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The issue outlined in this paper is that U.S. democracy promotion in Africa occurs only when it is convenient for the superpower from the West. Analyzing the countries that comprise the Gulf of Guinea – which share commonalities of recently discovered oil reserves, marginally democratic or nondemocratic regimes, and friendly relations with the U.S. - this paper illustrates how U.S. foreign policy continues to be shaped more by motives of self-interest than by real concern for the promotion of democracy and constitutional liberalism. The gap that exists between political rhetoric and policy is especially noteworthy in the wake of the September 11 attacks and the increased focus of the U.S. on democracy promotion in the Middle East. Given the renewed efforts to thwart terrorism by pressuring authoritarian regimes to open up politically and increase human liberties, the ongoing friendly relations between the U.S. and authoritarian regimes in arenas outside the Middle East border on hypocrisy. Despite recent rhetoric by U.S. policymakers concerning freedom and human rights advancements in Africa, actual U.S. policy in the Gulf of Guinea region belies the fact that U.S. economic interests still subvert the professed desire to see democracy succeed on a global scale. United States involvement in the Gulf of Guinea has important implications for the ability of individual countries in the region to avoid the ‘resource curse’ and to establish viable institutions. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A conference paper on issues related to relations between European Union (EU) and Russia is presented. Topics discussed include issues related to the Cold War, capitalism and the Soviet communism, the need of implementing liberal democracy in Russia and differences between Russia and EU on the basis of economics, freedom and justice. Also mentions issues related to Ukraine and Azerbaijan and its impact on Russia-EU relations.

Prior studies have focused heavily on one dimension of democratic attitude (support for democracy over authoritarianism) and neglected its multidimensional nature. Conceptually, this study proposes a hierarchical model of democratic attitude consisting of three components: affection, cognition, and conation toward democracy at the regime level. Substantially, the present paper shows that global mass publics have strong conation to live in democracy but their affective commitment toward democracy and cognitive knowledge of democracy are limited. Empirically, the democratic attitude and its components are shaped by self-expression values, education, non-voting participation, and evaluation of democratic performance. However, these common determinants have different effects across democratic attitude and its components. Overall, the empirical analysis suggests two implications: the three components of democratic attitude are distinct but related and democratic attitude is more comprehensive and complex than prior studies have identified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In parliamentary democracies, political parties bargain over the allocation of cabinet portfolios when forming coalition governments. The non-cooperative theory of bargaining predicts the formation only of minimal winning coalitions. However, the empirical evidence suggests that half of all governments are either minority or super-majority. In this paper, we develop a multistage non-cooperative bargaining model of multi-party government formation where political parties care both about the allocation of cabinet positions and the expected policy implemented by the future government. For sufficiently high values of the "policy concern" parameter, parties may be willing to sacrifice the office benefits in their entirety in order to achieve a more desirable government policy. I show that the for sufficiently high level of polarization among the parties outside the government coalition, or for sufficiently little office benefits, opposition parties have an incentive to support a minority government on critical votes rather than forming a majority coalition with other parties. I show that the "formateur" of the minority coalition can play a critical role in securing the majority vote by strategically allocating the cabinet portfolios in a way that indirectly distributes policy benefits to external supporters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Beyond Nigeria's 2007 Elections: Demystifying the Fallacy of Electoralism BySolomon O. Akinboye, PhDABSTRACTNigeria is currently confronted by the challenge of successful internal transformation to democracy. This is sequel to the general elections conducted in the country in April, 2007. However, while elections constitute a critical turning point in the process of democratic transition, they do not necessarily make for democracy i.e. elections alone do not make a democracy. One should therefore not fall for the fallacy of electoralism, or the tendency to focus on elections while ignoring other political realities. By implication, attainment of democracy is predicated not only on successful elections but also on achievement of other extra-electoral imperatives including the empowerment of the people through provision of education, health care delivery, and other social amenities; constructing a people-oriented constitution that can stand the test of time; re-federalising the nation's polity in order to ensure equity, justice and fairplay; addressing other pertinent issues that confront the socio-political fabric of the nation e.g. ethno-religious cleavages, corruption and internal security. Nigeria, in its chequered political history has been persistently engrossed in electoralism as against liberal democracy. Apart from the failure of the electoral process to achieve meaningful transition to democratic order, the extra-electoral imperatives have not been sufficiently addressed; and hence, the persistent failure to achieve democracy. The paper argues that though not all elections engender democracy, democracy cannot be built without elections. Secondly, while elections amount to the starting point for democracy, they do not constitute the entire gamut of the democratic process, as other extra-electoral imperatives have to be considered in the process of building a stable democratic order. The post-2007 general elections, the paper submits, should be completely devoid of electoralism, and instead foster a remarkably sustainable democracy that is capable of approximating inclusiveness and accommodativeness rather than simply competitiveness and divisiveness. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The last three years were very important in democratic development of former Soviet countries. The series of democratic "color revolutions" in which people angered by rigged elections had toppled entrenched, corrupt leaders in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005) led analysts to believe that other republics, particularly Azerbaijan that was supposed to have parliament elections in fall of 2005, will follow their ways. Unfortunately democratic revolution did not take place in Azerbaijan. Instead, despite mass demonstrations and active opposition struggle, current autocratic regime once again falsified parliament elections and strengthened its position. In his seminal article, "Transitions from Post-Communism," Michael McFaul pointed out several factors that lead to a successful revolution, including:1. A semi-autocratic rather than fully autocratic regime. 2. An unpopular incumbent.3. A united, organized opposition. 4. The ability of independent media to quickly drive home the point that voting results were falsified. 5. A political opposition capable of mobilizing thousands of citizens to protest electoral fraud. 6. Divisions among the regime's coercive forces. The paper compares the situation in three countries from McFaul's position and analyzes the reasons and factors that led to successful revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, and failure in Azerbaijan. Furthermore, the paper discusses the role of foreign actors such as the United States, Russia, the European Union and international NGOs in these revolutions ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What do political leaders look for in potential foreign policy advisors? I argue that the delegation of foreign policy decisions by the political leader constitutes a principal-agent problem that the leader will account for during the selection of their foreign and defense ministers. More specifically, I argue that leaders with hawkish foreign policy preferences will tend to have foreign and defense ministers with similarly hawkish foreign policy preferences, and that this efect will weaken whenever the leader does not have as much control over the selection of those ministers; specifically, when the leader is the head of a coalition government in which the foreign affairs and defense portfolios have been awarded to a different political party. I test these hypotheses using ordered probit analyses of the European Representative Democracy (ERD) data set on cabinet formation in post-WWII Europe, as well as original data on the time in office, age, military service, and gender of the foreign and defense ministers in 29 countries between 1950 and 2000. I find moderate to strong support for the hypotheses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much of the research that examines democratic institutions initially focused on political economic outcomes. More recently there has been increasing interest in how political institutions impact domestic and foreign policies beyond the scope of the fiscal and monetary domain. For instance, where once researchers mainly focused on governmental revenues and expenditures when examining the effects of democratic institutions, today there is a growing body of research that seeks to address the relationship between majoritarian and consensus democracy and social and foreign policy prescriptions. This research aims to expand our knowledge of political institutions on domestic policy-making by analyzing the relationship between electoral rules and education policy. I argue that democracies that produce greater representativeness will place greater importance upon educating their citizens. My research models whether democracies vary in how education policy is prescribed and educational standards achieved. The findings suggest that electoral rules effect how education policy is formulated. These results have far-reaching implications on how countries develop and provide opportunities to their citizens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on a study to examine international relations, and to determine how autocracies and democracies interact with one another, and what may motivate rational actors to pursue an alliance. Topics discussed include alliances between the U.S. and a foreign autocratic party, democracy as one of the oldest forms of government in the world, and autocracy system of government. It further discusses dictatorships often established in states with little economic vibrancy.

Political leaders desire to stay in office. This implies that leaders make both domestic and foreign policy decisions in a manner most likely to satisfy the people who keep them in office. Selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, Smith 2001) suggests that when a leader's winning coalition is small (autocracies), leaders bestow private benefits to stay in office and when a leader's winning coalition is large (democracies), leaders are inclined to provide public goods. This paper argues that when leaders make foreign policy decisions congruent with the desires of domestic religious actors, it a public good rather than a private benefit. Thus, religious political influence is more likely to occur in democracies than in autocracies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I show that the hypothesis of a "separate" or dyadic peace among democracies was first developed by Giuseppe Mazzini, and not by Immanuel Kant, as present-day international relations theorists commonly assume. Giuseppe Mazzini, the inspirational leader of the Italian struggle for national independence, ranked among the most influential European public figures of the mid-19th century. He also made a seminal contribution to the development of modern liberal internationalist thought. Yet he has largely fallen into oblivion today among international relations scholars and political theorists. A systematic reappraisal of Mazzini's international political thought should allow for some fresh insights on the causes of peace among democracies: unlike other liberal thinkers, Mazzini did not believe that democracies are inherently peaceful. He simply thought that Europe's vulnerable democracies would be natural allies in the struggle against despots and other enemies of liberty. Europe's new democracies, Mazzini argued, would thus establish a "collective defense pact" among themselves. This would lead to increased inter-democratic cooperation, trust, and a gradual overcoming of the security dilemma among democracies.The essence of Mazzini's causal argument can explain the emergence of a "separate peace" among liberal democracies since the end of WWII: the western democracies initially created a defensive security alliance under American leadership, to protect their freedom from what they perceived as an expansionist communist threat. The institutionalization of this western alliance promoted increasingly close contacts and exchanges among the western democracies, with a concomitant progressive reduction of the security dilemma among them. Mazzini's causal explanation is logically coherent and more consistent with the historical evidence than alternative explanations, based on democratic institutional constraints or on the "externalization" of democratic norms in foreign affairs. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When leaders initiate and escalate international conflict, there are often tangible and immediate domestic consequences. Both the democratic peace perspective and diversionary theory suggest that leaders are constrained (or encouraged) to participate in international conflict because of an anticipated mass reaction to the conflict based on attributes of the target state. Yet research has not shown that the public reacts favorably to certain types of targets, as diversionary theory would suggest, but rejects other targets, as the democratic peace suggests. In this paper I suggest that a rational and informed public recognizes the incentives for leaders to divert the nation by acting aggressively abroad during times of domestic instability. I argue that a rational public will only provide a boost in popularity when either it is obvious that the conflict is not for diversionary purposes or it is against a state with important geo-strategic interests. I test these hypotheses using time series data from six advanced democracies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relationship between civil society and democracy is complex, with debate often centering on issues of definition and measurement. The relationship has become the focus of foreign policy with the increase in funding provided to civil society groups in Africa, the goal of which is to strengthen democratic institutions and encourage better government. This article seeks to join the debate by unpacking the catch-all term of 'formal civil society organization.' I will focus on one aspect of civil society: associational life. Based on responses in the Afrobarometer dataset, an individual-level survey spanning 18 African countries, the findings indicate that the relationship between formal associations and democracy is much more nuanced than is often acknowledged by either side of the civil society debate. The type of organization to which an individual belongs may shape their attitude about democracy. The impact of organization type is conditioned by democratic values and attitudes about democratic institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do audience costs make democracies more likely to honor alliance commitments than autocracies? Traditionally, scholars have argued "yes." I posit that international promises are distinct from threats in that states draw utility from promises being carried out into the future, and often, repeatedly. Threats, if tested, are beneficial when they can be carried out quickly and do not need to be repeated. I examine these differences, and the extensions that can be drawn from them, in regards to audience costs and military alliances. General shifts in public opinion on foreign policy and realizations of decreases in the value of an alliance affect the costs a leader faces for honoring or violating an alliance. Democracies are sensitive to these costs and likely to respond to these pressures in wartime tests of their alliances. I find empirical support for the hypothesis that democracies are no more likely to honor alliances than autocracies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the relations between the European Union (EU) and the U.S., with focus on the position of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). It examines whether the rift is deepening towards heading the transatlantic relations from alliance to partnership. The author questions whether the ideas of global war against terror, shaping global trade environment, and spreading American model of democracy help to maintain the tie.

The article examines the influence of international conflict involvement on the development of national democracy. The argument that international conflict involvement will undermine democracy of target states due to the negative impact of external threats on development is explored. The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method and diverse datasets concerning international conflict have been employed.

The article analyzes the development of U.S. foreign policy in Central Asia. The examination provided in the article revealed a subtle shift since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the type of programs funded in Central Asia. It reveals that the U.S. policies focus less on democratic institutions and civil society and more on trans-national security issues of dubious accomplishments.

IR scholars have recently begun to examine how political institutions impact a state's decision to go to war. One school of thought, led by Leblang and Chan (2003), has found that certain electoral system characteristics (i.e., proportional representation systems) are associated with more pacifist behavior because PR systems often produce a greater number of actors that are involved in the policymaking process that leads to consensus building and more risk adverse foreign policies. However, we contend that this finding may overlook other important electoral considerations. Specifically, we believe that there are implications for going to war and politicians may be held more accountable in certain electoral systems than in others, thus impacting a state's decision to initiate conflict. As a result, we argue that more candidate-centered electoral systems (measured using Carey and Shugart's (1995) personal vote index) should lead to more pacific foreign policies. We test our argument using a time-series cross-sectional analysis with panel-corrected standard errors of more than 50 democracies from 1975-2004. The results reveal support for our hypothesis that candidate-centered electoral systems result in less conflict initiation than party-centric systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Russian-Chechen conflict has its origin in the 18th century. After the collapse of the Soviet Union two wars took place between the Russia and Chechnya. The aim of my presentation is to classify the Russian-Chechen wars: I focus on the question of whether these wars can be defined as new wars or, conversely, if both wars must be considered as a continuation of the old conflict with modern means. I utilize the definition of new wars set by scholars such as Münkler, Daase and Delbrück. I follow a two-step process: First, I establish a general overview of the wars´ characteristics by discussing primordial, cultural, ethnic, geostrategic as well as economic aspects. In the second step, I compare the results stated in step one to the theorems of Herfried Münkler, etc. The Russian-Chechen wars are important since inherent to them are several current aspects of international politics: the conflict between Islam and the Western culture, the enforcement and protection of universal human rights, the weaknesses of Russian democracy and the establishment of an authoritarian policy by Putin. The topic and the methods of my presentation are new compared to earlier discussions because such discussions either focused on documentation of the events and delivering prognoses or used particular elements of the wars to substantiate theoretical argumentation, whereas I link both to avoid errors in defining the nature of the Russian-Chechen wars. Furthermore, my approach allows more accurate predictions and understanding of future developments of the marginalized conflict on Europe's periphery. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]