Search

From naturally occurring disease threats to the deliberate creation of biological weapons, the field of biosecurity encompasses a broad swath of life science research and the associated risks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses attention of the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity to the security and safety implications of gain-of-function research and work of Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on Syria's declarations on chemical weapons.

An essay on the decision making process by the World Health Organization (WHO) for global health on the disease Super-Flu is presented. Topics discussed include meeting by the WHO held on February 16-17, 2012 due to concerns about bio-containment and bioterrorism risks, influence of the policy choices for decision making process by the pathos, ethos and logos and biosafety articles published by the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB).

A recent controversy over the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity's recommendation to censor two publications on genetically modified H5N1 avian influenza has generated concern over the threat to scientific freedom such censorship presents. In this paper, I argue that in the case of these studies, appeals to scientific freedom are not sufficient to motivate a rejection of censorship. I then use this conclusion to draw broader concerns about the ethic of dual-use research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two studies of H5N1 avian influenza viruses that had been genetically engineered to render them transmissible between ferrets have proved highly controversial. Divergent opinions exist about the importance of these studies of influenza transmission and about potential 'dual use' research implications. No consensus has developed yet about how to balance these concerns. After not recommending immediate full publication of earlier, less complete versions of the studies, the United States National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity subsequently recommended full publication of more complete manuscripts; however, controversy about this and similar research remains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the redaction commanded by the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) to publishers of journals on a dual-use research which shows the process of transmitting H5N1 avian influenza virus to mammals. It states that NSABB was doubtful to disseminate the research due to its risk for accidental release of lethal new virus. It adds that the NSABB's voting and non-voting members have deliberated and decided to fully publish the report in March 2012.

The ongoing controversy over publication of two studies involving the transmission in ferrets of H5N1 (H5) subtype influenza viruses and the recommendations of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity to redact key details in the manuscripts call for an examination of relevant scientific facts. In addition, there are calls in the media to destroy the viruses. curtail future research in this area, and protect the public from such "frightening" research efforts. Fear needs to be put to rest with solid science and not speculation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author discusses the gain-of-function (GOF) research with potential pandemic pathogens and the Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA). He discusses the importance of clinician perspective for risk-benefit assessment (RBA) of GOF research. The author mentioned the recommendations from the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) on the dual use and biosecurity of GOF.

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various topics within the issue including National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) criteria's for public health and safety, avian influenza virus to be the most dangerous and the concept of dual-use research of concern (DURC).

The author discusses the debate over the publication of two studies on the avian influenza virus H5N1 HPAIV. He is critical of restricting this type of research that he believes is important for public health. Also mentioned are the recommendations by the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) regarding the studies.

The article offers biomedical industry news briefs as of May 2012. The U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity has turned its decision regarding the two controversial studies on flu. It states that Jim Yong, a global health expert, has been appointed as president at World Bank. It mentions the high rates of autism in children across the U.S. according to the survey conducted by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

The article discusses the publication of the revised versions of the two studies on influenza A H5N1. It says the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) has approved the studies of Yoshihiro Kawaoka of the University of Wisconsin-Madison and Ron Fouchier of the Erasmus Medical Center. Arthur Caplan of University of Pennsylvania says that the authors worked in facilities rated at biosafety level 3 enhanced, but research would be done carefully everywhere.

The article discusses an approval by a U.S. government advisory panel, which included members of the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), to publish the results of two controversial studies regarding laboratory-created versions of the H5N1 avian influenza virus. Reportedly the studies, which were conducted independently by research teams in the Netherlands and the U.S., contained information that the NSABB deemed too dangerous to U.S. national security to publish. Factors that led to a reconsideration to publish the findings are discussed, including a misunderstanding of the original manuscript's intent and brevity, a recognition of the study's usefulness for H5N1 surveillance, and concerns about adequate regulation of dual-use research.

Information about the World Health Organization (WHO) meeting held in Geneva, Switzerland is presented. Topics include the H5N1 avian influenza virus, a recommendation from the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) and the need for virus studies to be published in full. The meeting featured several notable people including Ron Fouchier, Yoshihiro Kawaoka and Paul Keim.

The article reports that a World Health Organization (WHO) group comprised of influenza (flu) scientists, public health officials, and journal editors from 11 countries have recommended the full publication of research that details a highly pathogenic bird flu virus rendered capable of being transmitted easily among mammals. According to the author, the group's recommendation ignores advice from the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity regarding the release of key details only to individuals who have a need to know. Topics include an overview of research by two separate teams of scientists who genetically manipulated the H5N1 bird flu virus, making it easily transmissible to mammals through the air, and the WHO group's influence on the publication of the research papers.

The authors discuss the debate over the publication of two studies on the avian influenza virus A/H5N1. They support the actions of the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) which recommended that the papers be published without methods or detailed results. Also investigated are licensed influenza vaccines for human use.

Members of the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) discuss their recommendations regarding the publishing of research detailing experiments on the transmissibility of the H5N1 avian influenza A virus. They argue that the public health and biosecurity risks outweigh the benefits of research, despite the importance of eradicating the disease. They discuss the importance of developing a broad consensus on the issue that protects both academic freedom and public safety.

The authors discuss the move of the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity to explain its recommendations on the communication of experimental work on H5N1 influenza. They mentions that highly pathogenic avian influenza A infection has been a serious public health concern since its identification in Asia. The state that to date, no human pandemic has occurred.

The article presents an interview with virologist Ron Fouchier. He discusses his research paper that prompted concerns over the biosecurity of influenza studies, the 2012 declaration of a moratorium on research modifying the H5N1 avian influenza virus to increase its transmissibility among mammals, and his reaction to the position of the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) on the public health benefits of his work.

The article discusses the declaration of a 60-day moratorium on H5N1 avian influenza virus research in response to the debate over the potential biosecurity dangers posed by two 2011 studies that modified the virus to increase its transmission among mammals. The U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) asked the lead authors of each study, Ron Fouchier and Yoshihiro Kawaoka, to redact sensitive data from their papers. The United Nations World Health Organization (WHO) plans to study the issue in order to balance the need for global collaboration in the eradication of the disease with biosecurity concerns.

The article discusses the recommendation by the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) to censor the methodology and other details of two scientific papers on the creation of a more transmissible mutant form of the H5N1 avian flu virus. It says that advise by the NSABB was criticized by various scientists and accused them of academic communication restriction. It says that the NSABB will allow selected researchers to access the full details of the work.

The article reports that in December 2011 the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) asked that two research teams redact information papers on papers to be published in "Science" and "Nature" about methods for the engineering of the H5N1 influenza virus to increase its transmissibility between mammals. Critics of the move fear that increased government oversight will hamper vital research and information sharing on a global health concern, while proponents point to the importance of restricting access to sensitive data for bioterrorism prevention. The development of a system for the U.S. government to evaluate the safety of future dual-use scientific research is discussed.

The article discusses synthetic biology and synthetic genomics with reference to an article by Gibson and colleagues elsewhere in the issue. It explains the relationship between synthetic biology and synthetic genomics, noting that the latter applies to viruses and cellular life forms, whereas synthetic biology is broader in scope. To date, reportedly, synthetic genomics and biology have been limited to viral genomes. Genetic engineering of DNA is discussed including directed molecular evolution and DNA shuffling. The article discusses means to address issues of biosecurity and ethics associated with these developments including definitional proposals of the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB).

The article discusses a statement made by the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) regarding the federal government's moratorium on research of the influenza, MERS, and SARS viruses, how research can be continued if it protects public health, and the research waiver program.

The article discusses the controversy surrounding two H5N1 avian influenza studies, including one by virologist Ron Fouchier and colleagues at Erasmus MC in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, showing how H5N1 can be engineered so that it is transmissible among mammals. Topics include a voluntary moratorium on H5N1 research, a recommendation by the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) against publishing the studies, and a debate over whether such studies are worth the risk.

The article discusses concern over proposed H5N1 avian influenza research. According to the author, the proposal was presented during a meeting of the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) in Bethesda, Maryland, and would be required to meet a list of seven criteria in order to be eligible for U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) funding. An overview of the controversial nature of the proposal and NSABB member concerns is presented.

The author reflects on dual-use research in which microorganisms that have scientific value, but are susceptible to misuse, are created via genetic or biosynthetic means. Topics include the premise behind the adoption of the term dual-use by a 2004 U.S. National Academy of Sciences committee, the creation of the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), and a controversial decision by the NSABB in 2012 regarding the publication of dual-use research.

The article offers information on the tightening of the global regulations for dual use research. It states that the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) has been discussing it and making documents available to the government and public for years regarding the re-use of researches.

The author reflects on the recommendation of the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) on not publishing full papers of avian H5N1 influenza virus research. He mentions that biosecurity objections appear too hypothetical and general to justify further research and obstructing publication. He states that neither the discussion of NSABB and the World Health Organization (WHO) were inclusive sufficiently of the research and security interests at stake.

The article discusses the research on the creation of a transmissible from of the bird flu virus (H5N1). He says that the H5N1 researchers found degraded samples of the 1918 virus in the lung tissue of the U.S. soldiers using polymerase chain reaction technology. He states that after the discussion of the results the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) recommended to continue study the virus. He adds that knowing the mutations for the virus could the public health.

The article focuses on a report concerning the vetting of researchers for biosecurity in the United States. It states that the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity suggested that academic researchers who work with dangerous pathogens shouldn't be subjected to the stringent background checks that scientists working in chemical and nuclear weapons programs undergo. It mentions that security regulations for bioscientists were increased after the U.S. anthrax attack of 2001.

The article focuses on the advancement made in the unification of genomes in the U.S. According to the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), experimentation with gene sequences is hindering the country's attempt in preventing bioterrorism. NSABB propagates preventives to counter the misuse of life sciences research. Researches involving biological agents such as microbes, viruses and toxins, which can pose a threat to the nation, do not face government interruption. The government needs to work out systematic guidelines for the researchers on the usage of nucleic acids.

The article reports developments related to biotechnology in Great Britain. Science minister David Sainsbury has been questioned by police investigating links between loans to the governing Labor party and appointments to the House of Lords. The U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity has approved a voluntary guide for assessing the risks of communication sensitive biodefense research. Researchers revealed that an experimental treatment for prion disease does not seem to work.

Discusses several issues related to the formation of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) in the U.S. Information that a U.S. National Academies committee chaired by Gerald Fink recommended in a 2003 report that the NSABB be established; Comments on the charter of the NSABB; Concerns regarding public health and biosecurity risks.

Comments on the inaugural meeting of the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NASBB) where politicians and policy-makers are taking codes of conduct and licensing in research seriously. Description of Brian Rappert of Exeter University in Great Britain, on the number of biologist who were unaware of the issues of dual use in the intelligence services and weapons; Availability of a Web site where codes for biologist have been drafted; Importance of the codes of conduct for the scientists to engage in a more constructive discussion about the role they play in the biology community.