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Using the frequency-domain spillover index method, we investigate time-frequency spillovers and their underlying drivers among fossil energy, clean energy and metal markets. We find that short-term spillovers are stronger than long-term spillovers. Global clean energy markets are powerful spillover transmitters that can have strong impacts on fossil energy and metal markets. Rare earth metals are most vulnerable to spillover effects from clean energy and base metal markets, particularly in the long term. Different clean energy sources and metal markets have heterogeneous connectedness, e.g., the impact of wind energy on rare earth market is greater than that of solar energy. The short-term spillovers are mainly driven by policy changes, while the long-term spillovers are mainly affected by stock market uncertainty and economic fundamentals. Our findings have important implications for the construction of optimal diversification strategies and the design of policy incentives to promote clean energy investments across different time horizons. Keywords: Clean energy, Metals, Spillovers, Time-frequency, Spillover drivers, 1. INTRODUCTION Metals are an energy-consuming resource that require fossil energy for their extraction, production, smelting and recycling processes; therefore, fossil energy is an important input for the operation of [...]

One hundred years ago, Justice Holmes embraced the marketplace of ideas in his dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States. (1) The same year as this centennial anniversary, Justice Kennedy, [...]

Increasing reliance on market mechanisms in higher education is analysed both as one of the approaches to steering as well as in relation to the consequences of markets for quality and accessibility of higher education. This article goes beyond the normative considerations of market elements as inherently good or bad and the economic theory-guided focus on freedoms of users and providers, by presenting an alternative conceptualization. The conceptualization adapted from studies of markets in other parts of the welfare state to the context of higher education is based on two dimensions: (1) who effectively controls production of certain goods and services and (2) how access to and funding of these goods and services are regulated. It focuses on interests of three main actors-the state, the users (students) and the providers (higher education institutions). This leads to six conceptually distinct markets, whose key characteristics are illustrated by examples from Denmark, England, India, Norway, Portugal and Serbia. The key message is that this alternative conceptualization allows identifying variance in marketization of higher education with regards to (1) which actors are empowered, (2) who are the likely winners and losers and (3) what might be the risks of introducing specific market elements in a higher education system. More generally, a more nuanced analysis relying on this conceptualization can potentially contribute to a deeper understanding of political and policy dynamics in higher education., Author(s): Jens Jungblut [sup.1] , Martina Vukasovic [sup.2] Author Affiliations: (Aff1) 0000 0001 1089 1036, grid.5155.4, International Centre for Higher Education Research (INCHER), University of Kassel, , Moenchebergstr. 17, 34109, [...]

Almost 100 years ago, Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek argued that a socialist state could not determine marginal cost prices and therefore could not allocate resources rationally. Oskar Lange and Abba Lerner responded with the market socialist model. Subsequent scholars have refined the model (Leeman, Roemer). Views on market socialism for an entire economy are mixed (Phelps, S h lei fer and Vishny, Roemer). We briefly review the debate. We argue that a form of market socialism exists and is especially important in education, health care, and health insurance. In these sectors, prices are often set or restricted centrally, while many providers are state-owned, nonprofit, or mutual firms. We argue in favor of applying market socialist principles to health care and to health insurance policy. In particular, we show that these principles imply that community rating of health insurance is a source of major inefficiencies and harmful regulatory pressure. We suggest moving in the market socialist direction --toward marginal cost pricing and therefore away from community rating. The desire for universal or expanded coverage can be fulfilled by explicit, politically transparent subsidies paid to consumers who are both poor and high risk. Comparative Economic Studies (2017) 59, 405-427. doi: 10.1057/s41294-0170027-3; published online 9 June 2017 Keywords: health insurance, market socialism, quasi-markets, pricing, community rating, new public management, corporatization JEL Classification: 113, P51, P27, 118, D47, B24, D02, L31, INTRODUCTION The socialist calculation debate began almost 100 years ago when Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek argued that a socialist state could not determine marginal cost prices and therefore [...]

Author(s): Mark G. Brennan[sup.1] Author Affiliations: Mark G. Brennan is adjunct associate professor of business ethics in the Business & Society Program at the New York University Stern School of [...]

The U.S. recovery from the Great Recession has proceeded at a slow pace. Brady Lavender and Nicolas Parent (2012-13) show that the economy has been rebounding more slowly than from [...]

We study tacit collusion in price-setting duopoly games with strategic complements and substitutes. While this problem has been considered by several studies, this article sheds new light on the comparison by focusing on the relationship between dynamic stability of equilibrium and tacit collusion. We find when controlling for the absolute slope of the reaction functions, there are no robust differences in either the convergence properties or tacit collusion between complements and substitutes treatments. JEL Classification: D43, LI3, L40, 1. Introduction This article concerns the determinants of tacit collusion in duopoly markets. While factors such as group size and communication are well-known ingredients for cooperation, a growing body of [...]

Over the last thirty years in Australia and elsewhere, there has been a substantial marketisation of human services (1) funded by government. A major justification used for this process has [...]

The hegemony of neoliberalism has seen the market virtually canonised and mainstream neoclassical economics successfully shaping an understanding of the market as being synonymous with the economy and capitalism more [...]

One of the most basic lessons any student of mainstream economics learns is that markets allocate scarce goods and services efficiently on the basis of price. More critical political economy [...]

Small business activity in Australia is perennially dogged by market structures operating to the benefit of larger corporations. Unfortunately, the small business-corporate interaction is little understood because it is little [...]

There is a story that has been told by both the physicist Stephen Hawking and the anthropologist Clifford Geertz. They report that a famous scientist was lecturing on the structure [...]

Although Berger and Luckmann do not specifically discuss the market, they would undoubtedly agree that the market is socially constructed. Indeed, the market is a product of social action that has an objective and subjective reality. Inspired by Berger and Luckmann's work, this paper will describe the social construction of the market. Specifically, it will focus on the Austrian understanding of the market. It is my contention that the Austrians have articulated a 'sociology of the market' that is consistent with Berger and Luckmann's approach. Keywords Berger * Social construction * Markets * Austrian economics, ... society [is] part of a human world, made by men, inhabited by men, and, in turn, making men, in an ongoing historical process. [Berger and Luckmann 1966: 189] The [...]

This paper canvasses recent arguments in favor of commercial markets in human transplant kidneys, raising objections to those arguments on grounds of the role of injustice, exploitation, and coercion in compromising the autonomy of those most likely to sell a kidney, namely, the least well off members of society. Keywords: autonomy, coercion, economic necessity, exploitation doi: 10.1093/jmp/jhp049

In this paper I develop and defend my arguments in favor of the moral permissibility of a legal market for human body parts in response to the criticisms that have been leveled at them by Paul M. Hughes and Samuel J. Kerstein. Keywords: kidneys, markets, organs, Paul M. Hughes, Samuel J. Kerstein doi: 10.1093/jmp/jhp044

Cass Sunstein details intrinsic flaws in group discussion, even in ideal deliberation, and draws attention to prediction markets and information-aggregation devices on the internet as supplements to discussion. I respond that the supposed flaws do not affect ideal deliberation, and that the evaluation of group discussion is too pessimistic: there are alternative hypotheses to account for his findings, and there are doubts about their external validity. Also, I contend that his evaluation of prediction markets and internet devices is too optimistic. The markets have failed miserably, and the internet is vulnerable to astroturfing by the powerful and wealthy. Keywords: discussion; deliberation; prediction markets; information aggregation; power., Introduction The deliberative approach reigns in democratic theory. Yet, the institutional recommendations of deliberative democracy do not go far beyond the injunction to increase group discussion, in its sites, in [...]

Charles Smith in the Market It is with great pleasure that I take this opportunity to write a short comment based on Charles Smith's article, 'Markets as Definitional Practices' (2007). [...]

Markets are an efficient way of producing and distributing a very large number of mundane items. Market incentives are a dependable way of getting our bread baked. Markets allow us [...]

The state is playing an increasingly important role in the recent wave of gentrification. This study reveals that strong state intervention in Shanghai's gentrification can be seen in three aspects. First, the state stimulates and accommodates the consumption demands of gentrifiers. Second, to create optimal conditions for capital circulation, the state makes policy interventions and invests heavily in environment beautification and infrastructure construction. Third, the state mobilizes the most important resources to tackle the problem of fragmented property fights and to facilitate gentrification. The state-sponsored gentrification under market transition is motivated by the pursuit of economic and urban growth at the cost of large-scale residential displacement. Keywords: the state; gentrification; market transition; Shanghai

Repugnance and its consequences in market transactions are discussed. The selling of tissue, lending money for interest, slavery, gambling, adoption and other examples of markets wherein repugnance has been established as a constraint on the market are presented.

The definition of markets should be de-emphasized in horizontal merges and exclusionary practices of tying and bundling agreements. Antitrust laws should be adjusted to facilitate balance between innovation and hindering intellectual property. The impact of antitrust laws on market competition is analyzed.

The effects of the organization of an asset market on liquidity are studied using a model of financial intermediation. Findings reveal that a reform that lowers the market power of the dealers may result to reduced trading costs, dealers' net entry, and an increased trade volume. The model also indicates that markets of similar structures may post different liquidity results.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the relation between scientific knowledge in the form of theories and the world that such theories are about. The focus is on market theories. I argue that everyday knowledge, conceptualized using the notion of 'lifeworld,' is the bedrock of scientific knowledge. I also make two distinctions, one between types of markets and one between principles of order in markets. There are two different types of markets, fixed-role markets and switch-role markets, and no existing theory can be used to explain both of them. In fixed-role markets, such as a producer market of garments, actors are identified as either sellers or buyers. In switch-role markets, such as the stock exchange market or currency market, actors are not identified with one role. The other distinction is between standard and status markets. In a status market, order is maintained because the identities of actors on both sides of the market are ranked according to status, which is a more entrenched social construction than the commodity traded in the market. In a market characterized by standards, the situation is reversed: the commodity is a more entrenched social construction than the social status of actors in the market. These distinctions are the backdrop of my analysis of the idea that markets are performed. It is concluded that the performativity approach is useful today for analyzing switch-role markets. A further conclusion is that neoclassical economic theory can be used in understanding switch-role markets, but not fixed-role markets.

A study on the financial limitations on attaining arbitrage profits in a market with no liquidity is presented.

The degree of market integration across individual country equity indices using modern cointegration techniques is analyzed.

I study pricing and commitment by platforms in two-sided markets with the following characteristics: (i) platforms are essential bottleneck inputs for buyers and sellers transacting with each other; (ii) sellers [...]

Models of Keynesian economics, which examine transition economy to be successful, are presented.

We utilize a randommatching model to examine the relationships between market frictions and international trade. In our setting, an individual may choose to search abroad where she may have a cost advantage, but is less likely to meet potential trading partners, owing to higher market frictions. Interestingly, we find that international trade may be associated with lower welfare than autarky. We show how this is due to price distortions resulting from bargaining when there are opportunities for exchange across countries.

Usage of innovation processes to develop an evolutionary simulation model for knowledge transfer during analysis of market performance is described.

Linear programming is applied to analyze effective securities in a market characteristic of no arbitrage with bid ask prices at bankruptcy.

The impact of market structure on beer supply, in Germany and the United States, is examined.

Building on the observation that competitive dynamics and market evolution are inextricably linked and underresearched, we propose a road map to guide and stimulate future research in the area. A [...]

Byline: K. Mehta (1) Keywords: parallel conduct; concerted practice; collective dominance; bidding markets; unilateral conduct; coordinated effects; divestment remedies; leniency/immunity programme; cartel coercer; market monitoring; collusion markers Abstract: These comments elaborate on the policy implications of theoretical models and compare them with competition law and practice. In regard to EU merger control it is discussed how case law has dealt with the creation of market structures that would maintain collusion. With respect to leniency programmes the deterrence and desistment incentives of actually implemented programmes are compared with theoretical results. Certain areas of research of particular relevance for enforcement are indicated in the conclusions. Author Affiliation: (1) Directorate General for Competition, The European Commission, Brussels, Belgium Article History: Registration Date: 09/09/2005 Online Date: 15/11/2005 Article note: The views expressed are my own opinions and do not reflect in any way those of the European Commission. JEL classification D43, L12, L41, K21

A framework in which establishing and managing a regulatory institution calls for an unchanging cost is advanced and the different facets of this model are analyzed. It is shown that, in the model, supply of regulation is limited by the extent of the market.

Clarifications relating various criticisms by David Colander, John Cullis, and Aaron Levine on a model for behavior of individuals and firms in rational economic and competitive markets duly integrating moral, ethical and altruistic conduct are presented.

The model presented by Morris Altman for behavior of individuals and firms in rational economic and competitive markets duly integrating moral, ethical and altruistic conduct is examined for its efficiency and the role that government can play for improving the ethical behavior.

An analysis of a study conducted by Morris Altman on the effects of altruism, moral dimension and ethical behavior on rational economic and competitive markets is presented.

Critical review of a study conducted by Morris Altman on the effects of altruism, moral dimension and ethical behavior on rational economic and competitive markets is presented.

A study examining the effects of altruism, moral dimension and ethical behavior on rational economic and competitive markets is presented. Based on the study a behavior model duly incorporating the moral and altruistic behavior for individuals and firms is developed.

The performance of markets during famines is a contentious issue, however, research tends to associate famine with market segmentation and hoarding. The analysis of the spatial and temporal patterns of food-price movements during four famines in pre-industrial Europe indicates that markets functioned normally in times of crisis.

A study is conducted to design a socially optimal market structure to control excessive entry of firms in to product market, which effects the social cost of public funds.

A study examining the extent to which costs can be minimized on public debt, in a scenario where short-term interest rates are dictated by monetary policy and there are risks and market impact constraints, is presented.