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The inter-governmental Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) was established within the framework of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter to support the struggle of the Palestinian people, empower them to attain their inalienable rights, and ensure global and regional peace. The OIC requires all member states to adhere to its principles. However, despite the Zionist regime's persistent efforts to quietly plan the annexation of occupied territories and its failure to respect the minimum rights set forth in international law for the Palestinian people, some Arab states have signed peace agreements to normalize their relations with Israel. This study employs a descriptive-analytical approach to examine the international legal aspects of the normalization of relations between certain Arab states and the Zionist regime. It explores the Zionist regime's disregard for international law and regional requirements, as well as the need for other OIC member states to support the Palestinian people in accordance with the provisions of the Organization. The study aims to shed light on the dimensions of international law surrounding the normalization of relations between certain Arab states and the Zionist regime, highlighting the Zionist regime's non-compliance with international law and regional requirements, and emphasizing the necessity for other member states of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation to support the Palestinian people within the goals and requirements of the OIC. Additionally, the study underscores the importance of the OIC's role in effectively maintaining regional peace and stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Avicenna was one of the premodern philosophers who argued for the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), namely the claim that everything has a cause and that no uncaused beings can exist. One of the consequences of PSR is necessitarianism, which is the assertion that whatever exists actually also exists necessarily because each and every member of the causal chain is determined by antecedent causes. PSR thus goes against human intuition that suggests that things could have been otherwise. My goal is to investigate whether post-Avicennian authors tried to mitigate the necessitarian consequences of PSR by excluding human will from it. I will concentrate on the comparison between Na~īr al-Dīn al-Tūsī’s (d. 1274) Persian treatise Jabr va qadar and his theological summa Tajrīd al-iʿtiqād. The immediate reason for choosing this issue is al-Tūsī’s assertions that humans intuitively know that they are autonomous agents of their actions, which seems to contradict the universal applicability of PSR. I will argue that al-Tūsī espoused somewhat different views on free will. Depending on the character of the texts and the period in which they were written, sometimes being consistent with Avicenna while other times engaging with Muʿtazilism. I will show how al-Tūsī left room for human freedom, however causally ineffective at times, which he understood as a different kind of determination that is able to act independently of the other types of determination to which humans are subject, be they physical or divine. Overall, the discussion tests al-Tūsī’s allegiance to either Avicennian philosophy or Shiʿi theology and even forces him to take a stance against Avicenna’s view on knowledge in some of his works. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We empirically explore whether perceptions of (in)determinism are related to the willingness to tolerate uncertainty. We argue that the belief in indeterminism supports a sense of personal autonomy and independence from external influence, a stance that provides protection from perceived uncertainties. Our preliminary study (N = 61) suggests that the belief in an indeterminate world is positively associated with uncertainty tolerance, whereas beliefs in free will and metaphysical dualism are not. We extend these findings by examining proxies of indeterminism belief in a cross-national dataset (N = 31 countries). We find that greater political and personal freedom is associated with higher tolerance for uncertainty, whereas religious belief, which posits a world determined by divine powers, is negatively associated with uncertainty tolerance. With these theoretical ideas and empirical findings, we hope to stimulate research to further advance our understanding of the association between belief in indeterminism and tolerating uncertainty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research has shown that prosocial behavior not only benefits the person being helped, but also promotes the well‐being of the person helping. Still, several specific characteristics of the helping situation have not yet been considered in one single study. Thus, we examined under which circumstances the helper's well‐being is more or less positively influenced. We carried out a 7‐day diary study with 363 participants who reported on their everyday prosocial behavior as well as their well‐being. We examined the effect of 13 potential moderation variables based on theoretical assumptions of self‐determination theory and theories about reciprocity and altruism, as well as invested resources. Overall, the results replicated the positive effect of prosocial behavior on well‐being. However, the helper's autonomy, the recipient's gratitude and low responsibility for the situation, the improvement of the situation through helping, and low expected self‐blame (when not helping) on the side of the helper were necessary conditions. Moreover, taking within‐subject effects into consideration, significant random effects in multilevel models showed that the effect of prosocial behavior on well‐being can highly differ from person to person, emphasizing that not all people under all circumstances are happier when they help others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question of the nature of free will remains a perennial challenge for philosophy. The French philosopher Henri Bergson was one who sought to address this challenge. He argued that traditional conceptions of the free-will debate would not suffice. He suggested that both determinist and libertarian accounts fall foul of spatializing tendencies. Bergson's first major work, Time and Free Will, sought to ground his understanding of freedom, in contrast to traditional understandings, in the concept of duration. Bergson, however, actively resisted attempts to define clearly freedom, which he believed ultimately leads to a spatializing of freedom. By attending to Bergson's concept of duration in Time and Free Will, and how this concept relates to freedom, it becomes possible to articulate a positive conception of freedom. This becomes important when arguing for the validity of Bergson's ideas in the current climate. Thus, a positive conception of freedom for Bergson can be "defined" as "the creation of the new within the flow of duration." It is, however, not something that can be defined, but is something that can be located. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay introduces the 40th Annual Spindel Conference special issue on relational autonomy and collective intentionality. Autonomy is often discussed in contexts of individual intention formation and moral decision making. When we consider collective intention formation and the decision‐making practices of institutions, a number of questions can be raised: How does the individual autonomy of participants affect the collective process? How do such collective processes modulate the autonomy of the individuals involved? How do institutional decisions and practices affect individual autonomy more generally—in what way do they enhance or undermine autonomy? Is there a significant difference in how we answer these questions if we already think of autonomy as relational rather than in a traditional individualistic way? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Uzhhorod National University Herald Series Law is the property of Uzhhorod National University, State Higher Educational Establishment and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

New medical technologies promise to allow us to transform our core characteristics. Some see these technologies as filled with promise. Others see them as filled with existential risk. David DeGrazia argues that personal identity concerns raised by opponents to enhancement technology fail to impugn attempts by autonomous agents to bring about enhancements with which they autonomously identify. In advancing this argument DeGrazia evaluates five supposedly inviolable core narrative characteristics, concluding that none of these characteristics are in fact inviolable so long as the individual contemplating transformation autonomously identifies with the change they decide to make. Employing insights gleaned from LA Paul's recent work on the subject of transformative experiences I will argue that at least for some transformations, the prospects for autonomous identification are slim at best. The upshot will be that many of the core narrative traits discussed by DeGrazia will be inviolable in practice, if not in principle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do we have free will? In this interview, Helen Steward explains part of her very distinctive approach to the philosophical puzzle concerning free will vs determinism. Steward rejects determinism, but not because she denies that we are not material beings (because, for example, we have Cartesian, immaterial souls that have physical effects). Her reasons for rejecting determinism are very different. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Attachment theory proposes that attachment security facilitates personal growth. However, attachment security origins in relationship history, and thus, how people treat their experiences may influence the outcomes of attachment security. People differ in the degree in believing that human beings have free will, and belief in free will may influence the relationship between experiences and outcomes. The present cross-sectional study investigated the relationships between attachment security, belief in free will, and personal growth initiative. Methods: We used the cross-sectional data of 346 Chinese college students for data analysis, including correlational analyses, regression, and moderation analyses. The nine-item Chinese version of the Experiences in Close Relationships-Relationship Structures Scale, the sixteen-item Chinese version of the Personal Growth Initiative Scale-II, and the seven-item Free Will subscale of the Chinese version of the Free Will and Determinism Plus Scale were utilized. Results: Results showed attachment avoidance and belief in free will, not attachment anxiety, was associated with personal growth initiative. Belief in free will moderated the association between attachment avoidance and personal growth initiative. When the centered score of belief in free will was higher than 0.64, attachment avoidance was no longer associated with personal growth initiative. 85.84% of our data were below this Johnson-Neyman significance region, and 14.16% were above. In other words, only those who scored higher than 0.64 on free will beliefs were able to pursue personal growth despite their high attachment avoidance. Conclusions: These findings suggest that when believing in free will, avoidantly attached people may believe in their ability to pursue personal growth and think their future has more possibilities, not influenced by other factors like social support, which they think they lack. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the account of teleology previously proposed by the authors is consistent with the physical determinism that is implicit across many of the sciences. We suggest that much of the current aversion to teleological thinking found in the sciences is rooted in debates that can be traced back to ancient natural science, which pitted mechanistic and deterministic theories against teleological ones. These debates saw a deterministic world as one where freedom and agency is impossible. And, because teleological entities seem to be free to either reach their ends or not, it was assumed that they could not be deterministic. Mayr's modern account of teleonomy adheres to this basic assumption. Yet, the seeming tension between teleology and determinism is illusory because freedom and agency do not, in fact, conflict with a deterministic world. To show this, we present a taxonomy of different types of freedom that we see as inherent in teleological systems. Then we show that our taxonomy of freedom, which is crucial to understanding teleology, shares many of the features of a philosophical position regarding free will that is known in the contemporary literature as 'compatibilism'. This position maintains that an agent is free when the sources of its actions are internal, when the agent itself is the deterministic cause of those actions. Our view shows that freedom is not only indispensable to teleology, but also that, contrary to common intuitions, there is no conflict between teleology and causal determinism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the post-COVID19 global order, rising geopolitical tensions in Eastern Europe and East Asia reflect the boiling tensions States face on multiple fronts. Within this, the United States is on two fronts as a major player and supporter of its allies that are directly facing hostility. Since the start of 2020, China's hard, military power maneuvering in the South China Sea, deteriorating political relations with Japan and Australia, and the Himalayan standoff against India have seemingly further substantiated the need for the formulation of The Quad, a proposed quadrilateral arrangement with a varying mandate of operations. The proposed structure would constitute India, Japan, Australia, and the United States.The grouping has repeatedly been touted as not as "anti-China." However Chinese interpretation of the mutual intent has equated them to being an "Asian NATO." Keeping this in mind, I draw upon Duncan Snidal and Felicity Vabulas' works on Informal Intergovernmental Organizations (IIGOs) and considers the inherent pitfalls that states may incur while negotiating through the contours of such a structure. Particularly in regards to strategic autonomy, asymmetry in resource contribution and control, and agreeing on a set of fundamental driving philosophies that are certain enough to tie the parties together for the foreseeable future. I focus on contemporary international relations theory, secondary research in the subject countries' Indo-Pacific policies, and the more significant geopolitical trends of securitization in Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Consumers engage in word‐of‐mouth pervasively, and strategies such as different endorsement types are commonly used to facilitate word‐of‐mouth diffusion. Prior work on endorsement has highlighted the advantage of the majority (e.g., everyone likes it) in persuasion so that companies usually use it to shape consumers' preference, but is the majority endorsement more effective than the minority endorsement (e.g., I personally like it)? This research demonstrates that the persuasiveness of majority or minority endorsement depends on the stages of the consumer decision journey. Minority endorsement can be more influential than majority endorsement in the early stage of the consumer decision journey. This paper theorizes and demonstrates that this effect occurs because minority endorsement emphasizes differentiation from the group and does not have any conformity pressure, which could satisfy consumers' pronounced need for decision autonomy in the early stage. In contrast, majority endorsement is more effective in the late stage because consumers regard it as social proof and can better meet consumers' salient need for decision control. These findings identify psychological needs in the consumer decision journey, contribute to the research on social influence, and provide managerial insights for marketers on when and how to adopt different strategies to influence consumers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Theories of free will are often measured against how well they capture everyday intuitions about free will. But what are these everyday intuitions, and what theoretical commitments do they express? Empirical methods have delivered mixed messages. In response, some free will theorists have developed error theories to undermine the credentials of countervailing intuitions. These efforts are predicated on the idea that people might misunderstand determinism in any of several ways. This paper sheds light on the comprehension problem. We first discuss recent efforts to explain systematic errors in how people interpret determinism. Then, we present the alarming results of two new preregistered studies exploring three types of comprehension failure: (a) epiphenomenal bypassing, (b) fatalistic bypassing, and (c) indeterministic intrusion. Our findings suggest that misunderstanding runs deeper than others have supposed. This casts doubt on existing models of commonsense thinking about free will. Unless and until researchers properly control for the kinds of misunderstandings we identify, research on free will intuitions cannot shed light on whether ordinary thinking reflects commitments to compatibilism or incompatibilism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One debate surrounding Derk Pereboom's (2001, 2014) four-case argument against compatibilism focuses on whether, and why, we judge manipulated agents to be neither free nor morally responsible. In this paper, we propose a novel explanation. The four-case argument features cases where an agent is the only individual in her universe who has been manipulated. Let us call manipulation whose scope includes at least one but not all agents existential manipulation. Contrast this with universal manipulation, which affects all agents within a universe. We propose that we find agents in Pereboom's manipulation cases less free and morally responsible in part because they are the target of existential manipulation. We empirically tested this hypothesis and found that people's free will and moral responsibility judgments were sensitive to the scope of manipulation: people judged existentially manipulated agents significantly less free and responsible than universally manipulated agents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Raising consciousness about the ethics of inclusive leisure services is a way to help leisure service providers act ethically. Identification of ethical principles for supporting inclusive leisure services is intended to increase practitioner awareness and subsequent actions across public, nonprofit, and private contexts. Despite the multiple dangers of unethical applications of various activities associated with leisure, few professional papers have analyzed ethical issues pertaining to leisure. Consequently, leisure service participants and professionals need help identifying principles to address ethical situations. This paper proposes twelve ethical principles for inclusive leisure practices and policies that cluster into three categories: universal, that apply to all human beings, social that pertain to modern society, and professional that focus on leisure service providers. We propose five universal ethical principles for promoting inclusive leisure. One such ethical principle establishes that leisure is a primary good. A second is a respect for human dignity by acknowledging and facilitating the freedom to pursue one's view of the good life. A third is that social justice requires individuals to access basic goods and services to realize valued lives. Everyone has the right to self-determination is a fourth principle. The fifth universal principle is that power is pervasive. The next set of ethical principles is specific to modern pluralistic societies. These principles include intersecting identities being commonplace, continuums unavoidable, inclusion good, and diversity enriching. The final set of ethical principles relates to leisure service providers. These principles include that people: identify responsibilities arising from their social positions, base inclusive leisure services on social justice, and consider perspectives different from their own. In conclusion, we address practical implications for each of the principles to assist practitioners in creating conditions conducive to providing ethical leisure services. Also, to evaluate leisure services, practitioners determine people's perceptions of their participation to help assess if participants experienced leisure or encountered barriers that prevented them from doing so. A contribution of this paper is to encourage moral behaviors guided by ethical principles that facilitate the provision of inclusive leisure services. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The objective of this article is to present the principle of dignity and that of vulnerability and their intimate correlation. To do this, the author philosophically explores the notion of dignity and vulnerability and lays the foundations for a Bioethics that transcends the hegemony of the principle of autonomy and starts from the recognition of every human being as a vulnerable being endowed with inherent dignity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on challenging the common view that Confucianism advocates for unquestioning obedience to authority. Topics include the examination of Confucian texts that suggest questioning authority, the distinction between Cultural Confucianism and Philosophical Confucianism, and the analysis of the relationship between authority and autonomy in Confucianism.

Copyright of Synergies Pologne is the property of GERFLINT (Groupe d'Etudes et de Recherches pour le Francais Langue Internationale) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

What is the relationship between the philosophical concept of the “autonomy of art” and the cultural policy-notion of “artistic freedom”? This article seeks to answer this question by taking the Swedish governmental report This Is How Free Art Is (Så fri är konsten 2021) and its reception in the Swedish main stream media as an emblematic example and by reading it symptomatically. Firstly, it traces the critical history of “artistic freedom” and the interrelated term “arm’s length distance”, primarily in the context of Great Britain. Secondly, it critically reconstructs the concept of the “autonomy of art” in the history of Western philosophy by making a critique of a fetishized notion of art’s autonomy in the name of l’art pour l’art. The main argument is that the idea about art’s autonomy, on which the Swedish report leans, resembles such philosophical and art historical idea of art’s autonomy. The claim is also that such an understanding of art does not tie up, either philosophically or historically, with the arm’s length principle, since they ultimately rely on different conceptions of art’s freedom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The special status of Indian Occupied Kashmir has been abolished after the Bhartiya Janta Party's (BJP) government revoked Article 370 of the Constitution in 2019. The bilateral relations between India and Pakistan are marred by the Kashmir issue. Since independence, Kashmiris have been denied basic human rights including the right to choose and the right to life. India has pursued hard-lined policies to suppress Kashmiris' right to self-determination. The central argument of this paper is that Indian government has been trying to legitimize its occupation of Kashmir. In pursuit of this, it has been suppressing the voices of Kashmiris and committing human rights violations. The research investigates how Indian actions following the abrogation of Article 370 have led to grave human rights abuses in Kashmir. The study has adopted qualitative approach and used various reports and published literature on the matter. The issue has been analyzed from the lens of realism, constructivism, and balance of power theory. India has been using excessive military might and tactics like changing the demographics of the region to stabilize and legitimize its rule. It is the time when the international community should take notice of Indian belligerence and abuse of the internationally accepted Convention of 1990, the Covenant of 1966, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. The United Nations must intervene to stop the illtreatment of the Kashmiri people, who have been the victims of Indian defiance for decades. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many popular artificial intelligence (AI) ethics frameworks center the principle of autonomy as necessary in order to mitigate the harms that might result from the use of AI within society. These harms often disproportionately affect the most marginalized within society. In this paper, we argue that the principle of autonomy, as currently formalized in AI ethics, is itself flawed, as it expresses only a mainstream mainly liberal notion of autonomy as rational self-determination, derived from Western traditional philosophy. In particular, we claim that the adherence to such principle, as currently formalized, does not only fail to address many ways in which people's autonomy can be violated, but also to grasp a broader range of AI-empowered harms profoundly tied to the legacy of colonization, and which particularly affect the already marginalized and most vulnerable on a global scale. To counter such a phenomenon, we advocate for the need of a relational turn in AI ethics, starting from a relational rethinking of the AI ethics principle of autonomy that we propose by drawing on theories on relational autonomy developed both in moral philosophy and Ubuntu ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this article is to compare and contrast the conception of heteronomy in the works of Emmanuel Lévinas and John D. Caputo. I am going to examine the historical connections between those authors. The notion of heteronomy will be analyzed in the framework of the idea of autonomy that has gained its most developed form in the philosophy of the Enlightenment. Critical analysis of the use of the philosophy of Lévinas and Caputo will enable me to raise the question about the limitations of the heteronymous approach in ethics. According to my thesis, it is not possible to create a purely heteronomous concept; yet, neither should pure autonomous ethics be pursued. These two attitudes must coexist with each other for the establishment of the possibility of a real moral response to the Other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The logical problem of evil holds that the existence of the theistic God, who is considered omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent, is logically incompatible with the existence of evil. Since there is evil in the world, the existence of the theistic God is then logically impossible. Alvin Plantinga has argued that if God has a good reason to allow evil to exist, the logical problem of evil fails. And the good reason that God has might be the great value of significant freedom -- the freedom to choose between moral good and evil. Wesley Morriston objects that Plantinga's free will defense is incompatible with one of the components of his ontological argument that God is omnibenevolent in every possible world. This paper aims to show that Morriston mistakenly assumes that the free will defense theorist holds the account of significant freedom for both human and divine freedom. If I am right, Plantinga's defense of free will can meet Morriston's objection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Ricoeur Studies / Etudes Ricoeuriennes is the property of University of Pittsburgh, University Library System and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The episode of Chauntecleer's dream found in Chaucer's "The Nun's Priest's Tale" is a controversial topic for Chaucer critics. Some critics argue that the downfall‐escape experience of Chauntecleer is worthy of investigation because animal figures in fables symbolize people (Finlayson, 2005, 495) and thus their rise and downfall sometimes allude to certain theological or philosophical issues such as the original Fall of Adam and Eve (Payne, 1976, 211–112). Other critics propose, on the contrary, that the episode of Chauntecleer is a "joke" and therefore should not be overestimated (Eliason, 1972, 172). These two opposing perspectives have their own rationale; nevertheless, the centrality of Chauntecleer's dream to the narrative of "The Nun's Priest's Tale" is hard to ignore. Considering the philosophical reverberations of the tale concerning the medieval concepts of destiny and free will, this paper argues that the Chauntecleer episode is not a "joke" but a philosophical exemplar that proposes the absence of any demarcating lines between destiny and free will, bearing in mind that destiny refers to the many options decreed by the deity to be available in every single situation for each individual, while free will refers to humans' freedom to decide what to say and do. The paper contends that Chauntecleer's dream shows how free will and destiny—though they are "inconsistent" forces (Boethius, 1785, 195)—mysteriously connive together to form what can be called conditional free will. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, Immanuel Kant's understanding of freedom and morality is explained. Freedom in Kant's philosophy is discussed on theoretical and practical levels, in the context of philosophy of knowledge and morality. Freedom, discussed on a theoretical level, is problematized as a possibility. This problematization is realized with regard to the question "is freedom possible?" While freedom, discussed on a practical level, is problematized through its conditions of realization. On this second level, the main question is "how is freedom realized?" While we should be concerned with the antinomy of freedom on a theoretical level؛ on a practical level we should be concerned with the relationship of freedom with the moral law. In this way, our study focuses on the theoretical and practical manifestations of freedom and Kant's understanding of morality. On the other hand, there are two main claims of our study. The first of these claims is that Kant's conception of freedom can only be clarifled through a comparative examination of his theoretical and practical philosophies. Our second claim is that Kant does not see every human will as free, but only human will developed according to the moral law. We anticipate that, justifying these claims, we will be able to clariffy certain points that are often ambiguous, implicit and or poorly handled in the literature, and provide a descriptive study to the literature that takes into account the details. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reports on the outcomes of an Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander community–led project which sought to build a pathway to reconciliation through formulating a localised community response to the Uluru Statement from the Heart. The research follows a phenomenological research design which collected qualitative data from lived experiences of the participants. Phenomenological analysis was conducted iteratively on the data where themes were identified as integral to achieve self-determination and reconciliation locally: respect, voice, truth, treaty and unity. Each theme comprised interconnected sub-themes where a Local Response to the Statement of Commitment was hewn from these results. This response will be used as a local charter to promote Memorandums of Understanding across the Fraser Coast region, Queensland, Australia, to improve life choices, control decision making and self-determination for all Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples in the region, enacting the vision of the Uluru Statement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this essay, I argue that it is morally wrong for police to lie to suspects in interrogations and that it should be legally prohibited. I base my argument on broadly Kantian considerations about respect for autonomy: Respect for rational agency forbids lying to suspects and there is no plausible and compelling rationale for allowing police to lie to suspects in typical cases of interrogation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this study is to find out and explain how the Implementation of Indiscipline State Civil Apparatus (ASN) coaching is carried out in the Bengkulu City Government (referring to Government Regulation Number 94 of 2021 concerning Discipline for Civil Servants) and what obstacles are found in the implementation of coaching. This type of research is qualitative with the method used being descriptive-analytical. The location of this research was carried out by the Bengkulu City Government. The results of this study consist of two namely; (1) The implementation of indiscipline ASN development in the work environment of the Bengkulu city government is appropriate and refers to PP No. 94 of 2021, although there are several cases that still use PP No. 53 of 2010 as a reference; (a) There are three types of punishments imposed on disciplinary ASN which fall into the light discipline category, namely in the form of an oral warning, a written warning, and a written statement of dissatisfaction; (b) The imposition of disciplinary sanctions while accepting bribes by ASN and ASN officials who commit acts of domestic violence is not in accordance with PP No. 94 2021 and still refers to PP No. 53 of 2010 due to the imposition of sanctions in the form of demotion to a lower level for 1 year and postponement of promotion for one year included in the category of severe disciplinary punishment; (c) The imposition of sanctions or the establishment of severe disciplinary punishment in the Bengkulu city government area already refers to Government Regulation No. 94 of 2021, namely the imposition of punishments in the form of; demotion to a lower level for 12 months, release from position as executor for 12 months, and honorable discharge not at his own request.; (2) Obstacles in the implementation of disciplinary ASN development in the work environment of the Bengkulu city government, namely the enforcement of discipline against civil servants (ASN) are considered not to be carried out optimally. One of these conditions is the result of the enactment of Government Regulation (PP) Number 53 of 2010 concerning ASN Discipline in the Bengkulu City Government, where this PP has not explicitly and in detail regulated ASN discipline. The implementation of these technical regulations is still far from expectations. Moreover, in practice it is very dependent on the subjectivity of staffing supervisors (PPK). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study discusses local autonomy in the context of local regulation. Based on the 2014 Law No. 23 on Local Governments, Article 1, Paragraph 6, local governments are defined as the execution of administrative affairs by local governments based on the principle of local autonomy. Regional autonomy is the right, authority and duty of autonomous regions to regulate and control their own government affairs and the interests of their communities within the unitary national system of the Republic of Indonesia. Regional chiefs are empowered to organize and control the affairs of their regional governments, but must still take precedence over national law. One way to promote local autonomy in governance is to require a system that can implement democratic principles that provide opportunities for citizens to participate in state government. This discussion describes how the role of local regulation has emerged and how it affects central governments in maintaining local autonomy practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The subject of the present article is the problem of the imputability of moral evil in Kant's practical philosophy. I propose an assessment of Henry Allison's approach of this theme in his referential book "Kant's Theory of Freedom" (1990). The reason of my choice is that Allison, one of the most influential commentators in the contemporary debate on Kant's philosophy, strongly contributed to a tendency in the last three decades to neglect a real difficulty that threatens not only the rationale of the imputability of moral evil, but also the coherence of Kant's undisputed thesis of a merely imperative morality for human volition. My analysis concentrates on section II ("Autonomy as a Property of the Will") of chapter 5 ("Rational Agency and Autonomy") of Allison's work, which constructs the meaning of free choice against morality from a conceptual debate on Kant's notions of "practical freedom" and "autonomy of the will". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study attempts to investigate the problem of responsibility as stated by the French philosopher Jacques Derrida in his essay 'Passions: "An Oblique Offering."' Having rejected the previously postulated notions of responsibility, Derrida ventures into positing his own peculiar framing of the concept of responsibility by offering the concept of the secret, which makes it resolve the binary opposition of obligation and free will in responding to, say, an invitation. However, the article argues that to resolve the problem of responsibility, Derrida has recourse to Platonic Forms through the concept of the secret. To work through the secret, a ritualistic ceremony is needed to unfold the relationship between the subject and the other and to be held responsible in this way demands approaching the secret of the other indirectly or offering oneself obliquely. It is in this way that the secret unfolds its conception of responding and responsibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to many, human autonomy is necessary for moral action and yet incompatible with being morally accountable to God's divine commands. By issuing commands that ground normative facts, God demands our accountability without understanding our normative reasons for moral action, which crushes human autonomy. Call this the Autonomy Objection to Theism (AOT). There is an unexplored connection between models of normative reason and AOT. I argue that any plausible AOT must be stated in terms of an adequate model of normative reason. There are two broad metaethical categories for models of normative reason: anti-realist or realist views. I defend the thesis that both anti-realism and realism about normative reasons fail to support AOT by means of a dilemma. If the AOT defender adopts anti-realism about normative reasons (subjectivism and constructivism), AOT loses its force. However, if the AOT defender adopts moral realism, they face the same problem as the theist, as normative fact constrains autonomy. Consequently, AOT is a problem for all moral realists, including non-theists, such as Russ Shafer-Landau, David Enoch, and Erik Wielenberg, among others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Health is the most important component of human life, and mental health even more so; the quality of mental health depends on the way individuals understand social relationships, manage to integrate in the family, in the group of friends, in the community, in social life. The European project KA202 - Strategic Partnerships for vocational education and training (Empow'Them) aims to develop an innovative methodology, which offers continuous, non-disruptive, free training addressed to all professionals. The project is a plea for the important role of self-determination in the recovery and reintegration of people suffering from various mental illnesses. This idea is in line with the Mental Health Action Plan 2013-2020 (WHO, 2013) and the European Commission Green Paper of 2005, which states that self-determination and empowerment of people with mental disorders are fundamental concepts in mental health to improve social inclusion. Self-determination is seen to act as a catalyst for beneficiaries' ability to make decisions about their own lives, remobilize, take responsibility for their choices and become full citizens, regardless of the severity of the illness. The project represents a reflection, search and implementation of viable solutions to support people in a vulnerable moment of their lives. The "Empow'Them" project is consistent with the actions supported by the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UN, 2008), as it aims to contribute to the respect and dignity of people affected by mental illness through professional practices that support their individual freedom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the impact of Indian intervention on the Madheshi parties' claim to self-determination in Nepal. In 2007, the Madheshi parties launched mass protests, demanding the recognition of their self-determination through an autonomous Madheshi province. Mainstream political parties became hesitant to incorporate this demand. The Nepalese government signed agreements with the agitating Madheshis but did not intend to implement its commitments. The Indian government was monitoring these developments; it stood on the Madheshi side and urged the Nepalese government to recognize self-determination and autonomy in the new Constitution. It increased pressure through press releases, parliamentary statements, bilateral visits, and an undeclared economic sanction. Against this background, this paper examines the following question: What is the impact of the Indian intervention on the Madheshi claims for self-determination in Nepal? It identifies that the Indian intervention obstructed the recognition of Madheshi self-determination as a constitutional right and the agenda of the nationalist movement. The mainstream political parties perceived the Indian intervention as unwanted interference in a sovereign state's internal affairs and responded to this pressure by adopting the Constitution without including self-determination. The Indian government continued to pressure through economic sanctions, but the latter just increased anti-Indian sentiments in Nepal. As a result, the Nepalese government re-strengthened its ties with the Chinese government and concluded trade and transit agreements. The Indian government perceived that Nepal-China ties would affect its national interests in Nepal and stayed silent about the Madheshi parties. This silence constructed a permissive environment for the Nepalese government to ignore the nationalist demands and forced the Madheshi parties to concede their self-determination as the ethnonational agenda. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses the issue of the two-level nature of acts of the will, i.e. its ability to voluntarily refer to its own acts. First, we will examine the ancient sources of the concept of the two-level will (Plato and Augustine). Then, we will focus on the views of John Duns Scotus on the types of acts of will, with particular emphasis on the concept of non velle and its application in philosophical and theological issues. Against the backdrop of Scotus’s concept, we will examine the ways in which 14th-century thinkers engaged with his position and developed his account of the two-level acts of will and types of acts of will. Finally, the article discusses a significant change in the function of non velle and the use of this type of volitional act in 14th-century ethics by exploring the views of Buridan and Kilvington. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research suggests that belief in free will correlates with intentionality attribution. However, whether belief in free will is also related to more basic social processes is unknown. Based on evidence that biological motion contains intentionality cues that observers spontaneously extract, we investigate whether people who believe more in free will, or in related constructs, such as dualism and determinism, would be better at picking up such cues and therefore at detecting biological agents hidden in noise, or would be more inclined to detect intentionality cues and therefore to detect biological agents even when there are none. Signal detection theory was used to measure participants' ability to detect biological motion from scrambled background noise (d′) and their response bias (c) in doing so. In two experiments, we found that belief in determinism and belief in dualism, but not belief in free will, were associated with biological motion perception. However, no causal effect was found when experimentally manipulating free will-related beliefs. In sum, our results show that biological motion perception, a low-level social process, is related to high-level beliefs about dualism and determinism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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My aim in this note is to shed light on ways of interpreting Kant's Formula of Universal Law (FUL), by looking at relevant similarities and differences between Pauline Kleingeld and Mark Timmons. I identify both their readings as a formal interpretation of Kant's FUL, in contrast to the substantive interpretations that favor a robust conception of rational agency as a necessary requirement for moral deliberation. I highlight the benefits that arise from Kleingled's interpretation in showing the immediacy involved in the volitional self-contradiction when universalizing a maxim. Alongside Timmons, I address a question as to whether Kleingeld's interpretation is completely free from at least a minimal set of assumptions about practical deliberation more broadly, that seem to play a role in generating the volitational self-contradiction she is defending. I close by raising some skeptical worries about the capacity of this kind of contradiction to translate into a moral judgment triggering action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In two recent articles I have argued that Kant's legal and political philosophy can shed new light on his much-contested account of moral autonomy and that important changes in his political theory help to explain why in his later work the Formula of Autonomy disappears. In the present essay, I respond to comments by Sorin Baiasu and Marie Newhouse, who argue that the changes in Kant's political theory fail to explain the disappearance of the Formula of Autonomy, since in both phases Kant held that laws are given by the people's representatives. I offer additional support for my original argument by developing a more detailed account of Kant's conception of the relation between the legislating representatives and the people they are taken to represent. I argue that Kant's conception of the proper representation relation changed, and that it changed so fundamentally that the analogy at the basis of the Formula of Autonomy was no longer apt, thus providing a plausible explanation for its disappearance. I also address several related comments and propose an explanation for why Kant dropped the very idea of autonomy as a property of the will. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Marcus Willaschek and I have argued against the widespread assumption that Kant claims the Moral Law—the supreme principle of morality—is (or must be regarded as) 'self-legislated'. We argue that Kant instead describes the Moral Law as an a priori principle of the will. We also argue that his conception of autonomy concerns not the Moral Law but substantive moral laws such as the law that requires promoting the happiness of others. In the present essay, I respond to the commentary by Alyssa Bernstein and Christoph Hanisch. In response to Bernstein, I clarify the relation between our interpretation of Kant and those proposed by John Rawls and Allen Wood. In response to Hanisch, I argue, among other things, that Kant's defense of the thesis that the Moral Law is an a priori principle of pure practical reason does not mean that practical reasoning and reasons-based action are impossible without it. It means rather that morally good and morally evil reasons-based action are impossible without it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pauline Kleingeld has argued persuasively that Kant's Principle of Autonomy draws an analogy between two relationships: 1) that between an individual agent and their maxim, and 2) that between a legislator and their legislation. She also suggests that Kant's evolving views on the normative significance of popular elections made his analogy inapt, which explains its disappearance from his later writings. This comment concurs with Sorin Baiasu that the merits of Kant's analogy were untouched by his evolving political views. The analogy presupposes that when lawmakers legislate, they do so as representatives of the people, but even Kant's mature writings posit that unelected lawmakers are representatives of the people in the necessary sense. Facts about whether a lawmaker acquired legislative authority by election, heredity, or conquest do have normative implications in the larger context of Kant's political theory, but such facts are necessarily temporally upstream of the relation between legislator and legislation, just as facts about how an agent became rational are upstream of the relation between individual agent and maxim. Because the analogy focuses exclusively on these two relationships, it cannot be damaged by such upstream facts. Moreover, we should consider the possibility that Kant's Principle of Autonomy compares a human will to the united general will of the people itself rather than to the will of a fallible public official or institution. On this alternative reading, it is even more clear that Kant's evolving views on the significance of elections could have no possible relevance to the Principle of Autonomy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pauline Kleingeld and Marcus Willaschek, in a co-authored article, declare that their purportedly new interpretation of Immanuel Kant's writings on autonomy reveals that his moral philosophy is neither realist nor constructivist. However, as I explain here, John Rawls already occupies the area of intellectual territory to which Kleingeld and Willaschek attempt to lay claim: Rawls interprets Kant's moral philosophy as neither realist, as Kleingeld and Willaschek evidently construe this term, nor constructivist, as they evidently construe this term. Contra Kleingeld and Willaschek, the moral constructivism attributed to Kant by Rawls is not voluntarist, and Rawls's account of Kant's concept of autonomy is not paradoxical. In order to understand autonomy, it is necessary to understand Kant's complex conception of the will, which structures his moral philosophy (as Rawls, unlike Kleingeld and Willaschek, explains). Rawls, like Kant, but unlike Kleingeld and Willaschek, clearly distinguishes between certain importantly different questions about normativity and obligation. Kant's moral philosophy, according to Rawls's insightful interpretation, is a form of objective moral constructivism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his early writings, Kant regarded the autonomy of the will as the supreme principle of morality, as well as the sole principle of all moral laws and of the duties conforming to them. Nevertheless, this impressively sounding principle gradually disappeared from the later Kant's texts, and there is not much in the literature to explain why. Pauline Kleingeld's purpose, in the two articles I consider here, is to address this lacuna and to show that there are good philosophical reasons for this principle's gradual disappearance from the Kantian framework. One of my aims, in this paper, is to formulate and argue for several reservations about Kleingeld's argument; however, even if these reservations turn out to be apposite, my claim is not that Kant did not actually abandon the Principle of Autonomy; instead, I argue that, even if Kleingeld were right and Kant had abandoned the Principle of Autonomy, he would still not have needed to. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article contains a critical reflection of the neuroscientific research of Benjamin Libet which claims that free will does not exist and that it is your brain and not you that takes decisions. The Libetian style research on free will is characterised by a conceptual reduction of free will, a perpetuation of dualistic thinking and the ontological emaciation of free will as a mechanistic action instead of as a complex process. The underlying philosophical and metaphysical assumptions of Libetian research is critically analysed with the verdict that it is not about free will and that it does not in any way addresses the complex nature of free will in humans. Viewed against an alternative neuroscientific perspective on free will, three astonishing features of these studies are highlighted in conclusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many philosophers take mental causation to be required for free will. But it has also been argued that the most popular view of the nature of mental states, i.e. non-reductive physicalism, excludes the existence of mental causation, due to what is known as the 'exclusion argument'. In this paper, I discuss the difference-making account of mental causation proposed by [List, C., and Menzies, P. 2017. "My Brain Made Me Do It: The Exclusion Argument Against Free Will, and What's Wrong with It." In H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock, & H. Price (eds.), Making a Difference: Essays on the Philosophy of Causation. Oxford Scholarship Online: Oxford University Press], who argue that their account not only solves the problem of causal exclusion but also saves free will. More precisely, they argue that it rebuts what they call 'the Neurosceptical Argument', the argument that if actions are caused by neural states and processes unavailable to us, there is no free will. I argue that their argument fails for two independent reasons. The first reason is that they fail to show that difference-makers are independent causes. The second reason is that physical realizers of mental states can be individuated in a way that makes both mental states and their realizers difference-makers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]