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This article explores the challenges of security governance and strategic stability posed by artificial intelligence (AI) in the context of major-power competition, specifically focusing on the United States and China. It discusses the impact of AI development and governance on the international system, including the US ban on advanced AI accelerator chip sales to China and restrictions on sending sensitive US data to China. The article emphasizes the need for effective AI security governance, global collaboration, and consensus to address these challenges. It also highlights the different models of AI security governance adopted by the US and China, reflecting their choices in balancing innovation, risk management, privacy protection, and security needs. The document emphasizes the importance of cooperation between the two countries in AI governance to contribute to global AI security governance. [Extracted from the article]

The article emphasizes the importance of partnerships in public health and outlines the author's goals for the year. Topics discussed include strategies for increasing membership through student chapters and affiliate memberships, establishing a mental health section to address a critical public health need, and enhancing collaboration with the periodical to showcase the intersection of urban planning and public health.

The widespread storage of documents through the range of Internet technologies known as "the cloud" offers tremendous convenience but also creates significant risks of exposure to third parties. In particular, law enforcement investigators seeking access to potentially relevant evidence have aggressively and extensively used the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 ("ECPA") to execute digital searches. But a relatively obscure provision of ECPA, § 2703, allows law enforcement to search a person's Fourth Amendment "papers" without them ever learning that a warrant has allowed the exposure of their private, sensitive, and possibly incriminating documents. What is more, federal and state law enforcers use their § 2703 secret search power many thousands of times per year, mostly on individuals that they will likely never charge with crimes. This practice denies countless cloud users their traditional Fourth Amendment right to notice of a search. This Article examines the problem of unannounced searches in the cloud and the legal and technological frameworks in which those searches operate. By analyzing the problem through the frames of communications privacy, constitutional history, and Fourth Amendment doctrine, the Article concludes that the current practice of unannounced searches under ECPA fails to meet the basic notice requirement of the Fourth Amendment--a foundational civil liberty that is ancient, important, and hard-won, but also difficult to vindicate through litigation. The Article first explains the ancient origins of the right of notice and how it is threatened by the current federal statutory framework for digital searches. At the policy level, it then identifies the elements that must be incorporated into long-overdue reforms to federal electronic surveillance law to comply with basic norms of the Fourth Amendment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1986, Congress enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) to afford privacy protections to electronic communications and it has not changed since its inception. The ECPA has proven problematic as technology has advanced, but Congress has not modified the law to reflect this change. Courts have struggled to apply the law to both old technologies that have been updated and new technologies that have emerged. The ECPA needs to be revised to reflect the new advances in technology or be repealed and replaced with a new approach. This will ensure that consumer data will be safeguarded while in the hands of data provider companies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("Wiretap Act") prohibits the intentional interception of an electronic communication. However, "parties to a communication" can intercept a communication without Wiretap Act liability. Parties include the intended recipients of a communication. When internet users navigate the internet, they communicate with websites using GET requests. The users' GET requests call out to websites and websites respond by providing the websites' content to the users. During this process, websites receive user data. This data can include information about the website visited, the search terms used to locate the website, and referral data identifying the last web page the users visited. Digital advertisers may populate websites users visit with advertisements or plug-ins that allow users to "like" content. In doing so, advertisers generate secondary GET requests between users and advertisers. Secondary GET requests are duplicates of the GET requests between users and websites insofar as they share user data. Advertisers retain and identify this data. In the Third and Ninth Circuits, internet users argued that digital advertisers used the duplicate GET requests to intercept user data contained in the GET requests between users and websites--arguably a violation of federal law under the Wiretap Act. Digital advertisers invoked the party exception, arguing that advertisers were parties to the duplicate GET request between internet users and advertisers. If so, the advertisers would be parties to the user data received in the duplicate GET requests and exempt from Wiretap Act liability. The Third Circuit held that the party exception applied to the advertisers' duplicate GET requests. The Ninth Circuit rejected this approach and held that the party exception did not apply. This Note argues that digital advertisers are unintended recipients that are ineligible for the party exception. First, transmitting duplicate user data via a second communication is an effective--and sometimes necessary--method of interception for electronic communications on the internet. In that case, duplicate GET requests may indicate interception. This requires courts to analyze shared data, not individual GET requests. Second, equating a direct recipient of a duplicate GET request with an intended recipient lacks judicial support and cannot properly decide party status. Third, users enter URLs or click hyperlinks to navigate the internet. This identifies the websites that users visit as the intended recipients of user data, not digital advertisers. As such, advertisers are best categorized as unintended recipients and therefore ineligible for the Wiretap Act's party exception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explains that Internet service providers, and other electronic communications service providers (ECSPs) are not guilty of wiretapping when they use a digital user's information to create targeted advertisements under Wiretap Act. It mentions comparison of Wiretap Act with European Union General Data Protection Regulation and the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018.

The article informs on the limitations that the Fourth Amendment to U.S. Constitution places on the government's ability to regulate electronic security technologies, particularly limitations upon the use of digital encryption. It informs Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures; improving privacy of encrypted information; and enactment of Electronic Communications Privacy Act for addressing the same.

The article discusess augmented reality, its application to Pokémon Go, and the surrounding data privacy concerns in the U.S. Topics discussed include framework of data privacy law in the country, and difference in privacy actions against the government and non-government entities; privacy issues associated with geolocation information; and enactment of Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 for addressing privacy issues in the country.

The article focuses on regulating biometric data through the lens of individual privacy concerns in the U.S. Topics discussed include risks biometrics pose to security and privacy; precedent dealing with issues relating to biometrics; and enactment of Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act of 2008, Electronic Communications Privacy Act, and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act for addressing the same.

The article focuses on the role of lawyers in enhancing the experience of clients while counseling about social media and divorce in the U.S. It mentions about discussing social media, communication by email and text message, and access to online accounts with clients; and enactment of Electronic Communications Privacy Act for maintaining online privacy of clients.

Abstract The advent of cloud computing has brought the computing power of corporate data processing and storage centers to lightweight devices. Software-as-a-service cloud subscribers enjoy the convenience of personal devices along with the power and capability of a service. Using logical as opposed to physical partitions across cloud servers, providers supply flexible and scalable resources. Furthermore, the possibility for multitenant accounts promises considerable freedom when establishing access controls for cloud content. For forensic analysts conducting data acquisition, cloud resources present unique challenges. Inherent properties such as dynamic content, multiple sources, and nonlocal content make it difficult for a standard to be developed for evidence gathering in satisfaction of United States federal evidentiary standards in criminal litigation. Development of such standards, while essential for reliable production of evidence at trial, may not be entirely possible given the guarantees to privacy granted by the Fourth Amendment and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. Privacy of information on a cloud is complicated because the data is stored on resources owned by a third-party provider, accessible by users of an account group, and monitored according to a service level agreement. This research constructs a balancing test for competing considerations of a forensic investigator acquiring information from a cloud. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Because the internet is so thoroughly global, nearly every aspect of internet governance has an extraterritorial effect. This is evident in a number of high-profile cases that cover a wide range of subjects, including law enforcement access to digital evidence, speech disputes, such as requests to remove offensive or hateful web content, intellectual property disputes, and much more. Although substantively distinct, these issues present courts with the same jurisdictional challenge: how to ensure one state's sovereign interest in regulating the internet's local effects without infringing on other states' interests. The answer, for better or for worse, is comity, the foreign affairs principle that informs a number of sovereign-deference doctrines. Sovereignty arguments have pervaded a number of recent consequential cases, including Google's challenge to the “right to be forgotten" in Europe and Microsoft's challenge to a court order to produce foreign-held emails under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act. These arguments will continue to play a significant role in future cases. Yet the proper application of foreign affairs law to cross-border internet disputes is not what many litigants and courts have claimed. Crucially, no sovereign-deference doctrine prohibits global takedown requests, foreign production orders, or other forms of extraterritorial exercises of jurisdiction over the internet. To the contrary, one of the key lessons of the sovereign-deference jurisprudence is that in order to avoid tensions between sovereigns, courts often enable, rather than inhibit, extraterritorial exercises of authority. This Article has three goals. First, it seeks to identify and characterize an emerging body of case law, which we might call data-sovereignty litigation: a diverse set of cases pitting national sovereigns against large internet firms. Second, the Article aims to show how the doctrinal rules of sovereign deference ought to apply to these disputes. Finally, it makes the case for a policy of sovereign deference beyond courts. The stakes are considerable. If we do not find ways to accommodate legitimate sovereign claims over global cloud activity, states will forcefully assert those interests-typically by taking physical control over local network infrastructure-imposing significant costs on entrepreneurship, privacy, and speech. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The providers of network services (and the makers of network devices) know an enormous amount about our lives. Because they do, these network intermediaries are being asked with increasing frequency to assist the government in solving crimes or gathering intelligence. Given how much they know about us, if the government can secure the assistance of these intermediaries, it will enjoy a huge increase in its theoretical capacity for surveillance--the ability to learn almost anything about anyone. This has the potential to create serious social harm, even assuming that the government continues to adhere to ordinary democratic norms and the rule of law. One possible solution to this problem is for network intermediaries to refuse government requests for aid and attempt to sustain those refusals in court. Although this proposal has received an enormous amount of attention, there is substantial cause for skepticism about how well it can work. Congress has given the government wide authority to demand information and assistance through tools like subpoenas, the Stored Communications Act, and Title III. Even when the government does not have specific statutory authorization, courts have interpreted the All Writs Act to authorize a great deal of open-ended aid, consistent with the well-settled Anglo-American history of third-party assistance in law enforcement. It is also far from unheard of for the executive to read restrictions on its surveillance authority narrowly, and its own inherent powers broadly, to engage in surveillance that is quasi- or extra-legal. A superior (or at least complementary) response to the problem is to restrict network intermediaries themselves by limiting how much they can learn about us and how long they can retain it. This approach treats enhanced state surveillance as a problem created by the intermediaries' stockpiling of data, and proposes to solve it at the root--which would, as a useful side effect, solve a number of other problems created by that stockpiling, too. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alexa, Amazon's digital voice assistant, and devices like it, are increasingly common. With this trend comes growing problems, as illustrated by a murder investigation in Bentonville, Arkansas. Police wanted Amazon to turn over data associated with the suspect's Echo device, hoping it had overheard something on the night of the murder. The case sparked wide-spread interest in the privacy implications of in-home devices that record audio of users. But the biggest threat to user privacy is not that Alexa may overhear a crime--it is that law enforcement will use such devices in new ways that users are not prepared for during investigations. Thus, a solution is needed for users to have the confidence and certainty that bringing these devices into their homes will not erode their privacy. This Comment proposes that companies should ensure privacy protections are engineered into their devices, and that legislatures should adopt forward-looking statutes to ensure protections for users. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As data breaches, denial-of-service attacks, and other cybersecurity incidents lead to extraordinary economic and national security consequences, commentators increasingly look to the legal system for solutions. Unfortunately, U.S. laws do not have a unified and coherent vision for the regulation and promotion of cybersecurity. For that matter, the U.S. legal system lacks a consistent definition of the term "cybersecurity law." This Article aims to fill that gap by defining "cybersecurity law." Although many articles have addressed various aspects of cybersecurity, none has stepped back to define exactly what "cybersecurity" is and the goals of statutes and regulations that aim to promote cybersecurity. By defining the scope and goals of this new legal field, policymakers can then examine how lawmakers could improve existing laws. Part II of this Article briefly describes the cybersecurity challenges that the United States faces by examining the cyberattack on Sony Pictures Entertainment. Part III defines "cybersecurity law" as a legal framework that "promotes the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of public and private information, systems, and networks, through the use of forward-looking regulations and incentives, with the goal of protecting individual rights and privacy, economic interests, and national security." Part IV explains the current legal regime for cybersecurity and concludes that many of the most prominent cybersecurity laws only address a small portion of the broader legal framework. Part V examines the gaps in current U.S. cybersecurity law and suggests starting points for improvements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusess laws associated with work-related monitoring in the U.S. Topics discussed include workplace privacy and employer monitoring; enactment of Electronic Communications Privacy Act and Stored Communications Act for work-related electronic communications; and impact of Global Positioning System on privacy.

Our personal data is everywhere and anywhere, moving across national borders in ways that defy normal expectations of how things and people travel from Point A to Point B. Yet, whereas data transits the globe without any intrinsic ties to territory, the governments that seek to access or regulate this data operate with territorial-based limits. This Article tackles the inherent tension between how governments and data operate, the jurisdictional conflicts that have emerged, and the power that has been delegated to the multinational corporations that manage our data across borders as a result. It does so through the lens of the highly contested and often conflicting approaches to the jurisdictional reach of law enforcement over data, the so-called right to be forgotten, and a range of other privacy regulations—engaging in an in-depth analysis as to how these issues are playing out across both Europe and the United States. In so doing, the Article highlights the flaws with the straightforward application of old jurisdictional rules onto the new medium of data—taking on recent scholarship on this issue. And it shines a spotlight on the unilateral rulemaking by powerful states and the powerful multinational companies that manage our data, which in turn puts private, multinational companies increasingly in control of whose rules govern and thus the substance of both privacy and speech rights on a global, or near-global, basis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most surprising episodes of the first hundred days of the Trump Presidency was President Trump's tweet stating "that Obama had [his] 'wires tapped' in Trump Tower just before the victory." Of the many questions this accusation raised, one of the most pointed was whether then-candidate Trump or his organization were under criminal investigation such that a criminal wiretap could have been authorized. This question was natural because federal law sets a high bar for government officials seeking real-time access to a person's phone calls or emails. But if President Trump had instead accused President Obama of accessing all his emails from the previous few years, the accusation would have been more plausible legally (if not factually) because law enforcement can theoretically obtain emails older than 180 days by issuing a simple subpoena. Does this difference make any sense? This Note examines the current framework for law enforcement access to private communications and proposes concrete ideas to make that framework coherent. Specifically, it advocates adopting a new system for deciding what authorization law enforcement must receive to access different types of communications. This system would be based on the scope of the access and the sensitivity of the material sought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the laws governing unauthorized access to computerized information in the U.S. Topics discussed include enactment of Consumer Fraud and Abuse Act and Electronic Communications Privacy Act for addressing the same; United States v. Nosal court case on the same; and Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc. court case addressing on computer crime.

Since Warren and Brandeis first expounded on the right of privacy in 1890, individuals' legal ability to protect themselves from unreasonable intrusions upon their seclusion has grown through both jurisprudence and statutes. While privacy rights on a national level have developed, community property laws in Louisiana have not evolved to ensure similar protections for intra-spousal privacy rights. One reason Louisiana law has not progressed in this respect is because privacy rights create a conundrum for community property: How can spouses share property with one another as part of the community, yet still retain a right of privacy from one another in that property? Community property ownership, management, and debt rules cause consternation for Louisiana courts considering an individual spouse's right of privacy. Two Louisiana courts have held that community property rules trump a spouse's right of privacy. Thus, while intra-spousal privacy rights have developed on a national level, an individual spouse's privacy rights in Louisiana have remained stagnant, This Article seeks to provide guidance to the Louisiana legislature and courts as to how to amend current community property law so as to give spouses a reasonable right of privacy' from one another in community property. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The home is often considered the last bastion of privacy and the Fourth Amendment guarantees people the right to be secure in their houses against unreasonable searches and seizures. But today, the government is not the only entity seeking to invade homes to obtain information--technology companies like Amazon and Google are making an aggressive push into homes with devices like Amazon Echo, Google Home, and Apple HomePod. We are entering an always-on, always-connected world. A generation of always-on devices, capable of watching and listening to everything we do, is entering the consumer electronics market. These devices promise to make daily lives easier, safer, and more enjoyable, but they also bring powerful surveillance tools into our most private spaces. Privacy and security issues associated with always-on, always-listening, and always-watching devices are demanding increased attention. After examining the current state of government regulation and the rapid technological development of always-on devices, this Article argues that existing legal regimes are not sufficient to protect consumers. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), for example, can only protect consumer privacy through sector-specific privacy laws that give the FTC oversight authority or by invoking its Section 5 "unfairness and deception" authority. Moreover, existing laws like the federal Wiretap Act or state one- and two-party consent laws do little to protect consumers from always-on device privacy intrusions. While sector-specific legislation like the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) offer stronger protection in certain situations, these laws are not comprehensive solutions to the challenges posed by always-on devices. This Article, developed as part of a collaborative effort between lawyers and data scientists, identifies three major gaps in the current law. First, when and how law enforcement agencies may access sensitive always-on device data is not clearly defined, giving always-on technology the potential to erode Fourth Amendment privacy rights. Second, consumers often lack control over what data always-on devices may collect and what happens to that data once it is collected. Finally, there is insufficient recourse for holding always-on service providers legally accountable for refusing to take data security seriously. This Article proposes model legislation to address these gaps. This propos al enhances consumer control and transparency, regulates law enforcement access to information captured by always-on devices, and requires service providers to adhere to industry security standards or higher security standards set by the FTC. The Article provides a new analytical context to view policies that will increase consumer confidence, protect privacy, and prevent disastrous, costly data breaches as we move towards an always-on, always-connected world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the U.S. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act. Topics include brief technological and legal history of law enforcement efforts to obtain access to electronically stored and transferred information; effects of changing technologies; and analysis of Electronic Communications Privacy Act.

The article focuses on data security in the U.S. Topics discussed include enactment of Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Digital Millennium Copyright Act and Electronic Communications Privacy Act for protecting the same; United States v. Valle court case on the same; and EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc. addressing the same.

The article focuses on the broader research project on Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) reform with prominence driven by two technological developments. Topics discussed include communication through the Internet means that emails and other evidence for criminal investigations, Fourth Amendment protections against unlawful searches and seizures with set of standards under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) and Stored Communications Act (SCA) and differences in criminal procedure.

The article examines laws related to posthumous privacy of individuals. Topics discussed include post-mortem access to digital assets of the dead; impact of digital media on intellectual property law; challenges to signature and witness requirements mandated by modern statutes of wills due to advances in digital technology; and digital information for fear of violating the Stored Communications Act, which is a portion of the larger Electronic Communications Privacy Act.

The article focuses on the federal, state, and international approaches to computer-related criminal law. Topics discussed include constitutional and jurisdictional issues concerning computer crimes, computer crime related treaties, issues such as online speech and child pornography. It mentions that the passage of Electronic Surveillance & the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).

The article reports on the warrant issued by U.S. government under Stored Communications Act (SCA) against technology company Microsoft, by directing it to compel the content of its email accounts because of some accounts involvement in drug trafficking. Topics discussed include decision of supreme court in United States v. Miller case; Electronic Communications Privacy Act for protecting electronic contents; and conditions of SCA for disclosure of customer's account information.

Can the Fourth Amendment protect an individual's right privacy by preventing the disclosure of her location through cell site location information? Does it currently? Should it? Many court opinions answer these questions in both the affirmative and the negative. The rationale underlying each conclusion is disparate. Some rely on statutory regimes, others rely on the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of reasonableness. However, Cell Site Location Information is a technology that requires uniformity in its interpretation. This note investigates the different interpretations of the Fourth Amendment as it relates to Cell Site Location Information. It explains the technology behind Cell Site Location Information, and then proffers a framework to unify the analysis of whether there is an expectation in Cell Site Location Information by modifying the U.S. Supreme Court's Katz test. This note does not seek to offer an opinion on whether Cell Site Location Information should be within the zone of reasonable privacy expectations. Instead, the analytical framework internalizes the privacy interests of the individual and the governmental interest in ferreting out crime. It is striking this balance when analyzing these issues that will help the courts to uniformly investigate the privacy implications of Cell Site Location Information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the enhanced network security measures (ENSM) covered by the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) or the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). It mentions that potential challenges under anti-hacking and electronic surveillance statutes by obtaining consent and authorization with the multi-layer permission-acquisition scheme. It mentions that terms of service (TOS), and user agreements for the prevention from criminal liability.

The article focuses on the importance of teaching of criminal procedure regarding the fourth amendment on electronic surveillance for the law students. It mentions that pieces of legislation is the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) with the telecommunications providers facilitated law enforcements' access to electronic surveillance and involving a narcotics trafficking investigation. It also mentions that telecommunication subscriber's records and social security number.

The article discusses the consequences of the decision of the U.S. court case 'In re Yahoo Mail Litigation'. Topics discussed include plaintiffs' claim alleging a violation of their constitutional right to privacy; inalienable right to privacy; and enactment of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.

The article explores the legislative framework for computer related criminal crimes in the U.S. Topics discussed include introduction of the Electronic Surveillance & the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, federal approaches used for prosecuting computer crime and analyzes enforcement strategies; and decision of the fifth circuit court in 'Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Service.'

The article examines the issue of ownership and management of electronic communications in community property regimes. Topics covered include spousal electronic spying in divorce proceedings and the U.S. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), the ownership and management of marital property in community property regimes, and the application of the community property framework.

The current regulatory structure governing the use of small drones by government and citizens is not yet fully settled, but enough parameters exist in the form of existing and proposed regulations, statutes, and case law that the answer to the question of whether police and private citizens may use small drones to remotely sense or record other people's activities is generally yes, subject to a few limitations. The next set of questions that arise pertain to the methods of collection, use, retention, and dissemination of that remotely sensed data. The current legal landscape in the United States relevant to that set of questions includes common law principles based in tort, the Third-Party Doctrine, federal data protection statutes such as the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the Privacy Act, Unmanned Aircraft System-specific laws, policies and regulations such as the 2012 FAA Reauthorization Act, the newly proposed Federal Aviation Regulations for small UAS, and a Presidential Memorandum on privacy issues related to drone use. Those laws, regulations, and policies, both individually and together, are ineffective in protecting remotely sensed private data. Because states are federally preempted from regulating aviation, a comprehensive federal legislative enactment delineating specific limitations on the gathering of private data via drones is necessary to prevent erosion of our collective reasonable expectations of privacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the liabilities of family law practitioner under the state and federal wiretap statutes in the U.S. Topics discussed include the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in the case Katz v. United States, the Fourth Amendment protections enjoyed by the individuals for privacy protection that is endangered by the technology, and ways family law practitioners navigate the wiretap statutes to avoid risks. Provision of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 are also mentioned.

The article discusses what the author refers to as a lack of legal protection for consumers against computer software spying programs in America as of 2015, and it mentions the U.S. Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), the nation's Wiretap Act, and the country's Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. American statutes are mentioned, along with judicial interpretation of the interception of communication under the ECPA. The relationship between law and technology is also examined.

The article discusses the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in relation to the legal aspects of searches of cloud storage accounts using locally installed computer software programs. A reasonable expectation of privacy in America is mentioned, along with legal protections against warrantless searches and seizures in the U.S. Internet laws, a third-party doctrine, and Title II of America's Electronic Communication Privacy Act of 1986 are also examined.

The article examines the U.S. Stored Communications Act of 1986 (SCA). Topics include the development of laws governing the fiduciary access to digital assets, lawful consent, and U.S. law governing electronic communications. Information is provided on the rights of Internet service providers (ISPs) and authorization to access decedents' personal data.

The author reflects on the need of modern Americans to get entitled to the U.S Constitution Fourth Amendment protections. Topics discussed include privacy issues in the era of Big Data, conservation of legal standard of reasonable expectation of privacy by reformation of laws such as Section 215 of the U.S Patriot Act of 2001, business record privacy and provision regulating third party data retention under the U.S Electronic Communications Privacy Act and privacy rights in the U.S.

The article focuses on the development of third-party data sharing in the U.S. Topics discussed include the role played by the U.S Federal Trade Commission in regulating online privacy, the role of FTC in regulation of third-party data sharing and increasing user access and control and the U.S Fair Credit Reporting Act. It mentions the concept of peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing and the U.S Electronic Communications Privacy Act.

The article focuses on the development of the third party exception and the U.S Congress's statutory responses to it. Topics discussed include application of the third party exception, U.S Supreme Court case Smith v. Maryland based on the installation and use of the pen register, the legislation passed by the U.S Congress after Miller to provide protection for consumers' financial records and regulation of law enforcement's use of pen registers, and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.

The article offers information on the purpose, benefits and threats of the governmental surveillance programs conducted by the federal internal intelligence organizations such as the National Security Agency under the provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. It analyzes the role of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court) in balancing national security and privacy interests of the U.S. with reference to the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986.