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This article explores the concerns and issues surrounding the use of generative AI in relation to copyright infringement on literary works. The Authors Guild has expressed concerns about copyrighted books being used to train AI models without permission or compensation. There are debates about whether generative AI can infringe on copyright, as it lacks human creativity and authorship. The fair use doctrine is complex in the context of generative AI and could potentially hinder AI progress or disenfranchise human authors. Authors also worry about the power of large corporations that own generative AI models and the lack of protection and remedies available to them under current copyright law. The U.S. Copyright Office is conducting an inquiry to address these issues and hopes to develop comprehensive guidance on the intersection of generative AI and copyright law. [Extracted from the article]

Korea introduced the fair use provision into the Korean Copyright Act following the model of the US system. Despite its adoption into the Korean Copyright Act, it has not been significantly relied upon by the courts of Korea. This article asserts that strong and robust fair use is crucial for achieving the objectives of Korean copyright law, which is a cultivating culture through copyright protection and facilitating the fair use of copyrighted works. Particularly important in the digital era, fair use serves as a pivotal tool for adapting the copyright system to rapid technological changes. Taking a legal transplant theory perspective, this paper evaluates the process of transplanting US fair use into Korean copyright law. It contends that the oversight of essential considerations during this process has led to a lack of balance between certainty and flexibility in Korean fair use. Following this analysis, this article offers recommendations to refine Korean fair use within the context of successful legal transplants. These recommendations will cover legislative revision, the roles of the courts and the involvement of legal experts to enhance legal certainty, ensure appropriate flexibility, and ultimately, promote the widespread use of Korean fair use. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates how instructors consider resource cost and availability when compiling assignments in their course syllabi. It uses the academic planning model from Lattuca and Stark to frame the influences on instructional material selection. It employs a critical incident technique method, asking instructors to take into account one course syllabus when making assignments. Findings address differences across formats including books, chapters, articles, and video. Findings show differences between disciplines and concerning lack of familiarity with fair use. It concludes that increased consultation with library personnel regarding course books would help provide students with affordable materials in compliance with fair use. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the issue of copyright protection for AI-generated content and suggests that alternative dispute resolution tactics may be able to address this issue until the law catches up with rapidly developing technology. It highlights cases where the United States Copyright Office and courts have rejected federal copyright protection for AI-generated artwork, emphasizing the requirement of human authorship for copyright protection. The article argues that protecting AI-generated works does not align with the original purpose of copyright law, which is to incentivize human creativity. It suggests that alternative dispute resolution methods, such as mediation and arbitration, may be more suitable for resolving disputes related to AI-generated content. The article also discusses the benefits of early neutral evaluation in providing business-oriented solutions and the importance of ADR in international copyright disputes. It presents ADR as an efficient and effective solution to fill the gap in copyright law related to AI-generated content. [Extracted from the article]

Generative artificial intelligence (AI) systems, together with text and data mining (TDM), introduce complex challenges at the junction of data utilization and copyright laws. The inherent reliance of AI on large quantities of data, often encompassing copyrighted materials, results in multifaceted legal quandaries. Issues surface from the unfeasible task of securing permission from each copyright holder for AI training, further muddled by ambiguities in interpreting copyright laws and fair use provisions. Adding to the conundrum, the clandestine practices of data collection in proprietary AI systems obstruct copyright owners from detecting unauthorized use of their materials. The paper explores the exceptions to copyright laws for TDM in the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Japan, recognizing their crucial role in fostering AI development. The EU has a two‐pronged approach under the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, with one exception catering specifically to research organizations, and another, more generalized one, that can be restricted by rightsholders. The UK allows noncommercial TDM research without infringement but rejected a broader copyright exception due to concerns from the creative sector. Japan has the broadest TDM exception globally, permitting the nonenjoyment use of works without permission, though this can potentially overlook the rights of copyright owners. Notably, the applicability of TDM exceptions to AI‐produced copies remains unclear, creating potential legal challenges. Furthermore, an exploration of the fair use doctrine in the United States provides insight into its potential application in AI development. It focuses on the transformative aspect of usage and its impact on the original work's potential market. This exploration underscores the necessity for clear, practical guidelines. In response to these identified challenges, this paper proposes a hybrid model for TDM exceptions emerges, along with recommended specific mechanisms. The model divides exceptions into noncommercial and commercial uses, providing a nuanced solution to complex copyright issues in AI training. Recommendations incorporate mandatory exceptions for noncommercial uses, an opt‐out clause for commercial uses, enhanced transparency measures, and a searchable portal for copyright owners. In conclusion, striking a delicate equilibrium between technological progress and the incentive for creative expression is of paramount importance. These suggested solutions aim to establish a harmonious foundation that nurtures innovation and creativity while honoring creators' rights, facilitating AI development, promoting transparency, and ensuring fair compensation for creators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI) DEPLOYED FOR customer relationship management (CRM), digital rights management (DRM), content recommendation, and content generation challenge longstanding truths about listening to and making music. CRM uses music to surveil audiences, removes decision-making responsibilities from consumers, and alters relationships among listeners, artists, and music. DRM overprotects copyrighted content by subverting Fair Use Doctrine and privatizing the Public Domain thereby restricting human creativity. Generative AI, often trained on music misappropriated by developers, renders novel music that seemingly represents neither the artistry present in the training data nor the handiwork of the AI's user. AI music, as such, appears to be produced through AI cognition, resulting in what some have called ''machine folk'' and contributing to a ''culture in code.'' A philosophical analysis of these relationships is required to fully understand how AI impacts music, artists, and audiences. Using metasynthesis and grounded theory, this study considers physical reductionism, metaphysical nihilism, existentialism, and modernity to describe the quiddity of AI's role in the music ecosystem. Concluding thoughts call researchers and educators to act on philosophical and ethical discussions of AI and promote continued research, public education, and democratic/ laymen intervention to ensure ethical outcomes in the AI music space. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Synchronization (sync) licenses are required for works in which music is synchronized to video and generally have high transaction costs because they must be individually negotiated. Traditionally, sync licenses were obtained by sophisticated parties for movies, television, commercials, and the like. But digital platforms like TikTok have brought sync licenses from obscurity into the hands of every person with a smartphone. This transformative innovation has created new issues for copyright law. First, usergenerated content (UGC) created by individuals and shared on the internet via social media platforms or websites may require sync licenses that are cumbersome to negotiate and overinclusive. Private agreements between platforms like TikTok and record labels and publishers usually fill the gap, allowing most users to play music with their videos free from concern about copyright infringement. However, these licenses do not account for copyright's fundamental balance between access and exclusivity because they are overinclusive: Some content on TikTok may be covered by the doctrine of fair use, in which case no license is required. Fair use is an affirmative defense to copyright infringement that permits the defendant to use the copyrighted work without paying the rightsholder. Second, TikTok's agreements with labels and publishers could be eroding fair use. The ex-post nature of fair use means that risk-averse parties, when confronted by a situation in which the viability of their claim is unclear, are likely to obtain a license not required by law. This in turn can narrow the scope of fair use because the existence of an active licensing market makes it less likely that a court will find a use is fair. Future parties then become less likely to rely on an increasingly dubious fair use defense. In the TikTok context, doctrine about fair use and sync is especially uncertain. The scant precedent in UGC fair use cases appears to be highly fact-dependent, there are few cases that specifically deal with sync rights, and none of those have decided fair use as applied to sync. This Note proposes a blanket, compulsory license for noncommercial UGC sync as an imperfect solution to help correct the balance of copyright in the digital platform era. The compulsory license would return review of public copyright law back to Congress and courts and prevent private ordering from curtailing fair use. Further, valuable creativity would be protected because rightsholders would not be able to withhold permission for use of copyrighted material. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the question of whether generative AI can create copyrightable works by making a comparative analysis between European Union law and U.S. copyright law. First, it is argued that for copyright law it does not seem possible for an entity other than a human being to be the copyright holder, thus ruling out the possibility of generative AI being considered a copyright holder. It is established that in US copyright the door it may be possible to register part of a work made using generative AI, and that in the EU this door remains open and pending evolution, although European jurisprudence already gives some guidelines. Afterwards, this paper explores possible infringement of exploitation rights in the different parts of the training process of generative AI models and in the activities that lead to the generation of content that is like intellectual works. It is concluded that in US law there is a gap in knowledge as to whether fair use would cover these types of activities. In European Law, although there are exceptions such as those in Directive 2001/29, it is not at all clear whether this will be sufficient to cover these activities, or whether the authorization of the rights owner will be necessary. If the latter is true and judging by the wave of lawsuits that have followed against companies and institutions that have made generative AI tools publicly available, it is possible that licensing negotiation may take a central role in the AI industry, with the negative consequences that this may bring for the advancement of science and for the public domain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The emergence of ChatGPT and other related artificial intelligence systems has posed many questions upon the impact that such tools could have on some jobs, including media workers. Serious legal concerns have arisen regarding the learning practices of AI-related companies such as OpenAI and Google. These concerns involve crawling and extracting presumably unauthorized copyright works from news repositories, whose rightholders are often media companies. In this article, we aim to categorize the newsroom practices and routines affected by artificial intelligence. We also explore copyright-law related issues, including AI-assisted reporting, its impact on journalists and the media workforce, SEO and commercial strategies, as well as training and blocking AI engines. The legal solutions applied to solve those questions are also addressed, including technical solutions, fair use guidelines and legal solutions (litigation, legislative reform, and negotiation). Our conclusion is twofold: first, in the unequal fight against artificial intelligence systems, a utilitarian and entrepreneurial conception of intellectual property is enforced; and second, the position of journalists as authors is weakening. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the legality of using parody in Brazil, specifically in the context of elections and advertising. It discusses a legal case where the court ruled that altering a song for political campaign purposes did not constitute parody and required authorization from the copyright holder. The article emphasizes the importance of protecting parody as a form of freedom of expression and highlights the need for creativity and respect for the original work in order for a parody to be considered lawful. It also mentions other cases and legal precedents related to parody in advertising and concludes by discussing the ethical considerations of using parodies in political campaigns. [Extracted from the article]

The legislative report titled "Protecting Lawful Streaming Act of 2020" discusses the Act's goal of combatting unlawful streaming of copyrighted material by increasing criminal penalties. It allows the Department of Justice to bring felony charges against those who illegally stream copyrighted material for commercial advantage or financial gain. The report emphasizes the need for public education about the consequences of digital piracy and illegal streaming. It examines previous acts and legal frameworks related to copyright infringement and acknowledges the challenges of keeping up with evolving technology. The report suggests a combined approach of legal measures and educational initiatives to create a cultural shift and reduce the demand for pirated content. [Extracted from the article]

The article discusses the intersection of generative artificial intelligence (AI) and copyright law, particularly in the context of architectural works. It explores how generative AI technologies are reshaping the creative landscape and the legal challenges they pose in terms of copyright infringement. It is reported that the rise of generative AI has led to a cascade of class actions against AI companies, raising questions about authorship, rights allocation, and fair use.

The article focuses on the intersection of copyright law and generative AI (artificial intelligence), particularly in relation to the concepts of fairness and fair use.

The article focuses on the complex and often contentious relationship between content creators who produce Let's Play videos and the video game developers who own the rights to the games being played. It highlights the challenges creators face due to YouTube's automated Content ID system, which frequently flags and removes videos for alleged copyright violations, and the lack of clear legal guidelines governing the fair use of video game content.

The article discusses the need for a federal right of publicity in the United States to address inconsistencies and lack of uniformity in state laws. Currently, different states have different definitions and protections for the right of publicity, leading to inconsistent results and forum shopping. A federal law would provide clarity and consistency by defining what is protected and for how long. The article proposes that a federal right of publicity should protect a person's name, image, likeness, voice, and signature from unauthorized use in endorsing or promoting commercial endeavors. It argues against dividing the right into categories based on the level of fame achieved. The article suggests that a federal right of publicity should have an initial period of exclusivity, followed by a requirement for use to maintain the right. It also proposes exceptions for news, public affairs, sports broadcasts, and political campaigns, as well as general First Amendment and fair use defenses. The article concludes that a federal right of publicity would protect individuals' rights while promoting creativity and public discourse. [Extracted from the article]

In the midst of the twentieth century, a South African musician and composer named Solomon Linda wrote "Mbube." "Mbube" never prospered to the heights reached by its foreign progeny, "The Lion Sleeps Tonight." Disney accrued millions of dollars capitalizing on Linda's magnum opus, while Linda died a pauper. In the aftermath, the postcolonial Republic of South Africa remains scarred and reminiscent of the abject atrocities of Western encroachment. Thus, when the American-incubated doctrine of fair use, a provision that allows for the usage of copyrighted works for an infinite number of purposes, introduced itself at the doors of the National Assembly of Parliament, it was to no one's surprise that the South African public strongly resisted the doctrine which they feared would expose their works to Western exploitation. As a result, President Ramaphosa reserved the fair use doctrine, and referred the Bill back to parliament for breach of international law and deprivation of the constitutional right of property. This Article examines these two postulations, inter alia, and confutes the omnipresent misconceptions of fair use that have been promulgated throughout South Africa by several competing interest groups. It begins by delving into the history of copyrights in South Africa all the way to the introduction of the fair use doctrine in 2015. The Article then discusses the context revolving around the introduction of fair use, which portrays the numerous perceptions projected by the South African copyright industry, the academic sector, tech companies and conglomerates, the print disabled, and US and European delegates. Those that impugn the doctrine conjecture that it is in breach of the Berne Convention's Three-Step Test, deprives authors of their constitutional right to property, is incongruous with other specific copyright exceptions, and is incoherent and uncertain. This Article proves that these postulations are baseless and stem exogenously from competing copyright industries and alliances to generate a dubiety visà-vis its legal status. This dubiety is devised to repel the proliferation of the fair use doctrine globally, while it remains intact and unimpinged domestically. This Article concludes that South Africa should base its legislative affairs solely on its own interests, impervious to the cynical perspectives of exogenous nations and alliances that could care less about its affluence or the welfare of its people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of IDP: Revista de Internet, Derecho y Politica is the property of Universitat Oberta de Catalunya and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This Paper is a reaction to AWE v. Goldsmith (Warhol), which found that Warhol's adaptation of a photograph of Prince, taken by photographer Lynn Goldsmith, is not protected from copyright liability by the fair use defense. The Warhol dissent accuses the majority of being overly concerned with the commercial character of Warhol's use, while the dissent emphasizes the artistically transformative quality of Warhol's adaptation. These different approaches provide strong evidence that the theory of fair use remains unclear to the Court. There is a need for a simple positive theory of thefair use doctrine. That need was largely met by Gordon's article in 1982. I aim to develop the economic theory of fair use further. especially in light of case law since 1982. A theory of fair use is at the same time a theory of the scope of copyright. I clarify the economic basis for jair use, taking advantage of basic concepts in welfare economics. As a general matter, the optimal scope of copyright minimizes the sum of dynamic (having to do with incentives over time) and static (having to do with allocation at a given time) welfare costs. One proposition advanced is that the concepts of economic complementarity, substitutability, and preference correlation provide crucial analytical tools in resolving fair use disputes. This proposition may seem narrow, but it stands the approach taken in the cases on its head. I explain how the approach urged here works ** by applying it to several cases, including Warhol and Google v. Oracle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the challenges researchers face when conducting text and data mining (TDM) due to copyright restrictions. It highlights issues such as limited access to data, confusing license terms, and restrictions on data use and sharing. These obstacles can lead to changes in research design, limited scope and quality of research, and delays in obtaining data. The article suggests solutions such as deidentifying and sharing datasets, collaborating with data owners, and implementing policies that support TDM research. It emphasizes the need for governments to address restrictive copyright laws and expand open access to government databases to facilitate TDM research. [Extracted from the article]

The article discusses the U.S. Supreme Court's 2023 copyright decision on "fair use" in the visual arts, focusing on Andy Warhol's works based on Lynn Goldsmith's photograph of Prince. It explores fair use, its historical background, and the legal dispute between Warhol and Goldsmith. The Court's decision, emphasizing the purpose and character of the use, commercial nature, and the specific use of a copyrighted work, is highlighted for its impact on fair use law.

The article focuses on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith (AWF). It explores the legal aspects of copyright's fair use doctrine and its intersection with privacy and intellectual property, particularly the right of publicity. It emphasizes the case's central figure, the iconic musician Prince and discusses the absence of Prince's interests in legal discussions.

The document titled "Comparative Parasitology Policies and Instructions for Authors" provides guidelines for authors submitting manuscripts to the journal Comparative Parasitology. The journal focuses on comparative research in parasite taxonomy, systematics, ecology, and biogeography. The document outlines the conditions for publication, including author participation and consent, originality of the work, and formatting requirements. It also provides instructions for manuscript preparation, including headings, citations, taxonomic descriptions, acknowledgments, and the literature cited section. The document emphasizes the importance of accuracy and consistency in formatting and offers options for color figures in the online and print editions. [Extracted from the article]

The courts and legal frameworks across the globe have not been unanimous as to whether the right against destruction should be a moral right or not for artists in general and for architects in particular. Both common law and civil law countries have been non-committal and lack uniformity in their approach in this regard. The right against destruction has been distinguished from other rights on the premise that there is no loss/detriment caused to the artist by the destruction of the creation. Despite its beneficent presence in the Copyright Act, 1957 the recent denial of moral rights against destruction to architects in the buildings envisioned and realised by them by the Delhi High Court needs a sound diagnosis and correction as it could have a cascading effect. In this, it deviates from a former ruling of the same (Delhi high court) court without making a substantial reference to it. It raises the issue of whether the basis for anti-destructive sentiment can be placed on the plank of public interest in the preservation of artistic works rather than on personality rights upon which the right to integrity is anchored. An assessment of these contexts will be useful to identify the limits on the right to destroy property particularly intellectual property in architecture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the issue of copyright protection for video games without narratives. The author argues that granting copyright protection to game mechanics and rules may hinder the growth of the video game industry and suggests that patents should be used instead. The article discusses the purpose of intellectual property rights, the principles behind copyright and patent protection, and the potential implications of current copyright law on the video game industry. It also examines the challenges of determining copyrightable elements in video games, the ambiguity surrounding copyright and patent protection, and the use of patents as an alternative to copyrights for games without narratives. The conclusion emphasizes the importance of providing economic incentives to video game developers while avoiding oppressive monopolies. [Extracted from the article]

The article explores the application of copyright protections to architectural works in the metaverse, a virtual world where users create and interact with online personas. It argues that existing copyright laws can be applied to virtual buildings in the metaverse, including original and recreated virtual buildings, as well as hybrid buildings that combine virtual and real-world elements. The article discusses the requirements for establishing copyright infringement and the exclusive rights granted to copyright holders. It also addresses the issue of fair use and the application of copyright protections to virtual and hybrid buildings. The article concludes that current copyright protections are sufficient and do not require significant changes to accommodate the metaverse. [Extracted from the article]

The article discusses a class-action lawsuit against Microsoft and OpenAI's GitHub Copilot for alleged copyright violations. The lawsuit claims that the AI tool, which generates code suggestions, infringes on copyrighted code. The plaintiffs argue that the tool reproduces and distributes their copyrighted work without permission. The article explores the legal issues surrounding AI-generated content and the potential impact of this lawsuit on the future of AI copyright. [Extracted from the article]

In the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress unequivocally considered computersoftware to be a work of authorship. As a work of authorship, computer programs were to receive the same copyright protection as other literary works. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in Google v. Oracle disagreed with this treatment. Being unable to declare that software lacks Feist-type creativity, the Court turned to the fair use defense. Using a fair use analysis that is strikingly different than had been used for any other copyrighted work, the Court effectively attempted to end copyright protection for computer programs. Recognizing the deficiencies in the opinion and in line with a central concept of fair use law that it is always fact specific, future courts should use the holding in Google v. Oracle only where smartphone operating systems are being developed. In all other cases, fair use for computer programs should be evaluated as it is for any other work of authorship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Moral intuitions regarding when it is "fair" to engage in unauthorized copying or derivation from a copyrighted work may often take into account factors that the fair use statute, 17 U.S.C. § 107, does not enumerate among fair use considerations. This project examines one extralegal factor that may weigh in a moral equation: a contrast in relative status between the copyright owner of the underlying work and the accused infringer. Is it more or less "fair" for a teen to sell unauthorized fanfiction based on their favorite movie or for a movie studio to turn a kid's fiction into a blockbuster movie without permission? A number of scholars have observed that copyright law has the potential to promote social justice or, conversely, to establish or reinforce stubborn social, racial, or economic hierarchies. The fair use doctrine provides an example of this duality: it can allow less privileged speakers to "talk back" to dominant culture, to find voices and audiences, and to forge paths to success; it can also allow more privileged speakers to engage in cultural appropriation and exploitation with impunity. The differences between these scenarios may have more to do with who is on which side of the fair use coin than with any of the doctrinally prescribed fair use factors. This thought experiment considers whether and how the fair use doctrine might better promote progress if it took considerations, such as party resources and cultural market share, into account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The digital revolution has launched myriad new technologies in the field of art and cultural heritage law, including digital art, NFTs (non-fungible tokens), artificial intelligence (AI)-generated art, virtual reality and reality augmentation, online viewing rooms and auctions, holograms, immersive experiences, and more. As a $67.8 billion industry, the art market is a global driver of innovation, international collaboration, and national economies, given its cross-border transactions. However, given the extremely rapid development of these new technologies, regulators have struggled to keep pace and implement legal measures that are fit for purpose in this field. Limited oversight has resulted in several claims that have the potential to change the legal landscape. For instance, claims over the theft/misappropriation of NFTs and the related fraud and money laundering that may ensue, as well as a recent class action copyright infringement suit against the creators of a popular AI algorithm and infringement claims over immersive installation and light technologies, demonstrate how new ways of thinking are required to assess cases involving digital property (distinguished from other types of non-tangible property). Moreover, the US Supreme Court has issued a landmark ruling on fair use within the copyright context, which will be relied upon in the future to determine whether (and to what extent) the appropriation of existing copyrighted material is permitted. This includes both the digital use of physical artworks and the use of born-digital works. Although jurisprudential decisions are made on a case-by-case basis, factual patterns involving online media, digital art, and related technologies could serve as guidance for legislators and other decision-makers when considering what limits should be imposed on Web 3.0. This article will focus on recent US-based claims and regulations and dovetail with existing art market regulations in this jurisdiction (e.g., anti-money-laundering statutes) to determine their impact on new technologies, whether directly or indirectly. Finally, the article highlights ongoing trends and preoccupations to provide an overview of the shifting legal landscape. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rapid proliferation of artificial intelligence (AI) technology, particularly the deployment of generative AI in the creation of short videos, has exposed the anachronistic and incomplete nature of the copyright limitations and exceptions (L&E) within the Copyright Law of China. The US jurisprudential approach, characterized by the four-factor fair use analysis and the doctrine of transformative use, has been embraced in China by courts as 'general legal principles'. These principles have been localized within the restrictive framework of the Berne Convention's three-step test. However, the application of these principles to China's burgeoning AI and AI-generated content industry, exemplified by the short video sector, reveals a complex landscape. The purposes behind the utilization of copyrighted works are multifaceted, and the intense rivalry between 'long' and 'short' videos that represent established and emerging giant Internet platform enterprises further muddies the waters in the application of the American 'purpose transformation' concept. A better alternative would be to seek guidance from the Copyright Law of Japan. By grounding decisions in pre-existing, enumerated copyright exceptions, systematically categorizing L&E scenarios, and delineating key considerations for various categories, the judiciary can be steered towards a more nuanced and equitable resolution of individual cases and strike a balance between the interest of copyright holders, Internet users, and the emerging Internet platform enterprises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the intersection of transformative uses and the right to prepare derivative works in copyright law, examining the potential conflicts and commonalities between these concepts. Topics include the evolving definition of "transformative" uses, the impact of the Supreme Court's decisions in Google v. Oracle and Andy Warhol Found. v. Goldsmith, and a proposal to refocus on the fourth fair use factor.

We propose a revised definition of "argument scheme" that focuses on describing argumentative performances and normative assessments that occur within an argumentative context, the social context in which the scheme arises. Our premise-and-conclusion structure identifies the typical instantiation of an argument in the argumentative context, and our critical framework describes a set of normative assessments available to participants in the context, what we call practically normative assessments. We distinguish this practical normativity from the rationally or universally normative assessment that might be imposed from outside the argumentative context. Thus, the practical norms represented in an argument scheme may still be subject to rational critique, and the scheme avoids the is/ought fallacy. We ground our theoretical discussion and observations in an empirical study of US district court opinions resolving legal questions about copyright fair use and the lawyers' briefs that led to them, instantiating our definition of argument scheme in the "argument for classification by precedent." Our definition addresses some criticisms the argument-scheme construct has received. For example, using our data, we show that a minimally well formed instance of this type of argument does not shift any conventional burden from the proponent of the argument to its skeptics. We also argue that these argument schemes need not be seen as dialogical. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Three copyright doctrines focus more than any others on the contributions of authors to visual artworks: originality, substantial similarity, and fair use. Questions regarding the aesthetics of works of authorship filter into judicial determinations under each of these doctrines. This Article comments on a trend among courts hearing visual arts cases to de-emphasize substantial similarity analyses and shift infringement determinations almost entirely to the fair use defense. The trend has troubling procedural fairness consequences. Without a full evidentiary record about the artworks they encounter in infringement cases, courts' ability to properly evaluate whether the use of appropriated material in a second work is justified, or whether expression has been taken from the first work for some other (infringing) purpose, is compromised. If courts fail to properly understand works because they do not fully analyze basic infringement claims, it can also affect later users and owners of artworks. Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith illustrates the conflicts appellate courts face when they are forced to analyze cases solely through the lens of fair use. This Article embraces Warhol's majority opinion but suggests that the dissent's concerns about judicial reluctance to engage with and understand creative works aesthetically are not entirely misplaced. Such engagement should happen earlier in the infringement inquiry, however--not merely as part of a fair use analysis. This Article expands the 2022 Meyer Lecture delivered by this Author shortly after oral arguments concluded in the Warhol litigation. It urges that to ensure the best outcomes for all artists, courts should apply a procedurally conscious approach to analyzing copyright infringement cases involving visual artworks. Specifically, district courts should establish a solid record that the first work is original; then inquire whether the second work infringes, applying the test for substantial similarity. Only if they find infringement should courts consider the affirmative defense of fair use. Following the proper procedural path is crucial to balancing all parties' interests--particularly when the works of two artists are involved. Allowing both the first and the second artists equal voice in representing the originality of their contributions is necessary to ensure an adequate factual record in copyright litigation. Courts require this record to anticipate the impact of their rulings on future litigants and the art world at large. These goals are consistent with copyright jurisprudence, which encourages creativity and original contributions to the creative lexicon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last few years, due largely to breakthroughs in deep learning technologies, artificial intelligence (AI) has begun to step into the shoes of human content generators and make valuable creative works at scale. Before the end of the decade, a significant amount of art, literature, music, software, and web content will likely be created by Al rather than traditional human authors. Yet the law lags behind this technological evolution by prohibiting copyright protection for AI-generated works. The predominant narrative holds that even if AI can automate creativity, this activity is not the right sort of thing to protect, and that protection would even harm human artists. AI-generated works challenge beliefs about human exeeptionalism and the normative foundations of copyright law, which until now have offered something for everyone. Copyright can be about ethics and authors and protecting the sweat of a brow and personality rights. Copyright can also be about the public interest and offering incentives to create and disseminate content. But copyright cannot have it all with AI authors-there is valuable output being generated, but by authors with no interests to protect. This Article argues that American copyright law is, and has traditionally been, primarily about benefiting the public interest rather than benefiting authors directly. As a result, AI-generated works are precisely the sort of thing the system aims to protect. Protection will encourage people to develop and use creative Al which will result in the production and dissemination of new works. Taken further, attributing authorship to Al that functionally does the work of a traditional author will promote transparency, efficient allocations of rights, and even counterintuitively protect human authors. AI-generated works also promise to radically impact other fundamental tenets of copyright law such as infringement, protection of style, and fair use. How the law should respond to AI activity has lessons more broadly for thinking about what rules should apply to people, machines, and other sorts of artificial authors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research is a peer-reviewed journal that welcomes research articles from scholars around the world. The journal uses Digital Object Identifier (DOI) for each article and is published four times a year. The editorial review process relies on the cooperation of authors and reviewers. The journal has policies in place for retraction of articles, digital preservation, handling complaints, conflicts of interest, publication ethics, and peer review. The double-blind review process is used, and referees are selected based on their expertise in the field. The acceptance or rejection of a manuscript is based on the evaluations of the referees. The journal also accepts comments on previously published articles, and there are technology-based quality assurance measures in place, such as readability tests, plagiarism detection, and appropriate citation formats. Contributors are encouraged to perform word count, spelling, and grammar checks before submission. [Extracted from the article]

The article discusses the importance of attribution, especially in the context of the Supreme Court decision regarding the artist Andy Warhol's use of a copyrighted photograph. It reports that the proper attribution is crucial for transparency, provenance, and respecting the moral rights of creators, while also highlighting the need for transparency in the age of artificial intelligence and derivative works.