The Public's Response to Uses of Force in Geo-Strategically Important Regions.

When leaders initiate and escalate international conflict, there are often tangible and immediate domestic consequences. Both the democratic peace perspective and diversionary theory suggest that leaders are constrained (or encouraged) to participate in international conflict because of an anticipated mass reaction to the conflict based on attributes of the target state. Yet research has not shown that the public reacts favorably to certain types of targets, as diversionary theory would suggest, but rejects other targets, as the democratic peace suggests. In this paper I suggest that a rational and informed public recognizes the incentives for leaders to divert the nation by acting aggressively abroad during times of domestic instability. I argue that a rational public will only provide a boost in popularity when either it is obvious that the conflict is not for diversionary purposes or it is against a state with important geo-strategic interests. I test these hypotheses using time series data from six advanced democracies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]