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The definition of a brain state remains elusive, with varying interpretations across different sub-fields of neuroscience-from the level of wakefulness in anaesthesia, to activity of individual neurons, voltage in EEG, and blood flow in fMRI. This lack of consensus presents a significant challenge to the development of accurate models of neural dynamics. However, at the foundation of dynamical systems theory lies a definition of what constitutes the 'state' of a system-i.e., a specification of the system's future. Here, we propose to adopt this definition to establish brain states in neuroimaging timeseries by applying Dynamic Causal Modelling (DCM) to low-dimensional embedding of resting and task condition fMRI data. We find that ~90% of subjects in resting conditions are better described by first-order models, whereas ~55% of subjects in task conditions are better described by second-order models. Our work calls into question the status quo of using first-order equations almost exclusively within computational neuroscience and provides a new way of establishing brain states, as well as their associated phase space representations, in neuroimaging datasets.

We present a hierarchical empirical Bayesian framework for testing hypotheses about neurotransmitters’ concertation as empirical prior for synaptic physiology using ultra-high field magnetic resonance spectroscopy (7T-MRS) and magnetoencephalography data (MEG). A first level dynamic causal modelling of cortical microcircuits is used to infer the connectivity parameters of a generative model of individuals’ neurophysiological observations. At the second level, individuals’ 7T-MRS estimates of regional neurotransmitter concentration supply empirical priors on synaptic connectivity. We compare the group-wise evidence for alternative empirical priors, defined by monotonic functions of spectroscopic estimates, on subsets of synaptic connections. For efficiency and reproducibility, we used Bayesian model reduction (BMR), parametric empirical Bayes and variational Bayesian inversion. In particular, we used Bayesian model reduction to compare alternative model evidence of how spectroscopic neurotransmitter measures inform estimates of synaptic connectivity. This identifies the subset of synaptic connections that are influenced by individual differences in neurotransmitter levels, as measured by 7T-MRS. We demonstrate the method using resting-state MEG (i.e., task-free recording) and 7T-MRS data from healthy adults. Our results confirm the hypotheses that GABA concentration influences local recurrent inhibitory intrinsic connectivity in deep and superficial cortical layers, while glutamate influences the excitatory connections between superficial and deep layers and connections from superficial to inhibitory interneurons. Using within-subject split-sampling of the MEG dataset (i.e., validation by means of a held-out dataset), we show that model comparison for hypothesis testing can be highly reliable. The method is suitable for applications with magnetoencephalography or electroencephalography, and is well-suited to reveal the mechanisms of neurological and psychiatric disorders, including responses to psychopharmacological interventions.

There are considerable gaps in our understanding of the relationship between human brain activity measured at different temporal and spatial scales. Here, electrocorticography (ECoG) measures were used to predict functional MRI changes in the sensorimotor cortex in two brain states: at rest and during motor performance. The specificity of this relationship to spatial co-localisation of the two signals was also investigated. We acquired simultaneous ECoG-fMRI in the sensorimotor cortex of three patients with epilepsy. During motor activity, high gamma power was the only frequency band where the electrophysiological response was co-localised with fMRI measures across all subjects. The best model of fMRI changes across states was its principal components, a parsimonious description of the entire ECoG spectrogram. This model performed much better than any others that were based either on the classical frequency bands or on summary measures of cross-spectral changes. The region-specific fMRI signal is reflected in spatially and spectrally distributed EEG activity.

Therapeutic affective touch has been recognized as essential for survival, nurturing supportive interpersonal interactions, accelerating recovery—including reducing hospitalisations, and promoting overall health and building robust therapeutic alliances. Through the lens of active inference, we present an integrative model, combining therapeutic touch and communication, to achieve biobehavioural synchrony. This model speaks to how the brain develops a generative model required for recovery, developing successful therapeutic alliances, and regulating allostasis within paediatric manual therapy. We apply active inference to explain the neurophysiological and behavioural mechanisms that underwrite the development and maintenance of synchronous relationships through touch. This paper foregrounds the crucial role of therapeutic touch in developing a solid therapeutic alliance, the clinical effectiveness of paediatric care, and triadic synchrony between health care practitioner, caregiver, and infant in a variety of clinical situations. We start by providing a brief overview of the significance and clinical role of touch in the development of social interactions in infants; facilitating a positive therapeutic alliance and restoring homeostasis through touch to allow a more efficient process of allostatic regulation. Moreover, we explain the role of CT tactile afferents in achieving positive clinical outcomes and updating prior beliefs. We then discuss how touch is implemented in treatment sessions to promote cooperative interactions in the clinic and facilitate theory of mind. This underwrites biobehavioural synchrony, epistemic trust, empathy, and the resolution of uncertainty. The ensuing framework is underpinned by a critical application of the active inference framework to the fields of pediatrics and neonatology.

A growing body of evidence highlights the intricate linkage of exteroceptive perception to the rhythmic activity of the visceral body. In parallel, interoceptive inference theories of affective perception and self-consciousness are on the rise in cognitive science. However, thus far no formal theory has emerged to integrate these twin domains; instead, most extant work is conceptual in nature. Here, we introduce a formal model of cardiac active inference, which explains how ascending cardiac signals entrain exteroceptive sensory perception and uncertainty. Through simulated psychophysics, we reproduce the defensive startle reflex and commonly reported effects linking the cardiac cycle to affective behaviour. We further show that simulated 'interoceptive lesions' blunt affective expectations, induce psychosomatic hallucinations, and exacerbate biases in perceptual uncertainty. Through synthetic heart-rate variability analyses, we illustrate how the balance of arousal-priors and visceral prediction errors produces idiosyncratic patterns of physiological reactivity. Our model thus offers a roadmap for computationally phenotyping disordered brain-body interaction.

Estimating the changes of epidemiological parameters, such as instantaneous reproduction number, Rt, is important for understanding the transmission dynamics of infectious diseases. Current estimates of time-varying epidemiological parameters often face problems such as lagging observations, averaging inference, and improper quantification of uncertainties. To address these problems, we propose a Bayesian data assimilation framework for time-varying parameter estimation. Specifically, this framework is applied to estimate the instantaneous reproduction number Rt during emerging epidemics, resulting in the state-of-the-art 'DARt' system. With DARt, time misalignment caused by lagging observations is tackled by incorporating observation delays into the joint inference of infections and Rt; the drawback of averaging is overcome by instantaneously updating upon new observations and developing a model selection mechanism that captures abrupt changes; the uncertainty is quantified and reduced by employing Bayesian smoothing. We validate the performance of DARt and demonstrate its power in describing the transmission dynamics of COVID-19. The proposed approach provides a promising solution for making accurate and timely estimation for transmission dynamics based on reported data.

The propagation of epileptic seizure activity in the brain is a widespread pathophysiology that, in principle, should yield to intervention techniques guided by mathematical models of neuronal ensemble dynamics. During a seizure, neural activity will deviate from its current dynamical regime to one in which there are significant signal fluctuations. In silico treatments of neural activity are an important tool for the understanding of how the healthy brain can maintain stability, as well as of how pathology can lead to seizures. The hope is that, contained within the mathematical foundations of such treatments, there lie potential strategies for mitigating instabilities, e.g. via external stimulation. Here, we demonstrate that the dynamic causal modelling neuronal state equation generalises to a Fokker-Planck formalism if one extends the framework to model the ways in which activity propagates along the structural connections of neural systems. Using the Jacobian of this generalised state equation, we show that an initially unstable system can be rendered stable via a reduction in diffusivity-i.e., by lowering the rate at which neuronal fluctuations disperse to neighbouring regions. We show, for neural systems prone to epileptic seizures, that such a reduction in diffusivity can be achieved via external stimulation. Specifically, we show that this stimulation should be applied in such a way as to temporarily mirror the activity profile of a pathological region in its functionally connected areas. This counter-intuitive method is intended to be used pre-emptively-i.e., in order to mitigate the effects of the seizure, or ideally even prevent it from occurring in the first place. We offer proof of principle using simulations based on functional neuroimaging data collected from patients with idiopathic generalised epilepsy, in which we successfully suppress pathological activity in a distinct sub-network prior to seizure onset. Our hope is that this technique can form the basis for future real-time monitoring and intervention devices that are capable of treating epilepsy in a non-invasive manner.

In contrast to the symmetries of translation in space, rotation in space, and translation in time, the known laws of physics are not universally invariant under transformation of scale. However, a special case exists in which the action is scale invariant if it satisfies the following two constraints: 1) it must depend upon a scale-free Lagrangian, and 2) the Lagrangian must change under scale in the same way as the inverse time, [Formula: see text]. Our contribution lies in the derivation of a generalised Lagrangian, in the form of a power series expansion, that satisfies these constraints. This generalised Lagrangian furnishes a normal form for dynamic causal models-state space models based upon differential equations-that can be used to distinguish scale symmetry from scale freeness in empirical data. We establish face validity with an analysis of simulated data, in which we show how scale symmetry can be identified and how the associated conserved quantities can be estimated in neuronal time series.

Being confident in whether a stimulus is present or absent (a detection judgment) is qualitatively distinct from being confident in the identity of that stimulus (a discrimination judgment). In particular, in detection, evidence can only be available for the presence, not the absence, of a target object. This asymmetry suggests that higher-order cognitive and neural processes may be required for confidence in detection, and more specifically, in judgments about absence. In a within-subject, pre-registered and performance-matched fMRI design, we observed quadratic confidence effects in frontopolar cortex for detection but not discrimination. Furthermore, in the right temporoparietal junction, confidence effects were enhanced for judgments of target absence compared to judgments of target presence. We interpret these findings as reflecting qualitative differences between a neural basis for metacognitive evaluation of detection and discrimination, potentially in line with counterfactual or higher-order models of confidence formation in detection.

Predictive processing (e.g., predictive coding) is a predominant paradigm in cognitive neuroscience. This Primer considers the various levels of commitment neuroscientists have to the neuronal process theories that accompany the principles of predictive processing. Specifically, it reviews and contextualises a recent PLOS Biology study of alpha oscillations and travelling waves. We will see that alpha oscillations emerge naturally under the computational architectures implied by predictive coding-and may tell us something profound about recurrent message passing in brain hierarchies. Specifically, the bidirectional nature of forward and backward waves speaks to opportunities to understand attention and how it nuances bottom-up and top-down influences.

[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005769.].

Living creatures must accurately infer the nature of their environments. They do this despite being confronted by stochastic and context sensitive contingencies-and so must constantly update their beliefs regarding their uncertainty about what might come next. In this work, we examine how we deal with uncertainty that evolves over time. This prospective uncertainty (or imprecision) is referred to as volatility and has previously been linked to noradrenergic signals that originate in the locus coeruleus. Using pupillary dilatation as a measure of central noradrenergic signalling, we tested the hypothesis that changes in pupil diameter reflect inferences humans make about environmental volatility. To do so, we collected pupillometry data from participants presented with a stream of numbers. We generated these numbers from a process with varying degrees of volatility. By measuring pupillary dilatation in response to these stimuli-and simulating the inferences made by an ideal Bayesian observer of the same stimuli-we demonstrate that humans update their beliefs about environmental contingencies in a Bayes optimal way. We show this by comparing general linear (convolution) models that formalised competing hypotheses about the causes of pupillary changes. We found greater evidence for models that included Bayes optimal estimates of volatility than those without. We additionally explore the interaction between different causes of pupil dilation and suggest a quantitative approach to characterising a person's prior beliefs about volatility.

Knowing how another's preferences relate to our own is a central aspect of everyday decision-making, yet how the brain performs this transformation is unclear. Here, we ask whether the putative role of the hippocampal-entorhinal system in transforming relative and absolute spatial coordinates during navigation extends to transformations in abstract decision spaces. During functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), subjects learned a stranger's preference for an everyday activity-relative to one of three personally known individuals-and subsequently decided how the stranger's preference relates to the other two individuals' preferences. We observed entorhinal/subicular responses to the absolute distance between the ratings of the stranger and the familiar choice options. Notably, entorhinal/subicular signals were sensitive to which familiar individuals were being compared to the stranger. In contrast, striatal signals increased when accurately determining the ordinal position of choice options in relation to the stranger. Paralleling its role in navigation, these data implicate the entorhinal/subicular region in assimilating relatively coded knowledge within abstract metric spaces.

Successful behaviour depends on the right balance between maximising reward and soliciting information about the world. Here, we show how different types of information-gain emerge when casting behaviour as surprise minimisation. We present two distinct mechanisms for goal-directed exploration that express separable profiles of active sampling to reduce uncertainty. ‘Hidden state’ exploration motivates agents to sample unambiguous observations to accurately infer the (hidden) state of the world. Conversely, ‘model parameter’ exploration, compels agents to sample outcomes associated with high uncertainty, if they are informative for their representation of the task structure. We illustrate the emergence of these types of information-gain, termed active inference and active learning, and show how these forms of exploration induce distinct patterns of ‘Bayes-optimal’ behaviour. Our findings provide a computational framework for understanding how distinct levels of uncertainty systematically affect the exploration-exploitation trade-off in decision-making.

The locus coeruleus (LC) in the pons is the major source of noradrenaline (NA) in the brain. Two modes of LC firing have been associated with distinct cognitive states: changes in tonic rates of firing are correlated with global levels of arousal and behavioural flexibility, whilst phasic LC responses are evoked by salient stimuli. Here, we unify these two modes of firing by modelling the response of the LC as a correlate of a prediction error when inferring states for action planning under Active Inference (AI). We simulate a classic Go/No-go reward learning task and a three-arm 'explore/exploit' task and show that, if LC activity is considered to reflect the magnitude of high level 'state-action' prediction errors, then both tonic and phasic modes of firing are emergent features of belief updating. We also demonstrate that when contingencies change, AI agents can update their internal models more quickly by feeding back this state-action prediction error-reflected in LC firing and noradrenaline release-to optimise learning rate, enabling large adjustments over short timescales. We propose that such prediction errors are mediated by cortico-LC connections, whilst ascending input from LC to cortex modulates belief updating in anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). In short, we characterise the LC/ NA system within a general theory of brain function. In doing so, we show that contrasting, behaviour-dependent firing patterns are an emergent property of the LC that translates state-action prediction errors into an optimal balance between plasticity and stability.

Pathophysiological explanations of epilepsy typically focus on either the micro/mesoscale (e.g. excitation-inhibition imbalance), or on the macroscale (e.g. network architecture). Linking abnormalities across spatial scales remains difficult, partly because of technical limitations in measuring neuronal signatures concurrently at the scales involved. Here we use light sheet imaging of the larval zebrafish brain during acute epileptic seizure induced with pentylenetetrazole. Spectral changes of spontaneous neuronal activity during the seizure are then modelled using neural mass models, allowing Bayesian inference on changes in effective network connectivity and their underlying synaptic dynamics. This dynamic causal modelling of seizures in the zebrafish brain reveals concurrent changes in synaptic coupling at macro- and mesoscale. Fluctuations of both synaptic connection strength and their temporal dynamics are required to explain observed seizure patterns. These findings highlight distinct changes in local (intrinsic) and long-range (extrinsic) synaptic transmission dynamics as a possible seizure pathomechanism and illustrate how our Bayesian model inversion approach can be used to link existing neural mass models of seizure activity and novel experimental methods.

In previous papers, we introduced a normative scheme for scene construction and epistemic (visual) searches based upon active inference. This scheme provides a principled account of how people decide where to look, when categorising a visual scene based on its contents. In this paper, we use active inference to explain the visual searches of normal human subjects; enabling us to answer some key questions about visual foraging and salience attribution. First, we asked whether there is any evidence for 'epistemic foraging'; i.e. exploration that resolves uncertainty about a scene. In brief, we used Bayesian model comparison to compare Markov decision process (MDP) models of scan-paths that did-and did not-contain the epistemic, uncertainty-resolving imperatives for action selection. In the course of this model comparison, we discovered that it was necessary to include non-epistemic (heuristic) policies to explain observed behaviour (e.g., a reading-like strategy that involved scanning from left to right). Despite this use of heuristic policies, model comparison showed that there is substantial evidence for epistemic foraging in the visual exploration of even simple scenes. Second, we compared MDP models that did-and did not-allow for changes in prior expectations over successive blocks of the visual search paradigm. We found that implicit prior beliefs about the speed and accuracy of visual searches changed systematically with experience. Finally, we characterised intersubject variability in terms of subject-specific prior beliefs. Specifically, we used canonical correlation analysis to see if there were any mixtures of prior expectations that could predict between-subject differences in performance; thereby establishing a quantitative link between different behavioural phenotypes and Bayesian belief updating. We demonstrated that better scene categorisation performance is consistently associated with lower reliance on heuristics; i.e., a greater use of a generative model of the scene to direct its exploration.

The brain is thought to generate internal predictions to optimize behaviour. However, it is unclear whether predictions signalling is an automatic brain function or depends on task demands. Here, we manipulated the spatial/temporal predictability of visual targets, and the relevance of spatial/temporal information provided by auditory cues. We used magnetoencephalography (MEG) to measure participants' brain activity during task performance. Task relevance modulated the influence of predictions on behaviour: spatial/temporal predictability improved spatial/temporal discrimination accuracy, but not vice versa. To explain these effects, we used behavioural responses to estimate subjective predictions under an ideal-observer model. Model-based time-series of predictions and prediction errors (PEs) were associated with dissociable neural responses: predictions correlated with cue-induced beta-band activity in auditory regions and alpha-band activity in visual regions, while stimulus-bound PEs correlated with gamma-band activity in posterior regions. Crucially, task relevance modulated these spectral correlates, suggesting that current goals influence PE and prediction signalling.

Empirical evidence suggests the incentive value of an option is affected by other options available during choice and by options presented in the past. These contextual effects are hard to reconcile with classical theories and have inspired accounts where contextual influences play a crucial role. However, each account only addresses one or the other of the empirical findings and a unifying perspective has been elusive. Here, we offer a unifying theory of context effects on incentive value attribution and choice based on normative Bayesian principles. This formulation assumes that incentive value corresponds to a precision-weighted prediction error, where predictions are based upon expectations about reward. We show that this scheme explains a wide range of contextual effects, such as those elicited by other options available during choice (or within-choice context effects). These include both conditions in which choice requires an integration of multiple attributes and conditions where a multi-attribute integration is not necessary. Moreover, the same scheme explains context effects elicited by options presented in the past or between-choice context effects. Our formulation encompasses a wide range of contextual influences (comprising both within- and between-choice effects) by calling on Bayesian principles, without invoking ad-hoc assumptions. This helps clarify the contextual nature of incentive value and choice behaviour and may offer insights into psychopathologies characterized by dysfunctional decision-making, such as addiction and pathological gambling.

Normative models of human cognition often appeal to Bayesian filtering, which provides optimal online estimates of unknown or hidden states of the world, based on previous observations. However, in many cases it is necessary to optimise beliefs about sequences of states rather than just the current state. Importantly, Bayesian filtering and sequential inference strategies make different predictions about beliefs and subsequent choices, rendering them behaviourally dissociable. Taking data from a probabilistic reversal task we show that subjects' choices provide strong evidence that they are representing short sequences of states. Between-subject measures of this implicit sequential inference strategy had a neurobiological underpinning and correlated with grey matter density in prefrontal and parietal cortex, as well as the hippocampus. Our findings provide, to our knowledge, the first evidence for sequential inference in human cognition, and by exploiting between-subject variation in this measure we provide pointers to its neuronal substrates.

We are remarkably adept at inferring the consequences of our actions, yet the neuronal mechanisms that allow us to plan a sequence of novel choices remain unclear. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to investigate how the human brain plans the shortest path to a goal in novel mazes with one (shallow maze) or two (deep maze) choice points. We observed two distinct anterior prefrontal responses to demanding choices at the second choice point: one in rostrodorsal medial prefrontal cortex (rd-mPFC)/superior frontal gyrus (SFG) that was also sensitive to (deactivated by) demanding initial choices and another in lateral frontopolar cortex (lFPC), which was only engaged by demanding choices at the second choice point. Furthermore, we identified hippocampal responses during planning that correlated with subsequent choice accuracy and response time, particularly in mazes affording sequential choices. Psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analyses showed that coupling between the hippocampus and rd-mPFC increases during sequential (deep versus shallow) planning and is higher before correct versus incorrect choices. In short, using a naturalistic spatial planning paradigm, we reveal how the human brain represents sequential choices during planning without extensive training. Our data highlight a network centred on the cortical midline and hippocampus that allows us to make prospective choices while maintaining initial choices during planning in novel environments.

Substantial evidence indicates that incentive value depends on an anticipation of rewards within a given context. However, the computations underlying this context sensitivity remain unknown. To address this question, we introduce a normative (Bayesian) account of how rewards map to incentive values. This assumes that the brain inverts a model of how rewards are generated. Key features of our account include (i) an influence of prior beliefs about the context in which rewards are delivered (weighted by their reliability in a Bayes-optimal fashion), (ii) the notion that incentive values correspond to precision-weighted prediction errors, (iii) and contextual information unfolding at different hierarchical levels. This formulation implies that incentive value is intrinsically context-dependent. We provide empirical support for this model by showing that incentive value is influenced by context variability and by hierarchically nested contexts. The perspective we introduce generates new empirical predictions that might help explaining psychopathologies, such as addiction.

Given the amount of knowledge and data accruing in the neurosciences, is it time to formulate a general principle for neuronal dynamics that holds at evolutionary, developmental, and perceptual timescales? In this paper, we propose that the brain (and other self-organised biological systems) can be characterised via the mathematical apparatus of a gauge theory. The picture that emerges from this approach suggests that any biological system (from a neuron to an organism) can be cast as resolving uncertainty about its external milieu, either by changing its internal states or its relationship to the environment. Using formal arguments, we show that a gauge theory for neuronal dynamics--based on approximate Bayesian inference--has the potential to shed new light on phenomena that have thus far eluded a formal description, such as attention and the link between action and perception.

Various methods have been proposed to characterize the functional connectivity between nodes in a network measured with different modalities (electrophysiology, functional magnetic resonance imaging etc.). Since different measures of functional connectivity yield different results for the same dataset, it is important to assess when and how they can be used. In this work, we provide a systematic framework for evaluating the performance of a large range of functional connectivity measures – based upon a comprehensive portfolio of models generating measurable responses. Specifically, we benchmarked 42 methods using 10,000 simulated datasets from 5 different types of generative models with different connectivity structures. Since all functional connectivity methods require the setting of some parameters (window size and number, model order etc.), we first optimized these parameters using performance criteria based upon (threshold free) ROC analysis. We then evaluated the performance of the methods on data simulated with different types of models. Finally, we assessed the performance of the methods against different levels of signal-to-noise ratios and network configurations. A MATLAB toolbox is provided to perform such analyses using other methods and simulated datasets.

In its full sense, perception rests on an agent’s model of how its sensory input comes about and the inferences it draws based on this model. These inferences are necessarily uncertain. Here, we illustrate how the hierarchical Gaussian filter (HGF) offers a principled and generic way to deal with the several forms that uncertainty in perception takes. The HGF is a recent derivation of one-step update equations from Bayesian principles that rests on a hierarchical generative model of the environment and its (in)stability. It is computationally highly efficient, allows for online estimates of hidden states, and has found numerous applications to experimental data from human subjects. In this paper, we generalize previous descriptions of the HGF and its account of perceptual uncertainty. First, we explicitly formulate the extension of the HGF’s hierarchy to any number of levels; second, we discuss how various forms of uncertainty are accommodated by the minimization of variational free energy as encoded in the update equations; third, we combine the HGF with decision models and demonstrate the inversion of this combination; finally, we report a simulation study that compared four optimization methods for inverting the HGF/decision model combination at different noise levels. These four methods (Nelder-Mead simplex algorithm, Gaussian process-based global optimization, variational Bayes and Markov chain Monte Carlo sampling) all performed well even under considerable noise, with variational Bayes offering the best combination of efficiency and informativeness of inference. Our results demonstrate that the HGF provides a principled, flexible, and efficient - but at the same time intuitive - framework for the resolution of perceptual uncertainty in behaving agents.

The aging brain shows a progressive loss of neuropil, which is accompanied by subtle changes in neuronal plasticity, sensory learning and memory. Neurophysiologically, aging attenuates evoked responses--including the mismatch negativity (MMN). This is accompanied by a shift in cortical responsivity from sensory (posterior) regions to executive (anterior) regions, which has been interpreted as a compensatory response for cognitive decline. Theoretical neurobiology offers a simpler explanation for all of these effects--from a Bayesian perspective, as the brain is progressively optimized to model its world, its complexity will decrease. A corollary of this complexity reduction is an attenuation of Bayesian updating or sensory learning. Here we confirmed this hypothesis using magnetoencephalographic recordings of the mismatch negativity elicited in a large cohort of human subjects, in their third to ninth decade. Employing dynamic causal modeling to assay the synaptic mechanisms underlying these non-invasive recordings, we found a selective age-related attenuation of synaptic connectivity changes that underpin rapid sensory learning. In contrast, baseline synaptic connectivity strengths were consistently strong over the decades. Our findings suggest that the lifetime accrual of sensory experience optimizes functional brain architectures to enable efficient and generalizable predictions of the world.

Recent formulations of attention – in terms of predictive coding – associate attentional gain with the expected precision of sensory information. Formal models of the Posner paradigm suggest that validity effects can be explained in a principled (Bayes optimal) fashion in terms of a cue-dependent setting of precision or gain on the sensory channels reporting anticipated target locations, which is subsequently updated by invalid targets. This normative model is equipped with a biologically plausible process theory in the form of predictive coding, where precision is encoded by the gain of superficial pyramidal cells reporting prediction error. We used dynamic causal modelling to assess the evidence in magnetoencephalographic responses for cue-dependent and top-down updating of superficial pyramidal cell gain. Bayesian model comparison suggested that it is almost certain that differences in superficial pyramidal cells gain – and its top-down modulation – contribute to observed responses; and we could be more than 80% certain that anticipatory effects on postsynaptic gain are limited to visual (extrastriate) sources. These empirical results speak to the role of attention in optimising perceptual inference and its formulation in terms of predictive coding.

Dynamic causal modelling (DCM) provides a framework for the analysis of effective connectivity among neuronal subpopulations that subtend invasive (electrocorticograms and local field potentials) and non-invasive (electroencephalography and magnetoencephalography) electrophysiological responses. This paper reviews the suite of neuronal population models including neural masses, fields and conductance–based models that are used in DCM. These models are expressed in terms of sets of differential equations that allow one to model the synaptic underpinnings of connectivity. We describe early developments using neural mass models, where convolution-based dynamics are used to generate responses in laminar-specific populations of excitatory and inhibitory cells. We show that these models, though resting on only two simple transforms, can recapitulate the characteristics of both evoked and spectral responses observed empirically. Using an identical neuronal architecture, we show that a set of conductance based models – that consider the dynamics of specific ion-channels – present a richer space of responses; owing to nonlinear interactions between conductances and membrane potentials. We propose that conductance-based models may be more appropriate when spectra present with multiple resonances. Finally, we outline a third class of models, where each neuronal subpopulation is treated as a field; in other words, as a manifold on the cortical surface. By explicitly accounting for the spatial propagation of cortical activity through partial differential equations, we show that the topology of connectivity – through local lateral interactions among cortical layers – may be inferred, even in the absence of spatially resolved data. We also show that these models allow for a detailed analysis of structure–function relationships in the cortex. Our review highlights the relationship among these models and how the hypothesis asked of empirical data suggests an appropriate model class.

This paper considers psychotic symptoms in terms of false inferences or beliefs. It is based on the notion that the brain is an inference machine that actively constructs hypotheses to explain or predict its sensations. This perspective provides a normative (Bayes optimal) account of action and perception that emphasises probabilistic representations; in particular, the confidence or precision of beliefs about the world. We will consider hallucinosis, abnormal eye movements, sensory attenuation deficits, catatonia and delusions as various expressions of the same core pathology: namely, an aberrant encoding of precision. From a cognitive perspective, this represents a pernicious failure of metacognition (beliefs about beliefs) that can confound perceptual inference. In the embodied setting of active (Bayesian) inference, it can lead to behaviours that are paradoxically more accurate than Bayes optimal behaviour. Crucially, this normative account is accompanied by a neuronally plausible process theory based upon hierarchical predictive coding. In predictive coding, precision is thought to be encoded by the postsynaptic gain of neurons reporting prediction error. This suggests that both pervasive trait abnormalities and florid failures of inference in the psychotic state can be linked to factors controlling postsynaptic gain – such as NMDA receptor function and (dopaminergic) neuromodulation. We illustrate these points using biologically plausible simulations of perceptual synthesis, smooth pursuit eye movements and attribution of agency – that all use the same predictive coding scheme and pathology: namely, a reduction in the precision of prior beliefs, relative to sensory evidence.

The mismatch negativity (MMN) is a differential brain response to violations of learned regularities. It has been used to demonstrate that the brain learns the statistical structure of its environment and predicts future sensory inputs. However, the algorithmic nature of these computations and the underlying neurobiological implementation remain controversial. This article introduces a mathematical framework with which competing ideas about the computational quantities indexed by MMN responses can be formalized and tested against single-trial EEG data. This framework was applied to five major theories of the MMN, comparing their ability to explain trial-by-trial changes in MMN amplitude. Three of these theories (predictive coding, model adjustment, and novelty detection) were formalized by linking the MMN to different manifestations of the same computational mechanism: approximate Bayesian inference according to the free-energy principle. We thereby propose a unifying view on three distinct theories of the MMN. The relative plausibility of each theory was assessed against empirical single-trial MMN amplitudes acquired from eight healthy volunteers in a roving oddball experiment. Models based on the free-energy principle provided more plausible explanations of trial-by-trial changes in MMN amplitude than models representing the two more traditional theories (change detection and adaptation). Our results suggest that the MMN reflects approximate Bayesian learning of sensory regularities, and that the MMN-generating process adjusts a probabilistic model of the environment according to prediction errors.

The mismatch negativity (MMN) is an event related potential evoked by violations of regularity. Here, we present a model of the underlying neuronal dynamics based upon the idea that auditory cortex continuously updates a generative model to predict its sensory inputs. The MMN is then modelled as the superposition of the electric fields evoked by neuronal activity reporting prediction errors. The process by which auditory cortex generates predictions and resolves prediction errors was simulated using generalised (Bayesian) filtering--a biologically plausible scheme for probabilistic inference on the hidden states of hierarchical dynamical models. The resulting scheme generates realistic MMN waveforms, explains the qualitative effects of deviant probability and magnitude on the MMN - in terms of latency and amplitude--and makes quantitative predictions about the interactions between deviant probability and magnitude. This work advances a formal understanding of the MMN and--more generally--illustrates the potential for developing computationally informed dynamic causal models of empirical electromagnetic responses.

In this note, we assess the predictive validity of stochastic dynamic causal modelling (sDCM) of fMRI data, in terms of its ability to explain changes in the frequency spectrum of concurrently acquired EEG signal. We first revisit the heuristic model proposed in Kilner et al. (2005), which suggests that fMRI activation is associated with a frequency modulation of the EEG signal (rather than an amplitude modulation within frequency bands). We propose a quantitative derivation of the underlying idea, based upon a neural field formulation of cortical activity. In brief, dense lateral connections induce a separation of time scales, whereby fast (and high spatial frequency) modes are enslaved by slow (low spatial frequency) modes. This slaving effect is such that the frequency spectrum of fast modes (which dominate EEG signals) is controlled by the amplitude of slow modes (which dominate fMRI signals). We then use conjoint empirical EEG-fMRI data – acquired in epilepsy patients – to demonstrate the electrophysiological underpinning of neural fluctuations inferred from sDCM for fMRI.

In systems biology, questions concerning the molecular and cellular makeup of an organism are of utmost importance, especially when trying to understand how unreliable components--like genetic circuits, biochemical cascades, and ion channels, among others--enable reliable and adaptive behaviour. The repertoire and speed of biological computations are limited by thermodynamic or metabolic constraints: an example can be found in neurons, where fluctuations in biophysical states limit the information they can encode--with almost 20-60% of the total energy allocated for the brain used for signalling purposes, either via action potentials or by synaptic transmission. Here, we consider the imperatives for neurons to optimise computational and metabolic efficiency, wherein benefits and costs trade-off against each other in the context of self-organised and adaptive behaviour. In particular, we try to link information theoretic (variational) and thermodynamic (Helmholtz) free-energy formulations of neuronal processing and show how they are related in a fundamental way through a complexity minimisation lemma.

In this paper, we review the nature of illusions using the free-energy formulation of Bayesian perception. We reiterate the notion that illusory percepts are, in fact, Bayes-optimal and represent the most likely explanation for ambiguous sensory input. This point is illustrated using perhaps the simplest of visual illusions; namely, the Cornsweet effect. By using plausible prior beliefs about the spatial gradients of luminance and reflectance in the visual world, we show that the Cornsweet effect emerges as a natural consequence of Bayes-optimal perception. Furthermore, we were able to simulate the appearance of secondary illusory percepts (Mach bands) as a function of stimulus contrast. The contrast-dependent emergence of the Cornsweet effect and subsequent appearance of Mach bands were simulated using a simple but plausible generative model. We verified the qualitative and quantitative predictions of this model psychophysically, using briefly presented stimuli at different contrast levels and a fixed alternative forced choice paradigm. Because our generative model was inverted using a neurobiologically plausible scheme based on generalised predictive coding, we could use the inversion as a simulation of neuronal inference and processing. This allowed us to simulate event related potentials. We hope to use this inversion scheme as a model of empirical electromagnetic responses in future work; to associate the functional architecture of the generative model with neuronal responses in visual cortex.

The role of dopamine in behaviour and decision-making is often cast in terms of reinforcement learning and optimal decision theory. Here, we present an alternative view that frames the physiology of dopamine in terms of Bayes-optimal behaviour. In this account, dopamine controls the precision or salience of (external or internal) cues that engender action. In other words, dopamine balances bottom-up sensory information and top-down prior beliefs when making hierarchical inferences (predictions) about cues that have affordance. In this paper, we focus on the consequences of changing tonic levels of dopamine firing using simulations of cued sequential movements. Crucially, the predictions driving movements are based upon a hierarchical generative model that infers the context in which movements are made. This means that we can confuse agents by changing the context (order) in which cues are presented. These simulations provide a (Bayes-optimal) model of contextual uncertainty and set switching that can be quantified in terms of behavioural and electrophysiological responses. Furthermore, one can simulate dopaminergic lesions (by changing the precision of prediction errors) to produce pathological behaviours that are reminiscent of those seen in neurological disorders such as Parkinson's disease. We use these simulations to demonstrate how a single functional role for dopamine at the synaptic level can manifest in different ways at the behavioural level.

In this paper, we pursue recent observations that, through selective dendritic filtering, single neurons respond to specific sequences of presynaptic inputs. We try to provide a principled and mechanistic account of this selectivity by applying the free energy principle to a dendrite that is immersed in its neuropil or environment. We assume that neurons self-organize to minimise a free energy bound on the self-information or surprise of presynaptic inputs that are sampled. We model this as a selective pruning of dendritic spines that are expressed on a dendritic branch. This pruning occurs when the optimized postsynaptic gain falls below a threshold. Crucially, postsynaptic gain is itself optimized with respect to free energy. Pruning suppresses free energy as the dendrite selects presynaptic signals that conform to its expectations, specified by a generative model implicit in its intracellular kinetics. Not only does this provide a principled account of how neurons organize and selectively sample the myriad of potential presynaptic inputs they are exposed to, but it also connects the optimization of elemental neuronal (dendritic) processing to generic (surprise or evidence-based) schemes in statistics and machine learning, such as Bayesian model selection and automatic relevance determination.

Perception is the foundation of cognition and is fundamental to our beliefs and consequent action planning. The Editorial (this issue) asks: what mechanisms, if any, mediate between perceptual and cognitive processes? It has recently been argued that attention might furnish such a mechanism. In this paper, we pursue the idea that action planning (motor preparation) is an attentional phenomenon directed towards kinaesthetic signals. This rests on a view of motor control as active inference, where predictions of proprioceptive signals are fulfilled by peripheral motor reflexes. If valid, active inference suggests that attention should not be limited to the optimal biasing of perceptual signals in the exteroceptive (e.g. visual) domain but should also bias proprioceptive signals during movement. Here, we test this idea using a classical attention (Posner) paradigm cast in a motor setting. Specially, we looked for decreases in reaction times when movements were preceded by valid relative to invalid cues. Furthermore, we addressed the hierarchical level at which putative attentional effects were expressed by independently cueing the nature of the movement and the hand used to execute it. We found a significant interaction between the validity of movement and effector cues on reaction times. This suggests that attentional bias might be mediated at a low level in the motor hierarchy, in an intrinsic frame of reference. This finding is consistent with attentional enabling of top-down predictions of proprioceptive input and may rely upon the same synaptic mechanisms that mediate directed spatial attention in the visual system.

We review recent methodological developments within a Parametric Empirical Bayesian (PEB) framework for reconstructing intracranial sources of extracranial electroencephalographic (EEG) and magnetoencephalographic (MEG) data under linear Gaussian assumptions. The PEB framework offers a natural way to integrate multiple constraints (spatial priors) on this inverse problem, such as those derived from different modalities (e.g., from functional magnetic resonance imaging, fMRI) or from multiple replications (e.g., subjects). Using variations of the same basic generative model, we illustrate the application of PEB to three cases: 1) symmetric integration (fusion) of MEG and EEG; 2) asymmetric integration of MEG or EEG with fMRI, and 3) group-optimisation of spatial priors across subjects. We evaluate these applications on multimodal data acquired from 18 subjects, focusing on energy induced by face perception within a time-frequency window of 100-220ms, 8-18Hz. We show the benefits of multi-modal, multi-subject integration in terms of the model evidence and the reproducibility (over subjects) of cortical responses to faces.

Cortico-basal ganglia-thalamocortical circuits are severely disrupted by the dopamine depletion of Parkinson's disease (PD), leading to pathologically exaggerated beta oscillations. Abnormal rhythms, found in several circuit nodes are correlated with movement impairments but their neural basis remains unclear. Here, we used dynamic causal modelling (DCM) and the 6-hydroxydopamine-lesioned rat model of PD to examine the effective connectivity underlying these spectral abnormalities. We acquired auto-spectral and cross-spectral measures of beta oscillations (10-35 Hz) from local field potential recordings made simultaneously in the frontal cortex, striatum, external globus pallidus (GPe) and subthalamic nucleus (STN), and used these data to optimise neurobiologically plausible models. Chronic dopamine depletion reorganised the cortico-basal ganglia-thalamocortical circuit, with increased effective connectivity in the pathway from cortex to STN and decreased connectivity from STN to GPe. Moreover, a contribution analysis of the Parkinsonian circuit distinguished between pathogenic and compensatory processes and revealed how effective connectivity along the indirect pathway acquired a strategic importance that underpins beta oscillations. In modelling excessive beta synchrony in PD, these findings provide a novel perspective on how altered connectivity in basal ganglia-thalamocortical circuits reflects a balance between pathogenesis and compensation, and predicts potential new therapeutic targets to overcome dysfunctional oscillations.

Computational learning models are critical for understanding mechanisms of adaptive behavior. However, the two major current frameworks, reinforcement learning (RL) and Bayesian learning, both have certain limitations. For example, many Bayesian models are agnostic of inter-individual variability and involve complicated integrals, making online learning difficult. Here, we introduce a generic hierarchical Bayesian framework for individual learning under multiple forms of uncertainty (e.g., environmental volatility and perceptual uncertainty). The model assumes Gaussian random walks of states at all but the first level, with the step size determined by the next higher level. The coupling between levels is controlled by parameters that shape the influence of uncertainty on learning in a subject-specific fashion. Using variational Bayes under a mean field approximation and a novel approximation to the posterior energy function, we derive trial-by-trial update equations which (i) are analytical and extremely efficient, enabling real-time learning, (ii) have a natural interpretation in terms of RL, and (iii) contain parameters representing processes which play a key role in current theories of learning, e.g., precision-weighting of prediction error. These parameters allow for the expression of individual differences in learning and may relate to specific neuromodulatory mechanisms in the brain. Our model is very general: it can deal with both discrete and continuous states and equally accounts for deterministic and probabilistic relations between environmental events and perceptual states (i.e., situations with and without perceptual uncertainty). These properties are illustrated by simulations and analyses of empirical time series. Overall, our framework provides a novel foundation for understanding normal and pathological learning that contextualizes RL within a generic Bayesian scheme and thus connects it to principles of optimality from probability theory.

Generative models of neuroimaging and electrophysiological data present new opportunities for accessing hidden or latent brain states. Dynamic causal modeling (DCM) uses Bayesian model inversion and selection to infer the synaptic mechanisms underlying empirically observed brain responses. DCM for electrophysiological data, in particular, aims to estimate the relative strength of synaptic transmission at different cell types and via specific neurotransmitters. Here, we report a DCM validation study concerning inference on excitatory and inhibitory synaptic transmission, using different doses of a volatile anaesthetic agent (isoflurane) to parametrically modify excitatory and inhibitory synaptic processing while recording local field potentials (LFPs) from primary auditory cortex (A1) and the posterior auditory field (PAF) in the auditory belt region in rodents. We test whether DCM can infer, from the LFP measurements, the expected drug-induced changes in synaptic transmission mediated via fast ionotropic receptors; i.e., excitatory (glutamatergic) AMPA and inhibitory GABA(A) receptors. Cross- and auto-spectra from the two regions were used to optimise three DCMs based on biologically plausible neural mass models and specific network architectures. Consistent with known extrinsic connectivity patterns in sensory hierarchies, we found that a model comprising forward connections from A1 to PAF and backward connections from PAF to A1 outperformed a model with forward connections from PAF to A1 and backward connections from A1 to PAF and a model with reciprocal lateral connections. The parameter estimates from the most plausible model indicated that the amplitude of fast glutamatergic excitatory postsynaptic potentials (EPSPs) and inhibitory postsynaptic potentials (IPSPs) behaved as predicted by previous neurophysiological studies. Specifically, with increasing levels of anaesthesia, glutamatergic EPSPs decreased linearly, whereas fast GABAergic IPSPs displayed a nonlinear (saturating) increase. The consistency of our model-based in vivo results with experimental in vitro results lends further validity to the capacity of DCM to infer on synaptic processes using macroscopic neurophysiological data.

In medical practice, diagnostic hypotheses are often made by physicians in the first moments of contact with patients; sometimes even before they report their symptoms. We propose that generation of diagnostic hypotheses in this context is the result of cognitive processes subserved by brain mechanisms that are similar to those involved in naming objects or concepts in everyday life.To test this proposal we developed an experimental paradigm with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) using radiological diagnosis as a model. Twenty-five radiologists diagnosed lesions in chest X-ray images and named non-medical targets (animals) embedded in chest X-ray images while being scanned in a fMRI session. Images were presented for 1.5 seconds; response times (RTs) and the ensuing cortical activations were assessed. The mean response time for diagnosing lesions was 1.33 (SD ±0.14) seconds and 1.23 (SD ±0.13) seconds for naming animals. 72% of the radiologists reported cogitating differential diagnoses during trials (3.5 seconds). The overall pattern of cortical activations was remarkably similar for both types of targets. However, within the neural systems shared by both stimuli, activation was significantly greater in left inferior frontal sulcus and posterior cingulate cortex for lesions relative to animals.Generation of diagnostic hypotheses and differential diagnoses made through the immediate visual recognition of clinical signs can be a fast and automatic process. The co-localization of significant brain activation for lesions and animals suggests that generating diagnostic hypotheses for lesions and naming animals are served by the same neuronal systems. Nevertheless, diagnosing lesions was cognitively more demanding and associated with more activation in higher order cortical areas. These results support the hypothesis that medical diagnoses based on prompt visual recognition of clinical signs and naming in everyday life are supported by similar brain systems.

In a companion paper [1], we have presented a generic approach for inferring how subjects make optimal decisions under uncertainty. From a Bayesian decision theoretic perspective, uncertain representations correspond to "posterior" beliefs, which result from integrating (sensory) information with subjective "prior" beliefs. Preferences and goals are encoded through a "loss" (or "utility") function, which measures the cost incurred by making any admissible decision for any given (hidden or unknown) state of the world. By assuming that subjects make optimal decisions on the basis of updated (posterior) beliefs and utility (loss) functions, one can evaluate the likelihood of observed behaviour. In this paper, we describe a concrete implementation of this meta-Bayesian approach (i.e. a Bayesian treatment of Bayesian decision theoretic predictions) and demonstrate its utility by applying it to both simulated and empirical reaction time data from an associative learning task. Here, inter-trial variability in reaction times is modelled as reflecting the dynamics of the subjects' internal recognition process, i.e. the updating of representations (posterior densities) of hidden states over trials while subjects learn probabilistic audio-visual associations. We use this paradigm to demonstrate that our meta-Bayesian framework allows for (i) probabilistic inference on the dynamics of the subject's representation of environmental states, and for (ii) model selection to disambiguate between alternative preferences (loss functions) human subjects could employ when dealing with trade-offs, such as between speed and accuracy. Finally, we illustrate how our approach can be used to quantify subjective beliefs and preferences that underlie inter-individual differences in behaviour.

In this paper, we present a generic approach that can be used to infer how subjects make optimal decisions under uncertainty. This approach induces a distinction between a subject's perceptual model, which underlies the representation of a hidden "state of affairs" and a response model, which predicts the ensuing behavioural (or neurophysiological) responses to those inputs. We start with the premise that subjects continuously update a probabilistic representation of the causes of their sensory inputs to optimise their behaviour. In addition, subjects have preferences or goals that guide decisions about actions given the above uncertain representation of these hidden causes or state of affairs. From a Bayesian decision theoretic perspective, uncertain representations are so-called "posterior" beliefs, which are influenced by subjective "prior" beliefs. Preferences and goals are encoded through a "loss" (or "utility") function, which measures the cost incurred by making any admissible decision for any given (hidden) state of affair. By assuming that subjects make optimal decisions on the basis of updated (posterior) beliefs and utility (loss) functions, one can evaluate the likelihood of observed behaviour. Critically, this enables one to "observe the observer", i.e. identify (context- or subject-dependent) prior beliefs and utility-functions using psychophysical or neurophysiological measures. In this paper, we describe the main theoretical components of this meta-Bayesian approach (i.e. a Bayesian treatment of Bayesian decision theoretic predictions). In a companion paper ('Observing the observer (II): deciding when to decide'), we describe a concrete implementation of it and demonstrate its utility by applying it to simulated and real reaction time data from an associative learning task.

Ongoing brain activity has been observed since the earliest neurophysiological recordings and is found over a wide range of temporal and spatial scales. It is characterized by remarkably large spontaneous modulations. Here, we review evidence for the functional role of these ongoing activity fluctuations and argue that they constitute an essential property of the neural architecture underlying cognition. The role of spontaneous activity fluctuations is probably best understood when considering both their spatiotemporal structure and their functional impact on cognition. We first briefly argue against a ‘segregationist’ view on ongoing activity, both in time and space, countering this view with an emphasis on integration within a hierarchical spatiotemporal organization of intrinsic activity. We then highlight the flexibility and context-sensitivity of intrinsic functional connectivity that suggest its involvement in functionally relevant information processing. This role in information processing is pursued by reviewing how ongoing brain activity interacts with afferent and efferent information exchange of the brain with its environment. We focus on the relationship between the variability of ongoing and evoked brain activity, and review recent reports that tie ongoing brain activity fluctuations to variability in human perception and behavior. Finally, these observations are discussed within the framework of the free-energy principle which – applied to human brain function - provides a theoretical account for a non-random, coordinated interaction of ongoing and evoked activity in perception and behaviour.

Mathematical models of scientific data can be formally compared using Bayesian model evidence. Previous applications in the biological sciences have mainly focussed on model selection in which one first selects the model with the highest evidence and then makes inferences based on the parameters of that model. This "best model" approach is very useful but can become brittle if there are a large number of models to compare, and if different subjects use different models. To overcome this shortcoming we propose the combination of two further approaches: (i) family level inference and (ii) Bayesian model averaging within families. Family level inference removes uncertainty about aspects of model structure other than the characteristic of interest. For example: What are the inputs to the system? Is processing serial or parallel? Is it linear or nonlinear? Is it mediated by a single, crucial connection? We apply Bayesian model averaging within families to provide inferences about parameters that are independent of further assumptions about model structure. We illustrate the methods using Dynamic Causal Models of brain imaging data.

Perceptual decisions can be made when sensory input affords an inference about what generated that input. Here, we report findings from two independent perceptual experiments conducted during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) with a sparse event-related design. The first experiment, in the visual modality, involved forced-choice discrimination of coherence in random dot kinematograms that contained either subliminal or periliminal motion coherence. The second experiment, in the auditory domain, involved free response detection of (non-semantic) near-threshold acoustic stimuli. We analysed fluctuations in ongoing neural activity, as indexed by fMRI, and found that neuronal activity in sensory areas (extrastriate visual and early auditory cortex) biases perceptual decisions towards correct inference and not towards a specific percept. Hits (detection of near-threshold stimuli) were preceded by significantly higher activity than both misses of identical stimuli or false alarms, in which percepts arise in the absence of appropriate sensory input. In accord with predictive coding models and the free-energy principle, this observation suggests that cortical activity in sensory brain areas reflects the precision of prediction errors and not just the sensory evidence or prediction errors per se.

The brain's decoding of fast sensory streams is currently impossible to emulate, even approximately, with artificial agents. For example, robust speech recognition is relatively easy for humans but exceptionally difficult for artificial speech recognition systems. In this paper, we propose that recognition can be simplified with an internal model of how sensory input is generated, when formulated in a Bayesian framework. We show that a plausible candidate for an internal or generative model is a hierarchy of 'stable heteroclinic channels'. This model describes continuous dynamics in the environment as a hierarchy of sequences, where slower sequences cause faster sequences. Under this model, online recognition corresponds to the dynamic decoding of causal sequences, giving a representation of the environment with predictive power on several timescales. We illustrate the ensuing decoding or recognition scheme using synthetic sequences of syllables, where syllables are sequences of phonemes and phonemes are sequences of sound-wave modulations. By presenting anomalous stimuli, we find that the resulting recognition dynamics disclose inference at multiple time scales and are reminiscent of neuronal dynamics seen in the real brain.

BACKGROUND:Generalised spike wave (GSW) discharges are the electroencephalographic (EEG) hallmark of absence seizures, clinically characterised by a transitory interruption of ongoing activities and impaired consciousness, occurring during states of reduced awareness. Several theories have been proposed to explain the pathophysiology of GSW discharges and the role of thalamus and cortex as generators. In this work we extend the existing theories by hypothesizing a role for the precuneus, a brain region neglected in previous works on GSW generation but already known to be linked to consciousness and awareness. We analysed fMRI data using dynamic causal modelling (DCM) to investigate the effective connectivity between precuneus, thalamus and prefrontal cortex in patients with GSW discharges. METHODOLOGY AND PRINCIPAL FINDINGS:We analysed fMRI data from seven patients affected by Idiopathic Generalized Epilepsy (IGE) with frequent GSW discharges and significant GSW-correlated haemodynamic signal changes in the thalamus, the prefrontal cortex and the precuneus. Using DCM we assessed their effective connectivity, i.e. which region drives another region. Three dynamic causal models were constructed: GSW was modelled as autonomous input to the thalamus (model A), ventromedial prefrontal cortex (model B), and precuneus (model C). Bayesian model comparison revealed Model C (GSW as autonomous input to precuneus), to be the best in 5 patients while model A prevailed in two cases. At the group level model C dominated and at the population-level the p value of model C was approximately 1. CONCLUSION:Our results provide strong evidence that activity in the precuneus gates GSW discharges in the thalamo-(fronto) cortical network. This study is the first demonstration of a causal link between haemodynamic changes in the precuneus -- an index of awareness -- and the occurrence of pathological discharges in epilepsy.

In this paper, we suggest that perception could be modeled by assuming that sensory input is generated by a hierarchy of attractors in a dynamic system. We describe a mathematical model which exploits the temporal structure of rapid sensory dynamics to track the slower trajectories of their underlying causes. This model establishes a proof of concept that slowly changing neuronal states can encode the trajectories of faster sensory signals. We link this hierarchical account to recent developments in the perception of human action; in particular artificial speech recognition. We argue that these hierarchical models of dynamical systems are a plausible starting point to develop robust recognition schemes, because they capture critical temporal dependencies induced by deep hierarchical structure. We conclude by suggesting that a fruitful computational neuroscience approach may emerge from modeling perception as non-autonomous recognition dynamics enslaved by autonomous hierarchical dynamics in the sensorium.