da proposta de valorização da diferença pura, rompe com uma vontade de verdade pautada em fundamentos transcendentes e morais e apresenta uma condição de pensamento imanente à existência, valorando o corpo, seus encontros e suas experimentações.

EnglishDeleuzian criticisms of representational thinking converge on the understanding of thought as a recognitive process. To recognize is to think. Among all the problems concerning such a model of thought, there is a fundamental obstacle to recognition: it does not recognize what does not fit into its previously established premises and which delimit the linearity of correct thinking. Thus, as Deleuze warns us, the difference has never been thought for itself. In such a notion, the difference is just an opposition to the equal. In one of his dialogues with the philosophical tradition, the French thinker found a punctual gap in the thinking of the Greek philosopher Aristotle where difference is brought up. A moment when the difference emerged and was almost considered by itself, and which was called "the happy Greek moment" by Deleuze. It is about Aristotelian thought of difference, that Greek moment and the conceptual criticism that Deleuze conducts to compose his theory that the article will deal with. portuguesAs criticas deleuzianas ao pensamento representacional convergem para o entendimento do pensamento como um processo recognitivo. Reconhecer e pensar. Entre todos os problemas concernentes a tal modelo de pensamento, ha um empecilho fundamental na recognicao: ela nao reconhece aquilo que nao cabe em suas premissas previamente estabelecidas e que delimitam a linearidade de um pensamento correto. Assim sendo, a diferenca, nos alerta Deleuze, nunca chegou a ser pensada por si mesma. Nessa nocao a diferenca e apenas uma oposicao ao igual. Em um dos seus dialogos com a tradicao filosofica, o pensador frances encontrou uma rachadura pontual que tratou a diferenca no pensamento do filosofo grego Aristoteles. Um momento em que a diferenca emergiu e quase foi considerada por si mesma. Ocasiao que Deleuze chamou de “O feliz momento Grego”. E sobre o pensamento aristotelico da diferenca, o tal momento grego e a critica conceitual que Deleuze realiza para compor sua teoria que o artigo ira tratar.

İlkçağ doğa filozoflarının ele aldığı temel problemlerden birisi “evrenin ilk nedeni nedir?” şeklinde özetleyebileceğimiz kozmogonik sorunun üzerine inşa edilmiştir. Bununla birlikte, en az bunun kadar önemli olan ikinci temel soru ontolojiktir ve bu soruyu şu şekilde formülleştirmek gerekir: “Evren değiştiği halde nasıl özdeşliğini korur?” Bu iki soru her ne kadar pratikte iç içe geçmiş ve birbirlerinden yalıtılarak yanıtlanamıyor olsalar da doğa filozoflarının felsefi tartışmalarının arka planını yetkin biçimde analiz etmek için prensipte birbirlerinden ayrılmalıdır. Bu makale, bir yandan Herakleitos dışındaki Parmenides-öncesi doğa filozoflarının özdeşlik ile değişim arasındaki bu ontolojik gerilimin zorunlu olarak mantıksal bir çelişkiye yol açmadığını ve bu gerilimi kendisine çözümleyebileceğimiz çelişkisiz bir varlık katmanı olduğunu öne sürdüklerini göstermeyi amaçlamaktadır. Makalenin diğer bir amacı, Herakleitos’un bu ontolojik probleme getirdiği çözümle çelişkiden kaçınmak yerine onu varlığın temel yasası kılmak yoluyla alternatif bir özdeşlik anlayışı geliştirdiğini ortaya koymaktır: Bu alternatif özdeşlik anlayışı, çelişkiyi özdeşlikle bağdaşır kılarak onu kendi özsel unsuru olarak içine almasıyla Herakleitos’u diğer doğa filozoflarından kökten biçimde ayırır., While one of the basic problems worked out by ancient natural philosophers is based on the cosmogonial question “what is the first cause of the universe?” another basic problem as important, at least, as the first one, is based on an ontological one and can be formulated as “how does the universe preserve its identity while changing?” Although these two questions are practically intertwined and cannot be answered in isolation from one another, they should be distinguished in principle for a proper analysis of the context of the philosophical debates among natural philosophers. This paper aims to show that with the exception of Heraclitus, natural philosophers before Parmenides proclaim that the identity-change tension does not necessarily lead to a logical contradiction and there is a deeper realm of being by means of which this tension can be resolved. Heraclitus’ solution, on the other hand, differs from that of others radically in that he does not try to avoid contradiction, but by making it into a basic law of being, he develops an alternative conception of identity which allows contradiction to be a basic compotent of it.

El objetivo del presente artículo consiste en investigar y discutir las nociones de diferencia y representación en Emmanuel Levinas y Gilles Deleuze, articulando dichas nociones con un proyecto de extensión universitaria, un taller de música en el autismo. La metodología utilizada es la revisión no sistemática de la literatura, mediante la selección de las obras Totalidad e Infinito y Entre Nosotros – ensayos sobre la alteridad de Levinas, y “El concepto de diferencia en Bergson” y Diferencia y repetición de Deleuze, además de referencias secundarias. Las principales articulaciones de la investigación realizada con el Proyecto consisten en aspectos como la adquisición de responsabilidad del niño autista, a través de relaciones asimétricas, que se dan por vía de la sensibilidad, antes de figurarse cualquier representación, no totalizando la alteridad y manteniendo, al mismo tiempo , su diferencia radical. Además, se hace énfasis en trabajar con la diferencia de cada niño, más allá de su identidad diagnóstica, entendiéndose que todos los participantes se encontraban en procesos únicos de diferenciación y que algunas diferencias no son más privilegiadas que otras, que tales jerarquías son determinadas por relaciones de poder. Otro aporte de esta articulación es el énfasis en los flujos afectivos intensivos de los niños y la construcción de relaciones de afectación mutua, que aumentan la circulación del poder vital en cada uno. Finalmente, el Proyecto se ratifica como una propuesta de clínica, estética, ética y una política de la diferencia, alternativa a las prácticas hegemónicas en el autismo en la contemporaneidad. O objetivo do presente artigo consiste em investigar e discutir as noções de diferença e representação em Emmanuel Lévinas e Gilles Deleuze, articulando tais noções com um projeto de extensão universitária, um trabalho com música no autismo. A metodologia utilizada é a revisão não sistemática da literatura, por meio da seleção das obras Totalidade e Infinito e Entre Nós, de Lévinas, e A concepção da diferença em Bergson e Diferença e Repetição, de Deleuze, além de referências secundárias. As principais articulações da investigação realizada com o Projeto consistem em aspectos como a tomada de responsabilidade pela criança autista, por meio de relações assimétricas, que se dão pela via da sensibilidade, aquém de qualquer representação, não totalizando a alteridade e mantendo, ao mesmo tempo, sua diferença radical. Além disto, há a ênfase no trabalho à diferença de cada criança, para além de sua identidade diagnóstica, entendendo-se que todos os participantes encontram-se em processos únicos de diferenciação e que algumas diferenças não são mais privilegiadas que outras, que tais hierarquias são determinadas por relações de poder. Outra contribuição desta articulação se dá na ênfase aos fluxos afetivos intensivos das crianças e à construção de relações de afetação mútua, que aumentam a circulação da potência de vida em cada uma delas. Ratifica-se, por fim, o Projeto como uma proposta para uma clínica, estética, ética e uma política da diferença, alternativa às práticas hegemônicas no autismo na contemporaneidade. The aim of this article is to investigate and discuss the notions of difference and representation in Emmanuel Levinas and Gilles Deleuze, articulating such notions through the example of a university extension project involving the formation of a musical ensemble composed of autistic children. Our research involved a review of four major philosophical works—Emmanuel Levinas’ Totality and Infinity; Among Us: Essays On Alterity; and “The Concept Of Difference In Bergson”; and Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition--in addition to secondary references. The main articulations of the investigation carried out in the project consist of aspects such as: taking responsibility for the autistic child through cultivating asymmetrical relationships, a process that takes place through sensibility, below any representation; and not totalizing the alterity involved while maintaining, at the same time, its radical difference. In addition, there is an emphasis in the work on the difference of each child, beyond his or her diagnostic identity, understanding that all participants are undergoing unique processes of differentiation, and that some differences are not more privileged than others, in that that such hierarchies are determined by power relations. Another contribution of this research is the emphasis on the intensive affective flows of children, and the construction of relationships of mutual affection, which increases the circulation of vital energy in each one. Finally, the results of the project are offered as guidelines for clinical practice, and for the cultivation of a politics of difference, as an alternative to hegemonic practices in autism studies in contemporary times.

Un virage autocritique dans l’œuvre d’Althusser ? Les critiques adressées à la lecture althussérienne de Marx furent nombreuses et prirent des formes différentes. Toutefois, qu’il s’agisse des critiques conçues de l’intérieur du PCF, de celles de ses anciens élèves, ou de ses adversaires politiques, elles s’accordent sur le reproche de théoricisme. Il est aisé de comprendre que les critiques convergent sur ce point : elles s’autorisent d’Althusser lui-même et de l’autocritique qu’il engage, d...

C’est au travers d’une théorie de la lecture qu’Althusser développe une approche nouvelle de la matérialité de l’histoire, qui pose les bases d’une épistémologie à partir de laquelle il nous semble désormais possible de saisir la constitution conceptuelle et discursive de la matérialité de l’existence sociale. En 1965, Althusser inaugure une lecture de Marx à la lumière de l’épistémologie historique bachelardienne, parlant, entre Marx et ses prédécesseurs économistes, de « coupure épistémolog...

À partir des problèmes théoriques nés de la réception de Trouble dans le genre, nous nous proposons dans ce premier chapitre de montrer en quoi la critique du sexe, comme catégorie construite par le discours, est un geste matérialiste digne de ce nom. Nous souhaitons établir que l’approche foucaldienne adoptée par Judith Butler dans cet ouvrage, qui s’intéresse à la production de la matérialité corporelle par le discours, n’est pas reconductible à une forme d’idéalisme, quoi qu’en disent ses ...

C’est un même antihumanisme qui soude, chez Althusser et Foucault, la critique de la souveraineté moderne et l’idée d’une production de subjectivité par le pouvoir. En abordant le pouvoir, disséminé dans le corps social, au travers de rapports d’assujettissement, ils repensent l’idéologie au cœur d’une matérialité sociale qu’ils envisagent comme produite par les modalités de son appréhension conceptuelle et discursive. Cette parenté entre Althusser et Foucault peut être établie à partir d’un ...

La différence sexuelle de l’homme et de la femme est-elle un simple fait physiologique, ou bien également un effet des normes sociales ? En 1990, dans Trouble dans le genre, Judith Butler soutient que la catégorie de « sexe » ne se contente pas de décrire une différence naturelle entre l’homme et la femme, mais contribue à la produire, par la répétition des normes du genre dans les discours et les pratiques sociales. Pour déconstruire ces catégories naturalisantes (« homme » et « femme »), Butler inscrit sa critique du sexisme dans une critique plus globale de l’hétérosexisme, c’est-à-dire de l’injonction sociale à l’hétérosexualité. Trouble dans la matière s’ouvre sur le contexte polémique de la réception de Judith Butler en France, dans les cercles où l’on reproche aux études de genre de semer le trouble dans la lutte des classes. En mettant au jour la dimension matérialiste de la thèse butlerienne de la construction discursive du sexe, l’ouvrage interroge en retour la fécondité de son analyse du pouvoir des mots pour la critique sociale d’inspiration marxiste. En explorant la postérité singulière de Marx, d’Althusser à Foucault, au prisme de l’épistémologie de Canguilhem, Audrey Benoit fait de la construction discursive du « sexe » le point de départ d’une réflexion générale sur la production de la réalité sociale par les discours qui prétendent la décrire. Elle propose ainsi des éléments pour une épistémologie matérialiste qui considère le pouvoir du discours de produire et de transformer la réalité sociale.

Avec son concept d’idéologie scientifique, Canguilhem ne se contente pas de situer ses travaux dans le sillage d’Althusser et de Foucault. Il donne aussi corps à une véritable ligne de pensée, à la fois épistémologique et matérialiste, dans laquelle il s’inscrit en même temps qu’eux, et qui renouvelle la pensée de Bachelard. Son apport singulier réside dans la fonction critique qu’il accorde à l’épistémologie, la tenant ainsi à bonne distance de toute perspective empiriste. L’approche constru...

Sexe et genre : matière à critique La réalité naturelle du sexe – cet ensemble de traits anatomiques, chromosomiques ou hormonaux que le sens commun a coutume de référer à la biologie comme à sa caution – est-elle un fait ? Ce fait est-il préalable à la construction du genre ? La critique féministe a montré qu’elle était capable de se saisir de ce fait, en dépit de son caractère apparemment on ne peut plus concret, pour envisager les conditions de sa production discursive. C’est ainsi la déma...

L’épistémologie althussérienne redéfinit la matérialité de l’histoire ; elle évite ainsi de basculer dans la continuité des philosophies de l’histoire. Mais lorsque l’on tente d’échapper aux écueils des philosophies de l’histoire, et notamment à celui de la possibilité de penser la liberté humaine et la transformation politique sous les lois du devenir historique, le risque n’est-il pas de buter sur un nouvel écueil, qui est celui de remplacer l’« Histoire » par l’« Événement » ? La pensée de...

L’observation des résistances à l’ouvrage de Judith Butler de 1990 nous a conduit à identifier dans la tradition marxiste un chemin qui n’a pas été pris. Pour penser la constitution sociale et discursive de la matérialité du sexe – cette matérialité physique concrète qu’on attribue communément au corps en tant qu’hétérosexué –, nous proposons, sur la base des travaux d’Althusser et de Foucault, d’élaborer une épistémologie dont le double caractère matérialiste et constructiviste permette d’éc...

L’archéologie foucaldienne propose une nouvelle articulation de l’espace et du temps qui conduit à envisager une troisième voie entre la continuité de l’Histoire et la discontinuité de l’Événement. C’est cette manière de produire l’historicité des configurations de savoir, c’est-à-dire une forme de temporalité historique, à partir de l’espace discursif qui définit leurs conditions de possibilité, qui rapproche Foucault d’Althusser. L’archéologie foucaldienne fonctionne comme une épistémologie...

The article focuses on juxtaposing the stances of Franz Rosenzweig and Emmanuel Levinas on the notion of the Other based on the metaphysical principles of modernity so as to expose the prerequisites for their attitude to metaphysics in whole. The peculiarity of the proposed approach is the analysis of the notions of the Other in Rosenzweig and Levinas from the perspective of Jacques Derrida’s philosophy. The scrutiny proceeds from the assumption that the national philosophies, having been considered as the specific response to the effects of the encounter of societies to be modernized with the spreading modernity, for that very reason attach great importance to the construal of the Other. It is emphasized that the similarities between the national schools of philosophy indicate correlating the particular with the general as the paradigm for the comprehension of the Other, whereas the Jewish philosophy has previously conceptualized that paradigm by way of the opposition of “Athens and Jerusalem”. In an effort to assess the capabilities of the above-mentioned paradigm the analysis of the relevant range of problems is set into the wider context and they are considered in connection with the transition from essentialism to anti-essentialism that characterizes already the late modernity. It is disclosed that Rosenzweig’s stance was still essentialist, while Levinas tried to abandon the essentialist understanding of the Other, albeit he did not complete the transition to anti-essentialism. Levinas’ break with metaphysics was brought to a close by Derrida whose anti-essentialist stance on identity and difference radically diverges from the thinking that adheres to the “metaphysics of presence”. In the issue, Derrida who does not formally belong to the Jewish philosophy could afford to summarize Rozenzweig’s and Levinas’ approaches to the problem of the Other, and in so doing he makes a contribution to both general and Jewish philosophy.

We discuss a theory presented in a posthumous paper by Alfred Tarski entitled “What are logical notions?”. Although the theory of these logical notions is something outside of the main stream of logic, not presented in logic textbooks, it is a very interesting theory and can easily be understood by anybody, especially studying the simplest case of the four basic logical notions. This is what we are doing here, as well as introducing a challenging fifth logical notion. We first recall the context and origin of what are here called Tarski-Lindenbaum logical notions. In the second part, we present these notions in the simple case of a binary relation. In the third part, we examine in which sense these are considered as logical notions contrasting them with an example of a nonlogical relation. In the fourth part, we discuss the formulations of the four logical notions in natural language and in first-order logic without equality, emphasizing the fact that two of the four logical notions cannot be expressed in this formal language. In the fifth part, we discuss the relations between these notions using the theory of the square of opposition. In the sixth part, we introduce the notion of variety corresponding to all non-logical notions and we argue that it can be considered as a logical notion because it is invariant, always referring to the same class of structures. In the seventh part, we present an enigma: is variety formalizable in first-order logic without equality? There follow recollections concerning Jan Woleński. This paper is dedicated to his 80th birthday. We end with the bibliography, giving some precise references for those wanting to know more about the topic.

espanolSe trata de evidenciar los presupuestos de la lectura heideggeriana de Hegel. Hegelianos y antihegelianos asumen estos presupuestos como algo incontestable; unos movidos por la necesidad de combatir el retorno del espectro hegeliano, otros por la necesidad de liberarlo de su estigma ontoteologico. El resultado es una interpretacion reduccionista de la filosofia de Hegel, que regala la mayoria de sus conceptos fundamentales a la critica heideggeriana, al considerarlos contaminados por el totalitarismo de la clausura y de la identidad. Una interpretacion como esta descansa, sin embargo, en presupuestos muy cuestionables que conviene explicitar, y entre los que cabe destacar la interpretacion heideggeriana de la Aufhebung como superacion de la diferencia. El proposito de este articulo es perseguir las aventuras de la diferencia en algunos puntos clave de la dialectica hegeliana (fundamentalmente: la figura de la Conciencia desdichada y la categoria logica de la Reflexion) que Heidegger trata insatisfactoriamente en su comentario, sirviendose de maniobras sospechosas que pueden leerse como sintomas de una inhibicion. EnglishIt’s about evidencing the presuppositions of the Heideggerian reading of Hegel. Hegelians and anti-Hegelians have assumed these presuppositions as something incontestable; some moved by the need to combat the return of the Hegelian spectrum, others by the need to release it from the onto-theological stigma. The result of it is a reductionist interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy, which gives most of its fundamental concepts to Heidegger’s critics, considering them contaminated by the totalitarism of closure and identity. An interpretation like this lies, however, on very questionable assumptions that should be made explicit, and among which we can highlight the Heideggerian interpretation of the Aufhebung as overcoming of difference. The purpose of this article is to pursue the adventures of difference in some key points of the Hegelian dialectic (fundamentally: the figure of the unhappy consciousness and the logical category of Reflection) that Heidegger deals insufficiently in his commentary, using suspicious maneuvers that they can be read as symptoms of an inhibition.

portuguesO presente artigo propoe levantar uma serie de problemas para tentar pensar as possibilidades do ensino de filosofia como um processo de resistencia e luta contra aquilo que Deleuze e Guattari chamaram de ‘inimigos da filosofia: os pos-kantianos,o filosofo alemao Friedrich Hegel e especialmente, o marketing. A partir da critica desenvolvida, abordaremos tambem como o ensino de filosofia poderia criar linhas de fuga aquilo que Silvio Gallo chamou de ‘educacao maior’. Pretendemos pensar a filosofia e a educacao tendo como fio condutor, a filosofia da diferenca de Gilles Deleuze e Felix Guattari. A ideia e tratar a filosofia com criadora de conceito a partir da ideia de‘pedagogia do conceito’, o que nos possibilitaria problematizar uma pratica de ensino de filosofia estabelecendo enquanto campo de conversacao, a filosofia da diferenca e seu ensino, ou seja, tal pratica formativa pretende agir por brechas, fazendo emergir possibilidades dos estudantes escaparem na medida do possivel, das formas e dispositivos de controle. EnglishThis article proposes to raise a series of problems to try to think of the possibilities of teaching philosophy as a process of resistance and struggle against what Deleuze and Guattari called 'enemies of philosophy: the post-Kantians, the German philosopher Friedrich Hegel and especially, marketing. Based on the criticism developed, we will also address how the teaching of philosophy could create escape lines from what Silvio Gallo called ‘higher education’. We intend to think about philosophy and education based on the philosophy of difference by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. The idea is to treat philosophy as a concept creator based on the idea of ​​'concept pedagogy', which would enable us to problematize a philosophy teaching practice, establishing as a field of conversation, the philosophy of difference and its teaching, that is, such formative practice intends to act through loopholes, giving rise to the possibilities of students to escape, as far as possible, from control forms and devices.

This paper intends to verify the extent and effectiveness of the transforming appropriation of the Derridean concept of ‘differance’ by Stiegler with respect to the problems that, according to Stiegler, make this creative critical operation necessary; in particular with respect to the most recent question concerning the possibility of thinking about and putting into practice a ‘neganthropological différance’ capable of facing the ecological crisis that today seems to threaten the very existence of life on earth. The paper goes back to Technics and Time 1. to analyze the distinction between ‘vital difference’ and ‘noetic difference’ that constitutes the condition of possibility of the ‘neganthropological différance.’ In this perspective, the distinction proposed by Stiegler seems to re-propose the hierarchically oriented oppositional structure that characterizes metaphysical thought and in particular the opposition between man and animal, attributing to the human being the ability to free himself from the constraints of his biological-natural condition. Finally, the paper attempts to account for the repercussions of this approach on the very possibility of an effective response to the ecological crisis, concluding with a provocation regarding the role that theory can and must play with regard to such an urgent and far-reaching problem.

This study traces a persistent connection between the image of disease and the concept of difference in Plato’s Gorgias, Phaedo, and Timaeus. Whether the disease occurs in the body, soul, city, or cosmos, it always signals an unassimilated difference that is critical to the argument. I argue that Plato represents—and induces—diseases of difference in order to produce philosophers, skilled in the art of differentiation. Because his dialogues intensify rather than cure difference, his philosophy is better characterized as a “higher pathology” than a form of therapy. An introductory section on Sophist lays out the main features of the concept of difference-in-itself and concisely presents its connection to disease. The main chapters examine the relationship in different realms. In the first chapter, the problem is moral and political: in the Gorgias, rhetoric is a corrupting force, while philosophy purifies the city and soul by drawing distinctions. In the second chapter on Phaedo, the problem is epistemological: if we correctly interpret the illness of misology, as the despair caused by the inability to consistently distinguish truth and falsity, we can resolve the mystery of Socrates’ cryptic last words (“We owe a cock to Asclepius; pay the debt and do not neglect it”). In the third chapter on Timaeus, Plato treats diseases of the soul, the body, and the cosmos itself. There, the correlation between disease and difference actually helps humans situate themselves in the vast universe—for in both cases, proper differentiation is the key to a healthy, well-constructed life.My emphasis on Plato’s theory of difference counters the traditional focus on his theory of Forms. Elucidating the link between the concept of difference and the experience of disease has broader impact for the ageless question of how we should live our lives. In Plato’s system, neither disease nor difference is a wholly negative element to be eradicated. Instead, difference and disease, in their proper proportions, are responsible for the fullness of the world and the emergence of the philosophical subject.

Este texto resulta de pesquisa bibliográfica, de natureza filosófica, apoiada nos registros da filosofia da diferença e/ou multiplicidade desenvolvida pelos filósofos franceses Gilles Deleuze e Félix Guattari. Nosso intento é situar como a filosofia, assim como a arte e a ciência, se definem pelo poder criador, ou pela exigência de criação de um novo pensamento, contraposto ao pensamento representacional e da recognição. Destacaremos a especificidade da atividade filosófica e sua tarefa primordial enquanto criação de conceitos e pontuaremos elementos de uma pedagogia do conceito. Por meio dela e de movimentos de territorialização e desterritorialização, realizamos um exercício de pensamento abordando questões referentes à universidade contemporânea, contrapondo duas imagens de conhecimento, a saber, a arbórea e a rizomática; propomos ainda o conceito de universidade menor como baluarte de resistência.

This article intends to indicate a propositional use of the notion of image of thought, present in the work Diferença and Repetição by Gilles Deleuze, because according to this reference, repetition is typical of asserting itself, allowing the emergence of what differs. On the other hand, the notion of image of thought occurs in Deleuze's philosophy on three occasions, in the works Nietzsche and Philosophy, Proust and the Signs and in Difference and Repetition and in these works, this perspective does not always coincide, moving from a more critical use for more positive use. In strategic terms and methodological, it is precisely this last approach, of a constructive nature, that we will base ourselves on. The discussion revolves around an affirmative image of thought in philosophy in the face of difference in the act of repetition, which means that difference in philosophy would bring with it, in its movement, an internal process of differentiation, whose power repeats it, but not of the same way, if not transmuting it into other possibilities of what it means to think.

A partir da obra Diferença e repetição, pretendo discutir em que medida a proposta de Deleuze de restaurar a diferença na sensibilidade, evitando que a diferença seja confundida com o diverso, tal como propôs Kant, a fim de retirar a diferença da submissão à representação no âmbito da sensibilidade. Isso configura uma nova perspectiva para pensar a questão da diferença na sensibilidade reformulando noções do pensamento transcendental e da ontologia, por meio de uma aliança inusitada entre a ciência e a filosofia. Para tanto, os objetivos a serem cumpridos serão: I) expor a crítica de Deleuze à filosofia transcendental de Kant, no que tange à diferença como o diverso na sensibilidade e questionar o próprio conceito de transcendental como condição para a experiência; II) argumentar a saída de Deleuze para o problema da representação da diferença na sensibilidade a partir da noção de ser do sensível; III) explorar a apropriação de Deleuze do conceito de individuação de Gilbert Simondon; IV) exprimir porque as noções de vontade de potência e de eterno retorno, da filosofia de Nietzsche, contribuem, juntamente com a individuação, para compor o conceito de diferença em resposta aos limites do transcendentalismo.