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Since the end of the Cold War, the EU aims to advance to a relevant and autonomous actor in international politics—especially concerning security and defense politics. Scholars interested in whether the EU member states actually converge in their security and defense preferences often analyze strategy papers qualitatively, focusing on selected countries at specific points in time. In this article, we propose a dictionary approach for analyzing the development of security and defense preferences within the EU over the last three decades using quantitative text analysis. We make use of 163 strategy papers, published by all EU member states and the EU itself since 1994. The findings show that EU member states react similarly to international events, but do not converge substantially in their preferences. Furthermore, there is no substantial convergence to the position of the EU itself. We finally discuss usefulness and validity of quantitative text analysis in comparative research more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Events in the second half of 1995 and the first months of 1996 dramatically illustrated the promise, and the pitfalls, of the Middle East peace process. On one hand, steps toward political, cultural, economic, and environmental cooperation among the parties continued, evidenced by the October 1995 economic summit in Amman and the water agreement signed by Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority in February 1996. On the other hand, serious concerns persisted over the threats posed by conventional arms, weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism, exemplified by the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, exchanges of rocket and artillery fire in Lebanon, and continued suicide bombings. Such events demonstrate the continuing need to investigate the underlying dynamics and problems of the peace process and to propose cooperative solutions and confidence-building measures, particularly in the field of regional security.

Hayes and Zarsky describe the rapidly emerging agenda for regional collaboration on environmental issues in Northeast Asia. In Part One, they describe briefly some of the major transfrontier or regional environmental issues in Northeast Asia that represent a menu of opportunities for cooperation (and potential conflict) between states. These issues include transfrontier air pollution (acid rain only), marine pollution (radionuclides and oil only), migratory species (fish only), and trade-environment linkages related to increasing regional economic integration. Part Two examines the emerging and somewhat overlapping regional environmental management regimes. These include UNEP’s Northwest Pacific Action Plan or NOWPAP, the IOC WESTPAC, the ESCAP/UNDP Northeast Asian Environment Program, and the UNDP Subregional Technical Cooperation and Development Program.

Executive summary: • Cyber operations have become a reality in contemporary armed conflict. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is concerned by the potential human cost arising from the increasing use of cyber operations during armed conflicts. • In the ICRC's view, international humanitarian law (IHL) limits cyber operations during armed conflicts just as it limits the use of any other weapon, means or method of warfare in an armed conflict, whether new or old. • Affirming the applicability of IHL does not legitimize cyber warfare, just as it does not legitimize any other form of warfare. Any use of force by States – cyber or kinetic – remains governed by the Charter of the United Nations and the relevant rules of customary international law, in particular the prohibition against the use of force. International disputes must be settled by peaceful means, in cyberspace as in all other domains. • It is now critical for the international community to affirm the applicability of international humanitarian law to the use of cyber operations during armed conflicts. The ICRC also calls for discussions among governmental and other experts on how existing IHL rules apply and whether the existing law is adequate and sufficient. In this respect, the ICRC welcomes the intergovernmental discussions currently taking place in the framework of two United Nations General Assembly mandated processes. • Events of recent years have shown that cyber operations, whether during or outside armed conflict, can disrupt the operation of critical civilian infrastructure and hamper the delivery of essential services to the population. In the context of armed conflicts, civilian infrastructure is protected against cyber attacks by existing IHL principles and rules, in particular the principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack. IHL also affords special protection to hospitals and objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, among others. • During armed conflicts, the employment of cyber tools that spread and cause damage indiscriminately is prohibited. From a technological perspective, some cyber tools can be designed and used to target and harm only specific objects and to not spread or cause harm indiscriminately. However, the interconnectivity that characterizes cyberspace means that whatever has an interface with the Internet can be targeted from anywhere in the world and that a cyber attack on a specific system may have repercussions on various other systems. As a result, there is a real risk that cyber tools are not designed or used – either deliberately or by mistake – in compliance with IHL. • States' interpretation of existing IHL rules will determine the extent to which IHL protects against the effects of cyber operations. In particular, States should take clear positions about their commitment to interpret IHL so as to preserve civilian infrastructure from significant disruption and to protect civilian data. The availability of such positions will also influence the assessment of whether the existing rules are adequate or whether new rules may be needed. If States see a need to develop new rules, they should build on and strengthen the existing legal framework – including IHL. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The participation of states in a wide range of processes--economic, military, tecnological, cultural, and political--produces ever more intense forms of insecurity on many dimensions. This working paper explores some of the assumptions that underlie conventional discourse on national securityand how they intersect with modern international relations theory.

This article contends that Article 51 of the United Nations Charter (UN), which gives inherent right to states for individual or collective self-defense, should be construed by taking a greater account of the charter as an integrated whole. This approach can resolve the conflict of interpretation between the U.S., which wants a more expansive interpretation, and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), wants a more restrictive interpretation. It explains that Chapter 51 aims to create a collective self-defense without limiting national security.

The 2013 White Paper reaffirms the centrality of the US Alliance for Australia. It identifies a number of concrete areas for future cooperation and provides the foundation for developing greater strategic ties with China while remaining firmly anchored in the US camp. It is less clear, however, when it comes to Australia's future contribution to burden-sharing within the Alliance. Putting actions behind the goal to play a greater role in Southeast Asia will be an important litmus test for the alliance relationship. In many ways, the White Paper reflects a phase of re-orientation in the Alliance: away from operations further afield towards the increasing security dynamics in Australia's own region. As the future of China's trajectory-and US-Sino strategic relations—is still very much uncertain, the 'hedging' approach taken White Paper's approach makes sense. What happens if US-Sino strategic relations become more competitive is left to another day. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Governments across the globe have been quick to adapt developments in artificial intelligence to military technologies. Prominent among the many changes recently introduced, autonomous weapon systems pose important new questions for our understanding of conflict generally, and coercive diplomacy in particular. These weapons dramatically decrease the cost of employing military force, in human terms on the battlefield, in financial and material terms, and in political terms for leaders who choose to pursue conflict. In this article, we analyze the implications of these new weapons for coercive diplomacy, exploring how they will influence the course of international crises. We argue that drones have different implications for relationships between relatively equal states than they do for unbalanced relationships where one state vastly overpowers the other. In asymmetric relationships, these weapons exaggerate existing power disparities. In these cases, the strong state is able to use autonomous weapons to credibly signal, avoiding traditional and more costly signals such as tripwires. At the same time, the introduction of autonomous weapons puts some important forms of signaling out reach. In symmetric conflicts where states maintain the ability to inflict heavy damages on each other, autonomous weapons will have a relatively small effect on crisis dynamics. Credible signaling will still require traditional forms of high-cost signals, including those that by design put military and civilian populations at risk.

In May 2015, the Italian Ministry of Defence published its White Paper for International Security and Defence. In this article, Andrea Gilli, Alessandro R Ungaro and Alessandro Marrone examine the important domestic changes outlined in the document, including those made to the policy-making processes and the internal discussion about strategic issues. The document restricts Italy's focus to the Euro-Mediterranean region but sees a more active role for its armed forces - if and when necessary. European co-operation is also prioritised, especially with regards to military technology and procurement. It also puts forward reform of the defence ministry aimed at shaping an integrated approach and promotes further jointness, starting from the strengthening of the Joint Operational Command that will take responsibility for any future military operation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The author comments on Australia's Defense White Paper entitled "Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2030," which was released in May 2009. It is suggested that Australia's new defense policy was created in response to the rapid speed of globalization and increasing economic interdependence, as well as the declining power of the U.S. The author also argues that the policy document is beset with contradictions and there are no details of immediate challenges.