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This study examines the Internet neutrality issue in Korea by analyzing the debates among the stakeholders. It addresses the dynamic discussions of the issues by identifying how diverse groups of stakeholders are affected by various actions taken by the emergence of Internet neutrality. It presents a statistical analysis that reveals the factors implicated in the Internet neutrality debate and significant differences among individuals on opposing sides in the debate. The findings reveal insights into the connection between specific factors and positions in the Internet neutrality debate. The findings show that the issue of Internet neutrality is complex and as multifaceted as the parties' diverse interests. It concludes by proposing an effective model to govern Internet neutrality in Korea, based on the typology proposed by Strover. KEY WORDS: Internet neutrality, stakeholder analysis, Internet policy, broadband, South Korea, Introduction The Internet neutrality debate has sparked heated debate in telecommunications policy in the United States and, to a lesser extent, South Korea (hereafter Korea) and elsewhere. Internet neutrality is [...]

Technologies compatible with fiber-based next-generation networks (NGN) for deployment in competitive, non-competitive, and non-commercial geographical areas are determined. How the regulation can be modified in bringing out these technologies is discussed. Investment factors for governments in adopting NGN instead of copper telecommunications networks are also presented.

The development of Korea and Japan in high-speed, low-priced broadband services and the information technology is studied and it is seen that political issues and policies have pushed their similar regimes apart.

The policy of subsidizing mobile handset is used as a key marketing strategy to attract customers in a competitive mobile communication market in Korea. The development of handset subsidy related policy in Korea from 1997 to 2001is analyzed considering the multiple regulatory schemes.

An important and distinct element of regulatory policy in the European Union is that the operators with significant market power are required to provide cost-based interconnection whereas other operators are not providing such cost-based interconnection. Consequences of different interconnection charges for competition and investments are discussed.

The results of the 1996 Guatemalan radio spectrum reform that privatized its use are analyzed. The Guatemalan liberalization indicates that the transformation of the radio spectrum into private property rights can remove barriers to entry and yet not result in chaos.

Case studies are presented to illustrate the problems faced by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in the United States and suggestions are made for a framework that would allow for more spectrums in the market and increase innovation. A concrete method for moving toward much more market-oriented spectrum policy is proposed.

There were enormous differences in the revenues from the European 'third generation' (3G, or 'UMTS') mobile-phone license auctions, from 20 Euros per capita in Switzerland to 650 Euros per capita in the UK, though the values of the licenses sold were similar. Poor auction designs in some countries facilitated collusion between firms and failed to attract entrants. The sequencing of the auctions was also crucial. We discuss the auctions in the UK, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Greece and Denmark. JEL classification: D44; L96 Keywords: Auctions; Telecommunications; Spectrum auctions; 3G; UMTS; Bidding; Mobile phones; Antitrust; Collusion; Entry

In this paper we review, and draw some lessons from, the UMTS-auctions that have taken place in Europe during 2000 and 2001. We address several design issues and, in particular, focus attention on asymmetries between the bidders and on possibilities for collusion. An outlook is provided to several other auctions in which the stakes may not be so high, but the design issues perhaps somewhat more complex. JEL classification: D44; L96 Keywords: Auctions; Telecommunications; Game theory; UMTS

The regulatory incentives created by government policies aimed at promoting the transition to digital TV in the US, France, and the UK are compared. The conclusions suggest possible remedies to accelerate the transition to digital TV in the US based on the British experience.

Byline: Dennis L. Weisman (1), Michael A. Williams (2) Keywords: Consumers' surplus; discrimination; entry; Telecommunications Act Abstract: A primary goal of the 1996 Telecommunications Act isto encourage competition in long-distance telephonemarkets. Four years after passage of thislegislation, Bell Operating Companies (``BOCs'') havebeen granted permission to offer long-distanceservices in only one state. The regulatory barrier toentry is justified on grounds that the BOCs have theability to discriminate against incumbentlong-distance carriers in the provision of essentialaccess services. We take this premise as given andquantify the critical level of discrimination requiredto offset the positive consumers' surplus gainsassociated with the enhanced competition resultingfrom BOC entry into long-distance markets. Author Affiliation: (1) Department of Economics, Waters Hall, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, 66506-4001, U.S.A. (2) PM Industrial Economics, 2200 Powell St. Suite 1080, Emeryville, CA, 94608, U.S.A. Article History: Registration Date: 03/10/2004

Byline: Dale E. Lehman (1), Dennis L. Weisman (2) Keywords: Price caps; regulation; Telecommunications Act Abstract: The last decade has witnessed a dramatic substitutionof price cap regulation for rate-of-return regulationin the telecommunications industry. The 1996Telecommunications Act empowers state regulators toset the terms of competitive entry in local telephonemarkets. We investigate whether the form of regulationendogenously affects the regulator's behavior withrespect to competitive entry. The evidence revealsthat regulators in price cap jurisdictions tend to setmore liberal terms of entry in comparison withregulators in rate-of-return jurisdictions. Thissuggests that price cap regulation suffers fromincomplete contracting, undermining the potentiallysuperior incentive properties of this importantregulatory reform. Author Affiliation: (1) Department of Economics, Fort Lewis College, Durango, CO, 81301, U.S.A. (2) Department of Economics, Kansas State University, Mahattan, KS, 66506, U.S.A. Article History: Registration Date: 16/10/2004

A study was conducted to examine the alphanumeric use of telephone numbers. Results indicated that the alphanumeric use of service numbers correlated with social and economic concerns, and the need for specific rights related with the placement of such numbers. These rights correlate with the registration of alphanumeric use and assignment mechanisms. Findings also identified a number of regulatory concerns associated with the significance of added value numbers.

The impact of the regional universal telecommunication service policy on telephone access as well as the effectiveness and efficiency of the policy in providing telephone service for low-income households at the state level were investigated. The study covers the period 1984-1996 and was designed to determine whether the Telecommunications Act of 1996 has been successful in eliminating barriers to competition. Empirical results showed that there was a significant increase in the number of households with telephone at the state level even as inefficiencies in service were still evident.

The experience of the telecommunications industry at the state level following the implementation of the 1996 Telecommunications Act provides some important lessons for policy makers worldwide. An analysis of the US model of telecommunications policy in California, Texas and Michigan showed an ongoing quest to render the state and federal levels of regulation mutually consistent. Furthermore, the telecommunications policy is influenced by the existing economic, political and social structures of territories where it is implemented.

This paper examines how government policy has influenced the pattern of innovation and industrial leadership in the cellular mobile communication systems. It focuses on the US government's role in promoting the early development of the cellular concept in the 1970s, Europe's attempt to take the lead with the promotion of the GSM standard in the late 1980s, and the rise of two rival world-wide standards in the 1990s (Europe's GSM versus America's CDMA systems). The cellular mobile communication system is treated as an example of a complex product system (CoPS). CoPS are large-scale, engineering intensive products that are supplied in unit or batch production and tailored to meet the requirements of particular large users. The purpose of this paper is to show by a single case study how patterns of technological innovation in CoPS may be influenced by policies of direct and indirect government control to promote industrial leadership. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)

The convergence of the mass media and telecommunication sectors has raised difficulties in the formulation of a single regulatory framework as these two sectors are used to be governed by different regulatory systems. They are respectively represented by the regulatory model and the competition law model. Thus, authorities have resorted to the proceduralization of telecommunication law as this has the capacity to reconcile the complexity of convergence and impose domestic requirements from both sectors as well.

The convergence of the telecommunication and broadcasting sectors in the EU was decided to be placed under the governance of the European Commission (EC) Competition Law until a more specific regulatory framework can be developed. Despite EU Competition Law's consistent application to both telecommunications and broadcasting sectors, its policy resulted in different outcomes. It was successful in preventing problematic transactions in broadcasting, although it also prohibited profitable deals in the telecommunications sector.

The convergence of telecommunication and mass media sectors in the European Union has raised difficulties in the formulation of an appropriate regulatory policy, particularly for telecommunications and broadcasting. This is due to the two sectors differences in regulatory systems as the former is governed by competition laws that are determined by free market forces, while the latter has received stringent government regulations.

A process of proceduralization in telecommunications law adopted by industrialized nations of the 20th century is observed. This trend has opposed the implementation of specific and technical sets of legislations governing the telecommunications sector. The proceduralization process has brought the use of general and procedural regulatory norms and the development of greater dependence on regulatory institutions with general character.

Technological, organizational and economic convergence of broadcast and switched point-to-point telephony has required dramatic reforms in the communications infrastructure law, including regulations on the production, collection, processing, storage and communication of information and knowledge. An appropriate regulatory framework is proposed as one that promotes technical and organizational diffusion of communicative functions in society.

The imminent technological convergence between the telecommunication and media sectors has raised the issue regarding the construction of a regulatory framework that promotes growth in both sectors, assures market competition and provides consumers and the public with sufficient protection from market failure. Increased competition in the information market is expected to shape this regulatory framework to be an appropriate one.

The European Commission's (EC) Green Paper issued in Dec 1997 discussed the imminent impact of convergence of telecommunications, mass media and information technology sectors in Europe's regulatory policies. EC has argued that this process will make regulations that separately govern the telecommunications, media, broadcasting, audiovisual and computing sectors indistinct, thus, requiring the development of a new regulatory policy. The only dilemma, which they consider, in this situation is the construction of an appropriate policy that can justly regulate this convergence of sectors.