Examination of Michael Dummett’s Anti-Realism and Verificationist Approach

Anti-realism was first introduced by Michael Dummett, the contemporary analytic philosopher. He has always preferred to discuss about statements and assertions (instead of entities), such as statements in the past tense, statements about the physical world, and so on. Based on his approach to metaphysical problems, we should initially choose an appropriate model of meaning and a proper conception of the notion of truth applicable to the statements. By doing so, the dispute between realism and anti-realism can be rendered to a disagreement on the kind of meaning the statements may have. After criticizing the realist approach, he goes on to claim that without having proper evidence, we cannot judge on meaning and truth or falsity of linguistic statements. To understand a sentence, Dummett says, is to have the capacity of recognizing what would be counted as evidence for or against it. Therefore, an anti-realist believes that there is no guarantee for every sentence to be certainly true (or false). Or, it cannot be approved for each statement to be necessarily true or false, independently of our knowledge and relevant abilities. An adherent of realism, by contrast, admits the principle of bivalence and acknowledges that sentences are true or false because of the reality existing independently of us. In this essay, after introducing Dummett’s anti-realist approach and his criticisms on realism, I am going to discuss about and explain the correlation between his desired theory of meaning and anti-realism.