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This paper focuses on the economic, political, and strategic relationship between the United States and the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. This has become especially important in US foreign policy sine 2001. Economically this region is important because of its natural resources. Politically and strategically it is important in American counter terrorism policy as well as supporting the US strategic position in the region, in particular the military effort in Afghanistan. It also remains a dynamic of great power relations. Russia has attempted to maintain and reassert its influence in the region. China is also becoming an important consumer of Central Asian energy. This work examines alliance theory between great and regional powers using the American relationship between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as case studies. This thesis of this work is that because of the great value the US places on these alliances Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are able to manipulate the United States. As a result Washington gets manipulated into supporting authoritarian regimes which in the long term can weaken its position in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to provide a theoretical explanation for multi-vector foreign policies mostly followed by small countries by examining Kazakhstan's relationship with Russia and other major powers. In previous literature this type of foreign policy has been weekly defined and no convincing explanation has been provided. To fill the gap, I use concepts and implications of bargaining models of war and argue that multi-vector foreign policy is adopted by a small state because no single major power can credibly commit not to exploit the asymmetrical relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kazakhstan has rapidly emerged as the major geopolitical player in Central Asia, mostly due to the country’s hydrocarbon wealth and strategic location. Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan’s president, has consistently sought to broaden political and economic integration across the region, positioning himself as a pivotal figure in the struggle for influence currently playing out between Russia, the U.S., the EU and China in the region. Nazarbayev’s approach of “multi-vectorism” has been quite successful at maintaining productive relations with all four major powers, and the country’s growing economic might has resulted in Kazakhstan becoming Central Asia’s first significant creditor nation, investing more than $300 million, according to Kazakhstani sources, in Georgia in 2006. In spite of the success of the multi-vector approach, Kazakhstan faces several serious potential challenges to maintaining the delicate geopolitical balance it has struck. These include negative effects of economic structural imbalances (so-called “Dutch disease”), geographic limitations in the transport sector, political instability among neighbors, and potential strife in the country’s own internal ethnic dynamics. This paper will focus on analyzing these factors in the context of several research questions: Is the multi-vector strategy capable of maintaining Kazakhstan’s current status as a rising force in the broader region’s geopolitics? What shifts are likely in Kazakhstani political policy as the concept of multi-vectorism evolves? What factors or actions might engender such an evolution in strategy, and how might such changes affect Kazakhstan’s relations both within the Central Eurasian region and on the global stage? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the authoritarian elements of the super-presidential political system, Kazakh political culture is considerably more complex, and more democratic in orientation, than many Western observers have acknowledged. There are historical elements of the nomadic tradition which, when combined with the educational achievements of the Soviet era and the rapid economic growth of the post-communist period, give Kazakhstan a unique advantage over its Central Asian neighbors. There is an increasingly affluent, well-educated middle class, concentrated in the larger cities. Kazakhstan also has a diverse society and a culture of religious and ethnic tolerance that bodes well for democratic development. This paper assesses recent trends in the development of representative institutions in Kazakhstan, focusing on the national Majilis and regional maslikhats, and their relationship to the country’s extensive network of non-governmental organizations. Preliminary evidence is presented from the author’s long-term project on legislative assemblies and NGOs. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A banner on a main avenue leading to Almaty, Kazakhstan’s central square proclaims: “Kazakhstan is a fully equal and responsible member of the international community.” One way in which Kazakhstan and other post-Soviet states have attempted to demonstrate their sovereignty yet willingness to be good global citizens is by joining multilateral environmental conventions. The governments of most post-Soviet states rapidly signed on to a range of environmental treaties upon gaining their independence from the Soviet Union in late 1991. Given the enormous challenges these states faced in setting up new political and economic systems and defining new national identities, this attention to international environmental cooperation is surprising. Evidence from interviews with people involved in environmental policymaking and from the speeches of political leaders suggests that one reason for this impulse to join environmental agreements was to legitimize the new states at home and abroad.The post-Soviet states’ enthusiasm for signing onto international environmental agreements has not been matched by vigilance in implementing these agreements’ provisions. Changes in domestic legislation, submitting required reports and paying dues to treaty secretariats have all lagged. But does this mean that the commitments to environmental protection and to membership in an international community concerned with such things were simply declarative? Or does the linking of being a member of the international community with environmentally responsible behavior and specific treaty commitments change policy behavior? Who is the “international community” in this case and what is it that this supposed community demands of these states environmentally?This paper addresses these questions first with a look at compliance with international environmental commitments using statistics from all 15 post-Soviet states and secondly with case studies of the effects of participation in several multilateral environmental agreements in two states: Ukraine and Kazakhstan. With data from extensive interviews and the review of relevant documents carried out during eight months of field research, the paper explores both the domestic and international audiences that the states seek to perform for environmentally, and how these actors seek to shape environmental behavior. My research finds a great deal of inconsistent behavior on everyone’s part, including actors within international and national nongovernmental organizations, government agencies, international organizations and treaty secretariats. All of these at times subordinate environmental commitments to other ends, whether personal, commercial, or “community building.” Nevertheless, there has been a spread of an environmental discourse and with it the transportation of norms that have taken root in some unlikely circumstances. Ultimately, however, ideas of international responsibility cannot replace the domestic demand for environmental protection actions that is necessary to turn rhetoric into policy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the reasons behind the stagnation in the transition to democracy in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and contemplates the consequences of failed transitions ? for these societies and for general regional and system stability. According to their constitutions, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are democracies. In actuality, however, there is little evidence to support that these are democratic systems. These states? post-Soviet constitutions outline them as democracies ? yet they lack a free press; freedom of association is suppressed; religious freedom is limited; and free speech is constrained as well. While these three countries hold popular elections, much of their electoral processes are under the control of the executive branch of government - calling into question whether or not Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan really hold ?fair and competitive? elections. In sum, in all of these states, democracy is de jure rather than de facto. Why is this so? Why are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan not the democracies in practice that they are on paper?Many scholars and policy-makers blame the stagnation in these states? democratic transitions on the firm hands used by the countries? presidents to maintain or increase their current power. Other scholars point out that Central Asia has never been democratic and thus does not know how to be so. These scholars refer, in particular, to the region?s history as part of the Russian Empire and later, as part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Using frameworks drawn from Dahl?s Polyarchy (1971) and Huntington?s The Third Wave (1991), this paper finds that not only are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan straying from their constitutional democratic starting points, no single factor is to blame for the stagnation in the transitions to democracy in these states. Rather, it is the combination of multiple factors ? both internal and external ? that provides the most comprehensive explanation of these states? failure to become full-fledged democracies. Combining the elements of strong dictator-like presidents with a lack of democratic history is but the tip of the iceberg. Internal factors such as ?political culture? and external factors such as the influence of the international community also play major roles in the current state of affairs in these Central Asian states. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The decision of the Russian government to permit the importation of nuclear waste for storage and eventual reprocessing is fraught with significant consequences for both Russia and the international community. Kazakhstan is considering a similar policy. External actors cannot remain neutral with respect to the creation of a nuclear pollution haven in Russia and Kazakhstan. First, between 70 and 90 percent of the world’s spent nuclear fuel is of U.S. origin, and thus shipment to any third country is subject to U.S. consent. Second, Russia will be able to import spent nuclear fuel from the member states of the European Union only if the European Commission concludes that Russia has the legal, regulatory, and technical ability to safely manage the waste. Finally, the resulting climate of uncertainty has generated an incentive for EU candidate states with Soviet-designed nuclear power plants to return their waste to Russia as quickly as possible, regardless of safety or proliferation considerations. This paper will analyze the responses of other states to the Russian and Kazakh proposals and relate these to the growing literature on waste trading and pollution havens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main objective of this paper is to discuss some points of further development of democratization process on the post Soviet area, predominantly in the two the most economically sufficient ex-Soviet republics â€" Russian Federation and the Republic of Ka ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The majority of independent states emerging from the former Soviet Union are small to medium size states, albeit our geopolitical vision of the region is shaped by behemoths such as Russia or Kazakhstan. Many of the small states were the focus of conflict ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When the Soviet Union collapsed, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine had to redefine their relations with Russia. Each country faced similar demographic pressures due to the presence of a large ethnic Russian community and domestic and foreign economic pressures. However, the countries did not pursue similar national security strategies. Thus, simple rational choice arguments are not able to provide comparatively valid explanations. Using Kazakhstan as a case study, this research project examines the idea that national security interests were defined by prevailing perceptions of Russia. The meanings attached to the history of relations with the Russian and Soviet empires established the parameters of the debate about what constituted the proper national security strategy toward the Russian Federation and ethnic Russians inside each country. Whether the Russian Federation and its diaspora would be regarded as an enemy or ally depended on the assessment of that history. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on how new states of the former Soviet Union, namely Estonia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, define their identity politics and national security interests. The states opposed the presence of Russian armed forces and strategic bases in their territories following the collapse of the Union in 1991. The self/other dimension of identity politics played a major role in decisions about relations with the Russian Federation. Estonia wanted the withdrawal of the troops while the other two empathized with Russia.

The nuclear rollback of South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan is an empirical anomaly for realism, and realist scholars have avoided addressing the issue in their writings. Other research programs have taken up this intellectual space left open by realism and have provided explanations of nuclear disarmament. In this essay I advance two realist hypotheses to account for nuclear disarmament, which can be considered a defensive realist position on state behavior. States without a global secure second strike capability (SSSC) implement a rational strategy by giving up their nuclear arsenals; however absence of SSSC is a necessary but not sufficient condition for nuclear disarmament. The absence of a dyadic existential threat is also a necessary condition for a state to give up its nuclear weapons. I argue that a defensive realist explanation, based on absence of SSSC and existential threat, is jointly necessary and sufficient for nuclear disarmament. I present a typology of states that possessed and continue to possess nuclear arms, with respect to each state's threat environment and SSSC. I further analyze the cases of Israel and North Korea to test my hypothesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What historical legacies of Soviet socialism shape contemporary health care provision in post-Soviet Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan? Despite starting the era of independence with the same institutions, why do these countries adopt different strategies of heal ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several major factors drove Kazakhstan’s leadership to give up nuclear weapons left on its territory following the Soviet collapse. Among driving forces were concerns about country’s security (calculations against attempting to preserve nuclear arsenals a ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This explorative study examines the degree of government compliance with international recommendations on the prohibition of trafficking in women. Analysis of government reforms in four post-Soviet countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, and Ukraine, demonstrates that governments achieved better progress in developing and enforcing policies against trafficking in women in those countries, where international activism of non-governmental organizations against trafficking was supported by intergovernmental programs and collaborative state efforts to fight trafficking. Government action is assessed along three sets of criteria: legislative changes (adoption of a comprehensive strategy to fight trafficking), institutional changes (creation of a separate office within the government structures to fight trafficking), and specific programs (police training, support to shelters, and public awareness campaigns against trafficking). The findings suggest that dense intergovernmental networks and cooperative projects between governments strengthened the degree of government compliance with international requirements on anti-trafficking policies in Ukraine and Belarus. The absence of such cooperation on domestic violence against women explains why policy reform in this area is lagging behind in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is again in the spotlight after its Astana summit on July 5, 2005. India, Pakistan, Iran and Mongolia participated in the meeting as observers leading many to predict soon expansion of the SCO. The interest in the SCO has been clearly growing among the states of the region. Series of events in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, as well as continuing uncertainty in Afghanistan and Iraq make the SCO a promising alternative to the US-dominated mechanism of international security. However, the future of the SCO is difficult to foretell. Skeptical voices emphasize that the lack of a viable economic program will not allow the SCO members to reach the desired level of cooperation. I argue that two factors are likely to drive the SCO in the years to come: American involvement in the region and the internal transformation of post-Soviet regimes. The combination of these factors provide a volatile political trend in Central Eurasia that can either promote or hinder the SCO advancement in future. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To what extent do transnational forces and actors drive welfare state reform? Recent work on transnational politics suggests that international organizations (Deacon 1997; Barnett and Finnemore 2004), transnational social movements (Tarrow 2005), transnational advocacy coalitions (Keck and Sikkink 1998), transnational governmental networks (Slaughter 2004), and epistemic communities (Haas 1992; Chwieroth 2003) may have a strong impact on areas previously thought to be in the domain of domestic governance. Conversely, leading welfare state scholars have shown that nation states exhibit surprising resilience in determining welfare state policies, despite globalizing trends (Garrett 1998; Glatzer and Rueschemeyer 2005; Pierson 2001). This article shifts focus from transnational actors to the logics of transnational policy campaigns. It argues that a multiplicity of transnational policy actors has been involved in pension reform efforts in Kazakhstan and that their involvement has been shaped by the logic of a broader, loosely coordinated policy campaign. This logic dictated that Kazakhstan not turn into a "failed case" of reform. Efforts to prevent reform failure in Kazakhstan from becoming a negative model for reform elsewhere have shaped Kazakh reforms and caused transnational actors to remain involved in the country over the long-term. This long-term involvement has reached beyond the typical technical assistance in reform design to include continual involvement in reform implementation. These findings suggest that the transnational politics literature has tended to underestimate the extent of transnational actors' involvement in domestic welfare state policy. It also suggests the importance of considering the role of global policy campaigns and their internal logics in setting national welfare state policies. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and appearance of a new independent states on the post-soviet area a new migration situation has arisen. People were not only flowing due to political and ethnic tensions appeared in some post-soviet states. This pressure to migrate resulted from pronounced differences between the economic development and incomes in newly independent post-soviet states as well. The growth of unemployment and poverty resulted in massive migration from poor regions to regions with higher living standards and defined specificity of the migration flows ? emergence and intense development of temporary labour migrations, trafficking in human beings on the one hand and decline of educational mobility on the other hand. Spatial and gender inequality determined specific structure of inter-state migratory flows.Furthermore, the frontiers could not be sealed that resulted in undesirable immigration and illegal employment. This movement can hardly be stopped, not even by the most severe immigration laws. Suffice it to say that in Russia alone, the number of illegal economic migrants from other CIS countries amounts, by different estimates, to almost 3.5-5 million (about 3 per cent of population size), in Kazakhstan ? 300-500 thousand (2-3 per cent of population size). ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]