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McDowell’s defence of disjunctivism is often portrayed as starting from a controversial epistemological access-internalism, which he fails to support in his writings. This paper critiques such interpretations and presents an alternative reading of McDowell’s argument in favour of disjunctivism. Taking outset in McDowell’s early debate with Michael Dummett, it is shown why disjunctivism is a consequence of McDowell’s realism combined with his acceptance of the Fregean claim that Sense determines reference. It is argued that even within the modest approach to meaning theories which McDowell favour, disjunctivism is a necessary requirement for a defence of realism. This approach means that, rather than starting from controversial epistemological convictions, McDowell’s disjunctivism motivates the adoption of access-internalism, as it enables truth-ensuring experiential support for our thoughts. Hence, while I deny that disjunctivism follows from premises about the nature of knowledge, I agree with McDowell that the landscape of our debate about knowledge may be irrevocably altered once we accept disjunctivism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Husserl’s theory of fulfilment conceives of empty acts, such as symbolic thought, and fulfilling acts, such as sensory perceptions, in a strict parallel. This parallelism is the basis for Husserl’s semantics, epistemology, and conception of truth. It also entails that any true proposition can be known in principle, which Church and Fitch have shown to explode into the claim that every proposition is actually known. I assess this logical challenge and discuss a recent response by James Kinkaid. While Kinkaid’s proposal saves one direction of the parallel for semantics, it gives up the parallelism for truth. I spell out a different response which meshes naturally with Husserl’s account of meaning. If the parallelism is restricted to a class of basic propositions, the truth of non-basic propositions can be defined inductively, without leading to the paradox. I then discuss objections that have been raised against a similar proposal by Dummett. The result is that exegetically plausible and popular interpretations of Husserl’s correlationism are indeed challenged by Church and Fitch. But when taking into account the ‘logical adumbration’ of propositional blindspots, truth and possible fulfilment can be connected without paradox. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper defends a reading of Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics in the Lectures on the Foundation of Mathematics as a radical conventionalist one, whereby our agreement about the particular case is constitutive of our mathematical practice and ‘the logical necessity of any statement is a direct expression of a convention’ (Dummett in Philos Rev 68(3), 1959, p. 329). On this view, mathematical truths are conceptual truths and our practices determine directly for each mathematical proposition individually whether it is true or false. Mathematical truths are thus not consequences of a prior adoption of a convention or rules as orthodox conventionalism has it. The goal of the paper is not merely exegetical, however, and argues that radical conventionalism is able to withstand some of the most difficult objections that have been brought forward against it, including those of Dummett himself, and thus that radical conventionalism has been prematurely excluded from consideration by philosophers of mathematics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Annals of Philosophy / Roczniki Filozoficzne is the property of John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Faculty of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper continues mv discussion with Michael Dummett on Frege's senses, published in The Philosophy of Michael Dummett* 1 and further developed in Diametros.2 In his reply to my original paper, Dummett came to agree with me that senses are neither objects nor functions, since thev have a categoriallv different kind of linguistico-metaphysical function to perform. He then asks how we might quantify over senses, if they are neither objects nor functions. He discusses two main options, and finds one unviable and the other "very un-Fregean."31 then offer a Fregean or neo-Fregean option in my rejoinder.4 5 And I still hold that this way out will do the job, or is at least plausible enough that tire burden of persuasion is on those who disagree. But I hope to show in this paper that on a more complete examination of Frege, there are at least twenty Fregean or neo-Fregean ways out, with the one I proposed being option (17). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper begins with an account of the emergence of analytic philosophy of language in the twentieth century in the context of the development of logic and the linguistic turn. Subsequently, it describes two examples of analytic philosophy of language in its heyday when the discipline was conceived as first philosophy. Finally, it provides, by way of conclusion, a succinct outline of the current state of philosophy of language, marked by modesty and fragmentation. It is claimed that even if one retains optimism about the prospects of philosophy of language in the first century of the new millennium, it would be unreasonable to disagree with the opinion that the present-day philosophy of language is a highly specialized and diversified discipline and no longer so central for philosophical enterprise as it used to be. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My intention in this paper is to outline and criticise some of the main ideas in Michael Dummett's classic article "Bringing about the Past". From Dummett's remarks we can (I think) reconstruct two sceptical arguments designed to show that it can never be rational to attempt to bring about past events. Dummett is critical of both arguments. Though happy with Dummett's reply to the first sceptical argument, I disagree with his reply to the second. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In our paper, we put forward an argument for the existence of God that starts with a description of the goal of science. The fact that science approximates perfect knowledge opens the problem of its status. We proceed to three resolutions of the problem: perfect knowledge is only a kind of fictional idealization; it will be reached by humanity in the future; it is God’s knowledge. We point out the weaknesses of the first two options. Next, we go on to draw the conclusion that it is hardly possible to describe the goal of science without some theistic or near-theistic concepts.

Copyright of Veritas is the property of EDIPUCRS - Editora Universitaria da PUCRS and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Annals of Philosophy / Roczniki Filozoficzne is the property of John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Faculty of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Anti-realism was first introduced by Michael Dummett, the contemporary analytic philosopher. He has always preferred to discuss about statements and assertions (instead of entities), such as statements in the past tense, statements about the physical world, and so on. Based on his approach to metaphysical problems, we should initially choose an appropriate model of meaning and a proper conception of the notion of truth applicable to the statements. By doing so, the dispute between realism and anti-realism can be rendered to a disagreement on the kind of meaning the statements may have. After criticizing the realist approach, he goes on to claim that without having proper evidence, we cannot judge on meaning and truth or falsity of linguistic statements. To understand a sentence, Dummett says, is to have the capacity of recognizing what would be counted as evidence for or against it. Therefore, an anti-realist believes that there is no guarantee for every sentence to be certainly true (or false). Or, it cannot be approved for each statement to be necessarily true or false, independently of our knowledge and relevant abilities. An adherent of realism, by contrast, admits the principle of bivalence and acknowledges that sentences are true or false because of the reality existing independently of us. In this essay, after introducing Dummett’s anti-realist approach and his criticisms on realism, I am going to discuss about and explain the correlation between his desired theory of meaning and anti-realism.

The famous twentieth-century philosophers Charles Taylor and Michael Dummett have both commented on the Rushdie Affair. This article analyzes their criticism of the British author Salman Rushdie and tries to demonstrate the relevance of this criticism against the backdrop of the massacre in the editorial offices of Charlie Hebdo in Paris on January 7, 2015. Unfortunately, two great philosophers of our time do not give us guidance here. The world is confused, our political leaders are confused, and great political philosophers are confused. This is important, because if freedom of expression, thought, and religion are to survive in this world, it is necessary to defend these freedoms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Michael Dummett argued that, whilst we can imagine circumstances under which agents may rationally believe themselves capable of affecting the past, the attitude of such agents is bound to seem 'paradoxical and unnatural to us'. Therefore, only agents very unlike us could intentionally affect the past. I argue that this is not the case. I outline circumstances in which the attitude of such agents is prudent, even by our own standards. Worlds in which backwards causation occurs could, then, contain agents very much like us. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Knowledge of a language is a kind of knowledge, the possession of which enables a speaker to understand and perform a variety of linguistic actions in that language. In this paper, I pursue an agency-oriented approach to knowledge of language. I begin by examining two major agency-oriented models of knowledge of language: Michael Dummett's Implicit Knowledge Model and Jennifer Hornsby's Practical Knowledge Model. I argue that each of these models is inadequate for different reasons. I present an Acquaintance Knowledge Model, in which a speaker's knowledge of a language is a combination of the speaker's first-order linguistic ability and second-order acquaintance with his ability and actions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

According to Charles Travis our language is occasion-sensitive. The truth-conditions of all our sentences, and their correctness-conditions more generally, vary depending on the occasions on which they are used. This is part of a broader view of language as unshadowed. This paper develops objections Travis has made from this viewpoint against Michael Dummett's anti-realism. It aims to show that the arguments are suggestive but inconclusive. For all it shows unshadowed anti-realism is a possibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has recently been suggested that John Dewey's theory of ideas amounts to something called 'concept pragmatism,' a view that identifies the content of a concept with certain dispositions in inference. This, however, is doubly false: on Dewey's account, such dispositions neither suffice for the possession of a concept, nor are they requisite. In this article I argue that, in rejecting a dualism of disposition and explicit rule, Dewey's account relies on a rather different notion of content, one derived from his analysis of the practices constitutive of a culture--that is, from the cultural naturalism of his later years. Knowing the meaning of an expression in a language--thus having a concept--is not merely a matter of one's dispositions in using words, but is rather a matter of what one knows, implicitly, in having gained those dispositions: a knowledge of the considerations founding our practices, what Dewey refers to as the 'representative offices' underlying those uses. His is consequently a theory, I suggest, resting on a notion of practical sense. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines a somewhat neglected argument for the existence of God which appeals to the divine perspective as a way of reconciling the conflicting claims of realism and anti-realism. Six representative examples are set out (Berkeley, Ferrier, T. H. Green, Josiah Royce, Gordon Clark and Michael Dummett), reasons are considered why this argument has received less attention than it might, and a brief sketch given of the most promising way in which it might be developed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The fundamental assumption of Dummett's and Prawitz' proof-theoretic justification of deduction is that 'if we have a valid argument for a complex statement, we can construct a valid argument for it which finishes with an application of one of the introduction rules governing its principal operator'. I argue that the assumption is flawed in this general version, but should be restricted, not to apply to arguments in general, but only to proofs. I also argue that Dummett's and Prawitz' project of providing a logical basis for metaphysics only relies on the restricted assumption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 'Knowing How', ) propose an intellectualist account of knowledge-how, according to which all knowledge-how is a type of propositional knowledge about ways to act. In this article, I examine this intellectualist account by applying it to the epistemology of language. I argue that (a) Stanley and Williamson mischaracterize the concept of knowledge-how in the epistemology of language, and (b) intellectualism about knowledge of language fails in its explanatory task. One lesson that can be drawn from this case study is that Stanley and Williamson's intellectualism is limited in its explanatory scope and power insofar as it cannot explain the knowledge of language, which is usually conceived as knowledge-how and as non-propositional in character. Their intellectualist claim that all knowledge-how is knowledge-that should be withdrawn. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ability to attribute false-beliefs to others — the hallmark of a representational theory of mind — has been shown to be reliant on linguistic ability, specifically on competence in sentential complementation after verbs of communication and cognition such as ‘say that’ and ‘think that’. The reason commonly put forward for this is that these structures provide a representational format which enables the child to think about another’s thoughts. The paper offers an alternative explanation. Drawing on the work of the philosophers Michael Dummett and Robert Brandom, it argues that the available data better fits an account that grounds the notion of representation in the commitments undertaken by asserters. The competence in sentential complementation that precedes false-belief attribution is viewed as a result of the child developing a meta-awareness of the syntactic forms employed in assertion. This meta-awareness gives the child access to discourse about the commitments undertaken by speakers and the consequences of these for their behaviour. This understanding constitutes the child’s grasp of the representational nature of discourse and thought. The paper thus offers an illocutionary account of theory-of-mind development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Most type systems are agnostic regarding the evaluation strategy for the underlying languages, with the value restriction for ML which is absent in Haskell as a notable exception. As type systems become more precise, however, detailed properties of the operational semantics may become visible because properties captured by the types may be sound under one strategy but not the other. For example, intersection types distinguish between call-by-name and call-by-value functions, because the subtyping law is unsound for the latter in the presence of effects. In this paper we develop a proof-theoretic framework for analyzing the interaction of types with evaluation order, based on the notion of polarity. Polarity was discovered through linear logic, but we propose a fresh origin in Dummett’s program of justifying the logical laws through alternative verificationist or pragmatist “meaning-theories”, which include a bias towards either introduction or elimination rules. We revisit Dummett’s analysis using the tools of Martin-Löf’s judgmental method, and then show how to extend it to a unified polarized logic, with Girard’s “shift” connectives acting as intermediaries. This logic safely combines intuitionistic and dual intuitionistic reasoning principles, while simultaneously admitting a focusing interpretation for the classical sequent calculus. Then, by applying the Curry–Howard isomorphism to polarized logic, we obtain a single programming language in which evaluation order is reflected at the level of types. Different logical notions correspond directly to natural programming constructs, such as pattern-matching, explicit substitutions, values and call-by-value continuations. We give examples demonstrating the expressiveness of the language and type system, and prove a basic but modular type safety result. We conclude with a brief discussion of extensions to the language with additional effects and types, and sketch the sort of explanation this can provide for operationally sensitive typing phenomena. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Should the truth-value of statements be thought of as epistemically constrained or as determined by objective factors that stand quite apart from our best knowledge, evidence, or powers of conceptual grasp? The anti-realist/realist debate turns ultimately on this disagreement. My article takes its lead from a famous pronouncement by US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfield to the effect that there are 'known knowns', i.e. 'things that we know we know'; 'known unknowns', or 'things we know we do not know'; and lastly, 'unknown unknowns', 'things we don't know we don't know'. Whether Rumsfeld was talking gobbledegook, making some acute logical points, or just pulling the wool with regard to Iraq's disputed weapons capability is matter for debate. Still, his remarks may be useful for clarifying certain fundamental issues about knowledge and truth, especially in the context of assertions -- by anti-realist philosophers such as Michael Dummett -- that truth cannot possibly transcend our best powers of proof or ascertainment. On the other hand such scruples may have just the opposite (obfuscating) effect when we are faced with a complex and case-specific question, such as whether or not Iraq truly possessed weapons of mass destruction. My article contends that a wide range of reliably knowledge-conducive procedures, while indeed they fall short of absolute, indubitable truth, nonetheless offer grounds for arriving at a reasoned assessment of the evidence and for not consigning statements of the Dummettian 'disputed class' to a limbo of ultimate undecidability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In our paper, we put forward an argument for the existence of God that starts with a description of the goal of science. The fact that science approximates perfect knowledge opens the problem of its status. We proceed to three resolutions of the problem: perfect knowledge is only a kind of fictional idealization; it will be reached by humanity in the future; it is God's knowledge. We point out the weaknesses of the first two options. Next, we go on to draw the conclusion that it is hardly possible to describe the goal of science without some theistic or near-theistic concepts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]