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The article focuses on the Live Virtual Constructive (LVC) training for the U.S. Air Force (USAF) military training. It discusses the possibility of how USAF pilots may not be ready for aircraft tactics, operators survived more in combat after attending these sessions, training from live flying more profitable and inculcating electronic cyber warfare effects.

The article assesses the state of Japan's defense planning and readiness of Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), focusing on air and maritime capabilities. It highlights gaps among policy, force structure, and operational readiness. It argues that that the JSDF lacks the operational and tactical doctrines essential to enhancing its readiness in the air and maritime domains.

Background: Musculoskeletal complaints and injuries (MSCI) are common in military populations. However, only a limited number of studies have followed soldiers during international deployments and investigated the prevalence of MSCI during and at the end of their deployment. The aim was to describe the prevalence of MSCI in different military occupational specialties and categorise their most common tasks in terms of exposures to physical workloads during a six-month long international deployment in Afghanistan. Methods: Cross-sectional survey, including 325 soldiers (300 men), aged 20–62 participating in an international deployment in Afghanistan during the spring of 2012. Soldiers were clustered into different military occupational specialties: Infantry, Administration, Logistics, Logistics/Camp, Medical and Other. Data were collected through the use of the Musculoskeletal Screening Protocol at the end of the international mission. Results: Forty-seven percent reported MSCI during deployment, with 28% at the end. The most common locations of MSCI during the mission were lower back, knee, shoulders, upper back, neck and foot, while the knee and lower back prevailed at the end of the mission. Almost half of the soldiers who had MSCI reported affected work ability. The most common duties during the mission were vehicle patrolling, staff duties, guard/security duties, foot patrols and transportation. Soldiers reported that vehicle patrolling, staff duties and transportation were demanding with respect to endurance strength, guard/security duties challenged both maximum and endurance strength while foot patrolling challenged maximum and endurance strength, aerobic and anaerobic endurance and speed. Conclusions: MSCI during international deployment are common among Swedish soldiers. The results indicate the need to further develop strategies focusing on matching the soldiers’ capacity to the job requirements, with relevant and fair physical selection-tests during the recruitment process and proactive interventions targeting MSCI before and during deployment, in order to enhance soldiers’ readiness and promote operational readiness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author emphasizes the role of the U.S. Naval War College in enhancing readiness and lethality among its students. To better prepare students of the College the course of study at the College was redesigned with the introduction of additional war fighting-focused studies, the College also provided greater focus on understanding present-day threats while improving combat readiness and the expansion of the Russia Maritime Studies Institute.

The article focuses on problem of resource allocation faced by the Afghanistan Air Force and improving Resource Management within the force. It mentions the Afghanistan's Ministry of Defense (MoD) is responsible for functions necessary to ensure operational readiness for the Afghanistan National Army (ANA); and impact of political corruption on the resource allocation process. It also mentions need for making changes in Afghanistan's financial and procurement processes for reducing corruption.

The article discusses research about the importance of military training to enhance combat readiness of Russian Armed Forces. Topics mentioned include the level of military preparedness, ways on how to improve operational and mobilization training, list of tasks that military troops should focus on, and requirements in preparing troops for real combat.

After a number of events, during World War II in Belarus collaboration of the local people with the German occupation authorities took place. One of the most obvious episodes of collaboration was the establishment and the activity of the Belarusian National Defence. The armed unit was formed at the end of spring and in the beginning of summer 1944 through mobilization and was intended for armed combat with Soviet partisans and the Red Army. The article analyzes the process of establishing the unit, its numbers, the degree of combat readiness and participation in warfare. In summer 1944, after withdrawal of German forces from Belarus some of the soldiers of the Belarusian National Defence turned up at the Western front. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers the author's insights on the fifth generation of combat fighter aircraft pilots in the U.S. Air Force (USAF). Topics mentioned include the cost for the needed combat capability, the history and status of the F-35 and F-22 program, and the measuring of the combat capability where less time on the ground means more time in fighting. It also mentioned the ratio of crew pilot and aircrafts in a fighter squadron and the suggestion to use the original program.

The article discusses the importance of the role of airfield ground support services in the combat readiness of aircraft operated by Air Force units. It also examines the structure and purpose of aviation complexes and the role of airfield towing services within the system of preparing equipment according to the specific operations of the aviation complex. It also presents recommendations for designs of towing vehicles to prepare the aviation complex against large-scale guided weapons attacks.

The article reports on the manner in which the Swedish military élites assessed the new states of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland through the military attachés from a strategic point of view from 1919-1939. It provides a background of the concept of total war in relation to the Swedish military attachés' assessment of other states. It also looks at the military capacity of the Baltic armies.

Abstract: Introduction: The purpose of this research is to describe the leading circumstances of military vehicle crashes to guide prioritization and implementation of crash avoidance and/or warning technologies. Methods: A descriptive study using narrative text analysis on 3,944 military vehicle crash narratives. Crash data on drivers, from 2001 to 2006, were assembled from the U.S. Army Combat Readiness/Safety Center. Reviewers collected information on the circumstances of crashes and determined if vehicle technology could have prevented the crash. Results: Nearly 98% of the crashes were nonfatal; 63% occurred in the U.S. and 24% in Iraq. Among crash events where the direction of the impact was recorded, 32% were to the front of the vehicle and 16% involved a vehicle being rear-ended. Rollovers were mentioned in 20% of the narratives. Technology was determined to have the potential to prevent 26% of the crashes, with the forward collision warning system, rear end collision avoidance, emergency brake assistance, and rollover stability control system likely to have the greatest impacts. Conclusions: Some technologies available for civilian vehicles may prevent certain military crash circumstances. Impact on Industry: The results of this research are significant in light of ongoing global military operations that rely on military vehicles. Improving the preventive technology featured on military vehicles may be an effective strategy to reduce the occurrence of military crashes. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The maintenance and logistics systems that support aircraft fleets are complex and often very integrated. The complexity of these systems makes it difficult to assess the impact of events that affect operational capability, to identify the need for resources that can affect aircraft availability, or to assess the impact and potential benefits of the system and procedural changes. This problem is further complicated by the adoption of condition-based maintenance approaches resulting in dynamic maintenance planning as maintenance tasks are condition directed instead of scheduled or usage based. A proof of concept prototype for an aircraft operational readiness simulator (OR-SIM) has been developed for the Canadian Forces CH-146 Griffon helicopter. The simulator provides a synthetic environment to forecast and assess the ability of a fleet, squadron, or aircraft to achieve desired flying rates and the capability of the sustainment systems to respond to the resultant demands. The prototype was used to assess several typical scenarios including adjustment of preventative maintenance schedules including impact of condition-based maintenance, variation of the annual flying rate, and investigation of deployment options. This paper provides an overview of the OR-SIM concept, prototype model, and sample investigations and a discussion of the benefits of such an operational readiness simulator. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 3002.01E, Personnel Recovery in the Department of Defense, highlights personnel recovery (PR) as one of the DOD's highest priorities. As an Air Force core function, PR has experienced tremendous success, having performed 9,000 joint/multinational combat saves in the last two years and having flown a total of 15,750 sorties since 11 September 2001. Despite this admirable record, the author contends that the declining readiness of aircraft and equipment as well as chronic staffing shortages prevents Air Force rescue from meeting the requirements of combatant commanders around the globe. To halt rescue's decline, a numbered Air Force must represent this core function, thereby ensuring strong advocacy and adequate resources for this lifesaving, DOD-mandated function. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article quantitatively analyzes American naval-force structure from 1869 to 1899. It makes four arguments: first, that operational capabilities lagged behind political decisions by many years; second, that antiquated ships imposed a significant financial burden on the U.S. Navy; third, that successful fleet operations required a technologically compatible force structure; and finally, that the United States was ill-prepared to fight a major maritime war until about 1897. U.S. naval power during the Spanish-American War was thus both novel and fragile, and might have failed had it been put to the test earlier. The article also compares American naval recapitalization to other capital-intensive industries and to earlier periods in naval history, such as the galley era and the age of sail, and concludes with potential lessons for contemporary policymakers and military leaders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the issues regarding the active-missile-defense (AMD) program of Israel which approaches the last phases of incorporated development. It mentions that Israel applied a defensive military doctrine throughout its history wherein it is situated at the strategic level while its offensive doctrine is on the operational level. It states that the AMD program focuses on the Arrow anti-ballistic missile systems wherein the multi-layered aerial shield would feature the lower-tier Iron Dome, Centurion super machine gun of the Raytheon Co. and mid-tier David's Sling. It discusses the efforts done by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) relative to the development of the operational requirements for the missile system.

The article discusses the author's views on the approach to counter aerial enemy attacks in modern wars and armed conflicts. He notes that the defensive operation of an all-arms task force must be composed of air defense units, air force, missile forces, and long-range artillery operations to effectively counter air assaults. He also added the positioning of reserve group's unit between main and other forces to encounter contingencies on the aftermath of enemy's air attacks.

The article discusses new approaches to the assessment and calculation of combat worthiness which is an indicator showing the combat potential of military units. It discusses combat readiness, or readiness to fight, which is another type of combat potential indicator. Furthermore, it states that the goal of assessing the combat readiness of military formations is to indicate the type of mission they are ready to accomplish at any time and up to what extent.

The article focuses on the concept and methodological basis for determining and evaluating the combat capability indicators of military units through potential combat readiness. It defines combat potential as technical equipment, military skill, and morale which comprise the components of Armed Forces. It asserts that weapons and materiel (WM), combat worthiness (CW), and combat readiness (CR) are the main elements in assessing the potential combat capabilities of military units.

The article focuses on the assessment and calculation of the combat worthiness level of military subunits and units. It presents several things to consider in assessing combat worthiness of subunits which include the exclusion of battle readiness in the calculation, the five components of combat worthiness such as the state of the personnel, and the levels of these components. It notes that the combat worthiness of a particular unit depends on the combat worthiness level of its various subunits.

The article focuses on identified Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) by the Congress and senior defense officials as a means of responding to future threats to U.S. space systems. The ORS focus includes the ability to launch, activate and employ low-cost, militarily useful satellites to provide surge capability, reconstitute or augment existing constellations, or provide timely availability of tailored or new capabilities.

Protected core networking (PCN) is a con- cept intended to be used to implement a flexible transport infrastructure that supports future mil- itary operations based on network enabled capa- bility (NEC). PCN is based on creating a loose coupling between information domains and the transport infrastructure, and focusing on the provision of high service availability, also in high-threat environments. This architectural approach highlights a number of emerging and novel concepts where research and development is needed to properly support NEC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the author's views on mobility in the present-day combat readiness system in Russia. He sees it as the essence of current dynamic processes in military affairs and as a notion to carry out strategic deployments. He states that mobile forces must be composed of attack, controlling and supporting subsystems. He believes that organizationally, large mobile strategic formation is good, and that the mobility factor in combat employment of Russia's armed forces will grow.

The article focuses on the development of a metric to relate maintenance (MX) personnel skill level to operational readiness in the U.S. Air Force. It measures the mission capable (MC) rate as a function of the MX personnel skill level. MC rate refers to the percentage of time that aircraft are fully or partially mission capable. The Air Force needs to maintain percentages of seven and nine level maintainers to ensure that the value for MC rate does not fall below the threshold of 84 percent.

The article provides an analysis regarding the deployment of the joint grouping of aviation and air defense troops and the qualifying features and conditions for the realization of military activity modes. It examines the necessity of using radio-technical formations as well as electronic warfare units in air battles. It stresses the significance of a common design and elaborated plan for the deployment of the joint grouping of aviation and of air defense troops in the operation.

The article discusses the problems encountered in the organization of joint coordinated actions of multi-agency military formations in Russia Federation during a special operation. These problems were classified as legal, theoretical, organizational and technical. Also examined were the combat training system for multi-agency military units.

The article discusses the theory of interaction on the concept of operation of military troops. It reveals the essence of interaction pertaining to military activities including that it is a solution of a contradiction between centralization of control and flexibility, build up horizontal control of military operations, and the coordination in the actions of troops is achieved through preparation of an operation. Three models on interaction are given.

The article focuses on the analysis of the military activity in the context of military sciences using various methods of disciplines such as philosophy, psychology, and sociology. It points out that an approach to the military activity concept is not at all casual in society since it stems from the previous development stages of the native scientific idea. However, such interpretation of the relations between culture and military science is overcome as it lacks adequate conformity.

The article discusses the form of defense, a type of combat action in which one of the opposing sides realizes its combat capability. It is noted that defense operations are always a retaliatory reaction to initiative displayed by an advancing adversary. The ultimate objective of the defense will be neutralization of an attacking force. The main method of achieving defense objectives is depriving the adversary of its offensive capability.

Focusing on four critical components of combat cohesion--leadership, morale, trust, and training--the author argues that under Boris Yeltsin, combat cohesion deteriorated to the point where the Russian military was not in a position to carry out combat operations--as demonstrated by the army's poor showing in the First Chechen War. As a result, the military that Putin inherited was in shambles. Planes were not flying, ships were not sailing, and soldiers were not training. While the outcome is not assured, Putin has provided the generals with the two factors they value the most: stability and predictability. For the first time since the collapse of the USSR, the steep decline in combat readiness has begun to be reversed--even so, success is not assured, and there is a long way to go before Moscow will be able to boast of an army approaching that fielded by the Soviets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the importance of strategic training among echelons of command and troops of the Russian Federation (RF) Armed Forces towards succeeding combat operations. The authors account on the Great Patriotic War and several combat activities that RF Armed Forces should learn. The author also a presentation in an attempt to alert RF defense capability in countering possible aggressions.