Search

This is an update to the ongoing series of presentations tracking the state of domestic proton facility access for the purpose of single event effects (SEE) testing of microelectronics devices and systems. This includes proton research facilities and oncology therapy centers.

Total ionizing dose, displacement damage dose, and single-event effect testing were performed to characterize and determine the suitability of candidate electronics for NASA space utilization. Devices tested include optoelectronics, digital, analog, bipolar devices, and FPGAs.

As the space business rapidly evolves to accommodate a lower cost model of development and operation via concepts such as commercial space and small spacecraft (aka, CubeSats), traditional EEE parts screening and qualification methods are being scrutinized under a risk-reward trade space. In this presentation, two basic concepts will be the overarching theme: 1) The movement from complete risk aversion EEE parts methods to managing andor accepting risk via alternate approaches; and, 2) A discussion of over-design focusing on both electrical design performance and bounding margins.

From the outside looking in, the NEPP program supports NASA's traditional approach to providing electrical, electronic, and electromechanical (EEE) assurance for space missions. Standards (military and commercial) for EEE parts are based on risk averse methodologies, drive higher costs and schedules, and, in general, provide devices that significantly lag behind commercial devices in performance aspects (speed, power efficiency, etc...). This is NOT the model most small missions realistically can use. However, when you look behind the curtain, NEPP has been considering the risk trade space for small missions for over five years and has consistently provided resources that the small mission regime would find useful. In this paper, we provide a brief overview of these resources as well as NEPP's current research/development efforts that are relevant. While we'll primarily discuss radiation assurance related issues such as data availability and usage, assurances processes for not only the radiation effects side, but also the EEE parts reliability will be touched upon.

We present the results of single event effects (SEE) testing and analysis investigating the effects of radiation on electronics. This paper is a summary of test results.

Total ionizing dose and displacement damage dose testing were performed to characterize and determine the suitability of candidate electronics for NASA spacecraft and program use.

A standardized test method has been created to characterize and stress graphics processing units (GPU) during radiation effects testing.

While some Graphical Processing Units (GPUs) are discrete components (i.e.GTX1050), others take the form of an IP block or embedded engine within a System on Chip (SoC) device such as the Qualcomm Snapdragon"TM" 820 which contains a Qualcomm Adreno"TM" 530 GPU. Within this device are various functional blocks which can be exercised with software payloads. NVidia's Jetson"TM" TX1 SoC is provided on a System on Module (SOM). Within it are Central Processing Unit (CPU) cores and an nVidia GPU which can be accessed similarly to a discrete GPU coprocessor. While the packaging is different, each one of these GPUs needs to be tested using the same standardized code.

This presentation includes NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program FY18 overview, key efforts, concerns, and current status.

We will present the first ever single-event effects testing results on a 22 nm fully-depleted silicon-on-insulator test chip. The 128 MB SRAMs were irradiated with heavy ions and the results are compared to previous technology generations.

A standardized test method has been created to characterize and stress graphics processing units (GPU) during radiation effects testing.

Heavy-ion test data for 3D NAND flash memories is presented, along with a discussion of modern testing challenges and near-term plans for a broad survey of currently-available product lines.

The United States government has identified that application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) and field programmable gate array (FPGA) hardware are at risk from a variety of adversary attacks. This finding affects system security and trust. Consequently, processes are being developed for system mitigation and countermeasure application. The scope of this tutorial pertains to potential vulnerabilities and countermeasures within the ASIC/FPGA design cycle. The presentation demonstrates how design practices can affect the risk for the adversary to: change circuitry, steal intellectual property, and listen to data operations. An important portion of the design cycle is assuring the design is working as specified or as expected. This is accomplished by exhaustive testing of the target design. Alternatively, it has been shown that well established schemes for test coverage enhancement (design-for-verification (DFV) and design-for-test (DFT)) can create conduits for adversary accessibility. As a result, it is essential to perform a trade between robust test coverage versus reliable design implementation. The goal of this tutorial is to explain the evolution of design practices; review adversary accessibility points due to DFV and DFT circuitry insertion (back door circuitry); and to describe common engineering trade-off considerations for test versus adversary threats.

We present updates to the conventional methodology of triple modular redundancy (TMR) insertion as it pertains to clock domain crossings (CDCs). Three types of TMR schemes and their suggested corresponding CDC revisions are discussed.

NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program and NASA Electronic Parts Assurance Group (NEPAG) are NASAs point-of-contacts for reliability and radiation tolerance of EEE parts and their packages. This presentation includes an FY18 program overview.

NASA has a long history of using commercial grade electronics in space. In this talk, a brief history of NASAâ's trends and approaches to commercial grade electronics focusing on processing and memory systems will be presented. This will include providing summary information on the space hazards to electronics as well as NASA mission trade space. We will also discuss developing recommendations for risk management approaches to Electrical, Electronic and Electromechanical (EEE) parts and reliability in space. The final portion of the talk will discuss emerging aerospace trends and the future for Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) usage.

The aerospace and semiconductor industries lost approx. 2000 hours annually of research access when IUCF closed. An ad hoc team between the U.S. government and industry was formed to evaluate other facility options. In this presentation, we will discuss: 1) Why aerospace, semiconductor manufacturers, and others are interested in proton facility access, as well as, 2) Some of the basics of a typical test for electronics, and 3) We"ll conclude with the brief current status on progress.

The following are updated or new subjects added to the FPGA SEE Test Guidelines manual: academic versus mission specific device evaluation, single event latch-up (SEL) test and analysis, SEE response visibility enhancement during radiation testing, mitigation evaluation (embedded and user-implemented), unreliable design and its affects to SEE Data, testing flushable architectures versus non-flushable architectures, intellectual property core (IP Core) test and evaluation (addresses embedded and user-inserted), heavy-ion energy and linear energy transfer (LET) selection, proton versus heavy-ion testing, fault injection, mean fluence to failure analysis, and mission specific system-level single event upset (SEU) response prediction. Most sections within the guidelines manual provide information regarding best practices for test structure and test system development. The scope of this manual addresses academic versus mission specific device evaluation and visibility enhancement in IP Core testing.

The following are updated or new subjects added to the FPGA SEE Test Guidelines manual: academic versus mission specific device evaluation, single event latch-up (SEL) test and analysis, SEE response visibility enhancement during radiation testing, mitigation evaluation (embedded and user-implemented), unreliable design and its affects to SEE Data, testing flushable architectures versus non-flushable architectures, intellectual property core (IP Core) test and evaluation (addresses embedded and user-inserted), heavy-ion energy and linear energy transfer (LET) selection, proton versus heavy-ion testing, fault injection, mean fluence to failure analysis, and mission specific system-level single event upset (SEU) response prediction. Most sections within the guidelines manual provide information regarding best practices for test structure and test system development. The scope of this manual addresses academic versus mission specific device evaluation and visibility enhancement in IP Core testing.

NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) is developing a process to be employed in critical applications. The framework assesses levels of trust and assurance in microelectronic systems. The process is being created with participation from a variety of organizations. We present a synopsis of the framework that includes contributions from The Aerospace Corporation.

This presentation will cover NASA Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts Landscape and 2018 Activities.

We are investigating the application of classical reliability performance metrics combined with standard single event upset (SEU) analysis data to improve system survivability prediction.

NASA and the space community are faced with the harsh reality of operating electronic systems in the space radiation environment. Systems need to work reliably (as expected for as long as expected) and be available during critical operations such as docking or firing a thruster. This talk will provide a snapshot of the import of ground-based research on the radiation performance of electronics. Discussion topics include: 1) The space radiation environment hazard, 2) Radiation effects on electronics, 3) Simulation of effects with cyclotrons (and other sources), 4) Risk prediction for space missions, and, 5) Real-life examples of both ground-based testing and space-based anomalies and electronics performance. The talk will conclude with a discussion of the current state of radiation facilities in North America for ground-based electronics testing.

NEPP Mission Statement: Provide NASAs leadership for developing and maintaining guidance for the screening, qualification, test, and reliable usage of electrical, electronic, and electromechanical (EEE) parts by NASA, in collaboration with other government Agencies and industry.

The aerospace and semiconductor industries lost 2000 hours annually of research access when IUCF closed. An ad hoc team between the U.S. government and industry was formed to evaluate other facility options. In this presentation, we will discuss: 1) Why aerospace, semiconductor manufacturers, and others are interested in proton facility access, as well as, 2) Some of the basics of a typical test for electronics, and 3) We'll conclude with the brief current status on progress.

As the space business rapidly evolves to accommodate a lower cost model of development and operation via concepts such as commercial space and small spacecraft (aka, CubeSats and swarms), traditional EEE parts screening and qualification methods are being scrutinized under a risk-reward trade space. In this presentation, two basic concepts will be discussed: (1) The movement from complete risk aversion EEE parts methods to managing and/or accepting risk via alternate approaches; and, (2) A discussion of emerging assurance methods to reduce overdesign as well emerging model based mission assurance (MBMA) concepts. center dot Example scenarios will be described as well as consideration for trading traditional versus alternate methods.

We evaluated the effects of heavy ion and proton irradiation for a 3D NAND flash. The 3D NAND showed similar single-event upset (SEU) sensitivity to a planar NAND of identical density in the multiple-cell level (MLC) storage mode. The 3D NAND showed significantly reduced SEU susceptibility in single-level-cell (SLC) storage mode. Additionally, the 3D NAND showed less multiple-bit upset susceptibility than the planar NAND, with fewer number of upset bits per byte and smaller cross sections overall. However, the 3D architecture exhibited angular sensitivities for both base and face angles, reflecting the anisotropic nature of the SEU vulnerability in space. Furthermore, the SEU cross section decreased with increasing fluence for both the 3D NAND and the Micron 16 nm planar NAND, which suggests that typical heavy ion test fluences will underestimate the upset rate during a space mission. These unique characteristics introduce complexity to traditional ground irradiation test procedures.

We are investigating the application of classical reliability performance metrics combined with standard single event upset (SEU) analysis data. We expect to relate SEU behavior to system performance requirements. Our proposed methodology will provide better prediction of SEU responses in harsh radiation environments with confidence metrics. single event upset (SEU), single event effect (SEE), field programmable gate array devises (FPGAs)

When performing a single event effect (SEE) test during a test campaign, flexibility and out of the box thinking is often required for unexpected and unplanned events.

Testing of an Intel 14nm desktop processor was conducted under proton irradiation. We share lessons learned, demonstrating that complex devices beget further complex challenges requiring practical and theoretical investigative expertise to solve.

This presentation will cover NASA Electrical, Electronic and Electromechanical (EEE) Parts Assurance Structure, NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program, NASA Electronic Parts Assurance Group (NEPAG), examples of assurance challenges, and future challenges.

In this work, we use high- and low-magnitude optical microscope images, infrared camera images, and scanning electron microscope images to identify and describe the failure locations in heavy-ion-irradiated Schottky diodes.

We present the results of single event effects (SEE) testing and analysis investigating the effects of radiation on electronics. This paper is a summary of test results.

We evaluated the heavy ion and proton-induced single-event effects (SEE) for a 3D NAND flash. The 3D NAND showed similar single-event upset (SEU) sensitivity to a planar NAND of similar density and performance in the multiple-cell level (MLC) storage mode. However, the single-level-cell (SLC) storage mode of the 3D NAND showed significantly reduced SEU susceptibility. Additionally, the 3D NAND showed less MBU susceptibility than the planar NAND, with reduced number of upset bits per byte and reduced cross sections overall. However, the 3D architecture exhibited angular sensitivities for both base and face angles, reflecting the anisotropic nature of the SEU vulnerability in space. Furthermore, the SEU cross section decreased with increasing fluence for both the 3D NAND and the latest generation planar NAND, indicating a variable upset rate for a space mission. These unique characteristics introduce complexity to traditional ground irradiation test procedures.

Single-event effect (SEE) test results are presented for commercial grade, automotive grade, and radiation-hardened trench power MOSFETs.

Total ionizing dose and displacement damage testing was performed to characterize and determine the suitability of candidate electronics for NASA space utilization. Devices tested include optoelectronics, digital, analog, linear bipolar devices, and hybrid devices.

NEPP Mission Statement: Provide NASA's leadership for developing and maintaining guidance for the screening, qualification, test, and reliable usage of electrical, electronic, and electromechanical (EEE) parts by NASA, in collaboration with other government Agencies and industry.

Total ionizing dose and displacement damage testing was performed to characterize and determine the suitability of candidate electronics for NASA space utilization. Devices tested include optoelectronics, digital, analog, linear bipolar devices, and hybrid devices. Displacement Damage, Optoelectronics, Proton Damage, Single Event Effects, and Total Ionizing Dose.

Total ionizing dose and displacement damage testing was performed to characterize and determine the suitability of candidate electronics for NASA space utilization. Devices tested include opto-electronics, digital, analog, linear bipolar devices, and hybrid devices.

This presentation will discuss in detail NASA Government Working Group government topics from NASA Electronic Parts Assurance Group (NEPAG) which require additional in-depth technical solutions.

In this work, we discuss the observed single-event effects in a variety of types of diodes. In addition, we conduct failure analysis on several Schottky diodes that were heavy-ion irradiated. High- and low-magnitude optical microscope images, infrared camera images, and scanning electron microscope images are used to identify and describe the failure locations.

This presentation provides an overview of the NEPP Program.

This presentation is an outbrief of the current team status for access to domestic high (>200 MeV) energy proton facilities. In addition, future considerations will be discussed.

This presentation provides a NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program update of independent Single Event Upset (SEU) Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) testing including FPGA test guidelines, Microsemi RTG4 heavy-ion results, Xilinx Kintex-UltraScale heavy-ion results, Xilinx UltraScale+ single event effect (SEE) test plans, development of a new methodology for characterizing SEU system response, and NEPP involvement with FPGA security and trust.

Recent work for the NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging Program Power MOSFET task is presented. The Task technology focus, roadmap, and partners are given. Recent single-event effect test results on commercial, automotive, and radiation hardened trench power MOSFETs are summarized with an emphasis on risk of using commercial and automotive trench-gate power MOSFETs in space applications.

We propose a method for the application of single event upset (SEU) data towards the analysis of complex systems using transformed reliability models (from the time domain to the particle fluence domain) and space environment data.

NASA has a long history of using commercial grade electronics in space. In this presentation we will provide a brief history of NASA's trends and approaches to commercial grade electronics focusing on processing and memory systems. This will include providing summary information on the space hazards to electronics as well as NASA mission trade space. We will also discuss developing recommendations for risk management approaches to Electrical, Electronic and Electromechanical (EEE) parts usage in space. Two examples will be provided focusing on a near-earth Polar-orbiting spacecraft as well as a mission to Mars. The final portion will discuss emerging trends impacting usage.

We present destructive single-event effects characterization of a variety of silicon Schottky diodes from different manufacturers. We also discuss suitable derating guidelines.