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This article examines the similarities and differences between privations and accidental forms in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. It argues that both can be understood through the existential quantifier, but Aquinas emphasizes the importance of distinguishing their modes of existence. Privations, such as blindness, are considered beings because they are involved in true propositions, even though they lack essence and do not exist in reality. Accidental forms, on the other hand, exist in individual substances. The article suggests that a pluralist approach to existence is necessary to fully understand Aquinas's philosophy regarding privations and accidental forms. [Extracted from the article]

This paper interrogates the skepticism surrounding comparative ethics, particularly the question of its relevance in a world where ethical decision-making processes are primarily presumed to be dictated by one universalist culture. The paper argues that all cultures are inherently intercultural, evidenced by the historical coexistence of ideas and practices. Post-comparative ethics, which emphasizes the situational application of intellectual comparison and integration, is inevitable for postcolonial, non-Western societies. Historically, societies have navigated a variety of ethical frameworks, with some, like medieval Chinese society, embracing a plurality of beliefs. This pluralism is exemplified by the harmonious accommodation (yuanrong 圓融) of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism. Using the example of Song Dynasty Chan master Dahui Zonggao 大慧宗杲, this article illustrates that intercultural ethics can be both diverse and sincere. Dahui's pluralistic approach demonstrates that sincere commitment to multiple ethical systems is possible in our multicultural situation. I will discuss common approaches to the multicultural situation, such as expedient synthesis, theoretical synthesis, and crude syncretism, before illustrating the advantage of Dahui's kanhua 看話禪method as harmonious accommodation through confrontation. This underscores the importance of shifting the debate from "Why compare?" to "How to compare?" in achieving the accommodation of different ethical frameworks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that correlative thinking, a fundamental aspect of Chinese thought often distinguished from rational thinking, is rooted in our situated bodily experiences, constituting a unique mode of sensemaking. It performs a comparative analysis between Zhuangzi's Fish Parable and Merleau‐Ponty's philosophy of embodied perception, focusing on the self‐attunement in our embodied experience and Dao, which remains invisible but gradually reveals its presence as the parable unfolds. The paper illuminates the embodied nature of correlative thinking by exposing the intricate interplay between the self and others, as well as the self and its lived environment. This analysis underscores the reciprocal relationship between Dao and correlative thinking: Dao acts as the origin of correlative thinking, while correlative thinking, in turn, unveils the presence of Dao. This analysis could enrich our understanding of the interplay between the self, others, and the world they inhabit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Comparative philosophy is gaining traction in professional academic philosophy, with specialist journals, organizations, books, and public campaigns. These inroads have been made in canonical areas of philosophy, including epistemology, metaphysics, logic, and value theory. Yet comparative philosophy still plays little role in practical applied ethics, an interdisciplinary research area in which work with practice and policy implications are dominated by the anglophone world. In this article, I explain why comparative work might be especially difficult in this type of applied ethics, and I suggest how comparative philosophers might overcome these challenges to connect their theoretical work with contemporary practical issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I use the concept of epistemic injustice to think through the practice and methodology of comparative, or "fusion," philosophy. I make two related claims: 1) the philosophical ethnocentrism displayed by academic departments in the U.S. is a case of epistemic injustice, primarily willful ignorance, that ought to be rectified; 2) the corrective to this problem, namely, fusion philosophy, is itself epistemically problematic in its tendency toward ontological expansiveness, that is, an unjustified claim to all traditions as one's own. In the end, I hope to show how a robust practice of self-reflexivity can counter this potentially colonizing tendency of fusion philosophizing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The launching of philosophical pursuits undertaken in an East-West trajectory at the first East-West Philosophers' Conference in 1939 represents a turning point in philosophy. However, as groundbreaking as this approach was, it left out all philosophical cultures that did not fit the initial framework. Islamic philosophy, being viewed as neither Western nor Eastern (Asian), was thus marginalized from the start. I introduce " Bricolage " – a method emphasizing curiosity, humility, and playfulness – as a more nuanced way of engaging with diverse philosophical traditions. " Bricoleurs " are interculturalists who remain open to the use of different methodologies: they are " flâneurs " walking through diverse philosophical landscapes for sheer intellectual pleasure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I situate C.S. Peirce's theory of knowledge and action in comparison to Chinese philosophy. My argument is that the comparison makes it important to understand Peirce's abduction and his maxim as a much more potent force in comparative philosophy. Peirce's priority of practical effects over theory is similar to Confucian conceptions of truth and action. Jon Alan Schmidt has summarized sixty-one formulations of Peirce's maxim, from which I draw the four main expressions of the maxim here. According to Peirce, understanding the meaning of concepts in terms of actual effects is the core element of the maxim. This view can be seen as an echo in Wang Yangming's theory of the unity of knowledge and action. The theory is essentially a moral humanist philosophy. It integrates morality, ethics, and politics. It is similar to Peirce's pragmatic maxim, as James Liszka has explained. Finally, reflecting on the recent studies of Peirce's semiotics in China, I discuss the significance of Peirce's pragmatism in Chinese philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ultimate aim of both Eckhart's philosophy and Vedānta philosophy is to attain oneness with God/Brahman. Nevertheless, their different philosophical starting points and the conflict between the sublime ideal of the theory and reality means that their philosophies present a structural symmetry. They both have to face two dilemmas: "How can we claim that humans are already one with God?" and "Why is it that humans are not already one with God?". Eckhart's inherited tradition emphasizes the distinction between humans and God, while the Vedānta philosophical tradition emphasizes that "I am Brahman". Each of them starts from one pole of the seesaw of the dilemma and encounters the other's issue at the other pole. Eventually, they converge at the point of balance, with unity with God/Brahman realized in all human activities. Here, this worldly life becomes significant, all human work expresses the Divinity, and the importance of God is replaced by an impersonal Divinity that combines being and nothingness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article delves into the concept of "Wild Animal Sovereignty" from an Indigenous perspective, arguing that wild animals should be acknowledged as having authority over their land. It contrasts this idea with the traditional understanding of sovereignty and emphasizes the need for a new form of jurisdiction that addresses power imbalances between humans and wild animals. The article also highlights the importance of considering Indigenous perspectives and critiquing exclusionary and coercive aspects of sovereignty. It explores the concept of "Grounded Authority" as a jurisdiction rooted in Indigenous thought and ecological principles, emphasizing the significance of relationships with the land and knowledge of its seasons, plants, and animals. The text suggests that wild animal communities possess this knowledge and should be recognized as having their own jurisdiction. It discusses the shared jurisdiction between humans and nonhuman animals and the importance of respecting the gifts provided by the land. The article encourages a shift in perspective to recognize the land and its resources as gifts shared by all beings, including wild animals. It explores the concepts of respect and reciprocity in Indigenous philosophies and their implications for political practice and relationships with nonhuman animals. The text acknowledges that Indigenous philosophy may not always align with political actions and emphasizes the need to respect diverse perspectives. It discusses the concept of respect in relationships between humans and nonhuman animals, as well as the land and other elements of the natural world, emphasizing the importance of sustainable behavior and leaving enough for others. The article also explores examples of negotiations and treaties between human and wild animal communities, highlighting [Extracted from the article]

The present study, primarily of a theoretical nature, endeavors to accomplish two distinct objectives. First and foremost, it endeavors to engage in a thoughtful examination of the metaphysical significance that Anaximander's philosophy embodies within the context of the nascent Western philosophical tradition. Furthermore, it aims to investigate how it was contemporaneous Buddhist thought, coeval with Anaximander's era, that more explicitly elucidated the concept of the "void" as an inherent aspect of authentic existence. This elucidation was articulated through aphoristic discourse rather than being reliant on formal logical reasoning or structured arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a precarious occupation, martial arts instructors must be inspiring and build a shared philosophy. Drawing on Taijiquan and Capoeira, which have their philosophical or epistemological roots in Asia and Africa, this article explores core concepts that feature in students' enculturation. These concepts are grounded in epistemologies contrasting with Papineau's work on popular and elite sport, Knowing the Score. More specifically, the philosophical approach used builds upon Papineau's chapters on focus, cheating and racism, although these martial practices are not grounded in the Judeo-Christian Western epistemologies underlying Papineau's thinking. Indeed, one of the attractions for Western Capoeira and Taijiquan students is precisely their "strange" or exotic philosophical concepts driving specific pedagogical practices. Ethnographic fieldwork in Britain and written and oral accounts of embodied expertise are used to explore the practical uses of these non-Western epistemologies by teachers to build shared cultures for their students. Specifically, we examine the concepts of axé (life force) and malicia (artful trickery) in Capoeira, noting its contrast to Western ideas of energy and fair play. We then examine Taijiquan and the concepts of song (鬆 or "letting go") and ting (听 or "focused listening"), considering the movement skill of systematic relaxation and the focus on specific components of human anatomy and body technique among adults unlearning embodied tension built throughout their lives. We close with considerations for projects examining the diverse, alternative southern, non-Western, and potentially decolonial and subaltern epistemologies in such martial activities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An appreciation of the emphasis on flexibility in the Analects is one of the most consistent motifs in the various interpretations of this text. When applied specifically to normative readings, embracing adaptability, having malleable standards, and taking particulars into account are both promising and challenging ways to think about whether something might be moral or ethical. This paper attempts to deconstruct this familiar discussion along novel lines that can reveal new ways to reflect on the importance of flexibility in the Analects, while, at the same time, it reconstrues ways in which comparative projects might be oriented. The main argument is this: the Analects does not recognize a categorical distinction between a moral and non-moral realm. Whereas, in much modern academic thought, there is a distinction between what counts as contingencies and what is up to the individual, which, in turn, loosely corresponds to the non-moral and moral realms, the Analects does not make such clear distinctions. Everything, including core moral issues such as the individual's own choice, moral guidelines, and the contextualization of (moral) models, is all ultimately grounded in contingencies. Nevertheless, the Analects provides ways of reflecting on choices and actions that aim to steer people in specific directions. We may understand this as a type of morality, but one that is significantly distinct from those wherein the difference between the moral (non-contingent) and non-moral (contingent) is foundational. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Nibbānasukha-sutta contains Sāriputta's statement that the pleasure (sukha) of nibbāna lies in the fact that nothing is experienced (vedayita). This statement may be seen as complementary to the proclamation in the Kaḷāra-sutta that all that is experienced is unpleasant (dukkha). In this paper, I attempt to reconstruct the ideas serving as a philosophical backdrop to these radical and seemingly counterintuitive claims. I use a comparative and interdisciplinary approach, re-examining several key Nikāya passages, as well as drawing on modern cognitive science and philosophy of mind. I suggest that vedayita and the closely related concept of the five khandhas (and in particular viññāṇa) refer to various aspects of the type of consciousness whose content is phenomenal, introspectable, reportable and may be integrated into memory. I suggest that such consciousness is not a constant feature of our being engaged in the world and that its absence does not entail insentience or being incognizant. I hypothesize that a relatively low frequency of occurrences of such consciousness in the states known as absorption or flow contributes to their pleasurable nature and the altered sense of the passage of time and selfhood. I attempt to explain how the presence or absence of such consciousness is related to the states of dukkha or sukha, with particular focus on the role played by saṅkhāra. I also discuss the limits of introspection as a means of understanding what exactly makes experiences pleasurable or painful, and consider the possibility of non-introspectable forms of pleasure. In conclusion, I suggest that psychological transformation in early Buddhism is connected with a radical change of perspective, which involves no longer identifying with one's own consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses a special issue of the Journal of Chinese Philosophy that features articles written by women philosophers. The issue coincides with significant anniversaries related to comparative philosophy and the Department of Philosophy at the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa. The aim of the special issue is to highlight the contributions of women to comparative philosophy and to attract more women to the field. The articles cover a range of topics and philosophical traditions, including Pure Land Buddhism, Zen Buddhism, Guanyin, women's writings in ancient China, and the feminism of Emilia Pardo Bazán. The remaining articles in the issue critique Western philosophy and explore Islamic, Chinese, and Indigenous philosophies. The overall goal is to foster a genuine encounter between different philosophical traditions and promote learning and understanding. [Extracted from the article]

This paper explores the role of philosophical exemplars, focusing on two uncommon but valuable figures: Guanyin, bodhisattva of compassion, and the plumber-as-philosopher described by Mary Midgley. These figures highlight philosophical activity as benefitting from a wide variety of heterogenous sources, styles, and models, and suggest that philosophy be understood as a response to lived needs. The paper concludes with some suggestions for ways in which these exemplars might be relevant for contemporary issues in the academy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Digitality is increasingly central to individuals' existence, which has political implications. The article maps the political implications of digitalisation, focusing on African political thought. The latter is marked by Afro-communitarianism ideas, which foster solidarity, relationality, and communalism as foundational values of the polity. However, African communitarianism has granted little attention to contemporary phenomena such as digitalisation. Also, political theory discussions on digitality have looked mainly at (neo)liberal contexts. How the digital age is reshaping the tenets of communitarian political theories represents an underdiscussed issue. This article outlines a research agenda on digitality and African political thought. New digitality-enabled relational modes change human and political interactions. The issue at stake is how these new modes challenge or strengthen the Afro-communitarian political outlook. This article recognises digital-humanism, political community, relations of power as central matters of inquiry. The analysis relies on bibliographic sources from African philosophy and comparative political theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this chapter is to highlight some conceptual connections between the concept of zero and the philosophical concept of śūnyatā. Both ideas first arose in the Indian subcontinent, and I will try to suggest that this geographical congruence is more than a coincidence. As such, this will likely be a more speculative contribution to this volume than others, but I will attempt to substantiate my proposal by stressing the conceptual advantages deriving from such a syncretic enterprise. I will begin with an overview of the historical development of the number and concept of zero, followed by some considerations of its treatment in contemporary mathematics, as well as an examination of its less-evident semiotic properties. I will then proceed to re-examine the concept of śūnyatā, identifying its central meontological significance in the philosophy of Nāgārjuna. In this context, I will examine the idea of the 'trace' in the thought of Jacques Derrida, viewing it as another actor in the assemblage of concepts that I attempt in this chapter. Finally, I undertake a synthetic reading of these three 'voids' -- of zero, of śūnyatā, and of the trace -- aimed at a speculative rearrangement of these heterogeneous concepts, in a philosophical exercise that I see as both a possible and a necessary evolution of 'comparative philosophy'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If we want to talk about the philosophy of religion with an Islamic approach, we must clarify what are its differences and similarities with the conventional philosophy of religion in the West. For this purpose, in this paper, the meaning of comparative philosophy and its obstacles, possibilities, necessities, and benefits will first be investigated. After that, it will be shown what considerations should be taken into account in order to have a comparative philosophy. Then, we will show how to have a philosophy of religion with an Islamic approach and what differences and similarities this type of philosophy of religion has with the Western philosophy of religion. Following that, some hermeneutic considerations for this philosophical comparison will be mentioned, and afterward, it will be shown how the Christian background of Western philosophy of religion has affected it. Finally, we will review some of the main subjects of the philosophy of religion if it is to be rationally evaluated with the foundations of Islamic thought to show what differences it has with the conventional Western philosophy of religion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We point out how some Christian-Muslim comparative philosophies of religion may be enhanced with certain translations or interpretations of Christianity: a modalist view of the trinity and a high Christology. While perhaps of only limited significance, we argue in more detail that a comparison of two leading philosophers, one Islamic, the other Christian, can bring to light a shared philosophy of innate ideas or nativism, grounding moral and theological views of goodness and the divine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Moreover, few works analyze phenomenology as developed in China (Jansen & Cai, [2]; Lau, [4]; Steinbock, [14]; Tani et al., [15]) and Japan (Altobrando & Taguchi, [1]). Thus, since postphenomenology can be seen as building upon the philosophy of technology and phenomenology (Mykhailov & Liberati, [11]; Zwier et al., [21]), it is clear that its development in the two countries follows a similar path, even if separated. China and Japan share many aspects in terms of technological development and philosophical background. [Extracted from the article]

Tatsuya Sakamoto's book, "David Hume and Adam Smith: A Japanese Perspective," provides a Japanese viewpoint on the works of Hume and Smith. The book is divided into two parts, with the first part focusing on Hume's methodology in economics and comparing his theories to those of other philosophers. The second part explores the reception of Smith's ideas in Japan, particularly the influence of Fukuzawa Yukichi and other Japanese thinkers. While the book lacks structure, it offers valuable insights into the intersection of Scottish and Japanese thought. The text also discusses the perspectives of List, Marx, Weber, and Uchida on Smith's works and their impact on Japanese economic thought. It suggests future research directions, including deeper exploration of contextual intelligence in philosophical economics and comparative studies of Japanese and Chinese receptions of Hume and Smith. The book aims to understand the present by rereading Hume and Smith and realizing their visions for a world of shared knowledge, industry, and humanity. [Extracted from the article]

The article focuses on exploring the relationship between the boundaries of the world, the limits of language, and the means of expression beyond those limits. It compares the philosophies of Wang Bi and Ludwig Wittgenstein, with a primary emphasis on Wang Bi's commentaries on Laozi, to understand the nature of language's limitations and how it deals with issues beyond its reach.

The field of Latin American philosophy has established itself as a relevant subfield of philosophical inquiry. However, there might be good reasons to consider that our focus on the subfield could have distracted us from considering another subfield that, although it might share some geographical proximity, does not share the same historical basic elements. In this paper, I argue for a possible and meaningful conceptual difference between Latin American Philosophy and Indigenous philosophy produced in Latin America. First, I raise what I call Mariátegui’s Solidarity Challenge to show that there might be some neglectful treatment of the philosophical views of different Indigenous groups. I then depart from Mariátegui and engage in a critical exercise to show that even he would be guilty of failing in his own solidarity demands. I follow that by drawing out some implications of the argument. I first sketch how this differentiation would play out against the political project of “Mestizaje,” a project that seems to inform some of the Latin American philosophical tradition. I then speculate about the kinds of duties that the field of Latin American philosophy might have towards the field of Indigenous Philosophy produced in Latin America. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article re-examines Humboldt's comparative linguistics by analyzing two cases: the reception of Chinese philosophy in France and the translation of Greek philosophy in China. Humboldt's legacy is treated in opposite ways which result in two translation methods. I argue that Humboldt's statement about the inferiority of Chinese should not be taken in a literal sense. It highlights the grammatical differences between Greek and Chinese, and can lead to questioning some basic assumptions about the concept of being. Humboldtian comparativism, understood as the recognition of differences and the respect for the foreign, can shed light on transcultural understanding in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bloomfield has repeatedly stressed the important influence of behaviorism on linguistics, but there is still much controversy about the relationship between the them. Based on Bloomfield’s Language, the authors introduce the historical sources of description methods by means of literature reduction and comparison, and discuss the language description methods from the perspective of comparative philosophy of science and history of linguistics. It is believed that the important feature of the description method is that it emphasizes the scientific nature of the description process, which is an important method of language research. This method is deeply influenced by the scientific philosophy of behaviorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The willingness of defence departments to select the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) for their fifth-generation multirole fighter has frequently been analyzed as stemming from the close historical connections allies such as Japan or Canada have with the United States. However, such an approach glosses over or ignores the operation of military procurement processes which are more idiosyncratic and subject to many pushes and pulls from different actors and directions. This article compares the experiences of Australia and Canada in procuring the JSF. Both countries are British Commonwealth members, with a long history of supporting western, and in particular, US alliances. But while Australia has secured its F-35 procurement and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) has already received its F-35s, Canada has only recently overcome a lengthy F-35 procurement battle that remains mired in controversy and will not deliver to the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) an aircraft for several years yet. This comparative case study between Australian and Canadian defence priorities offers a new explanation for this disparity of procurement success based on the need to both create and maintain alignment between government strategic defence policy and military service doctrine if major platform purchasing decisions are to survive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay examines the nature of things in early Daoism via the lens of comparative philosophy. Daoism uses ziran 自然 (spontaneity) to express the nature of things. I explore the ziran or spontaneity of the myriad things through the analysis of de 德, sheng 生 (xing 性), and freedom (ziyou 自由). The sections on de 德 and sheng 生 reveal that the spontaneity of things is the ultimate reality, which contains the oneness of one and many, essence and appearance, change and changelessness. The section on freedom revolves around two essential questions in metaphysics: What are things? What is the relation between things and humans? Different from the motto of modern metaphysics, "humans prescribes laws to nature", early Daoism believes that human existence belongs to the constant ziran. I call this "nature prescribes laws to humans". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary arguments about private paramilitary organizations often focus on the threat of physical violence that they pose to the state: if such organizations garner enough physical power, then they can overtake the state via violent coup. Inspired by the legalist scholar Han Feizi's position, we contend that such organizations also represent a sociopolitical, existential threat to the state. Specifically, their tendency for ideological expansion and subsequent gathering of political influence undermines state institutions, even without the use of overt physical force. Consequently, the sociopolitical enterprise of having a unified, stable state is incompatible with the existence of, and public political support for, private paramilitary organizations, regardless of their actual or potential physical power. This argument succeeds regardless of the moral status of such paramilitary groups. Such groups, when they match the essential components of the description Han Feizi provides, are practically and politically antithetical to the integrity of the state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author enters an already old dispute, that is, whether a countеrpart of the notion of philosophy could be encountered in the traditional India, upholds the view that the term ānvīkṣikī (lit. "investigation") was nearest to it and traces its meaning along the texts on dharma, politics, poetics and philosophy properly. Two main avenues to the understanding of philosophy's vocations in India have been paved in the Mānavadharmaśāstra, along with the commentaries thereon and by Kamandaki, the author of the Nītisāra (as the knowledge of Ātman) and in the Arthaśāstra and the Nyāya texts composed by Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara (as a metascience helping the other branches of knowledge bear their fruits). Therefore philosophy in India as well was regarded as the duality of ideological and methodological constituents, while the emphasis on analytic practice in the definitions of ānvīkṣikī (Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy as a practice is also referred to in this context) paves a good promise for comparative philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To be sure, I that i may be McGhee's challenge to contemporary philosophy, but whether the challenge is I also i an I objection i to McGhee's picture "remains to be seen" - attendant on what actually I happens i in a secular humanist community that is more than a gestural proposal but could be a real way of life performing the roles for its participants that McGhee requires. Several lines of debate converge in this rich work by Michael McGhee to any one of which it would be uncharitably, and distortingly, reductive to collapse its reading. In this spirit, McGhee understands spirituality as a matter of practice in a philosophical community aiming to sustain and protect disciplines of moral improvement in its members. [Extracted from the article]

This document provides brief biographical information about the contributors to the International Journal of Applied Philosophy. The contributors come from diverse backgrounds and specialize in various areas of philosophy, including landscape design, comparative philosophy, bioethics, Kantian ethics, and immigration ethics. Their research interests cover a wide range of topics, such as commodification, stem cell research, artificial intelligence, and the philosophy of death and dying. The contributors have published extensively in their respective fields and are actively engaged in research and activism. [Extracted from the article]

This article considers Quentin Skinner's critique and methodology in his seminal essay "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas" vis‐à‐vis the current methodological debates in Chinese and comparative philosophy. It surveys the different ways in which philosophers who work with ancient Chinese texts in those related fields deal with the tension between textual contexts and autonomy and how some of the errors criticized by Skinner under the mythology of coherence, mythology of doctrines, mythology of parochialism, and mythology of prolepsis might apply to those fields. It argues that Skinner's insistence that understanding a text requires recovering its author's intended meaning by studying its linguistic context has limited application to Chinese and comparative philosophy because those fields' most important texts are not best understood as means of communication by specific historical authors with intended messages to convey to readers. These texts are instead the means by which Chinese traditions perpetuate their respective beliefs and practices. Instead of being circumscribed by authorial intent, the meanings of traditional texts are dynamic and co‐created in the process of producing, reproducing, and consuming texts as well as in the evolution of practices that also constitute each tradition. The meanings received by the audience are never exactly what authors or transmitters intended but have been transformed by each audience's own concerns and interests, even if the audience attempts to grasp what the former intended. Using the Five Classics and the Analects as examples, this article illustrates how such texts' purposes to teach and perpetuate the practices that constitute a way of life determine their meanings. Understanding is not merely cognitive but practical as well. The meanings of such texts are not static but dynamic as traditions evolve. The debates about methods of reading and interpreting ancient Chinese texts are also debates about the nature of Chinese traditions and struggles over their futures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Having distinguished the primary philosophers of religion, those whose philosophies of "Everything" entail something about religion, from those who study only or mainly religion, this article discusses the necessary comparative base for the future of the field. It distinguishes the approach that begins with the subject matter from the approach that sticks with a home tradition to which comparison adds new material, arguing for the former. The religions of West Asia, South Asia, and East Asia are discussed, noting the naturalistic form of the last. The fundamental comparative category for philosophy of religion is the Ultimate, of which I give my own version. This version also requires categories defining determinate things, their togetherness of various sorts, and their essential and conditional components. To be plausible, this theory needs to be associated positively and negatively with the main religious traditions and with our relation to nature and society. Religious lives need to be scaled from the primitive and literalistic all the way to the philosophical. Philosophy of religion or philosophical theology of all sorts is fallible and needs to prepare for the next step. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents Jeong Jedu (Hagok; 1649–1736) on the topic of emotions and its comparative and contemporary relevance. It discusses this leading neo-Confucian thinker's thought-provoking Four-Seven thesis and its vital implication for self-cultivation and ethics. This important topic has not been discussed in current scholarship on Korean Confucianism. The article begins with the Confucian notion of emotions (jeong/qing, 情), according to its textual and philosophical background in the Chinese tradition, and then covers key issues regarding the "Four Beginnings" of virtue, the "Seven Emotions", and leading neo-Confucian perspectives by Zhu Xi (1130–1200) and Wang Yangming (1472–1529). The article also provides a brief comparative analysis of Toegye's and Yulgok's leading Korean opinions on the nature, role, and problem of emotions. The third section focuses on Hagok's interpretation in the same context. The fourth section discusses Hagok's ethics and spirituality of emotions in terms of the mind's original essence (bonche/benti) and innate knowledge (of good) (yangji/liangzhi) in connection to Wang Yangming's doctrines. The final section concludes by considering the originality and distinctiveness of Hagok's holistic interpretation. It also presents my contemporary reflections to articulate how Hagok's groundbreaking insights compare with certain Western theories of emotions and why they offer a worthwhile resource for comparative philosophy, religion, and ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do people acquire modesty? A simple answer is: if people see that modesty is a worthy trait, they will incorporate it into their character. However, sometimes the knowledge that one is modest would undermine one's modesty. So, Driver claims that the modest person must not know his merits. If we are to accept Driver's claim, it would be difficult for us to conceive how learners can consciously acquire this virtue. In response, Bommarito puts forward a more moderate claim. The modest person does not need to be ignorant of his good qualities; even if he knows about them, he must not pay attention to them. Bommarito's explanation opens a space for Asian philosophers to engage in the debate. Asian philosophers generally emphasize the importance of practice and how practitioners must attend to the state of their consciousness so that they are not carried away by their desires. With regard to this, I put forward two ideas in this paper. First, I propose a third account of modesty, the knowledge account. I argue that modesty, in its worthy form, requires an agent's understanding of his temptations and weaknesses. Second, I will explain the Confucian view of moral education in regard to this discussion. I introduce strategies regarding learners' acquisition of virtues, including self-cultivation and cultivation through following rituals in interpersonal affairs. I believe that the Confucian view of moral education would enable agents to acquire virtues without the self-denial that troubles Driver and Bommarito. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The controversial issue of Martin Heidegger's Nazism has posed hermeneutic challenges since well before the philosopher's death. This essay approaches the political-philosophical conflict of Heidegger's early work not through consideration of explicitly problematic statements and writings but through comparison of the structural framework of Being and Time (1927) with Thomas Mann's roughly contemporaneous theoretical accomplishment in The Magic Mountain (1924). Specifically, the essay argues for a deep affinity between the two texts' constellations of language, temporality, and death. By demonstrating the extensively documented ties between the novel's philosophical framework and Mann's politics, the essay claims that any understanding of Heidegger's work must be contextualized alongside its concrete political valences in shifting ideological paradigms of the early Weimar Republic. This analysis suggests a new mode of ethical critique of Heidegger's magnum opus that focuses more on the text's greater theoretical edifice than on the problematization of localized passages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophy can help giving an ethical foundation for promoting sustainability of nature and respect for humanity in management and business practices. In this case, schools of philosophy need to take a role in promoting philosophy related to the theme of sustainability. This research aims to analyze the sustainability of schools of philosophy by taking Sekolah Tinggi Filosofi Driyarkara and Sekolah Tinggi Filosofi Widya Sasana as objects. The research is conducted according to the perspective of ISO 26000 and using in-depth interview as the method for collecting data from 62 respondents. The variables of research are the strategies of sustaining inclusivity, competitive advantage (Sustainable Value Proposition), integration of SDGs and the concept of social responsibility within curriculum, governance according to ISO 26000, and the relation between curriculum and SDGs no. 4, 5, and 16. Findings show that both institutions still need to adjust their curricula and governances according to ISO 26000. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the significance of Gilles Deleuze's almost passing references to East Asian thought. Even though Deleuze comes to these ideas through the work of other European thinkers—most notably Friedrich Nietzsche, Sergei Eisenstein, François Jullien, and Alan Watts—the article argues that there are ultimately deep resonances between Deleuze's philosophy, especially in its Bergso‐Leibnizian articulations, and specific East Asian ideas. The article begins by cataloging and commenting upon Deleuze's various references to Chinese and Japanese thought generally before discussing how one particular concept—that of the gap (écart)—not only lies at the heart of his metaphysics but also forms the very basis for developing an adequate methodology for negotiating his encounter with East Asia. Finally, by also considering some of Jullien's recent ideas, the article examines the ways in which this methodology of the gap may be more adequate than other attempts to characterize contemporary comparative philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses poetry as a site of what Pierre Hadot calls "spiritual exercises," with particular reference to China's greatest poet, Du Fu (712–70 C.E.). While Hadot's work has bridged gaps between (i) philosophy and religion and (ii) theory and practice, this paper suggests that spiritual exercises can also blur the modern separation between form and content. It argues for the possibility of poetry as philosophy; that is, philosophy in a less‐recognized form. If poetry can be spiritual exercise and if spiritual exercise with its goal of self‐transformation is the core of philosophy, then we may be able to treat poetry as one form of philosophy. The paper also demonstrates the relevance of Hadot's work for ancient Chinese and comparative philosophy more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most prolific approaches to the comparative study of Buddhist and Christian philosophy has been the use of Buddhist anti-metaphysicism to overcome the allegedly obsolete metaphysical discourse of Christianity. This approach has been practiced, among others, by Edgar Bruns, Frederik Streng, Joseph O'Leary, and John Keenan. Keenan's 1980–1990s seminal works were determinative in that they appeared to rely on intuitive and evident premises: Christianity became infused with Greek metaphysical concepts early on; consequently, it adopted the forms of essentialism and ontological discourse practiced in metaphysics. That discourse has now become obsolete and must be overcome; Buddhist anti-metaphysicism helps overcome it; hence, Christianity can learn from Buddhism. In this paper, I show that although Keenan presents the first of these claims as self-evident, it is in fact highly polemical. Its origins lie in Albrecht Ritschl's and Adolf von Harnack's Hellenization theory. While the theological and historical background to this theory has been debated, Keenan does not engage in these debates. Even more, he transforms the theory in such a way that it becomes incongruent with its inherent aim. Following the problems implied on these two levels, I suggest that Keenan's project makes itself vulnerable to incoherencies. In the end, I argue for the overcoming of antimetaphysicism as a basis for Buddhist-Christian dialogue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research is a comparative jurisprudential study between the five doctrines of jurisprudence and Yemeni law in the issue of the death penalty by hanging. It is aimed at clarifying whether the death penalty by hanging is, in jurisprudence and law, permissible or impermissible. This study includes an introduction, four sections and a conclusion. The first section is about the definition of death penalty in general, and death penalty by hanging, in particular; defining both of them linguistically, technically, and lawfully. The second section is about the methods of death penalty in jurisprudence and law, and the findings that medicine arrived at today in this concern. I mean: Is hanging a proper way to comfort the executed person or not? The third section, which is the core of this research, has approached whether death penalty in Islamic jurisprudence is permissible or impermissible, and whether Yemeni law took it in consideration or not? The fourth section examines modern Muslim scholars' Fatwa about death penalty. The research concludes with a conclusion that includes the most important findings among which is that death penalty by hanging is not legally, lawfully, and conventionally permissible because of the torture experienced against the executed person. The researcher also recommends the Yemeni legislator to legally stipulate on preventing death penalty by hanging, for being contrary to the purposes of Islamic law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The field of African philosophy of religion, like its parent discipline African philosophy, is making its presence felt globally rather late in the day for reasons familiar to the scholar and student of postcolonial studies. In "How African Conceptions of God Bear on Life's Meaning" Thaddeus Metz engages in an intriguing comparative axiological exercise that brings African and Western/Christian conceptions of God into a philosophical conversation. On the content of God's purpose, he argues that the Abrahamic conception of God promises more meaning in a life than the African vitalistic conception of God. [Extracted from the article]

He does not argue that one cannot find self-cultivation philosophies elsewhere; his focus is on how we can use self-cultivation philosophy as a valuable explanatory framework for diverse texts and traditions. Gowans shows how neither the contemporary philosophy of the seminar room, nor ancient Greek philosophy, is the paradigm of what is to count as philosophy. Gowans showcases the many shapes philosophy takes across time and space (e.g., the notion of transformative texts, texts intended to facilitate some fundamental transformative process in the lives of their readers). [Extracted from the article]

Such interpretive act involves the interaction of at least two cultures in global circumstances, manifested in two modes of interpreting, the intercultural and the transcultural, with "the former referring to concrete interactions between different cultures and their various elements, and the latter when referring to the goal and results of such interactions, that is, to see oneself in the other." Rosker argues that the solution is to reject the strategy of mitigating the inferiority of Chinese philosophy by renaming it as Chinese wisdom, sinosophy or even Chinese philosophical discourse. Interpreting Chinese Philosophy: A New Methodology, written by Jana S. Rosker. [Extracted from the article]

What are the fundamental divisions in ethics? Which divisions capture the most important and basic options in moral theorizing? In this article, I reject the ‘Textbook View’ which takes the tripartite division between consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics to be fundamental. Instead, I suggest that moral theories are fundamentally divided into three independent divisions, which I call the neutral/relative division, the normative priority division, and the maximizing division. I argue that this account of the fundamental divisions of ethics better captures the main concerns that normative ethicists have when assessing moral theories. It also helps us make progress in comparative ethics and makes visible theoretical possibilities obscured by the Textbook View. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article centers the Islamic philosopher ʿUthman Amin in order to explore the intellectual exchange between Muslim and Christian scholars in twentieth-century Egypt. Specifically, I look at inwardness, intellectual dialogue, and interreligious friendships in a field that has traditionally been dominated by scholarship on the relationship between Islam and politics or Islam and the law. I elucidate Amin's philosophy of inwardness and its attendant virtues of seclusion, spiritual contemplation, and the jihad of the self—paying particular attention to reading as an illuminative embodied practice—through the lens of an Islamic discursive tradition. How might we understand the concept of an Islamic discursive tradition, as a philosophy of reasoned and embodied religion, within the context of such interreligious encounters? Amin, I argue, was engaged in an experimentum mentis in which inwardness provided an angle of lucidity from which Islam and Christianity could gaze upon one another. In so doing, I demonstrate the heuristic value of theorizations of tradition by Alasdair MacIntyre and Talal Asad to studies of interreligious encounter and scholarly exchange. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The issue of the nature of existence is directly related to the way in which man deals with existence. What makes a difference between the schools in the history of philosophy is their attitudes towards this issue. In the thought of Nicholas of Cusa, existence is not something that a person can realize with purely epistemic abilities. Therefore, Absolute Being cannot be grasped in its own perfection as it is. What is primarily necessary for this is a kind of intellectual purification in which the reason renounces all affirmative claims of knowledge. This actually is a state of consciousness and the intellect that reaches this level contemplates existence at its source. In this state, where opposites appear in harmony and plurality in unity without any contradiction, God is no longer a subject of knowledge but a subject of experience. According to Cusa, only an intellectual comprehension can be achieved with a mystical view of being based on the inner experience of the human being in this way. The main thing is not knowing anymore but knowing that you can never know. According to Cusa, the way to reach this level of understanding is divine grace as well as spiritual education. Cusa’s philosophy, as a method and general approach, took its origin from Plato's philosophy, was shaped by the mystical theological views of Pseudo-Dionysius, and was influenced by philosophers such as Proclus, Erigena, and Augustine. The most distinctive feature of this philosophical tradition is the dialectical method inherited from Plato. Cusa, who has determined his primary goal in both his academic and professional careers as realizing harmony between differences, has also reflected this unifying attitude in his philosophical and theological views, and has used the dialectical method effectively in this context. The importance of the dialectical method cannot be denied in the formation of the theory of "unity of opposites", which he based on De Docta Ignorantia, which is considered to be his masterpiece, and elaborated on it from different angles in other works he wrote later. The dialectical understanding, which dominates the whole of Cusa philosophy, is revealed through the teaching of "the learning of ignorance" (de docta ignorantia) in his epistemology. Although “ignorance”, which is the essential element of the composition in the concept, seems to bring a negative emphasis to the fore, this negativity implies the necessity of an experiential divine vision that goes beyond a discursive theology that can be built on a purely conceptual basis, not as an absolute and final situation, but as a temporary and instrumental situation. Thus, Cusa, who brings together ignorance and knowledge in a common conceptualization, evaluates these two seemingly contradictory situations as an effort to gain a holistic understanding of existence to emphasize a cognitive activity that goes beyond speculative reason. While this level of comprehension admits that the truth of things is inaccessible with language and thought possibilities due to the inadequacy of the human mind, it accepts this comprehension as the solution itself. This level of comprehension, where thesis and antithesis appear in harmony, opens to human comprehension as an effort to see beyond the contradictions in the world. Cusa advocates a point of view that opposes the limitation of epistemic possibilities of man, who is a finite knower, to mere appearances. Thus, he opposes the approaches that make the knowledge of the particular absolute, and he thinks that such knowledge narrows the possibility of a universal perspective on existence. The thing that Cusa, who is described as a skeptic because of this attitude, doubts and thinks that he has become aware of as a result of this doubt, is not the possibility of knowledge of the being, but the inadequacy of the knowledge of the particular against the universal knowledge of the being. Here Cusa calls this awareness a kind of ignorance, and the effort to realize this ignorance is "the learning of ignorance". According to Cusa, the eye sees but does not know unless there is a power of discernment that turns seeing into knowing, that clarifies and perfects it. The mind makes inferences using sensory data. However, unless there is realization, it cannot know what it infers. The fact that the mind acquires this power is because of the Original, of which it is the manifestation, and God is the origin of all manifestation. Therefore, when it manifests in the mind, the originals of the things it contains agree with the object in the mind, and the knowledge in the state of potency is transformed into action in and by the mind environment, and the activity of making judgment takes place. Cusa likens it to the reflection of light in different colors on things, reflecting off the delicately sharpened tip of a masterfully polished diamond. Reaching an opinion about the forms of things by looking at its tip and being able to notice the effect of the diamond by seeing the similarity between the light reflected from it and the things, means activating the mind with the dimension of comprehension. Cusa's emphasis on ignorance in the face of truth should not be regarded as a kind of fideistic attachment as Cusa explains ignorance not as a mere value, but as a competence that can be obtained after reaching a certain level of comprehension. As a matter of fact, he insists that unknown things cannot be truly loved. Where there is no love, there is no real faith. The leap of faith that takes place as a result of this is never considered an unjustified and arbitrary activity for Cusa. He is in favor of preserving his comprehension-oriented approach to a healthy faith until the end. Making a distinction between what is contrary to reason and what is beyond reason, Cusa states that dogmas that cannot be understood empirically may well be theologically plausible. This study was conducted to address the possibilities revealed by the in-depth and versatile perspective of Nicholas of Cusa’s philosophy. In this respect, it can be said that Cusa has made a considerable contribution to the philosophical tradition in which his philosophical and theological thoughts are articulated. On the other hand, we are of the opinion that important results for the understanding of existence can be revealed by examining this philosophy in a comparative way with both philosophical and mystical thoughts that have emerged, especially in Islamic thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article compares the teachings on speech and communication in the Book of Analects and the Book of James. It explores the importance of speech in Chinese culture and the Scriptures, highlighting the impact of words on individuals and the need for proper timing and manner of speaking. The article analyzes the ethical concerns and social relationships emphasized by Confucius, contrasting them with the Christian perspective. It also discusses the linguistic model and discourse analysis used to gain a deeper understanding of the teachings on speech. The text further examines the teachings about speech in the book of James, emphasizing the importance of wisdom in controlling one's speech and the relationship between speech, morality, and wisdom from above. It concludes by discussing the cultural significance of speech in both Chinese culture and Christianity, and suggests that individuals influenced by Confucianism should also consider the relationship between God and humans in their manner of speech. [Extracted from the article]