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La teoría de los modelos mentales ofrece una explicación de cómo los seres humanos infieren conclusiones. Tal explicación no es coherente con la lógica clásica. Admite inferencias que son incorrectas en dicha lógica. Dos de esas inferencias son consideradas aquí. Una de ellas permite derivar que las cláusulas de un condicional son posibles si ese condicional es verdadero. La otra autoriza a deducir que las cláusulas de una disyunción son posibles si esa disyunción es verdadera. Recurriendo al modo que en Crisipo de Solos entiende las relaciones condicionales, este trabajo propone dos axiomas que describen las estructuras de esas dos inferencias. La idea es que tales axiomas podrían ser incluidos en un hipotético sistema axiomático que intentara reproducir cómo son los procesos inferenciales humanos.

According to the ‘white horse’ paradox, a horse that is white is not a horse: it is a white horse, but not a horse. Though logical arguments can be adduced in support of the proposition, people tend to reject the paradox. Individuals often regard a white horse as a horse and therefore usually ignore the arguments from logic. This paper attempts an explanation of their behaviour. The theory of mental models offers a cognitive explanation for the habitual rejection of the paradox. Within this framework, the key is the way that people reason – a way that does not necessarily coincide with logic.

There is a kind of logical theses that can be a cognitive problem. They are theses that are not tautologies and people tend to accept as absolutely correct. This is the case of theses such as those of Aristotle and Boethius. This paper tries to give an explanation of the reasons why this happens. The explanation is based on the theory of mental models. However, it also resorts to modal logic and the account of the ideas presented by Lenzen. Thus, relating the general framework of the theory of mental models to basic aspects of modal logic and this last account, a possible solution of the problem is proposed

Very important concepts in the theory of mental models are those of ‘possibility’ and ‘necessity’. Based on the definitions this psychology theory gives for those concepts, it has been shown that it complies with the requirement Fitting and Mendelsonh provides in general for modal logic. That requirement consists of being coherent with the modal interpretation of the square of opposition presented by Aristotle. This paper tries to move forward in this direction. It analyzes fourteen modal theorems indicated by Carnap under the approach of the theory of mental models. The results reveal that the theory is also compatible with those theorems.

This paper is intended to show that the properties classical logic attributes to conjunction are not always found in real compound nouns in natural language. This fact is described by means of several examples taken from different natural languages. The main conclusion is that perhaps a better option to understand human language and communicative phenomena is to assume a basically semantic approach with the mental model theory proposed as a more suitable alternative. This is because the fact that the logical properties that are not always present in real compound nouns is not considered a problem under the framework of this theory.

The mental models theory rejects that sentences are linked to logical forms. From its perspective, their most relevant aspect refers to the semantic possibilities that correspond to them. In this way, the theory has analyzed in detail the real semantic role that the traditional connectives in logic can play in reasoning. However, given that logical forms are not important in its framework, in this paper, it is argued that those connectives are not the only operators that the mental models theory should review, and that there are other connectives present in most of the languages in general that can be interesting for it as well. That is the case of ‘but’ in English, which is addressed from the approach of the aforementioned theory here.

Cognitive Linguistics is an important approach to language and cognition that gives relevant arguments and theses on topics related to these subject matters. On the other hand, the mental models theory is a psychological reasoning theory that also offers interesting experimental results consistent with its general ideas about these very topics. This paper is intended to look for connections between these two frameworks in order to show that, at least in principle, they are not contradictory, can be assumed at the same time and can support each other. This will be demonstrated mainly by means of an example linked to the differentiation between sentential and morphological negations and the way it can be addressed from the two approaches.

La regla de introducción de la disyunción, esto es, el esquema de la lógica clásica que, a partir de una premisa, lleva a concluir una disyunción transformando la premisa en uno de los términos de tal disyunción, es un problema cognitivo. Esto es así debido a que las personas solo utilizan esta regla en ciertas circunstancias. Por tanto, toda teoría que trate de describir el razonamiento humano tiene que explicar también este fenómeno. Basándose en la teoría de los modelos mentales, Orenes y Johnson-Laird proponen una explicación a este respecto, y este trabajo pretende mostrar que, aunque puede parecer que su explicación es contradictoria con algunos supuestos esenciales y ciertos desarrollos importantes de la teoría mencionada, tal no es verdaderamente el caso. Los puntos clave en este sentido que serán analizados son el modo en que la teoría de los modelos mentales realmente entiende la disyunción y la distinción que este mismo enfoque plantea entre Modelos Mentales y Modelos Completamente Explícitos.

Johnson-Laird and Byrne proposed in 2002 that, beyond the two traditional interpretations that are assigned to if, that is, the material and the biconditional ones, eight more combinations of possibilities related to their meaning can be attributed to this kind of sentences. The initial hypothesis in the present study is that not all of those ten interpretations should be usual in academic texts, since some of them resort, for example, to figurative language or irony. In this way, a study of a psychology paper is carried out in order to check that hypothesis. The results are that, at least in that paper, the uses of if tend to be linked to the interpretation that both Johnson-Laird and Byrne and the literature in general relate to the biconditional.

In 2012, Orenes and Johnson-Laird found interesting results from the cognitive point of view but problematic if analyzed under methods such as the semantic one of extension and intension presented by Carnap. The main difficulty in this way is that Orenes and Johnson-Laird showed that people tend to accept, in the case of certain inferences, conclusions that, by themselves, are, according to the aforementioned semantic method, false in absolutely all of the state-descriptions that can be imagined. However, in this paper, a way to overcome that difficulty is proposed. That way is based upon the idea that the real logical forms of the conclusions accepted by the participants in Orenes and Johnson-Laird’s experiments were not the apparent ones, but they corresponded to other very different structures that can be true in some state-descriptions.

Desde la antigüedad se ha discutido cuál es la forma más apropiada en la que debemos entender los enunciados condicionales. El debate, de hecho, llega hasta nuestros días y dos teorías cognitivas contemporáneas, la teoría de la lógica mental y la teoría de los modelos mentales, presentan visiones encontradas al respecto. Según la primera de ellas, el condicional, sin duda, no es material, pero, aunque no lo afirma explícitamente, la segunda parece atribuirle inicialmente características consistentes con tal interpretación. En este trabajo, se trata de profundizar en esta polémica y demostrar que los ejemplos de condicional ofrecidos por la teoría de la lógica mental con el propósito de evidenciar que una comprensión material de los mismos no es adecuada. No obstante, si son analizados detenidamente bajo el prisma de la teoría de los modelos mentales, se presenta una comprensión de las oraciones condicionales en tal dirección.

Linguistic inter-understanding is a communicative phenomenon that is well known and that has been studied in detail. It basically consists of the fact that an individual speaking a language is able to understand another person speaking a different language, and this without deeply knowing this last language or being able to express himself/herself in it. The phenomenon, which is especially frequent in the case of very similar languages, occurs because of certain inferential processes that can happen in the human mind when people try to interpret information in a distinct language. In this way, the main aim of this paper is to show how such processes are very akin to some of those that the mental models theory attributes to the human reasoning ability, and that hence linguistic inter-understanding can be considered as evidence that this last theory is, at least partially, correct.

Cicero attributes an inference schema that is not logically valid to Stoic logic. This fact has been deemed as a Cicero’s mistake. However, in this paper, I assume the thesis that Cicero was not actually wrong and that, by means of his schema, he could be showing us interesting aspects of Stoicism that are not clear in the ancient sources. In this way, I use the mental models theory as a methodological tool and argue that the case of Cicero’s mistake allows us to suppose that there were six indemonstrables in Stoic logic, and not five.

As described, for example, by Hornstein, the general linguistic framework given by the contemporary government-binding theory distinguishes several levels. This paper is intended to show that a differentiation of that kind, if such levels are understood in a different manner, can be clearly consistent with some developments in current cognitive science, and, in particular, with approaches such as the one of López-Astorga, which attempts to link proposals that, in principle, can be deemed as irreconcilable, such as the mental models theory and the idea that human cognition is led by logical forms. In this way, without accepting the characteristics that usually are assigned to the levels pointed out by the government-binding theory, it is argued that the role attributed to semantics and syntax by López-Astorga can be compatible with a general structure more or less akin to the one of this last theory.

Según Hornstein, la gramática generativa necesita ofrecer una explicación del hecho deque los niños pueden aprender cualquier idioma viviendo en contextos con muchas limitaciones ydeficiencias desde el punto de vista lingüístico. Piensa que las teorías inductivas no son capaces deaclarar cómo acontece el aprendizaje con tales limitaciones y deficiencias. Del mismo modo, en suopinión, las teorías semánticas no muestran por qué la semántica es necesaria para explicar esehecho. No obstante, el propósito de este trabajo es argumentar a favor de la idea de que una teoríacognitiva esencialmente semántica, la teoría de los modelos mentales, puede no solo clarificar elmencionado hecho, sino también evidenciar que la semántica es fundamental en la mayor parte delas actividades intelectuales humanas.

From the mental models theory, it has been claimed that the conjunction commutativity law, that is, the logical law providing that the order of the conjuncts joined by the coordinating conjunction ‘and’ can be changed without modifying the truth-value of the sentence, is not always valid in real conversations in natural language. For this reason, based on that very theory, it has been proposed that the true sense of a sentence of that kind can only be suitably captured by a semantic theory, such as the one of the mental models, which resorts to iconic possibilities describing reality. However, in this paper, it is argued that the formal and basically syntactic frameworks can also correctly stand for the actual meaning corresponding to propositions with a coordinating conjunction such as ‘and’ to which the conjunction commutativity law does not seem, in principle, to apply. To do that, they do not have to significantly move away from classical logic, but only to add to the connectives in this last logic a modal operator akin to ‘Next’ in temporal logic, and this without the need to assume many more temporal logical elements.

Hoje em dia, há uma controvérsia interessante sobre os fatores ou elementos que são mais importantes na mente humana. Desta forma, enquanto certos quadros afirmam que a atividade intelectual é principalmente sintática, outras abordagens insistem em que nossa mente basicamente leva em consideração as representações semânticas. Não há dúvida de que essa discussão pode ter sentido na ciência cognitiva e nos estudos sobre o raciocínio humano. No entanto, o objetivo essencial deste trabalho é mostrar que este debate é irrelevante do ponto de vista linguístico, pois mesmo idéias muito abstratas e complexas podem ser capturadas por meio de formas sintáticas e modelos semânticos, com a possibilidade de identificar relacionamentos claros entre tais formas e modelos também. Este último ponto é suportado com argumentos baseados na tese sobre o infinito de Anaximandro de Mileto, que é usada como exemplo.

AbstractThe mental models theory claims that human thought is mainly semantic and consists of analyses of the possibilities that the sentences refer to. The theory has a great empirical support. However, it can be thought that, if it actually shows how the human mind works, it should be possible to find ancient texts authored by philosophers or logicians whose arguments reveal identifications and comparison of semantic possibilities. In this paper, I try to argue that, indeed, texts of that kind are to be found in the ancient sources. In particular, I comment on a fragment written by Aulus Gellius in which an analysis of possibilities is clear.Keywords: ancient philosophy, mental models, possibilities, reasoning, semantics.

No final do século XX, a versão final da teoria lógica da mente foi apresentada. Ela era constituída por uma aproximação formal e sintática que objetivava descrever e explicar a habilidade de inferências humanas. Tendo em vista vários resultados experimentais obtidos nos útimos anos que fogem ao escopo desta teoria, podemos afirmar que ela, hoje, encontra­se desatualizada. Neste artigo, objetivamos atualizar alguns aspectos particulares da teoria lógica da mente em relação com evidências empíricas recentes e argumentos oriundos da literatura especilaizada. Tais aspectos se referem aos símbolos que ela deveria adotar, ao esquema essencial e ao modo no qual ela pode conviver com suas negações.

ABSTRACT: The mental models theory predicts that, while conjunctions are easier than disjunctions for individuals, when denied, conjunctions are harder than disjunctions. Khemlani, Orenes, and Johnson-Laird proved that this prediction is correct in their work of 2014. In this paper, I analyze their results in order to check whether or not they really affect the mental logic theory. My conclusion is that, although Khemlani et al.'s study provides important findings, such findings do not necessarily lead to questioning or to rejecting the mental logic theory.

The syntactic theories trying to describe human reasoning, communication, and language often claim that the role played by pragmatics basically consists of providing hidden premises that help one draw conclusions. Obviously, this is a very strong assumption. However, this paper is intended to show that there are arguments used by people that cannot be understood without such premises, and that hence they confirm that assumption. This is done by resorting, as an example, to an argumentation given by the Chinese thinker Deng Xi.

O paradoxo dos corvos negros proposto por Carl Hempel é um problema se for analisado a partir da lógica padrão. Isto é assim porque as equivalências nessa lógica pode levar a pensar que os indivíduos devem realizar determinadas ações que eles não costumam fazer. Neste artigo, vou mostrar que, se ignorarmos a lógica padrão e assumirmos outros sistemas, o problema desaparece, uma vez que essas mesmas ações não são esperadas. Em particular, eu uso como exemplos duas abordagens: a da lógica estoica e a da teoria dos modelos mentais.

Šiuo straipsniu mėginama parodyti, jog Indijos ir stoikų logika yra panašesnės viena į kitą nei į standartinę logiką. Šiuo tikslu analizuojama ištrauka iš Kathāvatthu, kurioje pateikiamas sąlyginio teiginio apibrėžimas dažnai interpretuojamas kaip atitinkantis modernioje teiginių logikoje vartojamą materialiosios implikacijos sampratą. Teigiama, jog tokia interpretacija nėra visiškai pagrįsta. Todėl daroma išvada, jog tai, kas iš tiesų sakoma aptariamoje ištraukoje, nuosekliai susiję su Chrisipo Soliečio pasiūlytu sąlyginio teiginio teisingumo kriterijumi.

The Stoics not only analyzed sentences showing to be clear conditionals. They also reviewed other kinds of sentences related to the conditional that are not exactly conditionals, for example, the pseudo-conditionals and the causal assertibles. In this paper, I try to argue that the Stoic account of such sentences reveals that certain problematic issues that contemporary cognitive science is concerned with, such as the ways the conditionals can be expressed or the pragmatic phenomenon of the conditional perfection, were already studied by the Stoics, and that they even gave their solutions to those problems. To do that, I resort to the semantic analysis of models usually made by the mental models theory, and use it as a methodological tool.

The mental logic theory does not accept the disjunction introduction rule of standard propositional calculus as a natural schema of the human mind. In this way, the problem that I want to show in this paper is that, however, that theory does admit another much more complex schema in which the mentioned rule must be used as a previous step. So, I try to argue that this is a very important problem that the mental logic theory needs to solve, and claim that another rival theory, the mental models theory, does not have these difficulties.

La teoría de la disciplina formal sostiene que el estudio de las matemáticas desarrolla las habilidades lógicas de los individuos. Attridge e Inglis realizaron un experimento con el fin de comprobar si esta teoría es correcta o no. Su conclusión fue que sus resultados mostraban que, si bien las matemáticas pueden, efectivamente, mejorar las capacidades lógicas, es necesario asumir la interpretación defectuosa del condicional. Sin embargo, López-Astorga contraargumentó que eran posibles otras interpretaciones de sus resultados, que tales resultados no prueban que la interpretación material del condicional no es válida y que la teoría de los modelos mentales también los puede explicar. En este trabajo, comento los problemas vinculados a las otras interpretaciones posibles propuestas por López-Astorga y trato de mostrar que la mejor opción para la interpretación de los resultados de Attridge e Inglis es asumir la teoría de la lógica mental.

Abstract According to standard propositional logic, the inferences in which the conditional introduction rule is used are absolutely correct. However, people do not always accept inferences of that kind. Orenes and Johnson-Laird carried out interesting experiments in this way and, based on the general framework of the mental models theory, explained clearly in which cases and under which circumstances such inferences are accepted and rejected. The goals of this paper are both to better understand some aspects of Stoic logic and to check whether or not that very logic can also offer an account on this issue. My conclusions are that, indeed, this later logic can do that, and that the results obtained by Orenes and Johnson-Laird can be explained based on the information that the sources provide on Stoic logic.