Search

From December 1956 to May 1957, President Dwight D. Eisenhower made unprecedented use of the parole statute of the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act in order to rapidly admit 38,000 Hungarian refugees to the United States. Characterizing this decision as a reactive effort to repair strained relationships with Western European allies following the Soviet invasion of Budapest, previous scholarship has correctly recognized that Eisenhower's actions "stretched American immigration law beyond belief"; at the same time, by assuming that sympathetic American legislators were eager to work with the president to find ways around legal obstacles to the admission of anti-Communist Hungarians, scholars to date have sidestepped the question of exactly how he managed to bypass congressional authority without provoking a constitutional crisis. Drawing upon sources including the president's personal papers, NSC memoranda, and State Department memos in order to more fully excavate the fraught process by which the president compelled Congress to cede control of immigration and refugee policy to the executive, this article argues that Eisenhower saw his use of the parole statute not only in reactive geo-political terms, but also as a proactive means of creating momentum for the reform of the nation's restrictive immigration policies. Asserting that the president sought deliberately to bypass legislators whose public expressions of sympathy obscured their lack of an affirmative commitment to the admission of Hungarian "freedom fighters," it further demonstrates that Eisenhower preemptively deployed a high-powered team of public relations professionals as part of a media-driven "end run" around restrictionist legislators whom he expected to oppose his use of the parole statute. Finally, highlighting the centrality of representations of Hungarian whiteness and Christianity to the executive-driven PR campaign that accompanied Eisenhower's refugee resettlement program, the article concludes that mid-century American notions of race and religion played a crucial role in generating public sympathy for displaced Hungarians and, by extension, in ensuring congressional acquiescence to Eisenhower's bold interventions into the jealously guarded sphere of refugee policy-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although primarily interested in domestic issues throughout his life, New York journalist and radio commentator John T. Flynn (1882–1964), author of more than fifteen books on current affairs, appeared as a fiery disparager of the internationalist and interventionist foreign policy of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. For instance, in his vitriolic writings and radio broadcasts, he frequently criticized containment measures such as the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the military intervention in Korea, and the Eisenhower Doctrine. Above all, in an age that coincided with the heyday of American internationalism, the colourful commentator fulminated against the membership of his country in the United Nations. Flynn's isolationist stance, not so surprising considering his credentials, was not trivial. In fact, it is plausible to believe that, during the early Cold War period, the controversial journalist, who was praised in conservative circles, contributed to the advent of a wave of increasing public resentment regarding unrestrained internationalism in US foreign policy by his unrelenting and largely broadcasted rhetoric. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite President Richard M. Nixon's own statements that his time within the administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower was influential to his thinking on foreign policy, only recently has the relationship between Eisenhower and Nixon actually been examined. This article explores Nixon's experiences as vice president under Eisenhower, including Nixon's role in policy making. From there, this article illustrates the important role that Nixon's time as vice president played in shaping his approach to the war in Vietnam and to the very policy‐making processes he created in his own administration to debate, produce, and implement foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the role that empathy played during the US intervention in the Lebanese civil war of 1958, also known as Operation Blue Bat. Through deep readings of public texts, it explores how a minority of Americans empathized with Lebanese opponents of President Camille Chamoun. After the arrival of US forces, Lebanese anti-Chamounists made their voices heard and feeling felt in the USA via global information providers, enacting cultural interventions. Lebanese dissent was headline news, engendering empathetic processes that reoriented US ways of feeling, thinking, and acting. By using empathy as a point of entry into historical intercultural relations, this article unearths how genuine transnational understandings were socially formed during a moment of conflict. Ultimately, it argues that a focus on empathy gives foreign relations scholars an avenue that eschews nefarious Orientalist binaries and their powers in the process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses about the national policy of the U.S. and explores on its political landscape and international relations. The author describes each of the candidates for the country's presidency. Moreover, he discusses on the existing competition between the U.S. and Soviet Union in terms of international popularity and image, which is achieved by delivering technical assistance to developing nations. The author contends that instead of competing, nations should set aside its power-political aims and unite collectively in establishing stable peace and cooperation.

Some of the problems in arranging scientific visits between U.S. and USSR are illustrated by Axel's experience in organizing the 1959 Gordon Conference on Photonuclear Reactions. The exchange problem in general and the East‐West contacts staff provide the background to the author's description of (1) delays in Soviet response. (2) red tape at home, and (3) the ensuing difficulties from the role as host of Soviet visitors. Axel emphasizes, reciprocity which, he feels, maximizes the exchanges and equalizes the advantages obtained by both sides. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses issues and topics concerning the agreement between the U.S., Great Britain and the Soviet Union on the monitoring of nuclear weapons tests during a conference held on November 24, 1959 in Geneva, Switzerland. The negotiations among scientific experts has called for considerations on technical evidence concerning the discovery of underground explosions. In contrast to the success achieved by the international scientific community two years ago, renewed negotiations among scientific experts concerning the discovery of underground explosions have ended in deadlock and mutual recriminations. This paper highlights some of the factors that have led to the failure in Geneva.

The article reflects on the problems presented with the advent of the atomic bomb and other weapons of mass destruction. In the years after the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, men of good will have thought that the problem posed by the bomb could be solved by getting rid of it in the foreseeable future. However, no one can be certain that this is, or that it ever really was, a promising approach to the problem. America and Russia might well be forced to retain for an indefinite period of time. For one, or more than one generation, substantial stockpiles of large hydrogen bombs, as well as the means suitable for their delivery.

The article cogitates on the necessity of a foreign policy governing science and technology in the U.S. At a time when the American foreign policy is being criticized at home and abroad, it may be presumptuous even to ask whether we need a foreign policy in science. Since the Second World War, U.S. foreign policy has had its brilliant facets such as the Marshall Plan and the Technical Assistance Program. However, on the other hand, at times it has given the impression of being merely anti-Communist without offering a truly constructive program.

This article discusses the implications of the H-bomb in the fall-out at Bikini for the future relations of the U.S. with Japan. For Americans, the problem created by the Bikini fall-out were essentially technical. For the Japanese, however, the problems were emotional. There was a complete lack of congruence in American and Japanese reactions because both sides fail to understand or to recognize the sincerity of the other. In addition, the American statement was not on the same emotional wave length as the Japanese request.

The article highlights seven points of the civil defense planning assumptions by the Federal Civil Defense Administration. It also offers comments to the assumptions in each point. The seven points includes the assumptions on the type of attack that the enemy will use, the assumptions on the size of attack that the enemy will apply, the assumptions on the bomb size that the enemy will use in the attack and its physical damage, the assumptions on the probable targets of the attack, the assumptions on the assistance need of the attacked city, the assumptions on the warning time, and the assumptions on people dispersion.

The article discusses the U.S. Trade Expansion Act (TEA) of 1962. The TEA is designed to "promote the general welfare, foreign policy, and security of the U.S." through international trade agreements. The legislation will also provide adjustment assistance to domestic industry, agriculture, and labor. This concept of interdependence is a symbol of the U.S.' departure from political and economic isolationism to a more liberalized policy. The specific purposes of the Act are outlined as stimulating the growth of the U.S., strengthening economic relations with foreign countries, and preventing Communist economic penetration.

This article explores aspects of American cultural diplomacy in Greece from the early 1950s to the late 1960s focusing on the general features of Educational Exchanges and propaganda aspects in their interaction with Greek political developments as well as on the promotion of English learning. Despite the explicit recognition of the need to promote a modernising policy agenda in Greece, in praxis American cultural diplomacy was characterised by an unattainable balance between modernisation and anti-communism. Its inherent contradictions led to inconsistencies in terms of policy implementation and to an obvious tension between progressive and reactionary goals. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's cultural assistance, the use of cultural resources such as film and education to accelerate modernization, to Sub-Saharan Africa in 1953-1961. It explores the possible explanations behind Eisenhower administration's hesitance to offer aid to Guinea which include his conviction that the Soviet Union attached more weight to political tactics, the fear that countries would become permanently dependent and the administration's ideological atachment to the free market. Also discussed is the administration's differentiation between communist infiltration and nationalism.

The article presents a speech by Senator John F. Kennedy on issues concerning disarmament, delivered on March 7, 1960, at the University of New Hampshire in Durham. During his address, Kennedy cited the dedication of the U.S. to peace and apparent lack of a concrete plan for disarmament in the American foreign policy.

The article presents the report of the American Delegation concerning the Technical Working Group II of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests held on November 24, 1959 in Geneva, Switzerland. Under the terms of reference agreed upon, the Technical Working Group shall consider the question of the use of objective instrument readings in connection with the selection of an event which cannot be identified by the international control organ and which could be suspected of being nuclear explosion, in order to determine a basis for initiating on-site inspections.

The article reports issues and topics related to the American foreign policy in the phase of the Cold War. Americans find it hard to go about with their daily tasks in an atmosphere of apparent security, that they are living in a world in which the values of Western civilization is under threats from Eastern communism. This picture is in no sense overdrawn. The danger is not less real merely because Communist objectives can of necessity only be accomplished over a period of decades. Wherever the Soviet power has extended, the independence of nations and the liberty of individuals alike have been extinguished. This is clearly the future reserved for all those who are unable or unwilling to resist Communist aggression or infiltration.

The article reports international developments related to the arms race. The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission announced on May 13 that the 1954 series of thermonuclear tests at the Pacific Proving Ground had been successfully completed. A council of Japanese doctors in Tokyo, Japan reported that an open letter would be sent the U.S. stating that the 23 fishermen suffering radiation injury from the March 1 test were in a dangerous condition. There has been considerable speculation both in Western Europe and in the U.S. as to the relative strength, in atomic terms, of the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

The article reports on the cooperative exchange between the U.S. and Great Britain to develop nuclear energy during the Second World War. The discoveries in Britain by Ernest Rutherford and others have realized that the possibility of nuclear energy is due to a great extent. It is less widely known how close was the cooperation between the two countries in the early stages of the wartime development, however, the collaboration certainly led to the atomic bomb and opened the way for other and more peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

The article explores the process by which the U.S. Atoms for Peace policy on exporting nuclear power was devised by members of the Department of State, the National Security Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in 1953-1955 to put President Dwight D. Eisenhower's promises in his December 1953 speech. Topics include the impact of the Atoms for Peace on the U.S. foreign relations, the promotion of the program as the foundation for the improvement of living standards within all cooperating countries, and the government's interest in developing commercial nuclear power overseas.

The article discusses aspects of the U.S. National Security Council Report 68 (NSC 68), which urged a massive increase in defense budget and implied within its text the rearmament of Europe, and the role of Policy Planning Staff director Paul Nitze and Secretary of State Dean Acheson in the production of the report on April 7, 1950. Topics include historians' view that the report expressed continuity with previous policies, the detection of the Soviet Union atomic detonation, and the writing of NSC 68 under Nitze's supervision and the policy debates that came along with it.

The article demonstrates the accuracy of the U.S. envision of the U.S.-Soviet Union détente under the efforts of President Lyndon B. Johnson's admnistration during the Soviet regime change after the October 1964 ouster of Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It examines U.S. analysis of the Soviet Union internal politics before Khrushchev's ouster, and how the Johnson administration responded to the regime change and managed the nation's relationship with the Soviet Union. It also explores how future U.S. foreign policy have been shaped by Khrushchev's ouster.