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The article discusses a U.S. Supreme court case involving a same-sex couple's rights to equal access to material benefits that accompany marriage in the U.S. It discusses facts of the case, a background of the Immigration and Nationality Act which governs birthright citizenship for foreign-born children which is relevant to the case, and the Supreme Court's decision.

This Article is the first to apply a critical race feminism (CRF) critique to the current immigration law in the United States, Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 212(a)(2)(D)(i), which excludes immigrants for engaging in sex work.1 This Article will use critical historical methodology to center the role of women of color as the primary targets of not only the first federal law to criminalize sex workers, but also the first explicitly racist immigration law in United States history. The Article will also employ theories of anti-essentialism and intersectionality to show how INA § 212(a)(2)(D)(i) both silences the voices and experiences of women of color sex workers and refuses to recognize the impacts of multiple intersecting systems of oppression. Finally, the Article will connect the critique of INA § 212(a)(2)(D)(i) to the anti-carceral feminist movement to decriminalize sex work in order to move from theory to praxis, and to inspire advocacy strategies and law reform efforts that point to a broader project of transformation. The ultimate goal of this Article is to strengthen links between critical race and immigration law scholarship so that scholars can continue to use CRF as an exploratory analytical tool to examine the intersections of race, class, and gender within immigration law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the case CSL Plasma Inc. v. U.S. Customs & Border Protection to discuss legal issues regarding subject matter jurisdiction covering plasma companies under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Immigration Nationality Act (INA).

The article discusses immigration issues in the U.S., particularly the effectiveness of using parole-in-place as a solution to change the immigration status of undocumented immediate relatives of American citizens as legal permanent residents. Other topics include the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) for said relatives, and the main strategy for legal immigration to the country.

The United States relies, in part, on certain criminal convictions to determine which noncitizens are deportable. The specific types of criminal convictions subjecting an individual to deportation proceedings are found in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). However, the INA only lists categories and types of crimes that trigger deportation. It is the courts' responsibility to compare the state criminal statute grounding the conviction with the list provided under the INA. This process is done using the "categorical approach," which allows courts to make a comparison and determine if a state criminal conviction matches a crime listed in the INA, subjecting a noncitizen to deportation proceedings. This approach is complicated and, at times, arbitrary. The results are particularly harsh considering a lack of a statute of limitations for deportation proceedings, which often results in deportation proceedings commencing decades after a conviction. This Note addresses the problems underling the use of the categorical approach and suggests establishing a statute of limitations to limit the consequences of late deportation proceedings on noncitizens, their families, and the courts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Noncitizens who have been convicted of a "crime involving moral turpitude" (CIMT) under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) can be deported. However, the INA fails to provide a definition for "moral turpitude" or a list of crimes that necessarily involve "moral turpitude." As a result, judges are given wide discretion to decide when a crime is morally reprehensible enough to render a noncitizen deportable. This moral determination in the CIMT analysis has led to disparate results among the lower courts, which deprives noncitizens of meaningful notice of what conduct could render them deportable. In 1951, the Supreme Court held in Jordan v. De George that the phrase "crimes involving moral turpitude" was not unconstitutionally vague. This decision left the moral turpitude provisions intact in the INA, though still undefined. While the Jordan decision remains untouched, the CIMT analysis has drastically evolved. Under the current framework, judges across the country reach disparate results on whether certain crimes necessarily involve moral turpitude, and noncitizens pay the price of the ensuing arbitrary results. Regulatory crimes pose particular difficulties in applying the current CIMT analysis. Even though some courts have reasoned regulatory crimes are typically not crimes involving moral turpitude, other courts have held the opposite. This discrepancy is notable with respect to a recent circuit split over whether failure to register as a sex offender is a CIMT. The revival and expansion of the void-for-vagueness doctrine and the increasing uncertainty over CIMT analysis--shown chiefly through sex offender registration statutes--creates an opportunity to revisit the vagueness challenge to the CIMT provision in the INA seventy years since it was first heard by the Court. Accordingly, the current framework for analyzing whether a crime involves moral turpitude under the INA should be rendered void-for-vagueness under the Due Process Clause. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Matter of Thomas & Thompson, former Attorney General William Barr argued that states have no role to play in immigration matters and thus, state adjustments to a criminal sentence post-conviction will not be given effect for adjudicating deportability based on criminal grounds under section 101(a)(48)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act without an underlying substantive or procedural flaw in the original criminal case. The former Attorney General incorrectly assumed that states cannot be involved in immigration decision making. Not only is it constitutionally permissible for the federal government to delegate certain immigration powers to the states, but the immigration code does so in many places. Careful examination of the text and legislative history of section 101(a)(48)(B) reveals that whatever sentence the state deems operative counts for immigration purposes—even if state law considers the operative sentence a later adjustment— implying that Matter of Thomas & Thompson put forth an erroneous interpretation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The nation prides itself on the notion of rebirth--the ideal that one can leave their past behind, come to the United States, and seize the opportunities available to advance and remake oneself. Yet, when it comes to immigration law, neither the passage of time nor a life full of positive equities ameliorates past wrongdoing or allows for future opportunities. In the words of the Senate Subcommittee when Congress permanently removed the statute of limitations for deportation from the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1952, "If the cause for exclusion existed at the time of entry, it is believed that such aliens are just as undesirable at any subsequent time." Time stands still in significant and detrimental ways throughout our immigration law. An immigrant's manner of entry into the United States can result in a lifetime bar to due process in removal proceedings, and a finding that an immigrant ever filed a "frivolous" asylum application will bar her from any immigration benefit throughout her life, even if she withdrew the application and procured no benefit through it. Detained noncitizens facing removal are routinely denied bond because of criminal charges that have been filed against them, even absent any finding of guilt. This occurs even if the accuser withdraws their complaint; the very fact that criminal charges were brought signifies danger and results in ongoing detention. In this Article, I examine a few of these provisions that result in lifetime consequences, as well as the lack of a statute of limitations or laches defense in immigration law. After exploring jurisprudence and legislative history in each of these areas, I analyze the theory behind statutes of limitation and laches defenses in other areas of law to argue for a statute of limitations for deportation proceedings, and for a time limit on penalties that attach to a single bad act, like filing a frivolous asylum application. I also argue that noncitizens should be entitled to the same presumption of innocence as in the criminal justice system with regards to bond determinations. This Article incorporates a broader moral and policy-based argument that after a certain period of time, a noncitizen's membership in the nation is so well-established and meaningful that deportation, or the denial of immigration benefits based on a past bad act, should no longer be possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses problems with the statutory cap on U.S. visas for H-2B temporary foreign worker program and its implications for businesses and proposes change in the Immigration and Nationality Act.

The Immigration and Nationality Act provides noncitizen service members and honorably discharged immigrant veterans a path toward United States citizenship. The Act allows those who have honorably served in the military to apply for naturalization with a considerably reduced residency requirement. However, the current military naturalization process is riddled with complexity, excessive and arbitrary vetting practices, misinformation, and an ever-growing backlog of naturalization applications that have precipitated processing delays. These flaws result in veteran deportations, which precipitate family separations and the deprivation of healthcare for veterans. Furthermore, requiring separate enlistment and naturalization processes leads to squandered government resources in the form of wasted work hours, duplicative background checks, and the addition of more applicants to an already overburdened immigration processing backlog. Moreover, the current system has arguably led to decreased noncitizen participation in the military and deterred eligible recruits with highly sought-after skills from enlisting. Although Congress has made attempts to address the shortfalls of the system with a patchwork of legislation aimed at addressing the process's consequences, it fails to target fundamental defects that cause them. The most efficient and effective remedy is a bottom-up reimagining of military service for citizenship--replacing the existing framework for military naturalization with voluntary automatic citizenship upon taking the Oath of Enlistment. Such an approach can adequately incorporate the substantive requirements for citizenship, mitigate the shortcomings of the current framework, and advance both United States national security and governmental efficiency. The current enlistment process functionally duplicates the procedures for naturalization and fulfills the same substantive requirements through its application questions, military aptitude screening, background checks, and Oath of Enlistment. A voluntary automatic service for citizenship initiative would benefit immigrant service members, the United States military, and the nation as a whole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on Impact of U.S. Immigration Form I-864 Affidavit of Support in State Family Court Cases on television show "90 Day Fiancé." It mentions law clearly recognizes provisions in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 that mandate U.S. citizen sponsors sign Affidavits of Support. It also mentions Section 213A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of Department of Homeland Security U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.

The article discusses the challenges unaccompanied immigrant children face in the U.S. immigration court system, where they are expected to represent themselves in court without legal representation. The article argues for an update to the law to provide legal counsel for these children,including United States. Immigration & Nationality Act and mentions the lack of progress in amending the law despite the increasing number of cases involving unaccompanied minors in immigration court.

Despite deportation's devastating effects, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) specifies deportation as the penalty for nearly every immigration law violation. Critics have regularly decried the INA's lack of proportionality, contending that the penalty often does not fit the offense. The immigration bureaucracy's implementation of the INA, however, involves a spectrum of penalties short of deportation. Using tools such as administrative closure, orders of supervision, and deferred action, agency bureaucrats decide who is deported and who stays, and on what terms, on a purely ad hoc basis. In this "shadow system," immigrants, their advocates, and the broader public lack basic information about what penalties are being imposed and why. This Article argues for reframing the problem of immigration law's disproportionality as a problem of insufficient justification--one remediable only by building the infrastructure for reason giving in the immigration bureaucracy. Deportation strikes many as disproportionate because the government often lacks satisfactory reasons for imposing such a drastic penalty. But in the system of shadow sanctions today, the government not only fails to offer good reasons: It fails to offer any at all. As a result, the system of shadow sanctions represents a classic case of an arbitrary exercise of government power. Looking to examples of procedural innovation across the administrative state, this Article backs prudential reforms to create immigration law's missing reason-giving infrastructure. With it in place, the public can demand better reasons or proportionality. But the first step is addressing immigration law's arbitrariness problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presidential abdication in immigration law has long been synonymous with the perceived nonenforcement of certain provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act. President Obama's never-implemented policy of deferred action, known as DAPA, serves as the prime example in the literature. But can the President abdicate the duty of faithful execution in immigration law by enforcing the law, i.e., by deporting deportable noncitizens? This Article argues "yes." Every leading theory of the presidency recognizes the President's role as supervisor of the bureaucracy, an idea crystallized by several scholars. When the President fails to establish meaningful enforcement priorities, essentially making every deportable noncitizen a priority, and resources for enforcement are insufficient to achieve full enforcement, the President de facto delegates that discretion to the rank and file without requisite constraints. In so doing, the President abdicates this supervisory role, producing abdication through enforcement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article identifies atrocities faced by detained unaccompanied children in mass detention centers in the U.S. and proposes granting of greater due process rights of appointed counsel for detained unaccompanied children. Topics discussed are provisions in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments and Immigration Nationality Act, due process statues that influence detention of unaccompanied children, and gaps in U.S. law addressed in the United Nations (UN) Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.

The article focuses on framework and history of Safe Third Country (STC) agreements and reliance on the current construction of the statute could lead to devastating results for asylum seekers, using the agreements. It mentions solution to the STC exception by looking at multiple sources, including laws and judicial opinions from Canada and Europe and issued by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). It also mentions the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).

As amended after the Supreme Court's decision in Immigration & Nationality Services v. Chadha, the National Emergencies Act (NEA) vests the President with crisis powers that cannot be terminated or taken away even by majorities in both Houses of Congress. President Donald Trump's 2019 declaration of a "national emergency" at the southern border of the United States as a pretext to secure funding for his border wall with Mexico threw into sharp relief the perils and shortcomings of this imbalanced arrangement. This Note argues first that the President lacks any inherent emergency powers; any such powers that might exist belong to Congress and are within Congress' discretion to delegate to the President. In turn, this Note contends that the post-Chadha change to the emergency termination procedure undermined the statute's basic efficacy in service of formalist constitutional theory. Under a revisionist, functionalist reading of Chadha, the original emergency termination procedure was constitutionally permissible as a political legislative veto. Alternatively, the recently proposed ARTICLE ONE Act would help to return the NEA to its original role of constraining executive use of emergency authorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Fifth Circuit in the case Ali v. Barr wherein Court upheld a Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) judgment that, pursuant to a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). It mentions Court deferred to the BIA's statutory interpretation despite prior guidance from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) implying noncitizens. It also mentions lawful permanent resident (LPR) status which offers a path to citizenship.

American immigration laws have been explicitly racial throughout most of the country's history. For decades, only White foreign nationals could become naturalized citizens. All racial criteria have since vanished from the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)-all but one. Section 289 of the INA allows "American Indians born in Canada" to freely cross into the United States if they possess at least 50% blood "of the American Indian race." Such American Indians cannot be prohibited from entering the United States and can obtain lawful permanent residence status-if they meet the blood quantum requirement. Such racialized immigration controls arbitrarily restrict cross-border Indigenous communities and have since their inception in the mid-1800s. Indigenous communities were never confined within national borders prior to colonization, and they continue to span both the U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico borders. The free passage of these individuals is restricted by INA section 289. This Comment focuses on how the question of who is "Indian" should be defined not by the federal government based on blood quantum, but by Indigenous nations themselves. Ultimately, this Comment argues that Congress should remove the blood quantum requirement entirely and expand the free passage right to include American Indians born in Mexico. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the immigration detention with respect Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) in the two U.S. Supreme Court cases Jennings v. Rodriguez and Nielsen v. Preap. It mentions Supreme Court's recent decisions, noncitizens' actual risk of flight and possibility of committing future crimes. It also mentions textualist interpretation, rejecting the lower court's ruling which implemented automatic bond proceedings to comport with due process.

When can a noncitizen bring her claims directly before a federal district court? The answer is complicated, due in large part to a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). That provision states that if a noncitizen's claims "arise from" her removal proceedings, they cannot be heard by a federal district court. Instead, those claims would be subject to more limited judicial review in a federal court of appeals only after the noncitizen's immigration removal proceedings have concluded. If, however, a noncitizen's claims do not "arise from" removal proceedings, § 1252(b)(9) poses no obstacle to district court jurisdiction. In these instances, noncitizens may have a more immediate opportunity to obtain judicial review and hold the government accountable for its potentially unlawful action. This Comment argues that § 1252(b)(9) should be read narrowly in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Jennings v. Rodriguez. To effectuate that interpretation, this Comment offers and evaluates several factors and frameworks that district courts can employ when confronted with claims that may implicate § 1252(b)(9). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Article explores the application of the terrorism bar in immigration law to noncitizens who have participated in an independence movement. It proposes a uniform standard that immigration adjudicators can use to determine whether a foreign entity is a state in order to promote accurate applications of the terrorism bar. The terrorism bar in the Immigration and Nationality Act is broad—it can bar most forms of immigration relief, including asylum, and reaches far beyond ordinary definitions of terrorism. For example, the terrorism bar can block immigration relief for noncitizens who nonviolently supported a militia fighting for independence against a repressive state or who received military-type training from such an organization. The terrorism bar applies even if that militia is supported by the United States. The bar can also ensnare a noncitizen’s spouse and children who have not themselves participated in those activities. Especially in light of its far reach and harsh consequences, it is of the utmost importance to accurately apply the bar, which can be challenging for cases on the margins. One such area is the application of the bar to noncitizens who have supported independence movements leading to the creation of new states, which are situations that often produce large numbers of asylum seekers and refugees. The complexity arises because the terrorism bar requires unlawful conduct, but participation in and support of a state’s armed forces are not unlawful. During an independence movement, a new state can emerge, and support of its armed forces is not unlawful even though hostilities may continue with the state from which it seceded. Adjudicators need to be able to determine when an entity achieved statehood because it could mean the difference between a noncitizen participating in unlawful rebellion, which could trigger the terrorism bar, and supporting the armed forces of a state, which would not. However, there is currently no uniform framework for analyzing questions of statehood in the context of the terrorism bar. Drawing from international law and domestic law, this Article proposes a standard that immigration adjudicators can use to assess questions of statehood to avoid the creation of “paper terrorists”— noncitizens who have participated in independence movements and are mistakenly labeled as terrorists under the Immigration and Nationality Act. This proposal stems from, and is consistent with, the statutory language of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and therefore does not require any legislative action. The proposed standard encourages immigration adjudicators to give full effect to the statutory language to promote more accurate applications of the terrorism bar. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on conviction in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) which implicitly leaves room for courts to inquire into procedural fairness underlying a foreign conviction and evaluating the sufficiency of foreign convictions in the contexts of extradition and international comity.

The article focuses on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Trump v. Hawaii on strong argument that the travel bans violate the Constitution because they are irrational. It analyzes underinclusivity and overinclusivity of Trump's travel bans and his discriminatoryanimus against Muslims in light of travel bans. It also mentions the U.S. President Donald Trump with challenges to travel bans often focused on alleged violations of the First Amendment or the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Public charge policy has been part of the nation's infrastructure since its colonial beginnings. The policy originated as a barrier to protect taxpayers from individuals who posed a risk of becoming a charge on society, relying on public aid and governmental support. Congress last addressed the public charge statute in 1952 in the Immigration and Nationality Act, and it has been further developed at the will of the executive branch alongside the growth of immigration law and the welfare state. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) proposed a rule change to the public charge policy to be implemented in October 2019, but the proposed rule change was temporarily halted by federal courts days before it went into effect, partially because it threatened public health and posed an extreme financial burden to healthcare centers. On January 27, 2020, the Supreme Court stayed the lower court's injunction in response to an emergency petition by the administration, effectively voiding the ban in forty-nine states and allowing the 2019 public charge policy to take effect while the issue is litigated in lower courts. The rule went into effect on February 24, 2020, a mere month prior to the onslaught of the COVID-19 outbreak in the United States. On July 29, 2020, DHS was enjoined from implementing the 2019 public charge policy for the duration of the national health emergency in response to the pandemic. Public charge policy has fallen to the discretion of the executive branch in recent decades, and the last major policy guidance was issued in 1999. Congress did not overrule the executive agency in 1999, in a way signaling acceptance of the policy trend at the turn of the millennium; however, the 2019 rule change executed by DHS derails the agency's prior interpretation significantly. Public charge policy has historically been used by the federal government to discriminate, and it continues to be used as a political tool to exclude racial and ethnic minorities from accessing public health benefits. In burdening these minorities, the government in turn burdens the healthcare system. Without congressional action, the fate of public charge is decidedly unclear and the confusion and fear for noncitizens fueled by the 2019 rule will not abate. This Comment proposes that Congress revise the public charge statute to address concerns raised by the 2019 rule, at minimum ensuring that access to legally entitled health benefits are excluded from public charge consideration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Criminalizing immigration status has tainted the lives of permanent residents in the United States for years. A minor misdemeanor conviction imposes the threat of extreme penalties for noncitizens and their continued residence in the United States. Specifically, a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude can prevent a noncitizen from seeking admission, threaten deportation proceedings, and jeopardize his or her ability to naturalize as a United States citizen. Crimes involving moral turpitude remain undefined in the Immigration and Nationality Act, causing courts to adjudicate the crimes arbitrarily. In the absence of statutory or administrative direction, jurisdictions across the United States generally employ a two-step categorical approach to analyze the definition of moral turpitude and to adjudicate the associated crimes. First, the court identifies the requisite elements of the state statutory conviction. Second, the court compares the state statutory elements of the conviction to the generic federal crime. A crime of moral turpitude is determined if all state statutory elements are a categorical match to the generic federal counterpart. The employed categorical approach appears facially determinable. Yet criminal convictions for similar crimes continue to elicit varying immigration consequences due to the swing of the political pendulum. Attorneys general introduce loopholes into the traditional two-step categorical approach effectively altering the outcome of a conviction which would otherwise not be considered a crime involving moral turpitude. This Note describes the traditional categorical approach and explores the modifications proposed, exercised, or rejected as the approach continues to evolve. Finally, this Note proposes a solution to adjudicate crimes involving moral turpitude. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

American immigration law mandates the civil detention of certain classes of migrants while their legal cases proceed through the courts. Due to the peculiar nature of immigration law, many migrants find themselves detained for years on end without receiving the level of due process that normally attends imprisonment. This Note draws on historical and comparative analysis to argue that the mandatory detention provisions of American immigration law are not civil, but functionally criminal, and that detained migrants are therefore owed a modicum of due process that they do not currently receive. This Note traces the history of immigration law in the United States, surveying the laws and cases that gave rise to the mandatory civil detention of certain classes of migrants. This Note then examines recent Supreme Court cases challenging these provisions. Analogizing migrant detention to debtors' prisons in early modern England and involuntary civil commitment in the substance abuse crisis, this Note identifies four features that help discern civil from criminal detention. Finally, this Note applies those four features to the mandatory detention of migrants under the Immigration and Nationality Act, concluding that this detention is functionally criminal imprisonment, demanding greater due process for migrants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article forecast the future of the standard of review used for Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 212(f) executive action. It mentions about the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in the "Trump and Hawaii" court case; and also mentions that the U.S. Congress has delegated power to president in INA. It mentions about Justice Robert H. Jackson's Zones of Executive Power.

The article focuses on part of the first wave of immigrants to crash into a changing America in the wake of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965. It mentions Americans had anticipated when the law was passed during the civil rights era and unsuccessful effort to enact the Equal Rights Amendment. It also mentions since the American Revolution, and activists have struggled to overcome exclusion and calling for a composite nationality.

The article discusess Matter of L-E-A- court case on asylum law. In this case Attorney General William Barr overturned the Board of Immigration Appeals' finding that the immediate family of the respondent's father constituted a particular social group. It mentions about the laws governing asylum under the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act.

The article argues that reviewing courts should not accord Chevron deference to the Board's "particular social group" interpretations because "particular social group" has an unambiguous meaning within the Immigration and Nationality Act. It further explores the US asylum law, including the Board's evolving "particular social group" interpretations.

The article provides a general background of how the immigration system interacts with federal courts and the statutory framework that strips federal courts of jurisdiction in certain cases in the U.S. Topics include recent jurisprudential trend wherein federal district courts have found jurisdiction over habeas petitions; statute's constitutionality under the Suspension Clause; and implementation of section 1252(g) of Immigration and Nationality Act.

Family reunification is widely seen as a relatively stable feature of the contemporary U.S. immigration regime protected by the nation's liberal democratic institutions and humanitarian values. Drawing on critical scholarship that situates immigration policies in racial nation‐building projects, this article explores the development of U.S. family‐based admission policies from 1965 to the early 2000s. I bring attention to the role of racial family logics in the changing character and meaning of these policies. Racial family logics reflect the emergent and contested ways in which families are both idealized and institutionally organized in relation to the state, the economy, and other social institutions to support racial projects. A normative conception of "the family" as a white, heterosexual, male wage earner, nuclear household unit informed the 1965 U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act and its emphasis on family‐based admissions. However, by the 1990s, the landscape of immigration, race, and family in the United States had shifted quite dramatically. The family‐based admissions system was now associated with immigrants from Asia and Latin America rather than Europe. The "browning" of the system was accompanied by its incorporation into racialized projects of state discipline, surveillance, and control over those deemed "undeserving" in relation to neoliberal values of self‐reliant and self‐regulating families. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in case Nielsen v. Preap wherein Court mandates the detention of qualifying immigrants years after their release from criminal custody. It mentions Court once again exempted its review of an immigration detention matter from generally applicable legal norms under Immigration and Nationality Act. It also mentions subjecting noncitizens and their release from criminal custody to mandatory detention.

In 2005, Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act to strip jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus challenging an order of removal or the decision to execute an order of removal. A first generation of legal challenges argued that this provision was a facial violation of the Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees the right to bring writs of habeas corpus, or an adequate and effective alternative to habeas. These challenges were unsuccessful, and for years, the conventional wisdom has been that noncitizens cannot bring habeas petitions to challenge or delay their removal. However, recent district court cases demonstrate the viability of a new generation of as-applied Suspension Clause challenges to the denial of habeas jurisdiction. This Note identifies and describes a category of cases where the denial of habeas jurisdiction is a Suspension Clause violation: noncitizens with orders of removal who are at risk for persecution in their countries of origin because of changed country conditions that arose while they were living in the United States. Recognizing habeas jurisdiction in these circumstances is essential to protect noncitizens' rights and to check executive power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information related to U.S. Supreme Court decision in case "Trump v. Hawaii," involving Presidential Proclamation signed by President Donald Trump, which restricted travel in the U.S. by people from several nations, or by refugees without valid travel documents. It reports that the court ruled ruling that plaintiffs did not have a "likelihood of success on the merits" on either their the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) or their Establishment Clause claims.

The article discusses how section 1252(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act precludes the exercise of federal jurisdiction over claims brought by wrongfully removed noncitizens. Topics discussed include the U.S. Supreme Court precedent suggesting that the section may apply to only the Attorney General's discretionary decisions; an ways in which the act restrains improper executive action and prevents harm to noncitizens.

A panel discussion is presented at a congress Immigration Politics: Shifting Norms, Policies and Practices incluidng Annie Lai, Hiroshi Motomura, and Karen Tumlin. Topics include the status of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals; the role Immigration and Nationality Act in addressing immigrants in the U.S.; and the U.S. President Trump admiration's immigration policy.

This Note details the legislative history of § 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which empowers the President to unilaterally restrict entry to the United States by any noncitizen. In 2016, President Trump fully embraced this power in implementing a broad travel ban against citizens of eight nations. In order to better understand the historical meaning of § 212(f) and the travel ban, this Note provides context by comparing the social forces at work in 2016, in 1952, and in 1789, when the Quasi-War with France led American legislators to enact the Alien Friends Act. This latter legislation similarly empowered President Adams to unilaterally deport any noncitizen for any reason. During each of these periods, although the United States was not at war, anti-immigrant hysteria gripped many Americans. This comparison reveals that while the Founders were concerned with the tyrannical nature of such unchecked executive power, in 1952 the Congressional majority ignored the Founders' cautionary approach. This Note concludes by arguing that critics of the travel ban should follow the lead of their predecessors by seeking to amend the law in order to better check the President and return such power to the more democratic legislature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article addresses the issue of noncitizens who are not guaranteed counsel in removal proceedings in the U.S. It presents a historical background of immigration in the U.S. and the provision of certain limited rights given to noncitizens under the country's case law. It provides some solutions to the issue, including forming the right to counsel in removal proceedings through a new rule in case law and amending the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).

On April 8, 2019, President Trump announced that his administration would designate Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). This is the first time the United States has designated an arm of another government, rather than a non-state actor, as an FTO. In his announcement, Trump asserted that the Iranian government has used the IRGC to engage in a campaign of global terrorism. The measure, which officially took effect on April 15, expands on previous terrorism-related sanctions imposed on the IRGC and Iran. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]