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Stoic Logic Allows Understanding a Priori Falsity in the Conditional
- Source :
- Studies about Languages. :33-40
- Publication Year :
- 2021
- Publisher :
- Kaunas University of Technology (KTU), 2021.
-
Abstract
- An issue to explain in cognitive science is nowadays the case of certain conditionals that people seem to deem as a priori false. Those conditionals appear to be false by virtue of semantics: the meanings of their antecedents and their consequents seem not to admit any link between them. This is a problem because, from the point of view of classical logic, they are not always false; there can be situations in which they are true (as classical logic provides, whenever their antecedents are false, those conditionals in entirety are true). There are contemporary frameworks explaining this phenomenon (e.g., the theory of mental models). However, this paper tries to make the point that the solution might be already in ancient philosophy: in particular, in Chrysippus’ logic. Thus, the paper describes in details (1) why those conditionals are controversial in classical logic and (2) the account that can be given for them from Chrysippus’ philosophy. That account is based mainly on the Stoic idea that the negation of the second clause of a conditional should not be compatible with its first clause.
Details
- ISSN :
- 20297203 and 16482824
- Database :
- OpenAIRE
- Journal :
- Studies about Languages
- Accession number :
- edsair.doi...........f8cfc229aa9e534000e107ac31729b6a