On generosity in public good and charitable dictator games.

We examine the relationship between generosity in charitable dictator games (CDGs) and public good games (PGGs). We construct a novel generalized game that subsumes both as special cases and present experimental subjects with different blends of CDG and PGG tasks. Generosity in the CDG and PGG are only weakly correlated, in spite of close experimental control on confounding factors. We furthermore demonstrate how underlying preferences shape these behaviors, revealing important distinctions between preferences for charity and public good provision. Our findings have implications for the generalizability of existing experimental results that rely upon these games. • Charitable Dictator Games (CDGs) and Public Good Games (PGGs) common in the lab. • Both used to study real-world charity and public goods, but different properties. • We construct generalized game that nests CDGs and PGGs as special cases. • Results indicate weak correlation between generosity in CDGs and PGGs. • Implications for generalizability of results from CDGs and PGGs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]