Comments on Switgard Feuerstein's 'Collusion in Industrial Economics--A Survey'

Byline: K. Mehta (1) Keywords: parallel conduct; concerted practice; collective dominance; bidding markets; unilateral conduct; coordinated effects; divestment remedies; leniency/immunity programme; cartel coercer; market monitoring; collusion markers Abstract: These comments elaborate on the policy implications of theoretical models and compare them with competition law and practice. In regard to EU merger control it is discussed how case law has dealt with the creation of market structures that would maintain collusion. With respect to leniency programmes the deterrence and desistment incentives of actually implemented programmes are compared with theoretical results. Certain areas of research of particular relevance for enforcement are indicated in the conclusions. Author Affiliation: (1) Directorate General for Competition, The European Commission, Brussels, Belgium Article History: Registration Date: 09/09/2005 Online Date: 15/11/2005 Article note: The views expressed are my own opinions and do not reflect in any way those of the European Commission. JEL classification D43, L12, L41, K21