Canada and the Netherlands in Afghanistan Martello Papers Series, no. 38, by Jospeh T. Jockel

Reviewed by: Matthew Willis, independent researcher, formerly of the Royal United Services Institute, LondonOn one level, Joseph Jockel's recent Martello Paper is an intelligent comparative study that demonstrates the striking similarities between the Afghan security engagements of Canada and the Netherlands. On another, it is a persuasive answer to two questions that have baffled Canadians and Dutch alike since their countries' 2006 deployments to southern Afghanistan: How did we get there; and why were we so ill-equipped to meet the challenges we encountered? On a third, it is a valuable addition to the small catalogue of studies that put national experiences of Afghanistan in their wider multinational context. Altogether, Canada and the Netherlands in Afghanistan is one of the more rewarding historical inquiries to come out of Canada's "Afghan decade."Jockel remarks early on that, from the beginning of their involvement, Canada and the Netherlands put themselves in "a laboratory situation ... in which it is possible to compare how their politicians, armed forces, civilian government agencies, and publics reacted" (10-11). This is no throwaway line--the study resembles the logbook to a decade-long science experiment in which the evolving behaviours of two adjacent specimens are painstakingly recorded and compared before finally being interpreted. In inexperienced hands, the account could drag, but Jockel pulls it off.After a scene-setting overview of the two countries' international security policies since 1945--which establishes notable parallels in worldview, self-perception, and interests--Jockel methodically profiles his subjects: their initial contributions to the American invasion; their stints as ISAF peacekeepers; and their turbulent deployments to the south. Focusing on this third phase, he then compares their motivations for picking southern provinces, their in-theatre experiences, their eventual pull-outs, and their attitudes--public as well as governmental--toward the war.By introducing Canadians to the Netherlands' experience of Afghanistan, and a wealth of Dutch scholarship, Jockel offers readers an original perspective on Kandahar and the deployments preceding it.[1] The net effect is to show just how un-unique Canada's experience was, from the delicate sales job that launched it, through the intense violence that defined it, to the political deal-making that conditioned its end. That is not to say that the Canadian and Dutch experiences were identical--far from it--and Jockel diligently points out their differences. But following a war in which Canada sometimes believed itself to be alone, and often told itself it was, it is extremely useful to be reminded, categorically, that it was not.Besides serving as an aide-memoire , Jockel's comparison also counterbalances some earlier studies, de-sensationalizing certain dimensions of the Kandahar deployment while highlighting others. The militarization of the Canadian foreign-policy apparatus, for example, central to Janice Stein and Eugene Lang's The Unexpected War , seems less nefarious when viewed alongside the prominent policy-shaping role played by the Dutch defence ministry.[2] Meanwhile, both governments' continued insistence that the violence of the southern deployments surprised them seems considerably more noteworthy when the available intelligence was as significant as Jockel suggests.Because Jockel coolly lays out 90 pages of findings before drawing everything together, it is at times hard to tell where he is going. Nevertheless, his conclusions, when they do arrive, are cogent. …