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Le projet d’histoire internationale et politique présenté ici interroge de façon critique l’historiographie des mouvements non étatiques transnationaux Al Qaida et l’organisation de l’État islamique (EI), invitant une réflexion plus large sur la nature de la violence qu’ils projettent. Cette réflexion fait explicitement rupture avec les lectures dominantes dans les sciences sociales occidentales qui situent ces mouvements dans des dimensions principalement régionales et religieuses. Désindexa...

A pesar del discurso mediático general, la identificación del fenómeno qaedista con el islamista, y del islamista con el terrorista, no es del todo acertada. Objetivo de este trabajo es contribuir a desmentir el prejuicio de que el Islam sea el motor único de la violencia qaedista, y criticar el uso sesgado que los medios de comunicación de masas a menudo hacen del término islamismo., Despite the general media discourse, the identification of the Al Qaida phenomenon with the islamist one, and of the islamist phenomenon with terrorism, is not totally right. The aim of the present paper is to contribute to the denial of the prejudice that Islam is the only reason for Al Qaida’s violence, and to criticize the use media often do of the term Islamism.

President Donald Trump’s Africa policy is often characterized as one of indifference towards the continent. The news of four American soldiers killed in combat with ISIS on the border of Mali and Niger, however, demonstrated the reality of the situation, which is that American troops are increasing their involvement in counterterrorism on the continent. This paper uses the Niger incident as its starting point to examine the Trump administration’s military policy in Africa against Al Qaeda and ISIS affiliated groups. Trump’s rhetoric and stated policy about Africa contrasts with the reality on the ground, where the US considers the war on terrorism there to be strategically important. The presence of the US Army and its actions in Somalia, Libya, Niger and in Nigeria demonstrate that Trump has carried over some of the active military policies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama. Trump, however, has changed the US strategy from an emphasis on foreign aid and peacekeeping to a focus on the use of significant military force and firepower to defeat Al Qaeda and ISIS terrorist groups. The wars in Africa fit into Trump’s worldwide war on terrorism aimed at destroying Al Qaeda and ISIS, and in which the administration is prepared to accept significant American casualties. La politique africaine de Donald Trump se caractérise par une certaine indifférence envers le continent. L’annonce de quatre soldats américains morts en combattant Daesh à la frontière du Mali et du Niger a cependant démontré qu’en réalité l’armée américaine est en train d’accroître ses activités antiterroristes sur le continent. Cet article examine la politique militaire de l’administration Trump, mise en place depuis l’incident au Niger pour lutter contre les groupes liés à Al Qaeda et Daesh en Afrique. La rhétorique de Trump contraste avec la réalité sur le terrain, où la guerre contre le terrorisme en Afrique est devenue une priorité pour les États-Unis. La présence et les activités militaires de l’armée américaine en Somalie, au Libye, au Niger et au Nigeria démontrent la continuité avec les politiques du George W. Bush et Barack Obama. Cependant, Trump a réduit les crédits pour l’aide au développement et les opérations de maintien de la paix en faveur des opérations militaires et de la puissance de feu afin de détruire les réseaux locaux d’Al Qaeda et Daesh. Les guerres américaines en Afrique font partie de la grande stratégie d’une guerre mondiale contre le terrorisme et l’administration Trump s’est montré prête à accepter beaucoup de pertes.

This thesis asks why and how terrorist organizations use the Internet to achieve three strategic goals: 1) the dissemination of propaganda, 2) recruitment, and 3) fundraising. It is immediately apparent that the Internet offers a number of advantages, including low cost, global reach, and anonymity. Nonetheless, terrorist organizations vary in their exploitation of these advantages according to their immediate objectives. To explain these variations, this thesis presents a comparative study of Al Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and the Taliban. This study considers how different objectives render distinct narratives and thereby affect how those narratives leverage images and information in the dissemination of propaganda. Similarly, targets of recruitment vary according to the objectives of the respective organizations; this primarily affects their use of social media, including Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and other applications. Fundraising methods also vary, from local means (extortion, narcotics, smuggling) to contemporary exploitation of digital platforms like PayPal and cell phone applications enabling anonymous donations. This thesis concludes that the sophistication of terrorist organizations online requires an equally sophisticated response that is as essential to the fight against violent extremism as kinetic operations. http://archive.org/details/terroristsandcyb1094559608 Colonel, Dominican Republic Air Force Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

"In 2009 at the latest there appeared a new type of Islamist militants originating from the Federal Republic: increasingly, young men and women with or without a migration background, who had been born and raised in Germany, decided to join foreign terrorist organisations to, by their orders, carry out militant actions or terrorist attacks against the West and Germany. From Hamburg, Berlin, Bonn and other German cities and regions the 'Jihad Caravan' went to Waziristan or Syria where a number of German converts, Turks, Afghans and Arabs, had joined groups such as Al Qaida (AQ), 'Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan' (IBU) and 'Islamic Jihad Union' (11U). The contribution sketches the lines of development of German jihad against the background of conflicts both in Germany and in foreign countries." (author's abstract)

ISI je vodilna obveščevalna služba v Pakistanu, ki jo strokovnjaki uvrščajo ob bok najmočnejšim obveščevalnim službam na svetu, nekateri jo imenujejo tudi država v državi. Njene številne naloge potrjujejo, da gre za obsežno službo z ogromnimi pritojnostmi jurisdikcijami. Poleg zbiranja domačih in tujih informacij, ISI koordinirajo in nadzirajo delovanje vojaških obveščevalnih služb. Prav tako ISI budno nadzoruje politično aktivno prebivalstvo, domače in tuje diplomate, medije in tujce. Prisluškujejo telekomunikacijam, izvajajo prikrite napade ter snujejo in usmerjajo določene vojaške operacije. V dogajanje v Afganistanu se je ISI aktivneje vključila ob invanziji Sovjetske zveze na to državo. Pomembno vlogo pri tem angažiranju je imela tudi CIA. V času sovjetske okupacije in kasneje do vzpostavitve talibanske oblasti v Kabulu naj bi ISI v Afganistanu izuril okoli osemdeset tisoč borcev. Afganistan je pod vladavino talibanov ob vèdenju ISI-ja al Kaidi nudil varno zatočišče. Zahodni svet je ukrepal, ko je Al Kaida izvedla 11. 9. 2001 več odmevnih terorističnih napadov na pomembne objekte v ZDA. Ko so talibani zavrnili ameriško zahtevo po brezpogojni izročitvi Osame bin Ladna, so ZDA, Velika Britanija in njune zaveznice še istega leta vojaško posredovale v Afganistanu. Večina talibanov in pripadnikov terorističnih organizacij je po invaziji prebeglo v Pakistan. Američanom ni bila po godu pasivnost Pakistana do tega vprašanja, predvsem pa to, da je ISI, čeprav prikrito, pomagal tako talibanom kot pripadnikom Al Kaide. Ko so ZDA pritisnile na pakistanskega predsednika Mušarafa se je tudi Pakistan začel aktivneje boriti proti upornikom. Pakistanska vojska je s pomočjo obveščevalnih podatkov, ki jih je zbrala ISI v zadnjih letih razredčila število upornikov, vendar ISI še zmeraj igra dvojno vlogo in tajno podpira talibane in njihove akcije v Afganistanu. Strokovnjaki so mnenja, da si ISI ne želi prisotnosti večnega nasprotnika Pakistana Indije in njene obveščevalne službe R&AW v Afganistanu. Prav tako so mnenja, da je delovanje ISI še zmeraj netransparentno, vendar je njeno delovanje vedno v skladu z nacionalnimi interesi Pakistana na tem območju. ISI is leading intelligence agency in Pakistan, which numerous expert sides with some of the strongest intelligence agencies around the globe, some of them are even going further and claiming, that ISI is the strongest intelligence agency and it has earned name state within state. Its numerous assignments prove that ISI is huge agency with lots of jurisdiction. Among gathering domestic and foreign intelligence, ISI also coordinate and survey politically active residents, home and foreign diplomats, media and foreigners. They are also listening telecommunications, conducting hidden attacks, plotting and guide certain military activities. ISI has been actively involved in Afghanistan after soviet invasion in there. Important role in that engagement played CIA. In the period of time from begging of soviet invasion till the establishment of Taliban authorities in Kabul ISI recruited approximately eighty thousand rebels. Afghanistan under Taliban government was offering Al Qaida safe place to stay and ISI was acknowledged. Western world took measurements after 11. 9. 2001, when Al Qaida carried out attacks on important places across United States. When Taliban rejected American unconditional demand to handover Osama bin Laden, US, Great Britain and their allies that year invaded Afghanistan. Most of Taliban and members of different terrorist organizations fled Afghanistan and moved into Pakistan. US didn’t like passivity of Pakistan towards this issue, especially ISI’s covert help towards Taliban and members of Al Qaida. After US tighten Pakistan president Musharraf, Pakistan started actively fighting against rebels. Pakistan army did with ISI’s gathered intelligence through years reduced number of rebels, but ISI is still playing double part and secretly supports Taliban and their activities in Afghanistan. Experts are in opinion that ISI doesn’t want presence of Pakistan everlasting enemy India and her intelligence agency R&AW. They are also of opinion that ISI activities are still non-transparent, but her activities are always in compliance with Pakistan national interests in that region.

The study examines the application of the post-World War II U.S. Armed Forces propaganda analysis methods as a valid framework for the analysis of modern extremist social media. Using Jihadist and Islamic extremist, Al Qaida core, affiliate and associate (AQAA), digital media products, the framework examines persuasive devices used to attempt to appeal to potential recruits and ultimately incite them to violence. The findings of the content analysis extend previous examinations and provide a unique lens in which to view the appeals used in messaging to encourage potential violent actors in civil society. The examination categorizes tools of persuasion with the aim to validate the applicability of a historical framework in exploring modern messaging, informing future counter-narratives, and providing law enforcement cues in the analysis and determination of ongoing threats in their respective jurisdictions. Publisher PDF

I analyse the recent cases of Islamic State terrorism (the immolation of the Jordanian pilot and cutting the throat of 21 Egyptian Christians in Libya) as well as the case of a terrorist act of Irgun in the struggle for Israeli independence. These cases (as well as many of the acts of Al Qaida) have the purpose of provocation thereby leading Western states to do foolish things and in that process hurting themselves and helping the terrorists.

Depuis la fin de l’année 2012, la révolution syrienne est confrontée à l’arrivée massive de combattants chiites, projetés d’Irak, d’Iran ou du Liban afin de soutenir militairement le régime de Bachar al-Assad. Au sein de l’opposition, cet afflux de mercenaires étrangers s’est traduit par la construction populaire d’une rhétorique confessionnelle, dénonçant la « menace » ou le « danger » chiite pesant désormais sur le pays. En s’appuyant sur les méthodes d’analyse discursive, l’objectif de cet article est d’examiner les représentations collectives de ces soldats issus des rangs du Hezbollah ou des Pasdarans iraniens, mais également de comprendre le réveil des dynamiques identitaires et confessionnelles désormais à l’œuvre en Syrie. Since the end of 2012, the Syrian revolution faces an influx of Shiite fighters sent from Iraq, Iran and Lebanon to fight alongside the military regime of Bashar al-Assad. Among the Syrian opposition, the involvement of foreign mercenaries in the conflict led to the construction of a sectarian rhetoric, denouncing the “Shiite threat” now weighing on the country. By analysing popular and political discourses, this paper aims to examine some collective representations of these Hizballah or Pasdaran soldiers but also to understand the awakening of sectarian dynamics and Sunni-Shia tensions in contemporary Syria.

Tolv år etter terrorangrepene på USA 11.september 2001, har Al Qaida endret karakter og organisering. I dag fremstår organisasjonen med en sentral ledelse og flere assosierte grupper i forskjellige deler av verden. Boko Haram i Nigeria kan være en slik assosiert gruppe, men kunnskapen om den voldelige gruppen er relativt liten i Norge. En studie av Boko Haram er av betydning da det vil gi kunnskap om gruppen i seg selv, men også om Al Qaida nettverket er i ferd med å revitaliseres i Maghreb og Sahel. I starten av denne studien blir begrepene terrorisme og opprør diskutert for å danne grunnlag for en analyse av Boko Haram. Boko Haram utøver religiøst motivert politisk vold, og springer ut fra det nordlige Nigeria. Nigeria er Afrikas folke-rikeste nasjon, og har omtrent like mange muslimer som kristne. De religiøse skillelinjene følger ressurslinjene. I det fattige og ressursknappe nord er muslimer bosatt, og i sør bor de kristne med tilgang til store ressurser i form av olje, gass og handel over havet via Guinea bukta. På veien fram mot analysen av Boko Haram tar studien også for seg Al Qaida som moderorganisasjon, Al Shabaab og Al Qaida i Maghreb for å danne et bilde av terrornettverket i Afrika. Deretter diskuteres Tuaregopprøret i Mali og Niger for å danne et bilde av opprør i regionen, og hvordan dette skiller seg fra terrorisme. Studien tar sikte på å forklare om Boko Haram først og fremst kan kategoriseres som en terrorgruppe, eller om de er en opprørsgruppe i Nigeria. Dette gjøres ved å analysere fem operasjoner de har gjennomført over de fem siste årene i konteksten av studiens valgte definisjon av både terrorisme og av opprør. Deretter analyseres rapportering av Boko Haram sine angivelige forbindelser til Al Qaida nettverket i den hensikt å avdekke om de er en del av nettverket eller ikke.

Naglašavanje razlike između islama i islamizma ima iznimnu političku važnost u današnjim međunarodnim odnosima. Islamizam je prvenstveno instrumentalizacija islama radi realizacije konkretnih političkih ciljeva. U tom se smislu govori i o političkom islamu. Jačanje islamizma ima svoje povijesne zasade u kojima postoji i znatna odgovornost niza zapadnih zemalja s obzirom na njihovu imperijalističku prošlost. Stoga je islamizam i pokret otpora neokolonijalističkom utjecaju moćnih zemalja Zapada. Islamizam posebno jača od kraja 1960-ih godina sa slomom ideološkog koncepta arapskog nacionalizma. Kao što islam i islamizam nisu sinonimi, važno je istaknuti i razlikovanje islamizma od terorizma. Pojedine islamističke skupine poduzimaju i terorističke akcije ali one nisu težišno obilježje islamističkog pokreta u cjelini. Ključni aspekti koji definiraju suvremeno značenje i razvoj islamizma odnose se na složeni kompleks arapsko-izraelskih odnosa, pitanje iranske islamske revolucije i na ukupnost geopolitičkih i drugih zbivanja u Afganistanu. Događaji i procesi koji su se odvijali i traju na širem području Izraela, Irana i Afganistana impliciraju i snažnu islamističku komponentu. Uključuju također i ulogu utjecajnih europskih zapadnih zemalja (prvenstveno Velike Britanije ali i Francuske, Italije, Rusije i dr.) te Sjedinjenih Američkih Država. Na početku 21. stoljeća upravo se islamizam pokazuje kao snažan politički pokret u nizu zemalja Bliskoga i Srednjeg istoka. O njegovoj političkoj afirmaciji te odnosu sa SAD-om kao vodećoj svjetskoj sili koja ima globalno izražene geopolitičke interese, ovisit će i politička stabilnost šire regije Srednjeg istoka ali i svih ostalih afričkih, azijskih i europskih područja u kojima islamizam predstavlja realnu ili potencijalnu političku snagu. Ukoliko se politika SAD-a i njegovih saveznika prema svijetu islama bude težišno svodila na strateške aspekte (vojne intervencije, stvaranje baza i vojnih uporišta, prodaja naoružanja savezničkim islamskim zemljama i dr.), na strani Zapadu opozicijskih islamističkih krugova nailazit će se na sve izraženiji i veći otpor. Takve okolnosti pogoduju i snaženju islamističkog terorizma koji je već pokazao da nije isključivo regionalni problem već da ima znatno šire dosege i politički utjecaj., The emphasis put on the differences between Islam and Islamism has an exceptional political importance in today’s international relations. Islamism is primarily the instrumentalization of Islam due to the realization of explicit political goals. In this sense, political Islam is spoken about.The strengthening of Islamism has its historic foundation in which there is an important responsibility towards a chain of Western countries considering their imperialistic past. Therefore, Islamism and its neocolonialist resistance movement had a powerful influence on countries of the West. Islamism has especially grown stronger since the end of the 1960s with the collapse of the ideological concept of Arab nationalism. Just as Islam and Islamism are not synonyms, it is significant to accentuate the distinction between Islamism and terrorism.Certain Islamist groups are undertaking terroristic attacks but they are not prime features of the Islamite movement as a whole. Key aspects which define contemporary meaning and development of Islamism refer to a complex of Arab-Israeli relations, the question of Iran’s Islamic revolution and the totality of geopolitical and other events in Afghanistan. The events and processes which occurred and are continuing across wider areas of Israel, Iran and Afghanistan are implying a strong Islamite component. Also including the influences from other powerful European countries (primarily Great Britain but as well as France, Italy, Russia and others), and the United States of America. In the beginning of the 21st century Islamism has proven itself as a strong political movement throughout the Middle East. About its political affirmation and relationship with the US as a leading world power which has marked the global geopolitical interests, and will depend on political stability in the wider regions of the Middle East and all other African, Asian and European regions in which Islamism poses a real or potential political force. If the policy of the U.S. and its allies with the world of Islam is simply reduced to the strategic aspects (military intervention, creating military outposts and bases, selling weaponry allied Islamic countries, etc.), on the West side of the opposition Islamic circles they will encounter a more severe and greater resistance. Such circumstances are favorable and strengthen Islamist terrorism which has already demonstrated itself not only a regional problem, but as to having a much wider reach and political influence.

Le septembre 1969, Kadhafi prit le pouvoir en Libye suite à un coup d'État dont il fut à l'origine contre le roi Idriss Ier. Ce changement de régime en Libye entraîna par conséquent la mise en place d'une nouvelle politique étrangère par Kadhafi qui, à l'opposition de celle du roi Idriss Ier, prônait le panarabisme et le panafricanisme. Avec la mise en place d'une vue politique anti-occidentale, Kadhafi devint l'ennemi public numéro un des pays occidentaux tout le long des années 1970 jusque dans les années 2000. Entre 2003 et 2006, Kadhafi et les pays occidentaux étaient venus à une entente politique d'une manière générale. Mais sous le mandat de Barack Obama en 2011, les relations s'envenimèrent à nouveau avec la gestion par Kadhafi d'une insurrection armée au sein de son pays. Ceci déboucha alors sur la Guerre de Libye initiée par Washington et Paris sous les couleurs de l'OTAN. Kadhafi finit par perdre la vie en octobre 2011 mettant ainsi fin à un régime qui aura duré plus de quatre décennies.