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We extend an investment model with demand uncertainty and asymmetric information on investment costs. The manager of firms has more investment costs information than the owner. Meanwhile, demand uncertainty that firms always face after investment. We develop a dynamic model that captures the joint effect of uncertainty and asymmetric information on investment timing and quantity. The results show that the risk effect dominates the uncertainty effect on the investment threshold and quantity. The uncertainty and degree of asymmetric information have opposite effects on investment. Moreover, the risk effect dominates the uncertainty effect, while the risk and the degree of asymmetric information are synergistic effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Adverse selection is a version of the principal-agent problem that includes monopolist nonlinear pricing, where a monopolist with known costs seeks a profit-maximizing price menu facing a population of potential consumers whose preferences are known only in the aggregate. For multidimensional spaces of agents and products, Rochet and Choné (Econometrica, 1998) reformulated this problem as a concave maximization over the set of convex functions, by assuming agent preferences combine bilinearity in the product and agent parameters with a quasilinear sensitivity to prices. We characterize solutions to this problem by identifying a dual minimization problem. This duality allows us to reduce the solution of the square example of Rochet–Choné to a novel free boundary problem, giving the first analytical description of an overlooked market segment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Administrative Sciences / Yonetim Bilimleri Dergisi is the property of Canakkale Onsekiz Mart Universitesi, Terzioglu Kampusu and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The role of information asymmetry in automobile insurance markets has been studied extensively. However, not all empirical studies found correlation between driver risk and chosen coverage. There are two explanations for this (Cohen and Siegelman 2010): (1) information asymmetry may not characterise environments in which consumers cannot act on private information; (2) most studies measure not risky driver behaviour, but ex post realisations of such behaviour, e.g. claims. In Taiwan's taxi insurance market, insurers cannot freely use rating factors. Usage density (e.g. daily distance), a direct measure of risk, therefore constitutes private information. Using ordinary least squares models, we find that usage density is positively correlated with total premiums. Using logistic models, we find high-density drivers more likely to buy additional policies. Thus, usage density is positively correlated with insurance demand, consistent with the risk-coverage hypothesis. Unlimited-mileage coverage may disproportionately attract high-risk drivers, an argument in favour of usage-based insurance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: Family businesses are essential to the global economy but often grapple with family-related issues, especially during succession. This study explores how governance tools like the family protocol (FP) mitigate conflicts by setting standards for family firm management and continuity. Pioneering the use of game theory and adverse selection setups in family business governance, this research uncovers FP determinants. Design/methodology/approach: This research employs game theory and adverse selection setups to delve into the strategic decision-making processes of stakeholders in family firms. The authors break new ground by applying principal–agent theory (PAT) to family business governance structures. This innovative approach uncovers the determinants of the FP, enhancing the authors' understanding of family firm dynamics. Findings: The authors emphasize the importance of custom governance structures, such as the FP, in managing complex family-business interactions. These structures mitigate conflicts and promote smoother transitions during succession, ensuring family firm continuity. This study identifies key determinants, and these results will aid founders, families and practitioners in achieving smoother transitions, ensuring family firm continuity. Originality/value: This research pioneers game theory and PAT applications in family business governance, shedding light on the effectiveness of customized governance mechanisms. By identifying FP determinants, the authors contribute to a deeper understanding of family firm dynamics. The findings have practical implications for founders, families, practitioners and consultants, promoting the long-term success and harmony of family firms in the global economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that in housing transaction with asymmetric information, sellers may signal their private information with special design of listing prices. We build a cheap-talk signalling model in which sellers strategically choose round number listing prices to signal their weakness, i.e. they are willing to accept lower prices in order to sell their houses more quickly. Using housing market transaction data in Beijing, we find that round number listings sell 0.13% lower and 0.086 months sooner than precise ones. We also show that these results are unlikely to be driven by housing unobserved attributes or round number self-attractiveness. In addition, we find that as the roundness of listing price increases, the signalling effects become more pronounced. Our results present empirical evidence that signalling helps improve negotiation efficiency under asymmetric information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing literature shows that a ban on child labour may be self-enforcing under the extreme assumption that, above the subsistence level, no amount of consumption can compensate parents for the disutility of child labour. The present paper shows that a partial ban may be self-enforcing also in a more general model where education is an alternative to work, and the disutility of child labour can be compensated by higher present consumption or future income, but a total ban may not. It also shows that, in the absence of informational asymmetries, child labour can be eliminated and a first best achieved if the ban is combined with a credit-backed policy including a subsidy to parents, and a tax on skilled adults. A first best is out of reach if the use children make of their time when they are neither at school, nor working in the labour market is private information, because the policy maker then faces an incentive-compatibility constraint. The second-best policy reduces child labour, but not to zero. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates manufacturer encroachment on a sustainable supply chain, where the manufacturer holds exclusive information on product greenness and is responsible for both corporate social responsibility (CSR) and greening. The manufacturer and the retailer play a signaling game whereby CSR effort and wholesale price serve as joint green signals. Findings reveal that, firstly, encroachment induces higher CSR efforts from manufacturers. When customers exhibit a strong CSR preference, the resulting CSR increment leads to increased offline demand and drives up both wholesale and retail prices in a mutually beneficial manner. This phenomenon is referred to as the CSR effect, yielding a win-win encroachment. Secondly, when signaling product greenness to highly CSR-sensitive customers, the high-greenness manufacturer principally distorts her CSR effort downward to an extent unprofitable for the low-greenness manufacturer to mimic and subordinately distorts the wholesale price downward to counter CSR-induced demand decrement and mitigate CSR cost pass-through downstream. Finally, the win-win encroachment pattern is characterized by encroachment profit and signal expense sharing, with encroachment strengthening downward-distorted signaling while signaling weakens the CSR effect. These insights contribute valuable guidance for green manufacturers in CSR decision-making, which functions as a component of green signaling and facilitates transitioning to dual-channel sustainable supply chains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When companies or organizations can evade audits on their harmful incidents, how should the affected entities design their audit and penalty policies? In "Audit and Remediation Strategies in the Presence of Evasion Capabilities" by Wang, de Véricourt, and Sun, the authors find random audits may be needed in the optimal policy. Specifically, the optimal policy alternates between ascending monetary penalties (without any audits) and random audits at a constant rate (when the penalty reach its maximum level). Only when the evasion is ineffective or the self-correction is too costly do deterministic audits become optimal. They tackle the problem in a continuous-time principal-agent framework with both adverse selection and moral hazard. In this paper, we explore how to uncover an adverse issue that may occur in organizations with the capability to evade detection. To that end, we formalize the problem of designing efficient auditing and remedial strategies as a dynamic mechanism design model. In this setup, a principal seeks to uncover and remedy an issue that occurs to an agent at a random point in time and that harms the principal if not addressed promptly. Only the agent observes the issue's occurrence, but the principal may uncover it by auditing the agent at a cost. The agent, however, can exert effort to reduce the audit's effectiveness in discovering the issue. We first establish that this setup reduces to the optimal stochastic control of a piecewise deterministic Markov process. The analysis of this process reveals that the principal should implement a dynamic cyclic auditing and remedial cost-sharing mechanism, which we characterize in closed form. Importantly, we find that the principal should randomly audit the agent unless the agent's evasion capacity is not very effective, and the agent cannot afford to self-correct the issue. In this latter case, the principal should follow predetermined audit schedules. Funding: This work was supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Foundation) ["Audit Schedules in the Presence of Concealing Effort"; Grant 387250733]. Supplemental Material: The computer code and data that supports the findings of this study and the online appendix are available within this article's supplemental material at https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2022.0289. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates how private information affects the joint determination of the payment method and the bid premium in M&As. The focus is on the uncertainty of the stand‐alone valuations of the firms involved in the transaction induced by their opacity. First, we model M&A negotiations as a signalling game with two‐sided private information and derive correlations between firm opacity and bid characteristics from equilibrium analysis. Then, we analyze a sample of U.S. deals, using an index based on market measures of adverse selection to quantify firm opacity. We find that the likelihood of stock offers and the bid premium increase with the target's opacity, while more opaque bidders are associated with fewer stock offers and smaller bid premiums. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we take a mechanism design approach to optimal assignment problems with asymmetrically informed buyers. In addition, the surplus generated by an assignment of a buyer to a seller may be adversely affected by externalities generated by other assignments. The problem is complicated by several factors. Buyers know their own valuations and externality costs but do not know this same information for other buyers. Buyers also receive private signals correlated with the state and, consequently, the implementation problem exhibits interdependent valuations. This precludes a naive application of the VCG mechanism and to overcome this interdependency problem, we construct a two-stage mechanism. In the first stage, we exploit correlation in the firms signals about the state to induce truthful reporting of observed signals. Given that buyers are honest in stage 1, we then use a VCG-like mechanism in stage 2 that induces honest reporting of valuation and externality functions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present a competitive matching model in which indivisible assets are reallocated among many traders. The model has three features: (i) traders are heterogeneous in their prospects as buyers, sellers, and also in their stand-alone values with endowed assets, (ii) buyers do not know true values of assets sold, (iii) sellers can disclose values of their assets by paying fees. Despite its complexity, the model admits closed-form solutions. Two main results emerge. First, if full Disclosure is facilitated by a monopolist, it captures a large fraction of the welfare gains. Second, adding the option of minimum disclosure, when combined with a cap regulation on price-dependent fees for full disclosure, significantly weakens the monopolist's power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the early studies of Olson (The logic of collective action, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1971/1965) and Tullock (Public Choice 11:89–99, 1971), who first defined the paradox of revolution, there has been a great deal of relevant work based on rational choice theory. While the main point of this research is to investigate solutions to this apparent paradox, its overall contribution is the provision of a rich analysis of revolutions in the light of rational choice. This article provides an overview of the literature over the last fifty years, highlighting the richness and complexity of the issues underlying the paradox and, more generally, collective action. The emphasis is placed on the salient points of what this literature and its evolution teach us about revolutionary commitment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We develop a model of investor information choices and asset prices in which the availability of information about fundamentals is time-varying and responds to investor demand for information. A competitive research sector produces more information when more investors are willing to pay for that research. This feedback, from investor willingness to pay for information to more information production, generates two regimes in equilibrium, one having high prices and low volatility, the other the opposite. The low-price, high-volatility regime is associated with greater information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors. Information dynamics move the market between regimes, creating large price drops even with no change in fundamentals. In our calibration, the model suggests an important role for information dynamics in financial crises. This paper was accepted by Kay Giesecke, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.01213. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We develop a dynamic investment model with loan guarantees wherein insurers face information disadvantages and learn about borrower quality. Borrowers signal their qualities through investment timing, which is characterized by the investment threshold and elapsed time. We derive the conditions for separating or pooling equilibria. We show that the separating investment threshold is constant and determined mainly by the maximum threshold preventing mimicry. If project risk is higher (lower) than the market growth rate, the pooling investment threshold declines (increases) with elapsed time, and learning enhances (reduces) the willingness of high‐quality borrowers to wait. Learning alleviates adverse selection and reduces guarantee costs. These effects are more pronounced with a greater uncertainty of the insurer on borrower quality. We reveal dual effects of waiting. The worse the market prospect, the higher the value of waiting in pooling outcomes. Fee‐for‐guarantee swaps are superior to equity‐for‐guarantee swaps in environments with marked information asymmetry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the optimal design of a pension system together with publicly provided individualized financial education. Agents can invest in both a risky and a non-risky asset and can either under- or over-estimate the expected return of the risky asset. We show that, under perfect information on the misperception biases, it is optimal for the government to impose a uniform level of pension contributions equal to the optimal level of investment in the riskless asset and a U-shaped level of mandatory education. Under asymmetric information, we show that the level of education is always distorted upward for agents with important misperception biases (who either under- or over-estimate financial returns), but can be distorted upward or downward for agents with mild misperception biases. Whether we end up in one or the other situation depends on the size of the public and private costs of education as well as on the shape of the distribution of the misperception biases in the economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper evaluates the contracting problem between a platform and a seller under information asymmetry where the seller holds private information about his/her cost for product quality. Price per product is influenced by seller's product quality and platform's service quality. Cost-sharing contract is more desirable as it induces a higher level of qualities and generates higher profit for the platform compared to revenue-sharing contract. The product quality and platform's service quality vary negatively with the ad-valorem tax imposed on price of the product. We then introduce advertising in our model and observe that the level of advertising is lower under information asymmetry. JEL Classifications : D86, L21, M37 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates manufacturer encroachment on a sustainable supply chain, where the manufacturer holds exclusive information on product greenness and is responsible for both corporate social responsibility (CSR) and greening. The manufacturer and the retailer play a signaling game whereby CSR effort and wholesale price serve as joint green signals. Findings reveal that, firstly, encroachment induces higher CSR efforts from manufacturers. When customers exhibit a strong CSR preference, the resulting CSR increment leads to increased offline demand and drives up both wholesale and retail prices in a mutually beneficial manner. This phenomenon is referred to as the CSR effect, yielding a win-win encroachment. Secondly, when signaling product greenness to highly CSR-sensitive customers, the high-greenness manufacturer principally distorts her CSR effort downward to an extent unprofitable for the low-greenness manufacturer to mimic and subordinately distorts the wholesale price downward to counter CSR-induced demand decrement and mitigate CSR cost pass-through downstream. Finally, the win-win encroachment pattern is characterized by encroachment profit and signal expense sharing, with encroachment strengthening downward-distorted signaling while signaling weakens the CSR effect. These insights contribute valuable guidance for green manufacturers in CSR decision-making, which functions as a component of green signaling and facilitates transitioning to dual-channel sustainable supply chains.

This paper presents a model of an executive administration that decides whether to mandate benefit-cost analysis (BCA) of newly proposed regulations. A regulator has private information about the social benefit of a new rule but may differ from the executive's preferences for regulation. BCA, which provides a noisy signal of the rule's social benefit, is most valuable when the executive is regulation neutral. Extremely regulation-averse administrations may be harmed by BCA unless they can bias it. Our results are consistent with use of BCA by U.S. presidential administrations since Reagan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of International Journal of Disciplines Economics & Administrative Scienves Studies is the property of International Journal of Disciplines in Economics & Administrative Sciences Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The observed money demand in the U.S. had a stable negative relation with the interest rate up until the 1990s. After this period, this relation fell apart and has never been restored. We show that the central bank's ability to gather information, referred to as market intelligence (MI), matters to generate an upward‐sloping money demand curve. We calibrate the model to the U.S. data for the period from 1990 to 2019 and show that MI helps to match the money demand. We also show that it is beneficial for the society, since it mitigates the inefficiency associated with asymmetric information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates whether sustainability labels for mutual funds in Europe provide consistent signals regarding funds' sustainable characteristics. Specifically, we assess the alignment of signals conveyed by third-party and self-declared labels. Among the first typology, we consider labels sponsored by government and nonprofit organizations (GNPOs) alongside Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) ratings from commercial data vendors. The latter category includes the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR) classification and an ESG-related name. Our findings indicate that equity funds with GNPO labels are more likely to exhibit top-tier ESG ratings and alignment with self-declared sustainability signals, namely Article 9 of SFDR and fund names. Furthermore, holding government and multiple GNPO labels is linked to other signals indicating higher sustainability standards. In addition, funds tend to experience an improvement in Morningstar globes after receiving a GNPO label, consistent with GNPO labels signaling funds of the high-quality type. The results regarding label alignment in fixed-income funds are less conclusive. Our findings underscore the need for credible signals in view of the growing number of sustainability labels available to investors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the licensing decision of a non-producer innovator with a new technology that enables the manufacture of a saleable product. The technology is licensed and each user privately knows its innovation-related production cost, whereas the licensor only knows, with a certain probability, that this cost may be low (the user is efficient) or high (the user is inefficient). When a single licence is granted through separating contracts, only the contract intended for the inefficient user involves a per-unit royalty, but when two licences are granted through separating contracts, the contracts intended for the inefficient and efficient users both feature a per-unit royalty. However, screening is less likely as the number of licences increases, to the point that the licensor does not screen users when granting three licences. Additionally, whereas the diffusion of the innovation is socially insufficient under symmetric information, with asymmetric information it may be socially optimal. Finally, when licensing with contracts involving an ad-valorem royalty is also feasible the licensor finds it less attractive than licensing with a per-unit royalty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Algorithm Decision Making (ADM) systems designed to augment or automate human decision-making have the potential to produce better decisions while also freeing up human time and attention for other pursuits. For this potential to be realised, however, algorithmic decisions must be sufficiently aligned with human goals and interests. We take a Principal-Agent (P-A) approach to the questions of ADM alignment and trust. In a broad sense, ADM is beneficial if and only if human principals can trust algorithmic agents to act faithfully on their behalf. This mirrors the challenge of facilitating P-A relationships among humans, but the peculiar nature of human-machine interaction also raises unique issues. The problem of asymmetric information is omnipresent but takes a different form in the context of ADM. Although the decision-making machinery of an algorithmic agent can in principle be laid bare for all to see, the sheer complexity of ADM systems based on deep learning models prevents straightforward monitoring. We draw on literature from economics and political science to argue that the problem of trust in ADM systems should be addressed at the level of institutions. Although the dyadic relationship between human principals and algorithmic agents is our ultimate concern, cooperation at this level must rest against an institutional environment which allows humans to effectively evaluate and choose among algorithmic alternatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using annual time series data for India, this research paper examines the presence of asymmetric cointegration and asymmetric causality between financial development and poverty reduction using nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag (NARDL) model and asymmetric causality test. The empirical findings support the existence of asymmetries in the short-run as well as long-run between poverty and financial development. The asymmetry reveals that negative financial development shocks leave a more profound impact on poverty alleviation than their positive equivalents. The result emanating from asymmetric causality test reveal a unidirectional asymmetric causality between negative shocks in financial development and poverty. Moreover, expansionary policies of financial development are found to serve as catalysts to spur poverty alleviation while contractionary policies of financial sector are found to exacerbate poverty in an asymmetric and nonlinear fashion. The findings of Wald's test also confirm the presence of asymmetric effects in the poverty-finance nexus. The asymmetric cumulative dynamic multipliers used to examine the behaviour of asymmetries and adjustments with respect to time lend credence to the results calculated using NARDL estimator and therefore demonstrate their robustness. The present study divulges the need for investigating asymmetry in finance-poverty nexus in order to draw policy-relevant conclusions. The authors conclude that financial development serves as a panacea and antidote to the scourge of extreme poverty in India. We recommend regulation of informal sources of credit, financial inclusion of poor, credit boost to small and medium enterprises employing rural poor and channelization of credit to productive sectors with high employment elasticity to be persistently encouraged for poverty alleviation in India. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We assess optimal deterministic nonlinear income taxation in a Mirrlees economy with a continuum of risk‐averse agents whose utilities are quasilinear in labor. A weak redistribution motive makes random taxes more likely socially dominated by the deterministic policy where after‐tax income lotteries are replaced with their certainty equivalents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We introduce a model of (platform‐mediated) many‐to‐many matching in which agents' preferences are both vertically and horizontally differentiated. We first show how the model can be used to derive the profit‐maximizing matching plans under customized pricing. We then investigate the implications for targeting and welfare of uniform pricing (be it explicitly mandated or induced by privacy regulation), preventing the platform from conditioning prices on agents' profiles. The model can be applied to study ad exchanges, online retailing, and media markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several features of automotive procurement distinguish it from the prototypical supply chain in the academic literature: pass-through pricing that reimburses suppliers for raw material costs, market frictions that prohibit cost transparency and imbue suppliers with pricing power, and contractual commitments that span multiple production periods. In this context, we formalize a procurement model by considering an automaker that buys components from an upstream supplier to assemble cars over several production periods in an environment where period demands and raw material costs are both stochastic. Our paper clarifies how information asymmetry and market factors that amplify or weaken this asymmetry affect the firms' procurement protocol preferences. Then, using proprietary contract and supplier data from BMW, we empirically validate this model and show that it reflects BMW's reality: the factors that should theoretically go into automotive procurement decisions do so. Our analysis also reveals that existing contracting protocols in this context are not optimal for procurement under asymmetric information, and so we propose an alternative contracting method. We calibrate our model and estimate an automaker's performance improvement from this optimal contract over the status quo. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4880. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the government subsidy programmes for a bioenergy supply chain composed of a power plant and farmers who privately know their quality information of bioenergy. The government offers two types of subsidy programmes to increase the supply of bioenergy: Agriculture Quantity Coverage (AQC) programme that pays the farmers subsidies based on the quantity of bioenergy, and Price Loss Coverage (PLC) programme that is triggered when the market price of bioenergy falls below a reference price. With AQC programme, when the quantity of bioenergy is large, farmers may get more subsidies but the wholesale price of bioenergy would decrease, thus hurting the farmers' payoffs. By contrast, with PLC programme, the farmers can get more subsidies with a lower wholesale price, which also undermines the farmers' profitability. In equilibrium, the government prefers the AQC programme when the cost of the non-bioenergy is high, or the cost of the non-bioenergy is low and the government's subsidy payment coefficient in the PLC programme is high. Moreover, social welfare is higher with the PLC programme than that with the AQC programme when the cost of the non-bioenergy is high and the subsidy payment coefficient is low, and is lower otherwise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Contemporary Accounting Research is the property of Canadian Academic Accounting Association and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

AbstractThis study examines the potential of public e-procurement to serve as a means to counteract corruption in Somalia. Coupled with Generalized Linear Regression (GLM), survey research design is employed to investigate the dynamics between different e-procurement components and factors associated with corruption, such as monopoly power, asymmetric information, transparency, and accountability. The research focuses on ministries and government departments in Mogadishu, encompassing all 25 federal ministries in the sample. The findings reveal that public e-procurement is linked to a reduction in monopoly power, indicating a decline in the influence of single suppliers in the market. Additionally, e-procurement diminishes asymmetric information in the procurement process, promoting fairness and equal access to information for all stakeholders. The study further confirmed a positive relationship between e-procurement adoption and heightened transparency and accountability within public procurement processes. The implications of these findings are significant for policymakers, underscoring the value of investing in e-procurement infrastructure to foster integrity, operational efficiency, and public trust in the realm of public procurement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Digital finance represents a novel financial service leveraging advanced technologies such as cloud computing, big data, and artificial intelligence. These technologies significantly impact the enhancement of financial services for the real economy and the attainment of high-quality economic development. Despite extensive macro-level studies, there remains a dearth of specific investigations into how micro-level digital finance influences the highquality development of enterprises. Additionally, the role of financial regulation in the evolution of digital finance and its impact on the high-quality development of enterprises warrant further exploration. This study empirically examines the mechanisms and pathways through which regional digital financial development facilitates the high-quality development of entities, utilizing annual data from Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed entities spanning 2013 to 2021. Employing a fixed effect model alongside the construction of high-quality enterprise development and digital financial development indices, the research demonstrates a significant positive correlation between digital finance development and the high-quality development of physical enterprises. This conclusion remains robust after addressing endogeneity concerns and conducting various robustness tests. For mechanism analysis, regional digital finance development mitigates information asymmetry between enterprises and capital suppliers, alleviates financing constraints, and fosters technological innovation among enterprises, thereby promoting high-quality development. Heterogeneity analysis reveals differential effects across industries and regions, with pronounced impacts observedin the secondary industry, the tertiary industry, and in sectors undergoing rapid technological evolution, as well as the first-tier cities of the digital economy and the eastern and central regions where digital technology is more concentrated. Furthermore, the study identifies three primary pathways through which digital finance drives high-quality enterprise development: enterprise innovation and development, shared development, and coordinated development. While green and open development are recognized as crucial, their full potential remains unrealized, highlighting opportunities for optimization. Moreover, employing a threshold effect model, the study underscores the indispensable role of effective financial supervision in realizing the high-quality development potential of digital finance-enabled enterprises. This paper contributes to the existing literature in three areas: first, by introducing the urban digital financial development index and the enterprise high-quality development index; second, by exploring the mechanisms of digital finance's impact on high-quality enterprise development from both external constraints and internal optimization perspectives; and third, by conducting a comprehensive examination of the effectiveness, impact, and regulatory framework supporting the implementation pathways of digital finance in promoting high-quality enterprise development. Ultimately, this research illuminates the relationship between the virtual economy and the real economy, informing targeted digital financial promotion and financial supervision policies. Such insights enable government and regulatory bodies to provide tailored policy support to enterprises across different regions and industries, facilitating their pursuit of high-quality development and enhancing the symbiotic relationship between digital finance and the real economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The health sector is one of the markets where asymmetric information is most intense. In the health sector, the increase in the perception of uncertainty, the decrease in the sense of satisfaction, the increase in insecurity, the increase in economic losses and the lack of information needs are mostly caused by asymmetric information. Today, the change of expectations in health services after the pandemic has put the economy of the countries in a difficult situation. For this reason, the increase in technical knowledge in the health sector, which causes economic losses, has led to an increase in studies that emphasize the importance and research of the asymmetric information problem. In this study, the effects and size of asymmetric information in the health sector in the province of Kütahya were investigated by survey data on 400 individuals residing in Kütahya who went to the hospital at least once between 2021 and 2022. Five factors that affect/determine asymmetric information have been identified, and it has been found that the level of satisfaction varies according to gender, and the need for satisfaction and information varies according to marital status. According to the ANOVA results, there is a significant relationship between the need for information and age, income level, occupational groups, education level; between satisfaction and income level and the preferred hospital type, and also between trust and income level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unreliable suppliers may pose a substantial threat to supply chains, especially when they hold private information of their reliability. We consider a dyadic supply chain where the information of supplier reliability (in the form of random production yield) is asymmetric. We propose a new mechanism-design model and derive the buyer's optimal procurement contract menu offered to suppliers with private information. We prove that the contract menu is as simple as offering two different inflated order amounts and setting the procuring price sufficiently low to let the suppliers earn zero reservation profits. These results are derived analytically under uniform distribution. We test them numerically under beta distribution and find them hold as well. However, the informational rent will become positive when the supplier's reservation profit is positive. Positive informational rent is also found when we consider another structure of the supplier's production cost. This paper provides some new insights into supply chain management under asymmetric information of uncertain supply. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economic theory predicts that bond insurance lowers issuers' financing costs by resolving asymmetric information and mitigating credit risk. With comprehensive data over the last 36 years, we find increasingly diminished empirical support for these models. The value of insurance in resolving asymmetric information beyond that resolved by credit ratings and other observable bond characteristics is economically minimal. The average gross value of insurance ranges from 4 to 14 bps when bond insurers offer Aaa-rated coverage. However, this gross value becomes insignificant after 2008 when Aaa-rated insurance no longer exists. Evidence suggests that the lack of insurance benefit in the postcrisis period is attributable to the deteriorated creditworthiness of insurance companies. Examining noninterest saving explanations for the continued use of insurance in the no-Aaa insurance market, we find evidence that issuers purchase insurance out of habit (with insurance value most diminished for habitual purchasers with low governance quality) and for the convenience it affords in default, but no evidence that insurance improves secondary market liquidity. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4813. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a knowledge-intensive financial enterprise, intellectual capital can play a significant driving role in enhancing the value of financial enterprises. Especially in the current unstable and complex international financial market, it is necessary for financial enterprises to actively consider the advantages of intellectual capital to shape their competitive edge and maximize profit value. However, it is also important to consider the issue of asymmetric information within the financial system, particularly the attitudes and behaviors in the strategic interactions between governments and financial enterprises. Therefore, this paper took the strict logical structure and analytical method of game theory as an effective analytical tool to solve the problem of asymmetric information in the economy and to use the asymmetric information game method to construct a mathematical model of intellectual capital in order to cope with the mistrust in the game process. Based on game theory, this paper systematically analyzed the factors influencing intellectual capital and constructed mathematical models of game theory for adverse selection ex-ante and moral hazard ex-post, analyzing strategic behavior. The research results indicated that, from the perspectives of market reactions and financing constraints, there is an issue of information asymmetry between the government and financial enterprises. The paper also presents viable strategic recommendations for alleviating information asymmetry and achieving coordinated allocation of information resources between government and enterprises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Maintaining good ratings increases the profits of sellers on online platforms. We analyze the role of strategic pricing for ratings management in a setting where a monopolist sells a good of unknown quality. Higher prices reduce the value for money, which on average worsens reviews. However, higher prices also induce only those consumers with a strong taste for the product to purchase, which on average improves reviews. Our model flexibly parametrizes the two effects. This parametrization can rationalize the observed heterogeneity in the relationship between reviews and prices. Based on an analytic characterization of the optimal dynamic pricing strategy, we study a platform's choice of the sensitivity of its rating system to incoming reviews. The optimal sensitivity depends on the effect of prices on reviews and on how the platform weighs consumers and sellers in its objective. Although sellers always benefit from more sensitivity, consumers may suffer from higher prices and from slower learning from reviews due to endogenously emerging price and rating cycles. This paper was accepted by Kartik Hosanagar, information systems. Funding: This work was supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft [CRC TR 224, Project C3]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4771. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Akerlof's seminal model on asymmetric information forms the basis for a broad range of regulatory interventions aimed at addressing the adverse effects of unequal information between transacting parties. While a groundbreaking model of the effects of information asymmetries in markets, Akerlof's model does not examine why information asymmetries emerge. This article argues that an examination of the underlying drivers and origins of information asymmetries revitalises the policy rationale for regulatory intervention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers a game-theoretic model of a firm that raises funds for financing an innovative business project and chooses between ICO (initial coin offering) and equity financing. The model is based on information problems associated with both ICO and equity financing well-documented in the literature. Several new features are introduced, for example, information complexity, which is analyzed along with a more traditional imperfect information and an asymmetric information approach. The model provides several implications that have not yet been tested. For example, we find that the message complexity can be beneficial for firms conducting ICOs. Also, high-quality projects can use ICO as a signal of quality. Thirdly, the average size of projects undertaking equity financing is larger than that of firms conducting ICO. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]