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This paper examines the bordering and debordering deployment of water infrastructures on the Islands of Kinmen. Located less than 5 km off the coast of China, yet 200 km from their governing authority, Taiwan, Kinmen holds a critical position in cross-strait relations, and its water infrastructures have carried opposite political intentions. The 2018 Fujian-Kinmen water transfer pipeline serves as a debordering tool as it showcases that the People’s Republic of China could offer benefits to the people on the islands. In contrast, Kinmen’s existing water infrastructure, established during the Cold War, served as part of the bordering campaign to counter Communist China, as it represented progress and modern living under the government of the Republic of China (Taiwan). However, rather than assuming the successful deployment of infrastructure or a passive role of the islands, this paper highlights that the planning and construction of Kinmen’s water infrastructures were influenced by conditions of militarisation, shifting cross-strait relations, the islands’ socio-material constraints and their relationships with Taiwan and China. The case of Kinmen illustrates the capacity of water infrastructure to serve bordering and debordering purposes, as well as how other factors disrupt or facilitate these processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an environment marked by global economic volatility and geopolitical uncertainties, the stability of Taiwan's supply chain takes on heightened importance, particularly given Taiwan's crucial role in the global semiconductor supply chain. In recent years, semiconductor companies in Taiwan have faced increasing inventory pressures, which will reduce their competitiveness and increase operational costs over the long term. Although previous studies have explored the influence of trade facilitation on macroeconomic and trade efficiencies, its specific impacts on the semiconductor industry have been less frequently addressed. This study integrates corporate inventory, trade facilitation, and geopolitical factors within a unified analytical framework to construct a model that explores mediating and moderating effects. This study conducted regression analysis on data from 52 Taiwan-listed integrated circuit companies from 2014 to 2022. Contrary to traditional findings that trade facilitation decreases inventory in other industries, it predominantly fosters inventory accumulation within Taiwan's semiconductor sector by expanding market size, thereby affecting supply chain efficiency. Moreover, geopolitical factors were found to intensify the effects of trade facilitation on corporate inventory. Elevated geopolitical risks lead to greater inventory accumulation, which ultimately threatens long-term competitiveness and diminishes the semiconductor industry's advantage in Taiwan, further influencing supply chain efficiency. Consequently, this study recommends that to more accurately forecast market size, semiconductor companies in Taiwan are encouraged to expand their manufacturing investments in Chinese mainland. Additionally, the prudent handling of cross-strait relations by the Taiwan authorities is an important strategy to mitigate geopolitical risks affecting the semiconductor supply chain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Relaciones Internacionales (1699-3950) is the property of Autonomous University of Madrid, Spain, International Relations Studies Group (GERI) Law Faculty and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The failure of the democratic movement during 2014–2020 prompted tens of thousands of Hongkongers (~40,000) to reluctantly leave their hometown and migrate to Taiwan to seek a freer future. Taiwan's cultural similarity to Hong Kong, together with Taiwan's democracy and geographic proximity, are commonly recognized as pull factors of migration. However, the intensifying cross-strait tensions since late 2021 have witnessed Taipei tighten its approval of Hongkongers' applications for permanent residency mainly in fear of the infiltration of Chinese agents. Based on mixed-methods in-depth interviews (N = 15) and an online survey (N = 147) with Hong Kong migrants, this paper reveals their complex experience in adapting to the Taiwan way of life, becoming frustrated by Taipei's attitudinal change, and contemplating onward migration. The findings reveal underlying cultural differences between Hong Kong and Taiwanese societies—manifesting as a cultural conflict—amid fears of an encroaching communist China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a growing risk of a military attack on Taiwan by mainland China (otherwise known as the People's Republic of China, or PRC) to achieve what the latter terms "reunification." Taiwan, the US, and Japan must urgently and interactively prepare for this contingency—which is also the best way of deterring it. Taiwan must increase military spending (as it has begun to do), with an emphasis on a "porcupine strategy" of lots of distributed, mobile, survivable, affordable, and lethal weapons. The US must increase its military deployments and joint exercises in the region, again emphasizing the types of weapons that can survive a preemptive PRC attack and counter a Chinese blockade or amphibious invading force. Japan will double defense spending over the next five years in a welcome and transformative move, but effective deterrence requires that it also signal that the collective defense of Taiwan against a military attack is existential for its own security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the shift in narrative focus in Taiwanese martial arts films from Confucian values to Daoist principles in the new millennium. It analyzes the films "Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon" and "The Assassin" to explore how they provide a space for second-generation waishengren filmmakers in Taiwan to search for their diasporic identity. The article also discusses the sociopolitical context of Taiwan and its relation to the Sinophone, as well as the decline of martial arts films in Taiwan due to censorship and changing international relationships. It highlights the films "Wohu Canglong" and "Cike Nie Yinniang" as attempts to revive the genre and explore the complexities of diasporic narratives and Taiwanese cultural belonging. The text also delves into the portrayal of Confucianism, Chan Buddhism, and Daoism in Taiwanese martial arts films, emphasizing the tension between social expectations and individual desires. It concludes by discussing the influence of Daoism on filmmakers Ang Lee and Hou Hsiao-hsien and how their films reflect their own diasporic identities. [Extracted from the article]

The United States has successfully prevented the military conflict between China and Taiwan since the 1980s through the Strategic Ambiguity (SA) strategy, which discourages both sides from deviating from the status quo by not committing to defend or not to defend Taiwan. The recent US–China tensions and the rising nationalism in China and Taiwan drew critics to SA and suggested it be replaced with the strategic clarity strategy. We argue that the choice of Dual Clarity (DC)—the United States promises to defend only if Taiwan does not unilaterally declare de jure independence—is widely ignored. We examine the psychological mechanisms behind the three strategies through a pre-registered, within-subject survey experiment in Taiwan (n  = 910). The result shows that DC can keep the status quo similar to SA—respondents lowered their support of independence in both DC and SA conditions. The results hold through robustness checks and formalized by a game-theoretical model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper complicates the classic security dilemma by considering the notions of ontological security and relational deterrence. It studies how the ontological security dilemma has emerged between the US, China, and Taiwan from the relational perspective and how these spiral chains will further develop in the future. The paper incurs the literature on relational analysis to expound on how different ontological security concerns allude to relational deterrence between the three actors. Taiwan's separatism is more of a threat to China's relational self than to physical security because the separatist does not belong to any already agreed relationship. A geometric model and a few simulations yield three unconventional findings. 1) The less advantaged the US military is over China, the less likely armed unification will occur. 2) The US anti-Chinese tendency is irrelevant in determining the probability of armed unification. 3) What may escalate the spiral are China's anti-Taiwan independence and Taiwan's anti-unification. Case sensitivity indicates the ontological sensibilities of a security dilemma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I will first describe the extent of the influence of Buddhism in Taiwan, presenting some data on the demographic importance of this religion in terms of people who identify with it, but also in terms of associations that claim to do so. I will then introduce the positions of the main masters of this tradition relevant to four kinds of political issues relevant to Taiwan: the democratic transition process itself, the development of Taiwan's welfare regime, cross-strait relations with China, and the contribution of Buddhist associations to the international influence of Taiwan in the context of the latter's diplomatic isolation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since coming to power in 2016, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has pledged to safeguard Taiwan's sovereignty amidst Beijing's aggressive imposition of the one-China principle. This article assesses the impact of the DPP's recognition for survival strategy which involves using free trade agreements (FTAs) to boost Taiwan's legal standing and recognition in the international community. The strategy entails a two-pronged plan: retaining Taiwan's status as a vital regional economic player to ultimately advance its de jure sovereignty via regional FTAs. Drawing on Taiwan's past FTA experiences, we analyze the possible outcomes of the government's application to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the likely consequences of these outcomes on the country's sovereign claims and status. We argue that while the DPP's strategy plays a crucial role in renegotiating Taiwan's political self as an unrecognized state, failure to mitigate the negative externalities of the one-China principle while negotiating and implementing the CPTPP will further undermine the country's facto sovereignty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

【Objective/Meaning】Under the background of accelerating the process of globalization, the deepening of economic interactions among the regions has made the regional coordinated development gradually become one of the key driving forces to promote the economic growth. In the rapidly changing international political and economic environment, the synergistic development in the field of tourism between Guangdong and Taiwan not only had significant economic benefits, but also served as a strategic measure to strengthen cultural ties and emotional bonds between the two areas.【Methods/Procedures】Based on the core concept of new regionalism, the historical context and existing pattern of the coordinated development of tourism between Guangdong and Taiwan were reviewed. Then, the existing difficulties were analyzed. Last, the specific strategies for promoting the coordinated development of tourism between the two areas within the framework of new regionalism were explored. 【Results/Conclusions】The research showed that there was a strong difference-complementary relationship between the tourism products in Guangdong and Taiwan. The traffic between the two places was convenient, the cultural exchanges between the two places were close, the economic cooperation was deeply rooted, and the tourism policy environment was gradually returning to normal in fluctuation. However, the coordinated development of tourism between Guangdong and Taiwan still faced some challenges and obstacles such as the complexity of political factors and cross-strait relations, the influence of public opinion and the deepening of distrust among the people, the differences in laws and regulations, and the overlap of tourism markets. In order to further promote the coordinated development of tourism between Guangdong and Taiwan, it was necessary to actively explore the policy guidance and mechanism innovation, improve the resource integration and product innovation, attach importance to the market development and brand marketing, and strengthen the infrastructure and the application of new technologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan's presidential-cum-parliamentary elections of January 2024 broke the traditional pattern of power turnover that happened every eight years (or two presidential terms). The political pendulum was stopped. The elections also brought about a Legislative Yuan devoid of a majority party. The direct cause of these two phenomena is to be found iii the rise of a significant third political force, Ko Wenje and his Taiwan People's Party (TPP). It was Ko's injection into the presidential race that divided the opposition and foiled the KNIT's aspiration to stage a political comeback. It is also because of the TPP's strong showing iii the party vote and the proportional seats it received that the party could play the role of a pivot, a veto player iii the new Legislative Yuan. Whether the Ko Wen-je phenomenon will last and the TPP thrive remains to be seen. A comparison with James Soong and his People First Party (PFP) is made. Reversion to the old system is deemed a likely outcome. The political implications of the elections are twofold: domestically the newly elected president will collide with the parliament over cabinet formation; externally mainland China is bound to put even greater pressure on Taiwan now that a pro-independence president has been elected. Voters extended the DPP government's mandate but put restrictions on its powers. This is the framework within which difficult decisions have to be made iii the following four years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is an exploratory research that seeks to investigate how ideology predicts Taiwanese perceptions of cross-strait relations, including attitudes toward Taiwan independence, perceptions of mainland China and Chinese people, Chinese invasion of Taiwan, and Chinese democracy. We took an inductive approach to left-right differences in Taiwan to offer a more systematic empirical understanding of ideology beyond the West. To do so, we conducted a nationally representative survey among adult Taiwan citizens (N = 1,350). Findings revealed that those who identified with the Left (vs. Right) tended to demonstrate more negative perceptions of cross-strait relations. Specifically, the political left is more negative about the outlook of Chinese democracy while favoring Taiwan independence, than the political right. Furthermore, the political left perceives both mainland China and the Chinese people more negatively than the political right. These findings underscore the role of ideology for a full comprehension of cross-strait relations, as they indicated a fundamental difference between the political left vs. right in terms of perceptions of cross-strait relations. The present research extends existing political psychology literature on ideology and international relations, particularly in the East Asian context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of EurAmerica is the property of EurAmerica and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Based on the data from the 1991–2016 agricultural investment of China's Taiwan in China's Mainland and the agricultural GDP of the latter, through models of vector autoregressive (VAR) and vector error correction (VEC), the influences of China's Taiwan agricultural investment on the development of agriculture in the eastern, central, and western regions of China are discussed. The results show a long-term equilibrium relationship between China's Taiwan agricultural investment and agricultural development in China's eastern, central, and western regions. In the long term, China's Taiwan investment in agriculture in the eastern, central, and western regions of China have certain positive promoting effect on their agricultural development. However, there is an obvious regional diversity in investment effect: Impulse response and variance decomposition show that the positive effect from China's Taiwan agricultural investment in China's western region agricultural development is most significant, and it is significantly higher than that in the eastern region; its contribution to the central region's agricultural development is little. VEC model analysis shows that in the short term, China's Taiwan investment in agriculture has a significant positive effect on the agricultural development of China's eastern region, but not on the agricultural development of the central and western regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on exploring various facets of Taiwan's cultural and political landscape through diverse research and reports. Topics include the impact of regional integration theory on Cross-Strait relations, the People's Republic of China's unification ideology and Taiwanese responses, and the influence of Cold War ideologies on Japanese and Sinophone perceptions.

A conflict between Taiwan and China might involve a full-scale invasion, or a more limited coercion campaign in which China seeks to cause Taiwan enough pain to cause it to change its behavior. If the United States chooses to intervene in such a conflict on Taiwan's behalf, it can likely prevent China from invading Taiwan but might not be able to prevent Taiwan from being coerced. For this reason, the United States would be mistaken if it completely abandoned its policy of ambiguity about defending Taiwan. If the United States were to change its policy of ambiguity, it should do so only in the case of an invasion and remain ambiguous as to whether and how it would respond to a Chinese coercion campaign. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores Indonesia's concerns about the growing rivalry between the United States and China and its impact on Southeast Asia. Indonesia aims to remain neutral and independent, but navigating this rivalry has become challenging. The article highlights four main concerns for Indonesia, including the potential for military conflict, the marginalization of ASEAN, the effectiveness of ASEAN-centered institutions, and the difficulty of balancing relations with both great powers. Indonesia's response involves maintaining the appearance of independence, striving for balance in its relations, and emphasizing the importance of ASEAN and regional institutions. However, these responses may not be enough as the rivalry intensifies. The article also discusses Indonesia's position in the rivalry, domestic concerns about China's influence, and the need for ASEAN to strengthen its collective autonomy. It suggests steps that Indonesia can take to enhance its own autonomy, such as strengthening national resilience and diversifying economic cooperation. The article concludes by emphasizing the importance of maintaining strategic autonomy and avoiding becoming a proxy for any great power. [Extracted from the article]

In Taiwan, where relations with China define the major political cleavage, voters have distinct preferences on the issue of independence. Do Taiwanese favor a symbolic or pragmatic approach to the Taiwan independence issue? What are the factors that account for their political preferences? We identify two types of voters, symbolic and pragmatic, according to whether their preferences on independence are conditional or unconditional on China's potential counter actions. Specifically, symbolic voters have unconditional preferences on independence, while pragmatic voters are more agreeable to independence under more favorable conditions. Using multiple wave data from the Taiwan National Security Surveys (TNSS 2002–2022), we investigate the individual- and macro-level factors and find that gender, age, education level, ethnicity, partisan strength, and economic growth rate shape the types of voters in Taiwan. This paper contributes to the study of political attitudes in Taiwan, and have important implications on the regional stability in East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A military conflict over the Taiwan Strait seems increasingly likely today against the backdrop of intensifying geopolitical competition between China and the United States. While much has been discussed and debated about the prospects for and consequences of war, we know little about how ordinary Chinese evaluate the full set of policy tools that Beijing could potentially leverage against Taipei in the near term. Drawing from a unique public opinion survey in China, we find that armed unification, or 'wutong', garners only a slim majority (55%) of support, no more than for a range of less aggressive policy options, from using small-scale warfare, to coercing Taipei into negotiating, to simply maintaining the status quo. Only one out of one hundred rejected all but the most extreme option of 'wutong'. Analyses of respondent attributes further reveal that aggressive policy preferences are primarily driven by nationalism and peer pressure, but dampened by concerns about the economic, human, and reputational costs of non-peaceful unification and the likelihood of US intervention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tensions between China and Taiwan have been heightened significantly lately. This paper is aimed at investigating the cross-Strait relations from Taiwan's perspective concerning, in particular, Taiwan's economic policy toward China. Indeed, China has long been Taiwan's largest trading partner; yet, political relationship between the two has fluctuated over time. On the one hand, China has been an attractive market for Taiwanese businesses, but one the other hand, there have also been economic and security concerns about Taiwan's dependence on China. This paper shows the connections between political and economic factors which jointly affect Taiwan's economic policy toward China. It argues that there may be a general equilibrium—a median voter—but it has often been distorted by the institutional constraints in Taiwan's political process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies of public support for war among non-Western and non-major powers (NWNM) states are distinctive from United States foreign military operations. First, these wars often intrude on subjects' direct livelihood. Second, great powers' intervention can drastically alter the outcome of these wars. These factors have not been examined extensively in the war support literature. We fill this gap by spearheading several hypotheses of war support unique to NWNM countries. Through an original and representative survey experiment on a hypothetical military conflict between China and Taiwan, our analysis yields that the information about the United States coming to Taiwan's defense in an armed conflict with China drives up war support by around 7% among the citizenry, although such information does not make the Taiwanese population more tolerant of combat casualties. In addition, perception of military training increases public support for war significantly. The findings suggest that the study of NWNM states could contribute to the war support literature from different perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Regional integration theory can explain past and present processes of cross-strait integration and disintegration. Historical institutionalism can analyse how the path dependence of the 'One China policy' shapes cross-strait relations until today and how fundamental changes can occur through critical junctures. Neofunctionalism can well explain the dynamics of economic integration through spillovers and spillbacks driven by transnational actors since the 1980s. Liberal intergovernmentalism can shed light on the bargaining processes and their outcomes during the negotiation of various cross-strait agreements under the Ma Ying-jeou administration. Postfunctionalism offers the best explanation for the central role that identity has played in cross-strait relations, in particular since 2014. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan's election campaign has concluded. Voters went to the polls on Jan. 13. As has been the case in almost every election, cross-Strait relations with China were the central issue, a secondary issue being President Tsai Ing-wen's management of the economy. The outcome of the election will largely dictate the course of Taiwan-China relations over at least the next four years. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate and President Tsai Ing-wen's chosen successor, William Lai Ching-te, the eventual winner, proclaims that Taiwan is already independent as the Republic of China. It should continue to diversify economic linkages away from China, strengthen military deterrence, and hope that China will eventually offer talks without one-China preconditions. The opposition Kuomintang candidate, Hou Yu-ih, called for expanded cross-Strait economic ties and dialogue with China under the one-China banner to reduce tensions while Taiwan also builds its military deterrence. China has deployed economic sticks, gray-zone military intimidation, and fake news to influence the election. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With its multilayered complexities, Taiwan is not just a contentious issue but a potential flashpoint for war between China and the United States (US). Since 1949, Taiwan’s politics has oscillated between its unique status of UNSC’s permanent membership and veto power to its present status of de facto sovereignty. Despite losing its UN membership in 1971, Taiwan maintains a de facto sovereign status, which can lead to conflict at any moment. China, the US, and Taiwan maintain conflicting views over the future status and resolution of the Taiwan issue. Taiwanese prefer independent and separate identity. China demands Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland. The US pursues an unclear policy of whether, in case of aggression from China on Taiwan, the US would defend Taiwan or not. While there has been relative peace, China’s rapid rise, Taiwan’s preference against unification, declining US deterrence, and ongoing Sino-US major power rivalry increase the likelihood of forceful unification. The US policy of “Strategic Ambiguity”—an acknowledgement of the One-China policy and commitment to Taiwan’s defence—further exacerbates the risk of war over Taiwan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From a nation‐state and regional perspective, global talent flows have traditionally been South−North, and the discourse has focused on brain drain or brain gain. This research extends beyond the South−North spatial structure to investigate Taiwanese talent flows to China, examining why young Taiwanese talent is migrating to China for employment in the complex context of cross‐Strait relations, and how they accumulate capital through their own particular globalized situation and the relationship they construct between capital accumulation and spatial mobility. The fieldwork for the present research included in‐depth interviews conducted in 2018 with 35 young Taiwanese who had relocated to Beijing for work. Results found that Taiwanese talent does not always accumulate capital through spatial mobility, but rather they experience the offset of privilege and depreciation of embodied cultural capital in the place of immigration and continue to accumulate mixed forms of embodied cultural capital such as 'Chinese experience' which enable the constant mobility or stop in the future. This research describes the dynamics of spatial mobility of talents caused by the accumulation of embodied cultural capital in countering the globalized situation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2016, China has been conducting military flybys around Taiwan, while the US has approved arms sales to Taiwan on several occasions and sent warplanes and battleships through the Taiwan Strait. How does Taiwanese public opinion respond to the Chinese and US military presence in the Strait? Is the public likely to become less supportive of de jure independence for Taiwan on account of China's military deterrence or more supportive owing to a perceived likelihood of US military assistance? In this report, we provide answers to these questions based on evidence from a survey experiment conducted in Taiwan in October–November 2020. We find that Taiwanese are less sensitive to the Chinese military presence in the Taiwan Strait but have become more supportive of de jure independence after seeing the US aircraft in the area. Our findings contribute to studies of cross-Strait relations and US foreign policy on the Taiwan Strait. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the political dimensions of globalization using the Russian invasion of Ukraine and tensions between China and Taiwan as case studies. While it has been argued that globalization and economies around the world being interconnected and dependent on one another recues the likelihood of war between nations, why then did autocrat Vladimir Putin launch an invasion of Ukraine and why are tensions between China and Taiwan as high as they have ever been in recent memory? This study offers new ideas and discussions about how the political landscape is impacted by globalization and vice versa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research examines the controversy caused by Taiwanese speedskater Yu-ting Huang at the Beijing Winter Olympics to analyze the concept of Chineseness on mass media in Taiwan. The videoclip of Huang wearing an outfit of the Chinese national team during training went viral on the social media. The incident triggered a series of chain reactions including her eventual suspension from the national team. However, Huang remained the flagbearer for the parade of nations representing Taiwan in the opening ceremony. The mixed messages were the microcosm of the complex between Taiwan and China and, more importantly, the problematic appropriation of the Chinese diaspora. While Taiwan and China are linguistically, ethnically, culturally proximate, and economically interdependent, Taiwan and China are also politically opposite and militarily hostile. Through Taiwan's unique perspective, instead of China's official and controlled channels, the concept of Chinese diaspora and the complex of the cross-strait relations can be further illuminated. While Chinese cultural heritage remains an integral part of Taiwanese identity, it is not an unquestionable and natural weight put on Taiwanese. It is via the narratives of sports that the contrast between Chinese and Taiwanese civil society is highlighted. The self-governing island since 1949 has grown its own unique identity. Chinese diaspora is thus becoming a concept that the island gradually growing out of from. While the construction of identity is always dynamic multi-directional, the dichotomic nature of sports differentiating "us" and "them" has become an indicative field for Taiwanese to construct a unique national identity vis-à-vis China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After Hong Kong's handover in 1997, the development of its relations with Taiwan has been full of twists and turns. Formal and bureaucratic interactions have stifled the strategic ambiguity needed to utilise Hong Kong as a buffer for cross-strait tensions. The subtle interaction between Hong Kong and Taiwan, being leveraged to reduce tension and facilitate communication in the cross-strait conflict, has been weakened since the mid-2010s even though institutionalisation was enhanced. Thus, the future development of Hong Kong–Taiwan relations may seem even more pessimistic than cross-strait relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does the quality of international relations between countries affect regional economics? The question of how much economic change can be attributed to the trajectories of international politics is difficult to answer, because different factors over time can influence economic development. This research uses synthetic control and difference-in-differences methods to evaluate the impact of the normalisation of cross-strait relations in 2008 on regional economic growth in Jiangsu province. Based on data from the Regional and China Year Books from 1990 to 2015, Jiangsu province, a region with prominently close economic ties with Taiwan, witnessed a CNY 20,726.52 (around GBP 2328.35) increase in per capita GDP from 2008 to 2015, compared with the counterfactual in the absence of normalised cross-strait relations. There was an annual increase of approximately CNY 2961 Yuan (around GBP 333). This research has important implications for acknowledging the relationship between the quality of political relations and their economic impact on confrontational countries and regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The growing tension between mainland China and Taiwan has a cultural aspect closely related to national identity. We focus on recent history curriculum changes in the mainland and in Taiwan and find that education authorities on both sides have implemented master narratives for content selection in and organization of history textbooks. In mainland China, the master narrative of pluralist unity constructs a geographically consistent Chinese nation throughout history, which bolsters the state's current claim to a territorial integrity including Taiwan. In Taiwan, the master narrative of multiculturalism becomes the essence of Taiwanese identity, and weakens Sinocentrism in Taiwanese official historiography. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do people risk their lives fighting in wars? This article looks beyond group grievance and material benefits to add another psychological mechanism explaining why people choose to fight or not to fight – perceived collective action. An individual is much more likely to fight when they perceive that others will also fight. Contrary to the expectations of social identity theory and social pressure theory, the effect of perceived collective action is stronger among those who have a weaker national identity because they are more likely to rationally calculate the chance of winning by accounting for others' decisions. To mitigate the endogeneity in post-conflict cross-sectional surveys, we conduct a survey experiment (n = 1,001) in Taiwan manipulating perceptions of others' willingness to fight in a potential China–Taiwan military conflict. Experimental evidence supports the hypotheses that perceived collective action works only on weak Taiwanese identifiers. The result holds in robustness checks and in another nationally representative survey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last few decades, China has become one of the most important foreign investment destinations and centers of economic development in Asia. China's growing economic clout and coercive measures lead to the following empirical puzzles: how has Taiwan perceived China's increasing military capabilities and economic influence? What are the major factors that facilitate or constrain the role of a government agency of a weaker state in addressing the economic power of a stronger one? More specifically, what has been the purpose of Taiwan's economic statecraft? Based on Taiwan's official statements, regional trade data, and newspaper coverage in Chinese and English, this study investigates both positive and negative evaluations of China-Taiwan trade from 2009 to 2021. From 2009 to 2016, President Ma Ying-jeou adopted a desecuritization strategy in normalizing bilateral trade with China, and he actively promoted greater liberalization of Taiwan's financial and service sectors for China's investment. From 2016 to 2021, President Tsai Ing-wen employed a securitization strategy in light of the risks of economic reliance on China's markets. The article proceeds as follows. First, it engages the current literature on economic statecraft, China-Taiwan relations, and Asian politics. Second, this study offers a framework of desecuritization and securitization of Taiwan's trade toward China, and it highlights how the political leaders in Taiwan attempt to find a balance between trade and security. Third, it provides in-depth case studies on how Taiwan executed desecuritization and securitization strategies. Finally, it concludes with some initial thoughts on the studies of comparative economic statecraft, and provides policy implications for countries in the Asia Pacific region and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research letter discusses the impact of the perceived threat of potential military conflicts between Taiwan and China on the psychological distress of Taiwanese individuals. The study, conducted through telephone interviews with 2000 Taiwanese nationals, found a significant association between the perceived threat and psychological distress. The study also highlighted the buffering role of social support in mitigating the association between the perceived threat and psychological distress. The findings emphasize the need for strategies to ease tensions between Taiwan and China and to monitor mental health status and enhance social support among Taiwanese individuals. [Extracted from the article]

Because of the complex and special political relationship between Mainland China and Taiwan. Cross-Strait trade is influenced by many variables, there has been a view that trade relations between Mainland China and Taiwan are more influenced by political factors. However, between the Cross-Strait, the trade volume has generally shown an upward development trend, especially since 2001. Therefore, the political factors can hardly explain the facts, and economic factors, especially industrial structure factors in Mainland China play an important role in Cross-Strait trade. Based on the small sample data since 2001, this study employed Grey Relational Analysis （GRA） method to verify the evolution of Mainland China's industrial structure and Cross-Strait trade. Based on the results show that the evolution of Mainland China's industrial structure strongly impacts the development of Cross-Strait trade. The tertiary industry has the strongest correlation with Cross-Strait trade, followed by the secondary and primary industries. Furthermore, the evolution of the mainland's industrial structure will expand as well as accelerate the imbalance of Cross-Strait trade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]