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The article discusses the U.S cigarette industry as of December 15, 1957. The author focuses on cigarette sales and filter cigarettes, cigarette manufacturer R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., its Vice Chairman Ed Darr, and cigarette brand Camel. Also mentioned is cigarette manufacturer P. Lorillard Co., its president Lewis Gruber, and cigarette brands Kent and Old Golds. Further discussed are cigarette producers American Tobacco, Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., and Philip Morris.

The article focuses on sales in U.S. cigarette industry according to survey conducted by Professor Charles W. Williams of the University of Louisville on tobacco industry trends. The results revealed that sales of cigarettes have been increasing for eight straight years as of 1947. Total sales of the industry in 1947 amounted to 368 billion U.S. dollars, 5% more than the 351 billion U.S. dollar sales in 1946. Dominating the post war cigarette market are American Tobacco, R. J. Reynolds and Liggett & Myers.

The article discusses the marketing approach and challenges faced by U.S. cigarette company R.J. Reynolds Tobacco. Due to the all-out marketing campaign of the company which included a visit to the Camel factory by Northerners, unit sales in the last ten years to 1952 have risen 128%. Reynolds chairman James A. Gray leads the financial strategy of the company. The author describes issues faced by Reynolds in terms of unions and Winston-Salem.

The article discusses the latest issues in the U.S. cigarette industry. The authors emphasize the competition among tobacco companies including R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Philip Morris Inc. and Liggett Group Inc. They mention the introduction of generic cigarettes started by Liggett and state that this segment has captured 2.5% of the market share. Among tobacco companies striving to revive their businesses include Lorillard and American Brands Inc.

The article reports on the rush of cigarette brands launched by various cigarette manufacturers in the U.S. It cites that various brands were launched by R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., the leading cigarette manufacturer in the industry, to test the market. It also explores the conflicting insights of the industry on the market segmentation of the newly-launched brands. A chart depicting the rank of the top 20 cigarette brands in the country relative to their sales is also presented.

The article discusses the study by research director Walter Knight of Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce regarding the events in the cigarette trade in 1959. It states that Pall Mall brand has surged to the number one spot for brand sales, edging out Camel which held the position for 10 years, while menthol cigarettes account more than 10% of the total market. It adds that R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. earned up to 1.1% increase in market share which strengthens its position.

The article reports on the increase in the sales of cigarettes in the U.S. in 1957. It mentions that the increase was due to the smokers' switch to filters, despite the Public Health Service warning against excessive smoking. It outlines the filter brands that are showing sales gains including American Tobacco Co.'s Tareyton, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.'s Winston, and P. Lorillard Co.'s Kent.

Big Tobacco sidled up to the states to craft their $200 billion legal settlement. Now a scathing court ruling opens up the industry to a new threat: antitrust. For years Big Tobacco has struggled to elude the ever-present threat of smokers' lawsuits alleging that cigarette makers covered up the health risks of an addictive product that kills 440,000 people every year. Now four tobacco titans face a new and perhaps more lethal threat: antitrust litigation. The new risk grows out of a federal lawsuit filed by two tiny tobacco importers challenging the sweeping settlement that the four biggest makers--Altria, R.J. Reynolds, Brown & Williamson and Lorillard--signed with the nation's state attorneys general in 1998. So, many states passed laws requiring tobacco upstarts to pay the states fees equivalent to--or, after taxes, even more than--what Big Tobacco pays in the settlement.

This article focuses at how tobacco company R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. is hoping that a redesign of traditional cigarette packs will help differentiate the fading Winston brand. A year after the tobacco giants' $206 billion settlement agreement with the state attorneys general in 1998, a group of 20 frustrated brand developers and strategists huddled in a conference room at R.J. Reynolds Tobacco's headquarters in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. Three years and at least $200 million later-an analyst's guess, the number two tobacco giant is introducing a curved, crushproof plastic flask in limited national distribution this month.

The article reports that U.S.-based R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.'s smokeless cigarette could face regulatory and marketing hurdles. Some critics and analysts doubt whether the company's product is an "innovative marvel" or just another drug delivery system for nicotine. There is also little indication that the new cigarette would help improve the image of the industry.

The article reports on the marketing tactics of cigarette makers Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds relevant to antismoking campaigns in the U.S. Both companies launched initiatives and campaigns to improve their image and keep smokers smoking. These companies are also expected to get involved in a trial that accuses cigarette companies of making products they know cause illness and death.

Considers the profitability of the cigarette industry in the U.S., as of March 1985. Challenges faced by the U.S. cigarette industry in 1984; Measures taken by the industry in order to earn profits; Increase in the unit sales of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.; Price increases that strengthened the earnings of industry.

The article reports on the participation of the brand-conscious R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. into the budget category of cigarette industry in the U.S. The company's Doral brand priced, will compete with generic cigarettes which is the industry's fastest-growing segment. The strategy is formed towards the notion that cigarettes might someday sell simply because of price rather than on the marketing appeal of the Marlboro man or the Virginia Slims liberated woman.

The article explores the state of tobacco companies in 1955. In the five years leading to 1955, R.J. Reynolds saw growth of only 21.1 percent, which is less than half of that seen by the 100 yardstick companies. The public's greater focus on their health significantly affected the business of cigarette makers in 1954, which put the industry's sales at 5 percent below that of 1953. The author shares that despite these, there are chances of a bright 1955 for cigarette producers.

The article focuses on a survey done by Walter E. Knight, an expert on industry trends, on cigarette consumption trends in the U.S. in 1949. The survey reports that the Camel cigarette from R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. has tied the Lucky Strike from American Tobacco Co. for the number one spot, and king-size cigarettes are doing a good business. It states that cigarettes from three big tobacco companies including Reynolds, American Tobacco and Liggett & Myer are reporting a decrease in the sales.

The article reports on increasing cigarette sales in the U.S. as of January 1949. It states that 1948 marked the ninth consecutive year of high cigarette sales, a 4% increase of 350 billion cigarettes, compared to the 336 billion sold in 1947. The three brands most sold were Lucky Strike by the American Tobacco Co., Camel by R. J. Reynolds, and Chesterfield by Liggett & Myers. These three firms made 83% of total cigarette sales in the country, with Philip Morris rising to fourth place, with 28 billion sticks compared to the 23 billion sold in 1947.

The article reports on the increase in the sales of large cigarette brands in the U.S. It states that the cigarette brands include Lucky Strike from American Tobacco Co., Camel from R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. and Chesterfield from Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. It mentions that Lucky Strike led the cigarette market, in which the sales rose to 106,500,000,000.

The article reports on the growth in the filter tips' share of the cigarette market from 16% in 1952 to 3.4% in 1953. It is stated that manufacturing of filter-tip cigarettes has been recently announced by R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. It is mentioned that the filters in cigarettes takes out nicotine and tar but unavailability of the information regarding which ingredient is harmful is leaving cigarette manufacturers handicapped.

Reports on the forces pushing for a bill to give the Food & Drug Administration the authority to regulate tobacco. Tobacco farmers and the Altria Group (formerly Philip Morris) who are looking for the protection the move could afford them; Protection against lawsuits and counterfeit products which hurt sales of Marlboro, America's dominant brand; Expectations that Altria will come out with a "safer" cigarette that could, under this bill, be advertised as having the FDA stamp of approval; Hurdles ahead for the bill; Expectation of strong opposition from R.J. Reynolds Tobacco and Lorillard Tobacco.

Describes the effects that major layoffs at R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. could have on the economy of Winston-Salem, North Carolina. Steady loss of tobacco jobs over the past two decades, due to changes in the cigarette industry; Lack of comparable jobs, as well as retraining opportunities, in the local economy; Ripple effects of the layoffs on other parts of the local economy; Impact on tobacco farmers.

The article discusses the conflict on graphic cigarette packaging in the U.S. Particular focus is given to lawsuits including one in which a judge ruled that graphic labels and warnings could be required of cigarette manufacturers. It outlines the costs that would be incurred by R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. to modify its package designs. Insights from Thomas Briant of the National Association of Tobacco Outlets on the potential effects of graphic images on retail are presented.

The article discusses the growth of the foreign cigarette market, as of 1978, and its implications for the U.S. cigarette industry. Topics include gains in foreign operating income of several U.S. companies, including Philip Morris, R. J. Reynolds, and American Brands, the major cigarette companies in the foreign market, such as British American Tobacco and Rothmans International, and the foreign market trends, such as the market competition in Brazil.

The article focuses on R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.'s strategy to market its Winston and Salem cigarette brands. Currently, the main problem with the brands is that they attract older smokers and do not have clear identities. However, Winston remains the company's second-largest seller in the United States, and Salem holds the fourth position. Analysts say the company's first attempt at reviving Winston is not showing much promise. In July 1996, it introduced a reformulated version of Winston in Florida with all additives removed.

The article reports on the 40 million dollar promotional campaign of Real, a low-tar cigarette of R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.

The article offers information on developments related to the marketing sector in the U.S. Spalding International Inc. has unveiled a 1 million dollar advertising campaign for its Top-Flite golf ball and has challenged several golf ball makers. The Idaho Potato Commission has failed a trade infringement suit against Washington Potato Commission. It affirms that more cigarettes will be tested by R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. as it unveils a cigarette brand intended for the female cigarette market.

The article focuses on the Eclipse low-smoke cigarettes, which are under development from R.J. Reynolds Tobacco. It is touted to have the benefit of very little second-hand smoke, and has less tar and nicotine than most cigarettes. However, Young and Riley lawyers, representing the estate of a nonsmoking nurse who died of lung cancer due to second-hand smoke, are demanding for the release of all documents that refer to or describe the Eclipse cigarette.

This article reports on the decline in profit margins of Western cigarette makers in the overseas market as of May 1993. On April 20, Philip Morris Cos. reported international tobacco income in the first quarter increased 18 per cent, to $675 million on a 17 per cent revenue increase. London, England-based cigarette marketer BAT Industries PLC and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco International Inc. expect similar gains. Tobacco companies face challenges in both developed and new markets. In Western Europe and Japan, excise taxes are high and antismoking ordinances are starting to multiply. Government monopolies opposes American-style cigarettes or discount brands. Thus making market-share growth for the U.S. companies to be moderate. Analysts figure Philip Morris and Reynolds make a profit of 2.5 cents a pack which needs upfront investments in manufacturing and marketing.

The article discusses the efforts of cigarette companies Philip Morris (PM) and R. J. Reynolds to argue before U.S. state revenue commissions and legislative committees about whether cigarettes should be taxed in increments of 1 or 10. Information on Reynolds' tax accounting of its Century cigarette brand is presented. PM has hired lawyer Keith Brooks to fight to retain the system of collecting cigarette taxes in Ohio.

The article describes the dominance of R.J. Reynolds in the U.S. tobacco market in 1958. The company, which was known for producing Camel cigarettes, made earnings worth 17 million dollars in the 1st quarter of 1958, which was higher than the earnings of competitor American Tobacco at 12.4 million dollars. Reynolds also produces Winston filter and Salem mentholated cigarettes, which competed against American Tobacco brands like Lucky Strike, Pall Mall, and Hit Parade.

The article discusses the U.S. tobacco and cigarette industries as of March 15, 1958. Particular focus is given to the financial performance of tobacco company R. J. Reynolds during 1957. A chart showing 1957 sales, earnings gains and profitability figures of cigarette companies including American Tobacco, Philip Morris and P. Lorillard is presented.

The article looks at the financial performance of cigarette company R. J. Reynolds as of November 15, 1956 with a focus on the sales of its “Camel”, “Winston” and “Cavalier” cigarette brands.

The article reports that the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has ordered cigarette manufacturers R.J. Reynolds, maker of Camel, and P. Lorillard, maker of Old Gold, to end advertising claims that their products have less nicotine than other brands.

The article discusses the latest developments in the U.S. cigarette industry as of December 23, 1961. It reports that local sales of cigarettes during the year are at record rates, and are expected to surpass the half-a-trillion mark in 1962. It cites RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co. as the firm that performed well in 1961 with its Camel, Winston and Salem brands. The opinion of industry expert Walter E. Knight on the issue is also cited.

The article reports on the financial performance of the major cigarette manufacturers in the U.S. for 1931 including R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Liggett & Myers, and American Tobacco Co.

A letter to the editor is presented thanking "Forbes" magazine for its Sixth Annual Report on the U.S. cigarettes industry.

The article discusses the separate annual reports of cigarette companies Liggett & Myers (LM) and R.J. Reynolds (RJR) for the year 1952. RJR has reported 89-million dollars of pretax profit on cigarettes, which represents a three million dollars increase over the profit in 1951. On the other hand, LM has revealed a decline in its pretax profit from 64-cents per 1,000 gaspers in 1951 to 57-cents in 1952.

This article focuses on the attempt by the United States government to sue tobacco companies to recover health-care costs. America's federal government charges its top cigarette makers--Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, Brown & Williamson (an arm of British American Tobacco that is now merging with Reynolds), Lorillard and Liggett Group--plus a British arm of BAT, with lying to the public about the hazards of smoking, of trying to fiddle or hide the scientific evidence, of deliberately getting people addicted to nicotine, of selling knowingly to people below smoking age, of pushing low-tar cigarettes as safer than others, while knowing they were not. In 1998, the four biggest reached a deal--the "master settlement agreement" (MSA)--with 46 state governments that accused them of pushing up the states' health-care costs. They agreed to pay $206 billion over the first 25 years, via a levy that is by now almost 50 cents a pack. Problem solved. Not so. The Clinton administration soon launched a federal suit, heavily reliant on a law meant to help the government recover health-care costs if someone injures a soldier. The judge threw out this part of the case, but left in another, based on the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970. This law, originally aimed at the mob, makes normal business a crime when it is part of an illegal conspiracy. That is what the tobacco men were up to, says the government, when they met on December 15th, 1953 in a doubtless smoke-filled room in a New York hotel, and schemed to mislead the public about the risks of smoking. And lo, Philip Morris has volunteered the cigarette makers to pay the cost--but only in return for FDA regulation. And Philip Morris would not weep at a ban on cigarettes that appeal to the young: Brown & Williamson and R.J. Reynolds have invested in sweet-flavored brands, which do just that.

Discusses the trend among cigarette companies to expand their operations in the overseas market through mergers. Acquisitions among firms to surpass Philip Morris' dominance of the market; Austria Tabak's purchase of the cigarette business of Swedish Match; Gallaher's acquisition of the rights to RJ Reynolds products in Great Britain. INSET: EU smoking on the rise again.

The article comments on the launching of an advertising campaign to promote the newest cigarette brand from R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. in the U.S. "Advertising Age," claims that the cigarette campaign is the largest ever made for the launching of a cigarette. "Times," on the other hand, describes the introduction of the new brand as the biggest marketing campaign.

The article focuses on a law passed restricting cigarette company advertising in the U.S. in 2009. It notes that the industry has continued to lie to consumers and regulators about the harmful dangers of its products, which eventually kills 440,000 Americans every year. Meanwhile, tobacco giants R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. and Lorillard Tobacco Co. state that they have their constitutional right to communicate with their customers.

The article reports that R.J. Reynolds is being sued by eight U.S. states for allegedly violating the terms of a landmark 1998 settlement between 46 states and the tobacco industry. The accord prohibited the industry from aiming its advertisements at minors and using cartoons in cigarette advertisements. The cigarette maker published animated advertisements in "Rolling Stone" magazine. But publisher Ray Chelstowshi said that the advertisements promoted a website, not Reynolds' Camel cigarettes.

The article reports that the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. will manufacture all its cigarettes brand using the "fire-safe" technology for public safety interest in the U.S. James M. Shannon, president of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), has urged the other tobacco companies to adopt the life-saving technology. Moreover, the NFPA and Coalition government coordinated a state-by-state campaign to encourage passage of fire-safe-cigarette mandates in the country.

This article looks at the marketing efforts of the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company to attract women cigarette smokers to their Camel No. 9 brand. The corporation held a three-night "smoking spa" at a New York bar where women were served cigarettes with their drinks and beauty regimes. Nearly 179,000 women die each year in the United States from smoking.