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How do wartime legacies affect repression after the conflict ends? Irregular forces support the government in many civil wars. We argue that if this link continues after the war, respect for human rights declines. As "tried and tested" agents they are less likely to shirk when given the order to repress. Governments might also keep the militias as a "fall-back option", which results in more repression. Analyzing data from 1981 to 2014 shows that pro-government militias that were inherited from the previous conflict are consistently associated with worse repression, but newly created ones are not. Wartime pro-government militias target a broader spectrum of the population and are linked to worse state violence. New militias usually supplement wartime ones and use violence primarily against political opponents. This study highlights the detrimental impact of war legacies.

Wie weit und umkämpft war dieser Weg? Von der Entpolitisierung des Oktoberfestattentats 1980 über die Verdächtigungen der Opferangehörigen des sogenannten NSU in den 2000ern bis hin zur öffentlichen Wahrnehmung der Familien der Getöteten des rechtsterroristischen Anschlags in Hanau 2020. Erst jetzt scheint sich eine längst überfällige gesamtgesellschaftliche Debatte in Bewegung zu setzen: über mangelnde Repräsentation, mahnende Erinnerung und sich verändernde Gedenkkultur, über strukturellen Rassismus und Behördenblindheit gegenüber Menschen, die sich längst nicht mehr als Teil einer Gesellschaft fühlen. Die Beitragenden des Bandes setzen sich mit Rassismus, Rechtsextremismus und Erinnerungskultur auseinander und gehen vor allem der Frage nach, wo der Kampf gegen rechten Terror und seinen gesellschaftlichen Nährboden heute steht.

There are many assumptions within terrorism research about the individual characteristics of those who commit or support the use of terrorist tactics, but no larger quantitative study exists on the subject in a European context. To rectify this the article aims to use a group identity framework in a novel way in order to study how group dynamics and group threat impacts individual attitudes toward the use of terrorist tactics. A multilevel research design, using survey data from the European Values Study, is employed to test some of the common explanatory arguments, looking at the role of religion, group identities, and grievances. The findings are mixed, with little support for the argument that religion is a central explanatory factor in understanding radical attitudes. It appears rather that group identities and grievances, as social phenomena, are a more fruitful avenue for understanding why some individuals are more willing to support the use of terrorist tactics. These findings remain robust after controlling for other common explanatory factors and when running alternative model specifications.

Shortly after COVID-19 was classified as a pandemic in March 2020, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres called on violent actors to initiate ceasefires so that energy could be focused on fighting the pandemic. Resonance was low, however - violence even increased in several countries around the globe. Overall, patterns of violence since the spread of COVID-19 have varied significantly over time, between and within Global South regions, and in terms of the most dominant violent actors. The nexus of the external shock of COVID-19 and armed violence is multifaceted and its manifestation highly context-specific. Comparing pre-pandemic patterns of violence with those exhibited in 2020 and 2021 allows us to disentangle pandemic-related from other drivers of violence. Changes in violence dynamics vary across time and space. While the number and frequency of violent events increased in sub-Saharan Africa after the onset of COVID-19, Latin America and the Caribbean along with the Middle East and North Africa experienced decreases. State and non-state violent actors were affected differently, and changes in their activities were not always linked to the pandemic per se. The main consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic on violence relate to the worsening of structural drivers of violent conflict, such as increasing inequalities and the marginalisation of large segments of the population. Bilateral and multilateral cooperation should focus on policies that reduce inequality and improve the provision of public goods, especially access to food, healthcare, and education. Additionally, "building back better" must include improving political and socio-economic opportunities for women, youth, and ethnic minorities.

Two years into the COVID-19 pandemic, there are signs that sub-Saharan Africa will experience a modest recovery in 2022. Yet at least in the first half of the year, the region will continue to suffer from inadequate provision and administration of vaccines. In addition, violent conflicts and structural weaknesses constitute considerable challenges. We present a selective list and analysis of "ten things to watch" in Africa in 2022. Politics: Last year saw a number of military coups, which may foreshadow future takeovers by armies in Africa. Pivotal elections lie ahead that could trigger the outbreak of violence, for instance in Kenya. Political heavyweight South Africa is in a severe socio-economic crisis that is engendering growing public anger, and the governing African National Congress is experiencing increasingly deepening internal rifts. Violent conflicts: The civil war in Ethiopia puts the state’s integrity at risk and could further undermine stability in the whole Horn of Africa. Jihadism represents a major security threat on the continent that needs to be tackled by African and international actors. A focus should lie on addressing root causes and on preventing crises. Development: It will take years for African countries to rebound from the pandemic’s socio-economic repercussions. Structural problems such as high poverty, inequality, and government debt hamper economic growth and the effects of climate change are strongly felt in many African countries already. The year 2022 will be crucial for devising the next steps for continental economic integration. International arena: Africa is a sought-after international partner. Several actors including China, Turkey, the United States, and the European Union and its member countries are vying for political and economic influence. This competition will further intensify. African countries getting their full share of COVID-19 vaccines will be important. African and international partners need to expand support fo

Discrimination against the approximately 500,000 African (mostly irregular) immigrants has recently spread in China. During the corona pandemic, it degenerates into a true Afrophobia. Shortly before, five Nigerians in Guangzhou had reportedly tested positive for Covid-19. Africans are widely accused as drug traffickers and criminals. Also, they would endanger China's global competitiveness for Africa's resources through media baiting abroad. Current reports testify the displacement of African migrants from homes and hotels in Guangzhou (Canton), where most of the Africans live. They are dependent on informal, mostly illegal networks in order to be able to stay in the country. In online social networks Afrophobia as cyber racism is particularly pronounced. Thereby, racism is more deeply rooted in the mentality of many Chinese than is commonly assumed. According to a traditional Chinese proverb, the greatest evil to be avoided is 'the destroyed nation and the annihilated race'. In addition, since 2005 land-grabbing by Chinese entrepreneurs in sub-Saharan Africa arose international attention. Its main purpose is to ensure food security in China and to profit from international grain speculation. It was racially legitimized from the start, with slogans such as, only Chinese investments could save Africans from their traditional 'laziness'. This repeats deeply rooted neo-colonial European prejudices of a 'wild, ahistoric and uncivilized Africa'. The prejudices are still associated with a feeling of racial superiority. The social fabric of China has always embodied essential characteristics of the exclusion of 'foreigners', focused on ethnicity, race, religion, sexual orientation and gender. The African Union, various African governments and even the United States have sharply criticized Beijing for mistreating migrants, particularly those from Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya and Uganda. Racist attacks on Africans in China have an oppressively long tradition, associated with the ex, In China breitet sich in letzter Zeit eine Diskriminierung der ca. 500.000 afrikanischen (meist irregulären) Einwanderer aus. Sie artet in der Corona-Pandemie zu einer wahren Afrophobie aus. Afrikaner werden pauschal als Drogenhändler und Kriminelle beschuldigt. Sie würden zudem über Medienhetze im Ausland Chinas globale Wettbewerbsfähigkeit um Afrikas Ressourcen gefährden. Aktuelle Meldungen berichten von der Vertreibung afrikanischer Migranten aus Wohnungen und Hotels in Guangzhou (Canton), wo die meisten Afrikaner leben. Sie sind auf informelle, meist illegale Netzwerke angewiesen, um im Land bleiben zu können. In sozialen online Netzwerken ist Afrophobie als Cyber-Rassismus besonders ausgeprägt. Rassismus ist in der Mentalität vieler Chinesen tiefer verwurzelt als gemeinhin angenommen. Nach einem traditionellen chinesischen Sprichwort gilt als größtes zu vermeidendes Übel die "zerstörte Nation und die vernichtete Rasse". Hinzu kommt seit 2005 die ‚Landnahme‘ chinesischer Unternehmer in Schwarzafrika. Sie dient hauptsächlich der Absicherung der Nahrungsmittelsicherheit Chinas und der internationalen Getreidespekulationen. Sie wurde von Anbeginn rassistisch legitimiert, mit Sprüchen, wie beispielsweise, nur chinesische Investitionen könnten die Afrikaner vor ihrer tradierten "Faulheit" retten. Damit wiederholen sich tief verwurzelte neo-koloniale europäische Vorurteile von einem "wilden und unzivilisierten Afrika". Dies ist nach wie vor verbunden mit einem Gefühl rassischer Überlegenheit. Das soziale Gefüge Chinas verkörperte schon immer wesentliche Merkmale der Ausgrenzung von "Fremden". Fokussiert auf ethnische Zugehörigkeit, Rasse, Religion, sexuelle Orientierung und Geschlecht. Die Afrikanische Union, verschiedene afrikanische Regierungen und sogar die Vereinigten Staaten haben Peking wegen der Misshandlung von Migranten, vor allem aus Nigeria, Ghana, Kenia und Uganda, scharf kritisiert. Kurz zuvor waren Berichten zufolge fünf Nigerianer in Guangzhou positiv a

La discrimination à l'encontre des quelque 500 000 immigrés africains (pour la plupart irréguliers) s'est récemment répandue en Chine. Pendant la pandémie de corona, cela dégénère en une véritable afrophobie. Peu de temps auparavant, cinq Nigérians de Guangzhou auraient été testés positifs pour Covid-19. Les Africains sont largement accusés d'être des trafiquants de drogue et des criminels. En outre, ils mettraient en danger la compétitivité mondiale de la Chine pour les ressources de l'Afrique par le biais du dénigrement médiatiques à l'étranger. Les rapports actuels témoignent du déplacement des migrants africains des maisons et des hôtels de Guangzhou (Canton), où vivent la plupart des Africains. Ils dépendent de réseaux informels, pour la plupart illégaux, pour pouvoir rester dans le pays. Dans les réseaux sociaux en ligne, l'afrophobie et le cyber-racisme sont particulièrement prononcés. Ainsi, le racisme est plus profondément enraciné dans la mentalité de nombreux Chinois qu'on ne le pense généralement. Selon un proverbe chinois traditionnel, le plus grand mal à éviter est "la nation détruite et la race anéantie". En outre, depuis 2005, l'accaparement des terres par des entrepreneurs chinois en Afrique subsaharienne a attiré l'attention de la communauté internationale. Son objectif principal est d'assurer la sécurité alimentaire en Chine et de profiter de la spéculation céréalière internationale. Il a été légitimé racialement dès le départ, avec des slogans tels que, seuls les investissements chinois pouvaient sauver les Africains de leur "paresse" traditionnelle., Discrimination against the approximately 500,000 African (mostly irregular) immigrants has recently spread in China. During the corona pandemic, it degenerates into a true Afrophobia. Shortly before, five Nigerians in Guangzhou had reportedly tested positive for Covid-19. Africans are widely accused as drug traffickers and criminals. Also, they would endanger China's global competitiveness for Africa's resources through media baiting abroad. Current reports testify the displacement of African migrants from homes and hotels in Guangzhou (Canton), where most of the Africans live. They are dependent on informal, mostly illegal networks in order to be able to stay in the country. In online social networks Afrophobia as cyber racism is particularly pronounced. Thereby, racism is more deeply rooted in the mentality of many Chinese than is commonly assumed. According to a traditional Chinese proverb, the greatest evil to be avoided is 'the destroyed nation and the annihilated race'. In addition, since 2005 land-grabbing by Chinese entrepreneurs in sub-Saharan Africa arose international attention. Its main purpose is to ensure food security in China and to profit from international grain speculation. It was racially legitimized from the start, with slogans such as, only Chinese investments could save Africans from their traditional 'laziness'. This repeats deeply rooted neo-colonial European prejudices of a 'wild, ahistoric and uncivilized Africa'. The prejudices are still associated with a feeling of racial superiority. The social fabric of China has always embodied essential characteristics of the exclusion of 'foreigners', focused on ethnicity, race, religion, sexual orientation and gender. The African Union, various African governments and even the United States have sharply criticized Beijing for mistreating migrants, particularly those from Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya and Uganda. Racist attacks on Africans in China have an oppressively long tradition, associated with the ex

The killing of political opponents is an established practice in the Philippines, to which several dozen office­holders fall victim each year and which undermines democracy. In this report, Peter Kreuzer presents a detailed data set on this type of violence and answers the questions why the practice is so wide­spread and why it hardly ever provokes public debate. The analysis focuses on the peace covenant, a central means of symbolic politics to contain violence, but one that uninten­tionally naturalizes it.

In 2015, Germany experienced a record high influx of refugees - and received international praise for its 'welcome culture'. At the same time, however, attacks on refugees rose to an alarming level. This article describes the distribution of these attacks and probes their causes, using detailed socioeconomic and political data while modelling a hierarchical data structure. Controlling for further relevant factors taken from the extant literature, the analysis first tests whether the strength of extreme right political parties plays a role and, second, it models a contagion effect, taking into account spatial as well as temporal proximity. The findings suggest that the strength of right-wing parties in a district considerably boosts the probability of attacks on refugees in that area. They also corroborate the idea of behavioural contagion. The set of social-structural variables employed as controls yielded only limited explanatory power.

Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland erlebte im Jahr 2015, vor allem ab dem letzten Quartal, eine immense Zuwanderung von Flüchtlingen, die bis ins darauffolgende Jahr anhielt. In der Folge kam es zu einem merklichen Anstieg der Anzahl von Anschlägen auf Flüchtlinge, die erst im Jahr 2017 allmählich zurückgingen. Der vorliegende Aufsatz repliziert eine Studie, die das Auftreten von Anschlägen in Deutschland im Jahr 2015 ergründet hat und prüft, ob die relevanten Erklärungsfaktoren auch in den beiden Folgejahren Gültigkeit haben. Die Analyseergebnisse zeigen, dass noch im Jahr 2015 politische, sozioökonomische und demographische Faktoren struktureller Art einen gewissen Erklärungswert für das Vorkommen von Anschlägen aufweisen. In 2016 und 2017 lässt die Erklärungskraft all dieser Variablen jedoch nach und es zeigt sich über das ganze Land verteilt ein deutlich diffuseres Anschlagsmuster. Als robust erweisen sich über den gesamten Zeitraum hinweg hingegen Ansteckungseffekte durch zeitlich wie räumlich nahe vorangehende fremdenfeindliche Ereignisse., In 2015, Germany took in a tremendous number of refugees, especially during the last quarter, and continued to do so well into 2016. A significant rise in the number of attacks against refugees followed these developments which only abated in 2017. This article replicates an analysis which analyzed the occurrence of attacks on refugees in Germany during 2015 and tests whether explanatory factors found relevant in that work are still valid for the two subsequent years. The results show that in 2015, political, socio-economic and demographic structural factors to some extent can explain anti-refugee violence. However, in 2016 and 2017 the explanatory power of these factors diminishes and we observe a notably more diffuse pattern of attacks throughout the entire country. At the same time, a contagion effect based on spatially as well as temporally close xenophobic violence remains robust for the entire period from 2015 to 2017.

Social unrest and armed violence rewind development achievements in the fight against poverty. This thesis examines various factors contributing to social unrest and armed violence in different parts of a country. A common method of this thesis is the empirical regression analysis of geo-spatial data to explain social unrest and armed violence. I find four results. First, social unrest occurs more likely in areas where droughts coincide with existing ethnic grievances. Second, to identify these grievances, we develop a novel spatial inequality measure between and within ethnic groups. Validation of the inequality measure against perceived differences in identity groups’ economic conditions shows that individuals feel ethnic grievances. Third, competition between armed groups causally increases the level of violence. Finally, there is no evidence that development aid increases civil wars, but Chinese aid seems to increase state repressions and a higher tolerance for autocratic rule. This thesis shows that spatial characteristics can help understand and explain social unrest and armed violence within countries.

In seiner Rede auf einem Empfang in der Düsseldorfer Industriekredit-Bank im September 1969 bedauerte der BDI-Präsident Fritz Berg (1901–1979), dass man Teilnehmern eines wilden Streiks bei der Dortmunder Hoesch AG nicht mit Waffengewalt entgegengetreten sei. Man hätte »doch ruhig schießen sollen, einen totschießen, dann herrsche wenigstens wieder Ordnung«. Der ehemalige Fahnenjunker der preußischen Gardepioniere bezog sich dabei auf eine Meldung der »Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung«, die auf ihrer Titelseite darüber berichtet hatte, dass nicht streikwillige Kollegen von streikenden Stahlarbeitern körperlich bedroht worden seien. Eine andere Gruppe habe das Vorstandsbüro gestürmt und anschließend versucht, sich gewaltsam Zutritt zur Villa eines Werksdirektors zu verschaffen. Dessen Ehefrau habe die marodierenden Malocher mit gezogener Waffe am Betreten ihres Anwesens gehindert. Als die geladenen Repräsentanten der nordrhein-westfälischen Wirtschaft auf Bergs Worte mit Schweigen reagierten, setzte dieser noch einmal nach und erklärte, seine Aussage könne man ruhig zitieren.

Seit rund zwanzig Jahren sind Städte zu Laboren neoliberaler Kriminalpolitik avanciert. Das gilt insbesondere für die Metropolen Nordamerikas und Westeuropas, in denen neue staatliche Polizeistrategien erprobt, private Sicherheitsdienste beauftragt und elaborierte Kontroll- und Sicherheitstechnologien zum Einsatz gebracht werden. Erstmals fassen hier ausgewiesene Experten theoretische und empirische Ergebnisse zur sicherheitspolitischen Kontrolle des innerstädtischen Raums, von Sportveranstaltungen, neuen sozialen Bewegungen und sogenannten Randgruppen in vergleichender Perspektive zusammen.

Der Begriff "Terrorismus" ist definitorisch uneindeutig - und das macht jeden Akteur zu einem bestimmten Grad zum Terroristen. Dieses Paradox zieht ddie Autorin als Ausgangspunkt für eine tiefgreifende Analyse der Strategien moderner Kriegsführung heran und löst es durch die gegenwärtig einmalige Verwendung von sogenannten Fuzzy-Inferenzsystemen zum Zwecke der Typisierung politischer Gewalt auf. Die intensive Verbindung von soziologischer Gewaltforschung mit der Mathematik unscharfer Mengen macht den Grad der Verwendung politischer Gewaltstrategien erstmalig berechenbar - und ermöglicht somit einen völlig neuartigen Blick auf den strategischen Kontext des Handelns politischer Gewaltakteure., Sociological research on violence meets fuzzy logic - the result is a comprehensive typology of political violence and terrorism, which is based on the latest findings in modern warfare.