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Rules for the rulemakers: asymmetric information and the political economy of benefit-cost analysis.
- Source :
- Journal of Regulatory Economics; Aug2024, Vol. 66 Issue 1, p1-51, 51p
- Publication Year :
- 2024
-
Abstract
- This paper presents a model of an executive administration that decides whether to mandate benefit-cost analysis (BCA) of newly proposed regulations. A regulator has private information about the social benefit of a new rule but may differ from the executive's preferences for regulation. BCA, which provides a noisy signal of the rule's social benefit, is most valuable when the executive is regulation neutral. Extremely regulation-averse administrations may be harmed by BCA unless they can bias it. Our results are consistent with use of BCA by U.S. presidential administrations since Reagan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Details
- Language :
- English
- ISSN :
- 0922680X
- Volume :
- 66
- Issue :
- 1
- Database :
- Complementary Index
- Journal :
- Journal of Regulatory Economics
- Publication Type :
- Academic Journal
- Accession number :
- 178878443
- Full Text :
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-024-09483-4