Search

In his 1965 work on Freud, Paul Ricoeur states and reasons that the hermeneutic field, as a space of interpretations, is constitutively fragmented and is, at the same time, a structure for hosting differ-ent interpretations formed in language, as a place where different human perspectives on the nature of reality converge. This justifica-tion emerges from epistemological and ontological conditions. On the one hand, it is based on the idea of a real that is always surplus, which makes it inaccessible to a total knowledge, and that the topics of evil and time are paradigmatic figures in Ricoeur’s thought..., Critical Hermeneutics, 2019: Path to the Hermeneutic Field [Special Issue]

The article intends to demonstrate that a theology of vegetarianism is possible, despite some contrary evidence present in the biblical texts. Like other theologies dealing with issues not directly voiced in the Bible, it becomes possible to interpret the biblical statements in a new way, on the bases of a specific methodology. As a result, an objective comprehension will go back inductively to Sacred Scripture. The article advocates for applying this new method as well as for introducing its ethical implications into the Christian tradition. An additional supportive argument in favour of establishing the new understanding can be found in the history of the Roman Church, besides the consolidated custom of carnivorous nutrition: there has been no shortage of positions in favour of vegetarian asceticism. This stance was also represented by Thomas Aquinas. By valorizing classic Christian authors in favour of vegetarianism (starting with Jerome), the inauguration of the theology of vegetarianism becomes legitimised. Such an inauguration would reorient Christian thought toward reconsidering cosmology, ecology and topical contemporary issues such as anthropocentrism and speciesism.

"Territorial Presence As A Ground For Claims: Some Reflections" returns to political theory to assess the moral and legal position of those individuals who are inside the territory of liberal democratic states, but whose very presence has been unauthorised by the state. The author asks the question as to what their bodily presence means and does from a political perspective. The paper is part of a broader political phenomenology of territoriality in liberal national thought and puts emphasis on the idea that it is migrants’ bodily presence within the state’s territory that lies at the analytical heart of the conversation about irregular immigrants. What is paradoxical about territorial presence of unauthorised migrants is that such presence is simultaneously (1) the source of the offence states invoke as a justification for making them ‘illegal’; (2) the basis for protections the migrants may claim against the state for basic fair treatment while present; and (3) the ground for claims they make (or are made on their behalf) to remain present – i.e., to stay in the territory. Territorial presence is thus a fertile ground for the analysis of arbitrary law-making in migration. The author sets out to analyse some recent legal developments pertaining to the governance of irregular non-citizen immigrants in the United States. These developments bear on the project of theorising "immigrant justice" as resistance to the growing illiberalization of migration policy. In her view, the very existence of a class of people designated as irregular migrants within state polities presupposes that such polities maintain formal exclusionary border regimes and that in such regimes, some persons are predesignated as ineligible for entry. And even though those exclusion rules do not function to fully preclude entry and presence of such persons, states do not treat their arrival as an automatic basis for full membership either. Hence, irregular immigrants are territorially present in a state that purports to eschew that presence. The author then explores how the idea of “sanctuary” relates to the kinds of claims that both liberal humanitarians and immigrant justice advocates have been making over the last few years. These are claims which ground protection in what exponents cite as the overriding ethical significance of immigrants’ territorial presence – their already-hereness – as the basis for recognition and rights. In particular, the author makes the case that even though "sanctuary" provides a logic of safe harbour, it fails to end the predicament of constitutive based in border exclusionism. For her, the political, social, but also philosophical, struggle for the idea of border abolitionism requires a figurative sword that must go beyond sanctuary so that borders are not just mitigated, but radically deconstructed and even destroyed. The author takes this to be the vital imperative that confronts all legal and political theorists who must engage the normative challenge of rethinking arbitrary law-making in view of the new inequalities that a global political order grounded on sovereign borders produces.

Bokanmeldelse av <> Forfattere: Simonsen, M. M., Rølsåsen, T., Eckbo, N., Dale, R. F., Barder, O. H. E. og Fjeldaas, E. Utgitt: Bergen, Fagbokforlaget. År: 2020. Sidetall: 134.

O presente artigo teórico identifica as convergências e divergências entre as obras de Giorgio Agamben e de Michel Foucault. Pretende-se discutir o pensamento político de Giorgio Agamben no que concerne às suas formulações sobre estado de exceção em contraste com as formulações de Michel Foucault sobre biopolítica. Uma convergência visível é a importância da noção de dispositivo e de biopolítica na obra dos dois autores. Em Foucault o acento se dá nas práticas cotidianas, por assim dizer, do exercício de poder, tendo foco o conceito de genealogia. Agamben procura dar mais ênfase, sem dúvida, ao estado de exceção e à vida nua. No que diz respeito à postura dos dois autores em relação à resistência aos poderes, o artigo aponta, em Foucault, todo seu exercício voltado ao tema do cuidado de si e da vontade de verdade e, em Agamben, numa evidente inspiração messiânica ao gênero de Walter Benjamin, como é possível pensar na comunidade que vem, que tem a potência de superar o paradigma da vida nua e seu correlato imediato, a soberania.

Submitted by Simone Maisonave (simonemaisonave@hotmail.com) on 2021-02-05T14:16:41Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) A_filosofia_radical_de_Karl_Otto_Apel.pdf: 875763 bytes, checksum: 154369d60f85d3f1b9439f16f55ad3a9 (MD5) Approved for entry into archive by Aline Batista (alinehb.ufpel@gmail.com) on 2021-02-05T23:13:17Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) A_filosofia_radical_de_Karl_Otto_Apel.pdf: 875763 bytes, checksum: 154369d60f85d3f1b9439f16f55ad3a9 (MD5) Made available in DSpace on 2021-02-05T23:13:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) A_filosofia_radical_de_Karl_Otto_Apel.pdf: 875763 bytes, checksum: 154369d60f85d3f1b9439f16f55ad3a9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2020 A passagem da semântica formal à pragmática promoveu uma transformação na filosofia. O efeito foi consolidar a corresponsabilidade dos sujeitos coautores diante dos problemas de ordem local e mundial. No seu escopo, não há lugar para a metaética. Por isso,Apel pode ser considerado como um filósofo radical. Em termos filosóficos, a corresponsabilidade é sinônimo de coautoria, atitude voltada à convivência hospitaleira. Deste modo, a pragmática apeliana, através dos níveis A e B, exige um compromissoconsensual-comunicativo entre humanos,dos humanos para com os não humanos e o ecossistema como tal.

How can someone reconcile the desire to eat meat, and a tendency toward vegetarian ideals? How should we reconcile contradictory moral values? How can we aggregate different moral theories? How individual preferences can be fairly aggregated to represent a will, norm, or social decision? Conflict resolution and preference aggregation are tasks that intrigue philosophers, economists, sociologists, decision theorists, and many other scholars, being a rich interdisciplinary area for research. When trying to solve questions about moral uncertainty a meta understanding of the concept of normativity can help us to develop strategies to deal with norms themselves. 2nd-order normativity, or norms about norms, is a hierarchical way to think about how to combine many different normative structures and preferences into a single coherent decision. That is what metanormativity is all about, a way to answer: what should we do when we don’t know what to do? In this study, we will review a decision-making strategy dealing with moral uncertainty, Maximization of Expected Choice-Worthiness. This strategy, proposed by William MacAskill, allows for the aggregation and inter-theoretical comparison of different normative structures, cardinal theories, and ordinal theories. In this study, we will exemplify the metanormative methods proposed by MacAskill, using has an example, a series of vegetarian dilemmas. Given the similarity to this metanormative strategy to expected utility theory, we will also show that it is possible to integrate both models to address decision-making problems in situations of empirical and moral uncertainty. We believe that this kind of ethical-mathematical formalism can be useful to help develop strategies to better aggregate moral preferences and solve conflicts.

The aim of this paper is to point to the possible approximations between the concept of Ethics by the Brazilian philosopher Álvaro Vieira Pinto and by the Argentinean Enrique Dussel. We discussed the reflections on Ethics provided by Álvaro Vieira Pinto in the books “Consciência e Realidade Nacional” and “Ciência e Existência” and glimpsed a complementarity between the two philosophers. The humanization of life conditions to the masses of underdeveloped countries is a confluent aspect in both philosophers’ reflections. We conclude highlighting the relevance of Álvaro Vieira Pinto’s thinking to the decolonial studies and the decolonization of Ethics.

A preocupação fundamental de K-O. Apel, diante de uma situação de crise da razão que leva à negação da filosofia, é articular um novo projeto da filosofia enquanto tal, a Pragmática Transcendental, que levanta a pretensão de articular uma profunda reformulação do projeto transcendental clássico, elaborado por Kant, a partir da reviravolta linguístico-pragmática do século XX. Apel articula a filosofia enquanto autorreflexão sobre os pressupostos necessários e irrecusáveis da atividade de argumentar enquanto tal como a nova forma de “Prima Philosophia”. O artigo procura mostrar que a Pragmática Transcendental, mesmo com sua reformulação pragmática do pensamento transcendental, conservou sua insuficiência ontológica e metafísica.

In the debate between Habermas and Apel on the foundation of discourse ethics, many things are mixed. The article reconsiders the debate, analyzes the form of the pragmatic-transcendental argument, and distinguishes two major issues in confrontation: questions about argumentative assumptions and questions about moral obligations. We try to show that, having made the appropriate distinctions, in the first question, Apel is more right than Habermas, and that, in the second question, Habermas is more right than Apel. The implications of each position are considered.

Este texto não apresenta resumo.

The article replies to the five comments to Political Self-Deception, from the more philosophical and epistemic remarks to the more political and historical ones. In the end, it summarizes the main points of the book as suggested by the discussion with the five comments.

What can one say to the self-deceived? And – perhaps more importantly – who can say it? The attribution of self-deception depends heavily on the criteria for what is thought to be beyond dispute. For Galeotti, misperception of reality is a product of psychological and emotional pressure resulting in ‘emotionally overloaded wishes’, and her solution thus involves the construction of what an ‘impartial’ and ‘dispassionate’ observer would conclude when presented with the same evidence. Drawing on her examples of foreign policy decision-making, I discuss two objections. First, I ask whether being ‘dispassionate’ is enough get one off the hook from the sorts of value judgements that must be made in assessing evidence in complex situations. Second, I address the role of disagreement and dissent, and suggest that what is required are not actors with a lack of emotionally overloaded wishes, but actors with different goals and wishes. Thus, while Galeotti emphasizes solutions drawing on ideals of impartiality, we might more productively look for solutions that engage multiple forms of partiality.

In Political Self-Deception, Galeotti considers (and rebuts) two ‘realist’ objections. Galeotti’s realist argues that there is no need for the overly complex concept of self-deception, since self-serving lies and manipulation are descriptively and normatively sufficient; and that in any case, deception in democratic politics is sometimes justifiable. In response, Galeotti offers explanatory, moral, and normative reasons why self-deception is a helpful concept in international politics: it helps us better understand the political reality of deception, and guides us in how to avoid or mitigate it. In this comment, I wish to revisit the realist objections, and to provide a more nuanced and more robust version of them. In doing so, I raise questions about the relationship between self-deception and the failure of political judgement, about the moral evaluation of deception in democratic politics, and about the normative implications of Galeotti’s analysis for political responsibility and for prophylactic measures.

This article engages with Julian Culp’s Democratic Education in a Globalized World from the perspective of political philosophy in a global world. The focus is on liberalism. From this angle, Culp’s book entails three important claims. The first is that a right to basic education on the global level exists, i.e. a right to education for everybody independent of one’s nation state. The second claim is that the implementation of this right is not a task for each nation state alone but of world society as a whole. This implies that countries that are able to provide more than basic education to its citizens have a duty to redistribute part of their excess resources to help poor countries secure basic education for their citizens. Culp’s third claim, relevant to the liberal project, is on the kind of education that is supposed to go global. This education should be free-standing, that is, based on political as opposed to perfectionist arguments. This contribution agrees with the first claim, is sceptical regarding the second one, and disagrees with the third one.

Historical Narratives in Scientific Research: the Case of Evolutionary Biology Evolutionary biology provides some hints to analyse the articulations and possible issues which arise from the integration between scientific practise and historical-philosophical reflection. Indeed, the study of organic change has been carried out by scientists poised to play on more than one table, becoming the major players in the dialogue among science, epistemology and history of science. In particular, during the XX century a number of biologists made the historical-epistemological reflection a work tool. This, however, poses a number of questions: which role do historical narratives play for the scientist? What drives his choices of authors and issues to tackle? Can we consider scientists’ historical narratives as rhetorical devices to legitimise their own scientific agenda? By framing such issues in the field of evolutionary biology, the present article aims at reconsidering the use of historical narratives in science. The paper will consist of three sections. In the first part, I will retrace the main steps of the debate on the role of history of science in scientific practise and education. In the second paragraph, I will examine how the classical historical narratives provided by twentieth-century biologists have come under considerable criticism over time. A third and last section will examine the interplay between the latest evolutionists’ narratives and the current approaches in the historiography of evolutionary biology.

Science and Philosophy. Reflections for a transdisciplinary Alliance Despite historical connections between science and philosophy have always been tight, today’s scientists often consider philosophy as extraneous, and sometimes even antagonistic, to science. In this paper I argue that, to the contrary, philosophy may have an important and productive impact on today’s science, fragmented into a multitude of specialized fields, by contributing to analyse and clarify concepts and hypotheses, assessing methods, formulating new theories and fostering the interdisciplinary dialogue between different sciences, as well as between sciences and society. More importantly, scientists cannot avoid to make non-empirical assumptions when conducting research, and philosophy can help to identify and critically debating them. I conclude by affirming the importance of a transdisciplinary dialogue between science and philosophy, which is crucial for a reciprocal ethical transformation that could open the road to a more aware and responsible way of approaching knowledge and acting in the present complex world.

Suppose you are a moral error theorist, i.e., you believe that no moral judgment is true. What, then, ought you to do with regard to our common practice of making such judgments? Determining the usefulness of our ordinary moral practice is exacerbated by the great number and variety of moral judgments. In-depth case studies may thus be more helpful in clarifying error theory’s practical im- plications than reflections about morality in general. In this article, I pursue this strategy with regard to a particularly important matter, namely climate change. First, I establish general conditions for when a moral judgment has any effect on those who accept it. Second, I show that the judgment that individuals in industrialized countries are morally obliged to act against climate change does not fulfill these conditions, and is thus neither beneficial nor harmful. Finally, I sketch several strategies for increasing people’s non-moral motivation to act against climate. This is the polish translation of book chapter by Thomas Pölzler, „The Effects of Morality on Acting against Climate Change,” published in: The End of Morality: Taking Moral Eliminativism Seriously, ed. Richard Garner, Richard Joyce, New York: Routledge 2018.

Among the many remarkable aspects of the June 2016 introduction of legislation to permit medical assistance in dying (MAiD) in Canada, is the central and even dominant role that women have played in moving this legislation forward, and their ongoing influence as the law continues to be reviewed and revised. The index medical cases on which the higher courts have deliberated concern women patients, and the legal decisions in the various courts have been presided over by women justices. Since the legislation has become law in Canada, women have been among the most vocal and enthusiastic proponents for expanding the criteria to ensure MAiD is more accessible to more Canadians. In this paper, I discuss how the voice of women in this debate is not the ‘different voice’ of second wave feminism first articulated by Carol Gilligan and then adapted and expanded in the ethics of care and relational ethics literature. Instead it is the very familiar voice of the ethics of personal autonomy, individual rights and justice which feminist critics have long decried as inadequate to the task of articulating a comprehensive social morality. I argue for the need to reassert the different voice of relational ethics and the ethics of care into our ongoing discussion of MAiD., Parmi les nombreux aspects remarquables de l’introduction, en juin 2016, d’une législation permettant l’aide médicale à mourir (AMM) au Canada, on peut citer le rôle central et même dominant que les femmes ont joué pour faire avancer cette législation, et leur influence permanente alors que la loi continue d’être examinée et révisée. Les cas médicaux indexés sur lesquels les tribunaux supérieurs ont délibéré concernent des patientes, et les décisions juridiques des différents tribunaux ont été présidées par des femmes juges. Depuis que la loi est entrée en vigueur au Canada, les femmes ont été parmi les plus virulentes et les plus enthousiastes partisanes de l’élargissement des critères afin de garantir que l’AMM soit plus accessible à un plus grand nombre de Canadiens. Dans cet article, j’explique comment la voix des femmes dans ce débat n’est pas la « voix différente » du féminisme de la deuxième vague, d’abord exprimée par Carol Gilligan, puis adaptée et développée dans la littérature à l’éthique des soins et l’éthique relationnelle, mais plutôt la voix très familière de l’éthique de l’autonomie personnelle, des droits individuels et de la justice, que les critiques féministes ont longtemps décrié comme inadéquate pour articuler une morale sociale globale. Je plaide pour la nécessité de réaffirmer la voix différente de l’éthique relationnelle et de l’éthique des soins dans notre discussion actuelle sur l’AMM.

The Disjunction This essay will discuss the difference in nature and essence between science and philosophy. This difference also signifies a disjunction which, while on the one hand is destined to intensify, on the other is going to persist as their original point of articulation. The awareness of such original articulation will never be achieved and yet it will have to be sought after in spite of its apparent unattainability.

Que sais-je? Science & Philosophy: an (im)possible dialogue S&F_, Science&Philosophy. Two terms entwisted by one ampersand (&). That means an exchange in the form of purchase and/or sale of goods. That & interwoves, distinguishes, approximates? Does it point out the market where a trickle of science is swapped for a portion of philosophy or where one buys transmission belts? The quality of the product is generally remarkable. Yet the issue that should be high on the agenda seems to slip away or to be shadowed: what does the philosopher ask the scientist and what does the scientist ask the philosopher?

Biology and its disciplinary Partitions – intellectual and academic Constraints A productive confrontation between biology and philosophy should be based on a serious effort to recover a comprehensive vision of the living world as the subject of a unitary science. Key steps in the emergence of biology as the science of all living beings in the first half of the XIX century are outlined. Academic constraints and personal agendas shaping emergence and fate of individual biological disciplines are examined, with examples from developmental and evolutionary biology. Disciplinary divisions within the life sciences can be seriously limiting for the philosopher of science, much less so for the scientist, although many concepts of foundational importance for different biological disciplines are nomadic concepts that take on the most diverse meanings according to the contexts in which they are used. It is suggested to try a reversal between disciplines and key concepts, turning the latter into anchors for a potentially nomadic set of disciplines.

Nothing personal? Tension and mediation of Personalization in Medicine Personalized medicine aims to develop tailored treatments for individual patients, linking biological knowledge with personal responsibility towards health. The aim of this paper is to analyze the tension and the mediation between these polar opposites. Taking into account the mediation theory by philosophy of technology, we are going to prove the paradox of personalized medicine, turning into a statistical knowledge and a de-personalized practice. It appears to be a new social strategy to foster personal initiative, in order to have a healthy conduct, supported by analysis of objective data, on a personal and general basis.

The self-made Man. The genetic Revolution between new Chances and (un)avoidable Risks In the last two decades we moved from first data about the human genome to the availability of new molecular tools for editing the human genome. An interdisciplinary approach is therefore essential to understand the role of genes in the establishment of human phenotypes and attitudes and to gain a mature knowledge about which human traits can be really improved by editing our genome.

Do we have a genuinely Canadian bioethics – and not only a practice of bioethics in Canada? This question, and this paper, are about the connection between bioethics and the actual healthcare, research, and public health experiences of Canadians. In addressing it, I am inspired by the philosophy of pragmatism that stresses the importance of everyday experience as a starting point for ethics, and of human flourishing as a goal for ethics. Through this lens, an ideal Canadian bioethics is one that is rooted in the lived experiences of Canadians; it reflects the ideal of flourishing projected by Canadian individuals, including their views on their political communities. However, it is unclear if a full-fledged Canadian bioethics has taken shape given increasingly uniform scholarship worldwide that sets expectations about the kinds of moral problems worth investigating and the kinds of solutions to be adopted. In the spirit of thinking about this question, I discuss aspects of Canadian society that could shape the development of a Canadian bioethics: (a) the existence of competing Canadian political narratives, (b) the distinctiveness of Canadian healthcare systems and healthcare experiences, (c) the commitment of Canadians to certain values and aspirations, (d) the institutional and procedural aspects of the Canadian public sphere, (e) the challenges of increasingly uniform scholarship across geographic and national contexts, and (f) the practical obstacles to developing a Canadian bioethics. These challenges that Canadian bioethics faces are likely relevant internationally for all contexts in which socially shaped moral problems are discussed and solutions envisioned., Avons-nous une bioéthique véritablement canadienne – et pas seulement une pratique de la bioéthique au Canada? Cette question, et le présent article, portent sur le lien entre la bioéthique et les expériences réelles des Canadiens en matière de soins de santé, de recherche et de santé publique. En l’abordant, je m’inspire du pragmatisme philosophique qui souligne l’importance de l’expérience quotidienne comme point de départ de l’éthique, et de l’épanouissement humain comme objectif de l’éthique. À travers cette optique, un idéal bioéthique canadien est un idéal qui s’enracine dans les expériences vécues par les Canadiens; il reflète l’idéal d’épanouissement projeté par les individus canadiens, y compris leurs opinions sur leurs communautés politiques. Toutefois, il n’est pas certain qu’une bioéthique canadienne à part entière ait pris forme, étant donné l’uniformisation croissante des recherches dans le monde entier, qui crée des attentes quant aux types de problèmes moraux qui méritent d’être étudiés et aux types de solutions à adopter. Dans un esprit de réflexion sur cette question, j’aborde les aspects de la société canadienne qui pourraient façonner le développement d’une bioéthique canadienne: (a) l’existence de récits politiques canadiens concurrents, (b) le caractère distinct des systèmes de santé et des expériences en matière de soins de santé au Canada, (c) l’engagement des Canadiens envers certaines valeurs et aspirations, (d) les aspects institutionnels et procéduraux de la sphère publique canadienne, (e) les défis posés par l’uniformisation croissante de l’enseignement dans les différents contextes géographiques et nationaux, et (f) les obstacles pratiques au développement d’une bioéthique canadienne. Ces défis auxquels la bioéthique canadienne fait face sont probablement pertinents à l’échelle internationale pour tous les contextes dans lesquels des problèmes moraux d’origine sociale sont discutés et des solutions envisagées.

The Paradox that heals. Communication and Therapy in Paul Watzlawick This article provides an overview of the epistemology on which Paul Watzlawick builds its innovative approach to psychology and communication. In the first paragraph, the analysis will introduce the basic concepts of cybernetic and the role it plays within the author’s work. It will also explore the nuances of what Watzlawick defines as “pragmatic science”, a specific perspective on communication and human relations. In the second paragraph, the analysis will give an overview on pathologic forms of communication, focusing on the toxicity of the paradoxical structure. The third chapter will explore the therapeutic tools based on strategic language techniques, disclosing a new approach to the science of behavior based on non linear logic.

The forces of ISIS (the so-called Islamic State) have lost most of the territory they held in Syria and Iraq, and the anti-ISIS forces are inclined to declare victory. On the presumption that we are in a context of aftermath to this struggle, that aftermath will itself be characterized by serious difficulties. A crucial problem in this context is that of returning foreign fighters. It is estimated that some 5600 persons left western countries to join the ISIS forces. Many of these men and women have been killed or imprisoned. Some will remain abroad to continue violent activities in alliance with ISIS or other jihadist forces. And some will seek to return home to the country they left. Regarding these people, referred to here as returnees, important issues of ethics and policy arise. These issues are likely to be disturbing and polarizing, with the result that some governments hold back from discussing them. Thinking that dodging the issues is a mistake, we explore some of them here, first setting the context in which they arise and then describing the central ethical dilemmas, which the tension between efforts to protect public safety and concern for the rights of suspected persons.

Charles S. Pierce’s Pragmatic Maxim. Some epistemological issues In this paper, my aims to think over Misak’s opinion on Peirce’s pragmatic maxim. Firstly, I introduce the 1878 formulation of the pragmatic maxim in order to show its verificationist character. Secondly, I present the 1905 expression of the pragmatic maxim so as to exhibit its non-empiricist nature. Thirdly, I argue that Misak barks up the wrong tree deeming that the second formulation of the pragmatic maxim is so weak that it cannot balance the detriments of the verificationist formulation. Finally, I claim that the 1905 expression of the pragmatic maxim is neither so loose that it is useless nor so strict that it rules out meaningful statements.

It is a fact that misleading communication is one of the factors that threaten food safety. With the widespread use of social media, this threat is increasing its influence gradually. In particular, statements of non-experts against scientific ethics mislead the society on food. This phenomenon adversely affects the producer, processor and consumer on the one hand, and the national economy on the other. To mitigate these effects, a prohibitive approach seems to have come to the fore. However, the most effective way to prevent these adverse effects is to create an evidence-based discussion environment within the scope of media ethics and to include every opinion within the scope of scientific ethics. It is also necessary to provide reliable information to the public from an independent and impartial scientific committee.

As Robert Toovey Walker notes, the multidimensional catastrophe is going to happen in 2064. The main aim of an article is to justify the standpoint that environmental and climate changes are so much calamitous its force some mod-ifi cations of native educational system, in the direction of reinterpretated envi-ronmental ethics anew. The necessity eventuates from – experienced by us – an ecological-social collapse which has got a deeper moral strand and which char-acterises modern age, called Anthropocene. In this strand one is able to observe an ubiquitous lethargy and social indiff erence to happening catastrophe, as well as to the lack of systemwide, governmental activities, that could reduce for ex-ample emission of carbon dioxide, devastation of water ecosystems or deforest-ation of green areas. Present article endeavours to answer the question how to adjust traditional, deeply anthropocentric ethical thought in order to safe next generations against some consequences of an actual lack of climate responsibil-ity as well as a lack of cross-generational and interspecies equity.

The article helps resolve the intricate authorship issue based on global organizations’ regulations. It draws a fine line between authorship and contributorship from the research ethics perspective., L’article aide à résoudre la question complexe de la paternité des oeuvres en se basant sur les réglementations des organisations mondiales. Il établit une distinction précise entre la paternité et la contribution du point de vue de l’éthique de la recherche.

This paper introduces the symposium on Anna Elisabetta Galeotti’s book Political Self-Deception. After having explained the contribution of the book to debates in democratic theory and having highlighted its main arguments, the paper provides an overview of the different contributions to the symposium. The contributions range from philosophy, political theory and history and, thus, show the interdisciplinary interest of the book and critically engage with its various aspects.

Episteme, Sophia and the Muses This article is an attempt to demonstrate how the scientist, rather than following certain deterministic prescriptions of epistemologists, achieves his goals with an empirical imagination of an almost artistic nature. Based on the suggestions and the studies of Paolo Rossi, Alexandre Koyré and Gerald Holton, we examine some stages of 20th century physics: the hypothesis of Heisenberg, according to which the same ultimate principles are geometric-mathematical forms similar to those described in the Timaeus; the confrontation between Ehrenhaft (Machian) and Millikan (Franklinian and equipped with eidetic imagination) on the existence of subelectronic charges; influences in Bohr’s thinking (Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, James and Taoism). Einstein, then, was both a realist and a metaphysicist, leaning towards a speculative investigation of the universe. Furthermore, if in Einstein’s case we could speak of a sort of “artistic creativity”’, the case of Fermi and his pupils in Via Panisperna represented a form of wisdom that we could call “creative craftsmanship”.

The Unpredictable as a Resource As knowledge grows, the progress of science despite promises and reassurances does not provide certainty. The contents of science are increasingly specialised and closer to deciphering human life forms. Knowing the “what is” is always accompanied by governing the “what is known”, the critical reflection of culture as the human artifice par excellence. Culture also includes the unproductive philosophy, which does not offer conquests, nor absolute truths. Can the thought in the search for meaning resist the widespread blindness of science as technology, avoid the shipwreck of common living and the exhaustion of humanity’s creative resources? Perhaps only by bringing attention back to the “minor”, to the unpredictable which, despite everything, is the greatest danger and checkmate for the new mythology of technicians, experts and programmers.

Canada’s Assisted Human Reproduction Act justifies its non-commercialization approach to surrogacy on the grounds that commercial payments for surrogacy commodify women and are exploitative. However, empirical evidence suggests that payments in surrogacy are not exploitative, at least not to an extent that would warrant criminalizing payments. Given skepticism about the connection between exploitation and commodification, I explore whether commodification critiques can ground an alternative justification for the non-commercialization of surrogacy. First, I examine Vida Panitch’s argument that commodification critiques are flawed for being absolutist, that is, they cannot identify what makes some surrogacy transactions better or worse than others. Second, I examine Anne Phillips’ rearticulation of a commodification critique: Commercial surrogacy is problematic because it undermines equality in a democratic society. I argue that Phillips’ revision can escape absolutism and provide a better justification for Canada’s non-commercialization stance. However, it also entails that the preference for criminalizing payments is weakened, as other policy solutions might be effectively implemented to protect equality. As a result, I propose a shift in how commodification is appealed to: Less attention should be paid to abstract values and more attention should be given to how those values are enacted relationally between members of a political community. I also tentatively suggest that commodification critiques might provide a normative basis in Canadian policy for a self-sufficiency regulatory framework, which centres on values such as solidarity and the public good., La Loi sur la procréation assistée du Canada justifie son approche de non-commercialisation de la maternité de substitution par le fait que les paiements commerciaux pour la maternité de substitution transforment les femmes en marchandises et relève de l’exploitation. Cependant, des preuves empiriques suggèrent que les paiements de maternité de substitution ne sont pas de l’exploitation, du moins pas dans une mesure qui justifierait la criminalisation des paiements. Étant donné le scepticisme qui entoure le lien entre exploitation et marchandisation, je me demande si les critiques de la marchandisation peuvent constituer une justification alternative à la non-commercialisation de la maternité de substitution. Tout d’abord, j’examine l’argument de Vida Panitch selon lequel les critiques de la marchandisation sont imparfaites parce qu’elles sont absolutistes, c’est-à-dire qu’elles ne peuvent pas identifier ce qui fait que certaines transactions de maternité de substitution sont meilleures ou pires que d’autres. Deuxièmement, j’examine la réinterprétation d’Anne Phillips de la critique de la marchandisation : La maternité de substitution commerciale est problématique car elle porte atteinte à l’égalité dans une société démocratique. Je soutiens que la révision de Phillips peut échapper à l’absolutisme et fournir une meilleure justification de la position de non-commercialisation du Canada. Cependant, elle implique également que la préférence pour la criminalisation des paiements est affaiblie, car d’autres solutions politiques pourraient être mises en oeuvre efficacement pour protéger l’égalité. En conséquence, je propose un changement dans la manière dont on fait appel à la marchandisation : moins d’attention devrait être accordée aux valeurs abstraites et plus d’attention devrait être accordée à la manière dont ces valeurs sont mises en oeuvre dans les relations entre les membres d’une communauté politique. Je suggère également, à titre provisoire, que les critiques de la marchandisation puissent fournir une base normative dans la politique canadienne pour un cadre réglementaire d’autosuffisance, qui se concentre sur des valeurs telles que la solidarité et le bien public.

The article discusses two books that make an interesting contribution to the development of ethical refl ection on the relationship between humans and an-imals. These are: Face to face with animals. Levinas and Animal question edited by Peter Atterton and Tamara Wright, whose authors, followers of the French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, address the ethical status of animals in the 168BŤŵťŤŵŤ NŬŨŧȌźŬŨŧŽŮŤlight of the “Other” and “Face” concepts, and the book: Ethical Condemnation of Hunting edited by Dorota Probucka – a collection of essays exposing myths, lies and pathologies accompanying the killing of animals for sport or entertain-ment. The authors of both collections of essays draw attention to the reasons and mechanisms for excluding animals from the sphere of philosophical refl ec-tion and human morality and give strong arguments for restoring their proper ethical status.

We access our foods through agricultural and food systems. These systems encompass all elements and activities related to production, processing, storage, distribution, preparation, sale and consumption of foods as well as relevant socio-economic and environmental impacts. The safety and wholesomeness of foods have always been extremely important for consumers. Furthermore, in recent years, ethical issues in agricultural and food systems have become a new area of interest for consumers. Ethical principles determine values or virtues related to personal and professional behavior, social behavior and responsibilities towards society. Agricultural and food ethics must be effectively considered at all stages from farm to fork: food production, processing, marketing and consumption. There are significant inequalities around the World, especially in terms of access to food. In this review, basic ethical problem areas and respective ethical approaches in food production and food safety are reviewed.

Science and philosophy: towards a common Language for the third Millennium The foundation (or refoundation) of a flexible and multifunctional Lògos for shaping a common language should be the main object of an ambitious project for the third millennium. We urge to imagine a platform in which science and philosophy are co-implicated. We need to construe a heuristic scaffolding to think in new ways an allegiance in which science and philosophy can find a new intimacy. In this interview Lucio Pastore and Gianluca Giannini discuss some crucial themes on the frontier between philosophical investigation and scientific innovations (with particular regard to life sciences).

eurotechnologies and Post-Human The development of neurotechnologies raises the issue of an “extended” mind, e.g. of a wideware implying a fusion of natural and artificial minds. It is therefore right to look at this issue in terms of impact on the concepts of person, identity, free will etc. The advent of brain-brain communication devices also amplifies the problems associated with the agent, responsibility.

On the Exceptionality of Philosophy: Is There Discontinuity between Philosophy and Science? The article is devoted to a short presentation of the controversy between the meta-philosophical conception of the nature of philosophy and its relation with natural science known as exceptionalism, and the opposite anti-exceptionalist conception. The exceptionalist view is traced back to the linguistic turn and is illustrated by focusing on the early and intermediate Wittgenstein, Waismann and Schlick. Quine’s naturalism is identified as the background of the anti-exceptionalist view, whose developments in the area of analytic metaphysics are taken as paradigmatic. Some issues concerning anti-exceptionalism are raised.

In Political Self-Deception, Galeotti carves out valuable space for the analysis of behaviour on the part of political leaders that lies between straightforward deception and honest mistakes. In these comments I consider whether the concept of self-deception can travel from the political to the academic arena, to illuminate problems in how political theorists treat empirical data in the course of their normative work. Drawing on examples from the literature on the social bases of self-respect, I show that political theorists too are vulnerable to the motivationally biased treatment of data. I suggest that this problem can helpfully be located on the same broad terrain Galeotti outlines, between lying and mistakes. I also identify some potential analogues, for the academic sphere, of Galeotti’s proposed remedies for political SD. The paper goes on to reflect on how Galeotti herself employs empirical evidence in developing her account of self-deception. In particular, I challenge the empirical basis of her assumption that political self-deception is significantly more predictable, and therefore preventable, than political lying. My discussion seeks to show that, in addition to its intended contribution to the study of political deception, Political Self-Deception offers a valuable perspective on recent debates about the place of empirical evidence in political theory. However, approaching the book from this methodological angle reveals, in turn, some weaknesses in the empirical foundations of one of Galeotti’s own key normative claims.

Galeotti argues that we can gain a better understanding of political decision making by drawing upon the notion of self-deception and offers a rich articulation of what self-deception is, and how and why it exerts influence upon political decision making, especially in high-stakes contexts where the decision seems to be counter to rationality. But such contexts are also explicable from a different perspective, with different theoretical resources. In recent years the field of ‘virtue epistemology’ has discussed a wide range of epistemic vices – traits of character, and cognitive strategies, that stand in the way of gaining knowledge. This raises questions about how an explanation of political decision making in terms of self-deception relates to an explanation in terms of epistemic vice. Because the notion of epistemic vice applies to self-deception and to other cognitive deficiencies, it is argued that the broader notion of epistemic vice might be explanatorily richer, and more useful.

Cet article aborde le thème de la réduction diagnostique en psychiatrie, un processus par lequel des situations forcément complexes et multifactorielles sont réduites à des conditions médicales. Ce processus présente des écueils évidents, mais aussi certaines fonctions, notamment celle de circonscrire ce sur quoi porte légitimement ou non le jugement psychiatrique. Nous discuterons parallèlement des distinctions entre souffrance narrative et pathologique, ainsi que des jugements moraux et médicaux qui peuvent leur être associés. Ceci mènera à argumenter en faveur d’une attitude pragmatique par rapport à la classification diagnostique psychiatrique, c’est-à-dire par rapport au vocable standardisé servant à catégoriser et identifier les troubles dits de santé mentale. Nous dégagerons par la suite des implications pour la pratique clinique, notamment qu’une discussion transparente de ces aspects avec certains patients peut bénéficier à la relation thérapeutique et permettre aux personnes atteintes de troubles mentaux d’envisager un narratif qui n’ait pas à se limiter à une condition psychiatrique ni à se constituer par le rejet de cette dernière, mais puisse lui laisser une place légitime. Ultimement, nous souhaitons que la sensibilisation des cliniciens aux enjeux éthiques inhérents au diagnostic psychiatrique permette de limiter le caractère potentiellement péjoratif et déshumanisant de la réduction diagnostique, en leur permettant d’adopter des attitudes réflexives et transparentes sur ces questions., This article addresses the theme of diagnostic reduction in psychiatry, a process by which necessarily complex and multifactorial situations are reduced to medical conditions. This process presents obvious pitfalls, but also certain functions, in particular that of circumscribing what the psychiatric judgment can legitimately or not focus upon. In parallel, I will discuss the distinctions between narrative and pathological suffering, as well as the moral and medical judgments that may be associated with them. This will lead me to argue in favour of a pragmatic attitude with regard to psychiatric diagnostic classification, i.e., with regard to the standardized term used to categorize and identify so-called mental health disorders. I will then highlight the implications for clinical practice, notably that a transparent discussion of these aspects with certain patients can benefit the therapeutic relationship and allow people with mental disorders to envisage a narrative that does not have to be limited to a psychiatric condition or be constituted by the rejection of the latter, but which can leave it a legitimate place. Ultimately, I hope that raising clinicians’ awareness of the ethical issues inherent in psychiatric diagnosis will limit the potentially pejorative and dehumanizing nature of diagnostic reduction, by allowing them to adopt reflexive and transparent attitudes on these issues.

The specificities of mental health care combined with the contemporary context of health care make ethical issues particularly salient in psychiatry. Thus, residents in training in this medical discipline may be particularly exposed to difficult situations involving an ethical dilemma, which can be a cause of distress and moral suffering. Future physicians are equipped with knowledge and skills that should enable them to address the ethical issues inherent to clinical practice, as teaching of this discipline is now a requirement for accreditation of residency training programs in Canada. However, many questions remain about the design of a valid and effective clinical ethics education for these young practitioners. In this essay, we attempt to sketch out possible answers to this wide range of questions, based on our experience as residents. After having examined some of the specificities of the ethics curriculum which we benefited from in the psychiatry residency program at the University of Sherbrooke, we analyze how its structure can be a good example for ethics training of other young professionals, that is, residents. More specifically, we highlight how creating a space to acknowledge the suffering of the care giver in-training can have an impact on their own sensitivity to the suffering of the patient who they are treating., La spécificité des soins en psychiatrie liée au contexte actuel rend les enjeux éthiques particulièrement saillants. Les résidents en formation dans cette discipline médicale sont confrontés à de tels enjeux dans bien des situations difficiles, lesquels peuvent fréquemment occasionner un inconfort marqué et une souffrance morale. Les futurs médecins sont outillés de connaissances et de compétences qui devraient leur permettre d’aborder les enjeux éthiques inhérents à la pratique, car l’enseignement de cette discipline est maintenant une condition d’accréditation des programmes de résidence au Canada. Or, bien des questions subsistent quant à la conception d’un enseignement en éthique clinique qui soit valide et efficient pour ces jeunes praticiens. Dans cet essai, nous tenterons d’esquisser des pistes de réponses à ce champ large de questionnements, à partir de notre expérience vécue en tant que résidents. Après avoir examiné certaines spécificités du dispositif pédagogique dont nous avons bénéficié au sein du programme de résidence en psychiatrie à l’Université de Sherbrooke, nous analyserons en quoi la structure du cursus proposé peut être un exemple positif pour une formation en éthique adéquate pour les jeunes professionnels de santé que sont les résidents. Plus spécifiquement, nous mettrons en évidence comment le fait de créer un espace pour accueillir la souffrance du soignant en formation peut avoir un impact sur sa propre sensibilité à la souffrance du sujet qu’il soigne.