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LIBERDADE PRÁTICA E AUTONOMIA DA VONTADE: KANT, ALLISON E A IMPUTABILIDADE DO MAL.
- Source :
-
Prometeus: Filosofia em Revista . mai-ago2023, Issue 42, p169-190. 22p. - Publication Year :
- 2023
-
Abstract
- The subject of the present article is the problem of the imputability of moral evil in Kant's practical philosophy. I propose an assessment of Henry Allison's approach of this theme in his referential book "Kant's Theory of Freedom" (1990). The reason of my choice is that Allison, one of the most influential commentators in the contemporary debate on Kant's philosophy, strongly contributed to a tendency in the last three decades to neglect a real difficulty that threatens not only the rationale of the imputability of moral evil, but also the coherence of Kant's undisputed thesis of a merely imperative morality for human volition. My analysis concentrates on section II ("Autonomy as a Property of the Will") of chapter 5 ("Rational Agency and Autonomy") of Allison's work, which constructs the meaning of free choice against morality from a conceptual debate on Kant's notions of "practical freedom" and "autonomy of the will". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- Portuguese
- ISSN :
- 18073042
- Issue :
- 42
- Database :
- Academic Search Index
- Journal :
- Prometeus: Filosofia em Revista
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 172862991