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We investigate the effect of a donation incentive tied to contributions to a public good when group members can decide on the size of their donation. An up to 20% donation of the public good was implemented either exogenously or endogenously by group members. In the Vote treatment, groups could either decide in favor of or against a donation of 20% of the public good; in the Vote Share treatment, subjects could decide on a donation share of between 0 and 20%. Results show that a large percentage of the participants vote in favor of implementing a donation share in both treatments. In groups voting in favor of a 20% donation share or endogenously implementing a high donation share in the Vote Share treatment contributions to the public good are higher compared to an exogenously implemented donation share. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cooperation amongst natural resource users is key to manage ecosystems sustainably and achieve environmental goals proposed by policy and regulations. This paper focuses on the impact that livestock farming can have on the quality of a water body and investigates farmers' willingness to cooperate to preserve water quality under two different sources of uncertainty and four different degrees of uncertainty. The first source relates to the level of water quality that must be guaranteed in a river catchment to avoid irreversible deterioration of aquatic ecosystems (threshold uncertainty, i.e. with catastrophic consequences). The second source relates to the financial losses that farmers will experience in the long run if they fail to cooperate (impact uncertainty). To this end, a lab‐in‐the‐field experiment was conducted with livestock farmers of Northern Ireland. A local public good game with threshold uncertainty was framed around an agri‐environmental scheme designed to create ungrazed buffer zones for water quality preservation. Results indicate that uncertainty generally hampers farmers' cooperation and the provision of information geared to reduce uncertainty enhances it. Impact uncertainty has a milder negative impact on cooperation than threshold uncertainty. Risk preferences and probability weighting do not influence cooperation, while loss aversion has an influence on cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the relationship between generosity in charitable dictator games (CDGs) and public good games (PGGs). We construct a novel generalized game that subsumes both as special cases and present experimental subjects with different blends of CDG and PGG tasks. Generosity in the CDG and PGG are only weakly correlated, in spite of close experimental control on confounding factors. We furthermore demonstrate how underlying preferences shape these behaviors, revealing important distinctions between preferences for charity and public good provision. Our findings have implications for the generalizability of existing experimental results that rely upon these games. • Charitable Dictator Games (CDGs) and Public Good Games (PGGs) common in the lab. • Both used to study real-world charity and public goods, but different properties. • We construct generalized game that nests CDGs and PGGs as special cases. • Results indicate weak correlation between generosity in CDGs and PGGs. • Implications for generalizability of results from CDGs and PGGs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: The Male Warrior Hypothesis (MWH) proposes that sex-specific selective pressures have promoted male cooperation with the ingroup members to outcompete rival groups. However, intergroup conflicts do not occur in isolation and the outcomes of previous competitions may influence group cooperativeness. Since this phenomenon is not well understood, we aimed to shed light on the effect of previous competition outcome on later cooperative behavior under intergroup conflicts. Based on the MWH, we hypothesized that repeated contests between groups could enhance ingroup cooperation, regardless of the outcome of the previous contest because status is at risk, but when competition is not present, participants would move to the symmetric equilibria. Methods: To test this hypothesis, we recruited 246 individuals organized in groups of 6 and measured cooperation using a threshold public good game over two rounds, manipulating the outcome in the first round to create groups of winners and losers. Results: Our results show that intergroup conflict scenarios promoted cooperation in both victory and defeat conditions, whereas, in the control scenario only losers increased their cooperation. Discussion: We argue that winners under the presence of an external threat may enhance in-group cooperation in order to assure their status; whereas, losers may be attempting to regain it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, a utility function framework is developed, serving to determine the demand for an upcoming demand responsive transportation system. A linear’public-good game’ (PGG) model is modified in a way that maximizing the consumer surplus is assumed to determine individual decision-making. This modification allows for considering the endowment effect in the function, which is expected to enable for a more precise distinction among customer segments. The purpose of this approach is to create a possibility for including descriptive behavioral economic findings in a normative modeling concept. It shall serve as a theoretical basis for coming empirical investigations.

This paper studies how individuals consider other individuals' preferences when selecting whom to include in a group or network in the absence of any personal taste or statistical reason associated with the inclusion of a particular applicant. This type of decision emerges, for instance, when unprejudiced white landlords discriminate against black applicants because of the prejudice of existing white tenants, or when employers hire an employee-referred candidate instead of an outsider who is disfavored by current employees. We investigate the potential causes as to why selectors consider the group composition preferences of other group members. First, selectors have altruistic feelings toward them and select their preferred candidates. Second, selectors anticipate that their cooperativeness depends on who will be included and so strategically select candidates who are preferred by current group members. We investigate the reasons for this type of discrimination in an experiment in which we allow for endogenous group formation and show that discriminatory behavior in embedded contexts emerges even when selectors have no taste for any candidate nor any reason to discriminate statistically, but still discriminate in favor of a current group member's preferred candidate both for altruistic and strategic reasons. We thereby identify a new major source for discrimination and for the perpetuation of systematic exclusion of outsiders disfavored by insiders, even when the latter do not participate in the decision of whom to include. We discuss the implications for policies aimed at overcoming strategic discrimination in hiring decisions, employee referral programs, quotas, and bonus payments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

IntroductionThe Male Warrior Hypothesis (MWH) proposes that sex-specific selective pressures have promoted male cooperation with the ingroup members to outcompete rival groups. However, intergroup conflicts do not occur in isolation and the outcomes of previous competitions may influence group cooperativeness. Since this phenomenon is not well understood, we aimed to shed light on the effect of previous competition outcome on later cooperative behavior under intergroup conflicts. Based on the MWH, we hypothesized that repeated contests between groups could enhance ingroup cooperation, regardless of the outcome of the previous contest because status is at risk, but when competition is not present, participants would move to the symmetric equilibria.MethodsTo test this hypothesis, we recruited 246 individuals organized in groups of 6 and measured cooperation using a threshold public good game over two rounds, manipulating the outcome in the first round to create groups of winners and losers.ResultsOur results show that intergroup conflict scenarios promoted cooperation in both victory and defeat conditions, whereas, in the control scenario only losers increased their cooperation.DiscussionWe argue that winners under the presence of an external threat may enhance in-group cooperation in order to assure their status; whereas, losers may be attempting to regain it.

Copyright of Environmental & Social Management Journal / Revista de Gestão Social e Ambiental is the property of Environmental & Social Management Journal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

A sense of resource availability creates a scarcity mindset, leading people to behave in a more competitive way instead of in a collaborative way. This study aims to examine the relationship between scarcity mindset and cooperative behaviors among parents and offspring, and to explore whether parents' scarcity mindset is related to their offspring's scarcity mindset and cooperative behaviors. We collected 239 parent–offspring pairs from several universities in northwest China. They completed the scarcity mindset scale and a one‐shot public good game (PGG). A path model analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between scarcity mindset and cooperative behaviors for offspring and their parents, respectively. The relationship between parental scarcity mindset and offspring's cooperative behaviors was also examined. The results showed that there was a high correlation of scarcity mindset between parents and their offspring. Scarcity mindset was negatively related to cooperative behaviors among both parents and offspring. In addition, both parents' cooperative behaviors and offspring's scarcity mindset mediated the relationship between the parental scarcity mindset and offspring's cooperative behaviors. Our results supported the idea that scarcity mindset triggers competitive rather than cooperative orientation. The present findings reveal an intergenerational relationship between scarcity mindset and cooperative behaviors by highlighting the impacts of parental scarcity mindset on that of their offspring's and its additional effects on offspring's cooperative behaviors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study aimed to explore the effect of subliminal priming on team trust and themechanismthrough themediating role of perceived trustworthiness. A total of 144 participants were asked to complete a lexical decision task that was embedded with the "trust" or "suspicion" Chinese words as the subliminal stimuli. Then, they played a public good game and evaluated the perceived trustworthiness of the team. The results of the study showed that subliminal stimuli had a significant effect on team trust [β = -0.99, 95% CI = (-1.64, -0.33)]. Perceived trustworthiness was found to have a significant mediating effect between the priming condition and team trust [β = -0.35, 95% CI = (-0.72, -0.02)]. The current study revealed the underlying mechanism through which subliminal priming techniques influence team trust and informed efforts by altering perceived trustworthiness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economic education is frequently blamed for negatively affecting students’ values and attitudes. Economists are reported as less cooperative, more self-interested, and more prone to free-riding. However, empirical evidence is inconclusive – certain studies support while others gainsay the so-called indoctrination hypothesis. We contribute to the discussion by running a Public Good Game (PGG) quasi-experiment. Working with economics and non-economics graduates (N = 206), we compared contributions to the common fund by representatives of both subsamples. Students’ contributions were then juxtaposed against the scores they achieved from the exam items, testing their command of game theory to detect the supposed influence of economic teaching. We hypothesised that holders of a bachelor’s degree in economics and management would contribute less to finance the common good. We also expected that those whose exam scores were higher would donate less to the common fund in the PGG. Contrary to expectations and prior empirical evidence, students holding a bachelor’s degree in economics and management made higher contributions to the common fund than their non-economics counterparts. Also, we found no correlation between the level of donations and exam scores. We conclude that there are no grounds for considering economic teaching as promoting uncooperativeness and exerting the supposed harmful influence on students’ character. We claim that economic departments provide education rather than indoctrination.

This paper proposes a possible mechanism for obtaining sizeable behavioral structures by simulating a network–agent dynamic on an evolutionary public good game with available social.learning. The model considers a population with a fixed number of players. In each round, the chosen players may contribute part of their value to a common pool. Then, each player may imitate the strategy of another player based on relative payoffs (whoever has the lower payoff adopts the strategy of the other player) and change his or her strategy using different exploratory variables. Relative payoffs are subject to incentives, including participation costs, but may also be subject to mutation, whose rate is sensitized by the network characteristics (social ties). The process discussed in this report is interesting and relevant across a broad range of disciplines that use game theory, including cultural evolutionary dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the development of information and network technology, a new type of manufacturing paradigm, known as a service-oriented Cloud Manufacturing (CMfg), is emerged. In the CMfg paradigm, geographically distributed various manufacturing resources authorized by different companies are encapsulated as different manufacturing services (MSs) supported by the enabling technologies, such as cloud computing, Industrial Internet of Things, virtualization technologies, etc. MSs are provided according to the demands of manufacturing tasks (MTs) presented by various customers via the IoT (Internet of Things) in CMfg paradigm. Generally, one MS may complete one MT, but mostly one MT needs more MSs to complete it cooperatively. Furthermore, these MSs are perhaps controlled and managed by different enterprises. As an autonomous entity, each MS generally makes decision in light of its own interests, and their own interests generally have conflicts with the others' and the collective ones. To solve the conflicts through MSs' cooperation is an efficient and low-cost method to maximize both individual and collective interests. Hence, the influences of individual decision-making behaviors on cooperation are explored and discussed in CMfg paradigm. The evolutionary game theory and agent-based modeling and simulating method are employed to model and simulate individual behaviors of MSs during the process of forming the coalition for completing MTs. In addition, the learning mechanism of MSs is discussed in the decision-making process. The simulation results show that decision behaviors of MSs are positively influenced by the information transparency of the CMfg environment and the learning mechanism of MSs effects on the cooperative emergence.

Copyright of Revista Gestão & Tecnologia is the property of Revista Gestao & Tecnologia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Currently we are facing Covid 19 pandemics and it opens many questions about willingness of individuals to give up some private pleasure to contribute to public wellbeing. Theoretical economic research suggest that methodology of group account distribution does affect the contribution size. Lawyers, politicians and economists try to answer these questions using various scientific approaches and methods. One of them is to examine the willingness of individuals to contribute to public goods. Using a laboratory classroom experiment, we test various situations through public goods game. We examine whether economic entities are willing to contribute in situations when it is not advantageous for them from an individual point of view, but it is advantageous for society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• The Paris Agreement needs effective mechanisms for ramping-up contributions. • We investigate pledge-and-review and starting with easier cooperation. • Both ramp-up mechanisms fail to improve cooperation in our lab experiment. • Starting with easier cooperation does not build greater trust. • The pledge-and-review mechanism can act as a safeguard. The ability of the Paris Agreement to achieve its ambitious long-term temperature goal depends on mechanisms that can promote a ramp-up of ambitions. Pledge-and-review may facilitate deeper cooperation over time by enhancing trust between parties. It has been proposed that starting out with easier cooperation that entails larger shares of domestic benefits, such as cooperation on short-lived climate pollutants, could also help promote the credibility and trust necessary for the ramping-up of contributions over time. Using a lab experiment we explore how these two mechanisms perform across two stages in a controlled and stylized setting where individual participants face incentives that mirror those of countries deciding on national contributions. We find that starting with easier cooperation does not produce higher levels of trust, and it leads to lower levels of cooperation when cooperation becomes more difficult in stage 2. The pledge-and-review approach does not, in itself, lead to significantly higher levels of cooperation, but it does offset the negative effect of starting with the easy cooperation. It can be seen as a safeguard against failed strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cooperation declines in repeated public good games because individuals behave as conditional cooperators. This is because individuals imitate the social behaviour of successful individuals when their payoff information is available. However, in human societies, individuals cooperate in many situations involving social dilemmas. We hypothesize that humans are sensitive to both success (payoffs) and how that success was obtained, by cheating (not socially sanctioned) or good behaviour (socially sanctioned and adds to prestige or reputation), when information is available about payoffs and prestige. We propose and model a repeated public good game with heterogeneous conditional cooperators where an agent's donation in a public goods game depends on comparing the number of donations in the population in the previous round and with the agent's arbitrary chosen conditional cooperative criterion. Such individuals imitate the social behaviour of role models based on their payoffs and prestige. The dependence is modelled by two population-level parameters: affinity towards payoff and affinity towards prestige. These affinities influence the degree to which agents value the payoff and prestige of role models. Agents update their conditional strategies by considering both parameters. The simulations in this study show that high levels of cooperation are established in a population consisting of heterogeneous conditional cooperators for a certain range of affinity parameters in repeated public good games. The results show that social value (prestige) is important in establishing cooperation.

The sound of the voice has several acoustic features that influence the perception of how cooperative the speaker is. It remains unknown, however, whether these acoustic features are associated with actual cooperative behaviour. This issue is crucial to disentangle whether inferences of traits from voices are based on stereotypes, or facilitate the detection of cooperative partners. The latter is likely due to the pleiotropic effect that testosterone has on both cooperative behaviours and acoustic features. In the present study, we quantified the cooperativeness of native French‐speaking men in a one‐shot public good game. We also measured mean fundamental frequency, pitch variations, roughness, and breathiness from spontaneous speech recordings of the same men and collected saliva samples to measure their testosterone levels. Our results showed that men with lower‐pitched voices and greater pitch variations were more cooperative. However, testosterone did not influence cooperative behaviours or acoustic features. Our finding provides the first evidence of the acoustic correlates of cooperative behaviour. When considered in combination with the literature on the detection of cooperativeness from faces, the results imply that assessment of cooperative behaviour would be improved by simultaneous consideration of visual and auditory cues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Most skilled individuals prefer to exclude less skilled ones in public good games. • Includers reduce cooperation with excluders in case of dissent inside the group. • Exclusion increases intragroup cooperation within the resulting segregated groups. • Re-inclusion into the same group reduces cooperation due to negative reciprocity. • Re-inclusion into a different group restores, in contrast, intragroup cooperation. Societies, communities, groups, and teams must often decide to exclude or to include other individuals. This article studies, firstly, the consequences of exclusion on the subsequent behavior of excluded individuals in the resulting segregated public good games, providing evidence that excluded individuals tend to behave in a more prosocial manner towards other excluded individuals. With respect to those responsible for exclusion, the use of majority voting to enforce exclusion led to a pronounced reduction in the contributions of those who voted for inclusion, but who were outvoted by a majority voting for exclusion. Secondly, this article studies the effect of two distinct kinds of policies that re-integrate excluded individuals, providing evidence that a policy that re-includes the excluded back in the same group from which they were excluded, and together with the perpetrators of exclusion, is counter-productive and reduces prosocial behavior because of negative reciprocity. In contrast, a policy that re-includes the excluded in another, different group does not activate the norm of reciprocity, and is apt to restore prosocial behavior of previously excluded individuals. In the end, the robustness of the findings when confronted to existing evidence from other sciences, as well as implications for public policies to overcome segregation and for legal instruments to redress exclusion are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Agriculture is one of the economic sectors most exposed to exogenous risks such as climate hazards and price volatility on agricultural markets. Agricultural policies targeting the adoption of environment-friendly but potentially risk-increasing practices cannot ignore this challenge. Farmers have indeed to decide if they take the foreground risk associated with the adoption of environment-friendly practices, while simultaneously facing exogenous background risk beyond their control. Using a theoretical model and a public good experiment, we analyse the adoption of agri-environmental practices and the effect of agri-environmental subsidies in a context where risks are both foreground and background. While most of the literature on background risk focuses on its impact on individual decisions, we analyse the influence of background risk in a context of strategic uncertainty (contribution to a public good). The results highlight the potential synergies between greening the CAP and supporting risk management. We find that background risk discourages the adoption of green practices, although it affects all farmland independently from the farmer's choice of practices (environment friendly or conventional). An incentive payment per hectare of land farmed with green practices increases the adoption of risk-increasing practices but is significantly less effective in the presence of background risk. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a model and experimental results of a public good game to explore the effects of fiscal transparency on the provision of a public good. Two types of fiscal transparency are explored. The first is the transparency of the decisionmaking process and the second is the transparency of government spending. To answer this question a model for the public good "city district quality" with heterogeneous agents is set up and the design and the results of the experiment are presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie zróżnicowania przestrzennego kapitału społecznego w Polsce determinowanego różnicami w rozwoju historycznym (regiony historyczne) oraz w układzie wieś – miasto – metropolia. Wcześniejsze badania wskazują na istnienie takich różnic, jednak opierają się na danych deklaratywnych, mających swoje mankamenty. W pracy zastosowano nową metodę oceny kapitału społecznego – obserwację zachowań badanych osób w eksperymencie teoriogrowym – którą skonfrontowano z badaniami ankietowymi w celu uchwycenia luki intencjonalno-behawioralnej. Badania przeprowadzone na próbie 1540 osób wskazują na niewielkie zróżnicowanie kapitału społecznego pomiędzy zastosowanymi jednostkami podziału przestrzennego, na istnienie różnic pomiędzy tym, co deklarowane, a tym, co obserwowane w kwestii zaufania, wiarygodności oraz współpracy. Wyniki tych badań słabo korelują z wynikami badań wcześniejszych.

This paper investigates systemic risk that emerges from the interplay between uncertain returns to individual actions, uncertainty on others' behavior and all this filtered through individual attitudes toward risk. We design a finitely repeated linear public good experiment based on a voluntary contribution mechanism and analyze the effect of risky and uncertain returns on subjects' contributions. Results from a baseline treatment without uncertainty are compared with two risky treatments characterized by different values for the marginal per capita return. In the treatments with risk, subjects are randomly assigned to one out of three feasible marginal per capita returns, independently of what their individual contribution was. Results show that a sufficient level of uncertainty leads to significantly lower individual contributions. Furthermore, in a system with lower contributions due to uncertainty, subjects' risk aversion enhances the systemic risk, leading the system to collapse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Moral decisions – that is, decisions that consider the consequences for the welfare of others – can be highly inconsistent across contexts. Here, we explore whether the altruism of young people is related to their willingness to cooperate with others, even in groups comprising non-reciprocating peers. Using the distinction between normative and cognitive expectations, we address this topic conducting several lab-in-the-field experiments with high-school students who played the dictator and linear public good games. We found that the altruism of young people in the dictator game and cooperation in the public good game were related, but only in the first rounds of the public good game. This indicates that young people orient their prosocial behaviour based on cognitive expectations, that is, they consider the information they receive regarding the free riding behaviour of peers and adapt their own. Nonetheless, young people who demonstrated high altruism tended to cooperate unconditionally, regardless of whether they belonged to a cooperative or uncooperative group, and despite disappointments. Finally, self-regarding young people were less likely to defect among cooperative peers. Therefore, group characteristics provide the boundary conditions for the consistency of the prosocial behaviour of young people. Some conceptual and policy implications are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We analyze cooperation of individuals in a family context, using a Public Good game. In a lab experiment, 165 individuals from 55 three-generation families (youth, parent, and grandparent) play a repeated Public Good game in three different treatments: one in which three members of the same family play each other (family), a second with the youth and two non-family members, while preserving the previous generational structure (inter-generational), and a third in which three randomly-selected players play each other (random). We find that all the age groups cooperate more when playing with relatives, indicating that family ties may have a positive relationship to contributions to the Public Good. We also find that this trend is more evident for the youths and the parents than for the grandparents. Furthermore, young individuals tend to cooperate less than older generations, especially in non-family treatments. Our results serve as evidence of the relationship between family ties and inter-generational cooperative behaviors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate whether revealing the identities in a public good game that includes a donation incentive leads to higher contributions to the public good. Previous evidence suggests that contributions to a public good increase significantly when these take place in public. Also, the amount of money given in charitable donations seems to be sensitive to the revealing of identities. Using a laboratory experiment, we implement a 20% donation share that is dependent on participants’ contributions to a public good. The donation is either costless (because it is financed by the experimenter) or deducted from a team’s contributions. In both settings, we explore whether informing participants that group members’ identities will be disclosed at the end of the experiment leads to higher contributions to the public good. Non-parametric statistics indicate that when donations are costly for the participants, the announcement of subsequent identity disclosure results in significantly higher contributions in the second half of the repeated public good game. In contrast, revealing identities in settings with costless donations reduces contributions to the public good significantly. The regression results indicate that conditional cooperators might be one subgroup driving these results.