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The state monopoly on the legitimate use of violence has been at the heart of the development of security as a collective good. Not only has it institutionalized the state as the prime national and international security provider, it has also helped to reduce the threat from other actors which are either prohibited from the use of violence or limited in doing so. Recent developments appear to undermine this role. Not only are private security firms proliferating at the national level, but also are mercenaries and private military companies making a comeback in international conflicts ranging from Sierra Leone to Iraq. This paper seeks to provide a theoretical examination of the implications of the growing role of the market in the provision of security by discussing how the commodification of security affects both the concept and level of security in contemporary society. To do so, the paper is structured in four parts. The first part examines the debate over the concept of security; the second part discusses the theory of collective goods and how it applies to security; the third part analyses the characteristics of the market and what it means for the concept and provision of security; and the fourth part discusses the future of security as a collective good. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper, part of a broader research project, is concerned with the question of how military intervention as part of the 'war on terror' was justified in the three core members of the 'Coalition of the Willing': the US, UK and Australia. In particular, we focus on the ways in which interventions in Iraq were justified to domestic audiences across these states. Building on critical constructivist understandings of security, we suggest the importance of conceiving of security discourse and policy as an intersubjective realm. Within this realm, the ability to legitimise or enable particular foreign and security practices is related to the extent to which these practices are located within dominant narratives of history, culture and identity within the political communities concerned. While political leaders in these three states therefore defined the need for intervention in broadly similar terms, subtle differences in emphasis and argumentation are potentially important not only in communicating how the military interventions themselves are made possible in different contexts, but also in illuminating the possibilities and constraints for discourses and practices of security in global politics. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can we measure compliance with the demands on which economic sanctions on Iraq were conditioned with rigor and precision? We argue that it is possible, but only with a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches to the study of compliance. This paper uses structured, focused comparison of cases to guide the construction of a spatial model for the study of sanctions compliance. It then uses that spatial model to examine the patterns of compliance that Iraq exhibited with the demands of the United Nations Security Council economic sanctions regime in the 1990s. We argue that a multi-method approach allows scholars to compare relative partial compliance in an innovative way. The sharpness that this methodological innovation brings to the study of compliance, we argue, provides deeper insight into the political relationship between sanctioner and sanctioned than current work on sanctions is able to provide. Our model is uniquely able to demonstrate that Iraq's relative partial compliance increased through the early and mid-1990s, decreased in the late 1990s, and increased again in the months following the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. We conclude by formulating hypotheses concerning the reason behind these policy shifts on the part of the Iraqi government, which provide insight into the question of whether Iraq was the 'threat to international peace and security' that the United States claimed in its petition for Security Council aid in the invasion. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In May 2003 the European Union (EU) declared its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) fully operational. Simultaneously the EU appeared terminally divided over the conflict in Iraq and transatlantic divisions were emerging highlighting different priorities and approaches to international security. Given that the ESDP was already a contentious political issue within the EU and for transatlantic relations, this paper questions whether the fall out from Iraq will fatally undermine the development of this policy. It will argue that with clear leadership the EU can develop the capacity to be an effective regional security organisation and that the security preferences and approaches on either side of the Atlantic are not mutually exclusive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Amidst the rancour in the aftermath of the Iraq crisis in March 2003, the UN Security Council was at a crossroads. Some declared that the ‘entire edifice’ had come crashing down, whilst others warned that the Council was more urgently needed than ever. Four years later, we are in a better position to assess what the Iraq crisis revealed about the efficacy of the UN collective security architecture in the lead-up to war, and what the implications of that crisis are for its future evolution. In part one, the paper addresses these two questions in turn, providing a focused political and discursive analysis of the reasons for the Council’s collapse into disunity.The paper then assesses two separate but related trends concerning the Council since the end of the Cold War. Firstly, the Council is increasingly perceived as both indispensable to contemporary questions of international security, as well as increasingly illegitimate and ill-equipped, as currently constituted, to provide workable answers to those questions. Secondly, the Council’s mandate is widening and deepening in response to new global challengesâ€"terrorism, people trafficking, human securityâ€"without significant corresponding changes to its structure, membership and powers. The humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur illustrates that notwithstanding this expanding remit and normative landscape, consensus and political will amongst the great powers is as elusive today as ever. The implications of these tensionsâ€"an unreformed, unrepresentative and overstretched Councilâ€"are assessed in the context of recent suggestions for reform and trends towards acting through ad hoc and regional groupings. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the ?end? of the war in Iraq, President Bush has been confronted with declining approval ratings. Public willingness to support the continuing occupation of Iraq and perhaps similar future aggressive actions has fallen as the body count has increased. In light of this, this paper investigates whether Iran, North Korea and Syria have exploited declining Presidential popularity in their dealings with the United States. This paper using events data and autoregressive time-series techniques examines the cooperative behaviour of the three states between 1990 and the end of 2004. The research demonstrates that these states clearly factor into their decision-making calculus the economic and political conditions within the United States. The research indicates that all three states have capitalised on the ongoing difficulties in Iraq and are now becoming more aggressive towards the United States which they believe is now constrained in its ability to project force into arenas. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why is the United States widely viewed as losing wars it fights against insurgents? Especially since Vietnam, it is a commonly held perception that the US wins wars it fights against states, but it loses wars it fights against insurgencies, a viewpoint reinforced by the current difficulties in Iraq. This paper tests three competing explanations for this ?quagmire? mentality. The first is that all major states fare badly in wars against insurgents. The second explanation holds that the US does indeed lose more often against insurgencies than other states, due to tactical weaknesses, cultural attitudes, and the US democratic system. However, a major part of the explanation is provided by a third, and completely novel, argument: often, the US does not meaningfully lose against insurgents, but is nevertheless perceived as having lost. American observers tend to evaluate US counter-insurgency operations with an extremely unforgiving yardstick for measuring success. A fair evaluation of success would focus on material outcomes and the achievement of aims, as well as the costs and benefits of not intervening. However, many evaluations of US wars against insurgents are based on whether or not the standards of American democracy are replicated abroad. To be judged as a success, therefore, a US intervention must not only destroy the insurgency, it must create political stability, and construct a democratic government. Utilizing this yardstick for US success, ambiguous outcomes in civil wars are usually seen as outright defeats. The Vietnam War Tet Offensive in 1968 and the Somalia intervention in 1993 are prime examples of at least partial successes perceived, nevertheless, as failures. In 2003 in Iraq, the American public?s view of US success fell dramatically as soon as the conflict shifted from an inter-state war to a counter-insurgency operation, strongly suggesting that a different set of subjective criteria are employed to judge success in these two types of conflict. The unforgiving standards for determining success result in part from the rhetoric of democratic reform often employed by US leaders to build support for interventions in internal wars; rhetoric which forms the basis for later negative evaluations. Furthermore, Vietnam was a searing experience for the United States, and strongly entrenched the ?lesson? that the US loses in quagmire wars against shadowy insurgents. Often, perceptions of failure are a self-fulfilling prophecy, with negative elite and public attitudes leading to US disengagement, and a very real failure on the ground.The paper uses a number of different sources and methodologies, including experimental analysis of American perceptions of counter-insurgency operations. This paper is based in part on research for my forthcoming book, tentatively entitled Victory and Defeat in International Relations (Harvard University Press, 2006), co-authored with Dominic Johnson, which explains more generally the subjective processes by which people decide which country won and lost in wars and crises. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper places Iraq in context with prior efforts of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). Lessons from those prior efforts, and from more academic assessments of the problem, suggest several lessons that could be applied in Iraq and other societies. First, DDR is more likely to be successful if it follows a full political settlement. Second, DDR is more likely to succeed if it is part of a comprehensive peace agreement, as opposed to being fragmentary. Third, DDR is more likely to succeed if a neutral mediator carries out the process. This paper next provides a detailed case study of the DDR effort in Iraq, an effort whose failure was illustrated in the opening paragraph. This case study is drawn from a mixture of original documents and the authorÂ’s own experiences working on this issue at the headquarters of the Multi-National Force in Iraq. Finally, the paper considers the extent to which the Iraqi DDR effort took advantage of lessons learned from past cases, and reflects whether or not these lessons could have been applied to the Iraqi case, and considers the prospects for peace in Iraq. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1945, the United States has been considered the world hegemon, providing international security and economic stability. Its hegemony was established with the widespread consent of secondary nations and via multilateral mechanisms. The Bush administration?s decision to invade Iraq in 2003 frustrated many U.S. allies, which had been supporters of America?s hegemonic order. A growing academic debate centers on whether the U.S. is abandoning its previous commitments and positioning itself as the next world empire. Building on the comparative history of empires, this paper questions the feasibility of building an American empire without the consent of other nations. The argument is presented in two parts. Part one examines the role of consent in empire-building, showing that empires have required at least the tacit consent of other nations if they are to sustain their rule over the long-term. Part two investigates the growing discontent with U.S. imperial ambitions in light of recent developments in the Middle East. The paper concludes by showing that the U.S. is at the crossroad of defining its new role in the world. It either will return to hegemonic strategy with the multilateral support from its allies or will pursue its imperial interests unilaterally. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nearly 25,000 private security contractors are estimated to operate currently in Iraq. Many earn between $100,000 and $200,000 per year – up to ten times more than they were paid in the national armed or police forces where most of them received their training and worked for many years. Unsurprisingly, military personnel are leaving the armed forces in large numbers. This paper examines the emergence of the private military contractor in North America and Europe as a new model of the soldier. It proposes that there have been three ideal-type models of the soldier since the beginning of the 20th century: the citizen-soldier, the military professional and the military entrepreneur. Each of these models is based on distinct notions of the relationship between the citizen, the soldier and the state. In particular, these types of soldiers can be distinguished in terms of their ideal relation with the state, their motivation, their identity, and their connection between political and military roles. Following a detailed analysis of the three models, the second part of the paper proceeds to investigate how the shift from the citizen-soldier to the military entrepreneur can be explained. It suggests that arguments which focus on the changing national and international security environment are incomplete. While the security environment does play a role, its impact is filtered by the changing balance between the ideological principles which underlie the different models of the soldier in the transatlantic region, namely between republicanism and liberalism. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On the basis of a recent commissioned study of different versions of comprehensive approaches and the Danish experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, the paper will discuss dimensions of comparison between the different approaches of NATO, EU, UN, US, UK, Holl ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the 1970s, the EU and Japan have both evolved as an international actor, or ‘Civilian Powers’. They now act even over the issue of peace and international security. This paper argues that the changing nature of both ‘Civilian Powers’ and the emerging need for their shared responsibility in international security. It will particularly focus upon their parallel interests in the Middle East, the Gulf region, and Iraq. It will cover European and Japanese policy towards Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, 1979-2003, and, to some extent, towards post-Saddam Iraq. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a policy analysis of the decision to disband the Iraqi security services and the role it played in the birth of many Iraqi insurgencies. The decision has been heavily criticized for fueling the insurgencies and dismantling institutions that were not loyal to the Baath party but were necessary for the post-war governance of Iraq. Those most heavily involved in the decision (Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Bremer) argue that the announcement of the disbandment of the Iraqi security services in May of 2003 was an official rubberstamp on the de facto situation of an Army that had entirely deserted. Their critics argue twofold. First, the Iraqi Army suffered massive desertions because the coalition army was too small to secure the Iraqi military units intact. Second, the Iraqi army could have been reconstituted had the coalition acted quickly and decisively. Thanks to recently released statements from critical retired generals, Paul Bremer?s book, and other primary source materials released by those involved in the decision, a picture of why the much criticized choice was made has begun to appear. The Rumsfeld Doctrine of a small and technologically-advanced force has proven effective in war-fighting, but too small for nation-building. The failure to govern large areas of Iraq created a market for security that could be filled by those with a comparative advantage in violence, former soldiers. Borrowing from economics literature on autarky, I intend to assess the decision to disband the Iraqi security services and its impact upon the birth of the insurgency as a synthetically created market for security. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why did the U.S.-led coalition intervene in Iraq in 2003? Why is the intervention an apparent failure? Why is this operation still on-going? These questions will long remain enigmatic. This paper proposes to give an answer to these questions based on the U.S. domestic politics and the structure of decision-making in the U.S. More specifically, we focus on the role played by public opinion in the shaping of foreign policy. Our findings lead to a model where the understanding of the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy need to be framed as evolving over time. Three different variables bring rhythm (more or less cyclical) to this timeframe: the level of consensus among political elites, external events and elections. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Security has traditionally been conceptualized as a good, provided by thepresence of adequate military capability. Recent attempts by the US toprovide security in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans, hasrevealed a flaw in this approach-s ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Securitisation theory is mainly developed by Ole Weaver and included in Copenhagen School’s new security framework for analysing post-Cold war security. The literature on securitisation emphasises how a particular discourse transforms certain entities or ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Official development assistance ought to be disbursed according to strategic aims. Strategic here means according to the donor national interest in the shape of systematic long term trend analysis. Foreign aid ought, in other words, be given where there is a maximum of future need (risk of societal implosion and subsequent need for assistance/intervention) and a maximum of likely impact (efficiency of instruments) with special regard to the donor. Futures analysis of grand strategic risks and challenges enables donor countries to comprehend the unity of their states' tools. Security and Development are converging not only on the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq in the shape of civil-military Comprehensive Approach, but also as strategic development as a means of alleviating future security problems with the urgency of security means but without (hard end) security means. Choosing where to invest for development should be seen as a long term investment from the donor countries, not as a selfless exercise. Thinking aid strategically will yield a higher return on investment: more reduction of both donor insecurity and of donor recipient suffering for the same investment. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the Taliban’s hold on Afghanistan faded in late 2001, the United States’ leading European allies contributed enthusiastically to security and stabilization efforts. Contrast this outcome with the transatlantic clash prior to the 2003 Iraq war, which ge ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the rhetoric of state building, during the presidency of George W. Bush state wrecking has been the name of the game. State wrecking is the most appropriate descriptor for the process from autocratic statehood to enduring state failure in Iraq. The country used to be a totalitarian state. It is now a failed state. We focus on the decisive part of state-wrecking: the privatization of force. We draw analytical distinctions between different forms of private force and show that state wrecking in post-invasion Iraq has followed a specific trajectory. The trigger was military occupation and security outsourcing. This has led to the commodification of force and communal self-help in Iraq. As a result, the constitution of legitimate Iraqi authorities endowed with an effective monopoly of force is a daunting task. We nevertheless propose a return from state wrecking to state building. A transitional stage with a multi-level public monopoly of force in Iraq is a promising conduit towards the ultimate goal of Iraqi sovereignty. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1945, states in the international system have cooperated heavily to reduce the threats from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, but their strategies have differed significantly. For nuclear weapons, states made use of international organizations from an early point, delegating significant authority to define, monitor and enforce a collective bargain. In contrast, such an act of delegation occurred much later for chemical weapons and not at all for biological weapons. I argue an international agent may be valuable for producing, collecting, and disseminating information on nonproliferation (or any other policy area) when information reporting is subject to political bias or risks large "sovereignty costs" by risking the revelation of valuable commercial or national security information. I find evidence to support these two hypotheses using a multi-method form of analysis. In addition to using a study of Iraqi proliferation and disarmament, 1970-2004, I analyze state revealed preferences and the structure of the nuclear, biological and chemical commercial industries. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article aims to unveil the way in which Italy has reacted to changes in the international security realm. It traces the historical forces which have formed the strategy for defense of the country, including an examination of the relationship of Italy with the U.S., NATO and the EU. The actions taken by Italy in response to operation Enduring Freedom, as well as military action and post-war operations in Iraq is analyzed. It notes that the relationship of NATO with the EU is a subject of interest in the security circles in Italy.

The article discusses the concept of the Modern Sherwood Forest which refers to internal disorder that draws political activists and allows them to engage in military training and establish clandestine transnational networks. It explains the phases of the Modern Sherwood Forest. It offers an overview of the cases of Lebanon, Afghanistan and Iraq as Modern Sherwood Forests. The author argues that many of the potential threats to global security stem from the Modern Sherwood Forests that are impossible to deter and difficult to contain.

The article looks at profound transformations at NATO. it offers insights on the organization as a language-based security regime which is a set of rules for defining security. It says that the conflict within the organization NATO over Iraq have allegedly produced some sort of alliance identity crisis that is now being corrected. Also noted is that current problems facing NATO are more probably because of a lack of an external threat.

In order to understand how dominant perceptions of ethnic identities are suppressed, revived, and remade through discursive transformations, and to derive theory and policy implications for the Kurdish and other conflicts, this article presents a systematic content-analysis of a major Turkish newspaper from 1984 to 1999. It then documents, divides into sub-periods, and explains the transformation of the mainstream discourse on Kurds during this period. The explanation contributes to a multidisciplinary body of theoretical and empirical literatures on public-political discourse, cascade theories of collective action and social-political change, elite-based explanations of ethnic conflict and democratization, Turkey, and Kurds. It is shown that the discursive transformation occurred relatively swiftly and underwent several stages and reversals, whereby the PKK-conflict, shifting instrumental elite beliefs, breakdown of cooperation among moderates, developments in Iraq, and the cascade dynamics of the mainstream discourse played causal roles. Implications for Turkey?s Kurds, democratization and role in Iraq are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aim: to examine why US and UK approaches to COIN vary and to assess how wide these differences are, to explain the differences and similarities in COIN doctrine and assess the relative succcess of these approaches within the context of Iraq. Proposed outline: 1. Questioning orthodoxy - the debate on US and UK approaches to COIN. Are British and American approaches to COIN that different and if so how do we explain this. Can we go beyond Nagl'es excellent study?2. Examining the causes of the insurgency in Iraq and the mode of operation of various groups involved. Is Current COIn doctrine equipped to tackle this kind of insurgency? 3. Assessing how US and UK forces are attempting to tackle the Iraqi insurgency, is there clear evidence of a different approach, what works and what doesn't? Is success attributable to other factors4. Can the British learn from the Amercians and can the Americans learn from the British. Do we see examples of this synergy in Iraq5. What evidence is there that UK and US forces are innovating in terms of addressing this threat? ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The success of UN weapons inspections in Iraq, performed by UNSCOM and then UNMOVIC, varied over time. I shed light on this variation by conceptualizing the inspectors as agents of a collective principal, the Security Council. The ability of the inspecting agents to succeed depended on two factors: their independence, which allowed them to operate without political interference, and their resources, which gave them the capacity to perform their duties. Both variables were subject to continual adjustment over time depending on decisions made by the Security Council. Because decisionmaking required consensus among the Permanent 5, delegation to the inspectors, and thus their ability to perform, tended to match the preferences of the most reluctant of the veto powers. This made it difficult to maintain a consistently effective regime and also allowed Iraq to exploit divisions within the Security Council.I trace the positions of the Permanent 5 over time to show how preferences within this collective principal affected the degree and nature of delegation to the inspectors. I also compare the success of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC to that of the IAEA, a standing body with substantially more independence and resources. This case is intrinsically important since the failure of inspections was one cause of the 2003 war. This study also has larger implications for rationalist theories of international conflict. A curious feature of the second Iraq war is that its initiation followed a willful decision by the U.S. to interrupt the inspections process and the information it provided on Iraqi capabilities. This raises the possibility that states might prefer not to have information that could obviate the need for war or facilitate a bargain short of war, a possibility not considered in the literature. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]