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In respect of Romania little has entered the public domain in Britain about the work of the M16 network which was active throughout the Second World War in gathering and passing on information to the British authorities about German military operations in Romania and Transnistria. The aim of this article is to shed some light on the network's activity in the period 1940-49. My research is based upon previously unpublished primary sources held by the National Council for the Study of the Archive of the Securitate (CNSAS) in Bucharest, as well as upon Foreign Office papers in The National Archives in London, on interviews with former officers of MI6 and of Romania's Second World War secret service, and on relevant secondary literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Psychologists have been an integral part of national security agencies since World War I, when psychological science helped in personnel selection. A robust infrastructure supporting wider applications of psychology to military and intelligence problems developed further during World War II and the years following, primarily in the areas of testing, human factors, perception, and the decision sciences. Although the nature of the attacks on 9/11 raised the level of perceived need for increased human-based intelligence, the impacts of psychologists on the policies and practices of national security agencies in the decade since have not increased significantly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the importance of intelligence co-operation in the Libyan rebel operations. It cites events related to the Libya crisis until Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's death on October 20, 2011. The author elaborates on human intelligence (HUMINT) and technical intelligence (TECHINT) activities in Libya, including North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) use of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance platforms with Target Acquisition capabilities or ISTAR tools.

This paper analyzes the institutional role of informal para-police groups in Mexico known as 'madrinas.' The specific characteristics of 'madrinas' are that they are run as complex-structured networks with hierarchies, they actively participate in police activities, and they are an alternative way of gaining entry into the police institution. However, their key function is intelligence work within the police agency itself, which is why they still survive today. Among other things, the lack of judicial control and a police informant law have contributed to this situation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the unspoken ethical dimension involved in resource construction and system evaluation, with emphasis on the use of Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). It defines MTurk as an online crowdsourcing, microworking system which enables elementary tasks to be performed by a huge number of people called Turkers online. It looks at how many Turkers are performing the Human Intelligence Tasks (HIT). It poses the question of whether activity in MTurk should be considered as labor or something like a hobby or volunteer work.

Despite the CIA's improved analytical tradecraft and increased resources, the future of its analytic mission remains in doubt. Post-9/11 improvements have been coupled with a continued focus on current intelligence priorities that minimize attention to the development of strategic research and deeper knowledge. Simply increasing the number of analysts has not produced deeper expertise. The CIA's traditional recruitment and training methods, as well as its rewards and promotion system, encourage analysts to avoid concentrating on any single area of regional or functional expertise in favor of moving around the agency to build a successful career. A continued reliance on risk-avoidance security practices also restricts analysts' contact with non-government and foreign experts who often have needed political and cultural knowledge of intelligence topics. To rectify these inadequacies, the CIA's analytic directorate needs to develop incentives for analysts who wish to develop more strategic analysis and remove the security barriers to closer collaboration with experts outside the US government. Developing cross-agency analytic collaboration would also maximize expertise and would benefit from intelligence community-wide training programs similar to what the US military does at its senior service colleges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Inductive reasoning is a fundamental and complex aspect of human intelligence. In particular, how do subjects, given a set of particular examples, generate general descriptions of the rules governing that set? We present a biologically plausible method for accomplishing this task and implement it in a spiking neuron model. We demonstrate the success of this model by applying it to the problem domain of Raven's Progressive Matrices, a widely used tool in the field of intelligence testing. The model is able to generate the rules necessary to correctly solve Raven's items, as well as recreate many of the experimental effects observed in human subjects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the end of the Second World War, historians have assumed that the greatest secrets of the German war machine were divined through ‘signals intelligence’ (SIGINT), the decryption at Bletchley Park of the Wehrmacht’s enciphered messages, and not through ‘human intelligence’ (HUMINT) supplied by high-level agents situated at the very heart of Hitler’s high command. The discovery that Anglo-Polish intelligence possessed at least two penetration agents within the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht and Oberkommando des Heeres , ‘Warlock’ and ‘Knopf ’, not only challenges this idée fixe, but corrects the historical record by overturning sixty years’ worth of received wisdom on the subject. This study aims, therefore, to demonstrate that by means of high-grade HUMINT, Whitehall gained a unique entrée into German strategic and operational thinking during some of the most critical stages of the war. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

'Combined arms' operations have been a central tenet of military planning for nearly a century. They call for the integration of land, air and sea forces to achieve battlefield synergies. This philosophy has equal application to intelligence. The article advances the combined arms concept as a way to foster synergies across the intelligence disciplines - geospatial, signals, measures and signals, human, and most recently open source intelligence. It describes the strengths and weaknesses of each discipline in forming an analytical foundation for such a 'combined intelligence' and calls for developing theory to integrate the intelligence disciplines. The authors suggest that combined intelligence would confer several benefits, including more effective collection efforts and stronger countermeasures against adversary denial and deception. The article closes by calling for development of concepts and doctrine to put combined intelligence into practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of expert system can be defined as a structure based on artificial intelligence, on the notion of knowledge in the field, can acquire knowledge from human experts, following that by logical inference to ensure efficient handling of specific issues in the field of expertise. The power of expert systems can be increased by using built-in neural structures, being able to learn from examples when human experts have not sufficient knowledge to solve the problems. Specificity of artificial intelligence consists precisely in identifying of the quantifiable elements of reasoning, using the abstraction process, for use these in computer programs. Thus, the qualitative power of human intelligence transferred on computer, working together with the quantitative power of the computing machines can offer a viable solution for applications in engineering industries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article looks at the U.S. intelligence services community, focusing on instances where conflicts of interest have arisen. Efforts of the office of the Director of National Intelligence to curtail such conflicts of interest are reviewed. Literature on the subject is discussed, including "Systems of Survival: A Dialogue on the Moral Foundations of Commerce & Politics," by Jane Jacobs, and "Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy," by Sherman Kent. The author comments on the importance of preventing the analysis of useless information.

Intelligence is considered the first line of defense in U.S. security against foreign threats. Relying on archival research, rare survey data, and interviews with policymakers and intelligence professionals, this research explores the contribution to America's security made by humint-spies-over the years. Humint has its downsides, especially the unreliability of agents, but it has proved to be a useful tool for gathering information about world affairs. Survey data from inside the intelligence community indicates a high level of reliance on humint by Washington decision makers. The prudent policymaker will continue to seek information from all collection sources, with human intelligence having a valuable role to play. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses intelligence policy in France. The author talks about the 2008 reforms in intelligence under French President Nicolas Sarkozy. The author explains that this reform does not formally recognize the existence of a French Intelligence Community. The author provides information on the history of intelligence policy in France. The author talks about how in the French Civil Service system, recruitments and careers in intelligence are kept separate. The article also discusses the French External Intelligence Agency which set up a specific formal recruitment for its civilian component.

The article discusses the countering of nontraditional human intelligence collection threats. The author talks about the U.S. National Counterintelligence Strategy and other national guidelines that address the relevance of nontraditional adversaries as active threats. The author addresses what nontraditional adversaries are. The elements of nontraditional intelligence collecting are examined. Subjects of the article also include the study of post-incident successes or failures, organizational objectives, and the use of insiders as counterintelligence agents.

The article discusses Collection Management Officers (CMOs) in the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) National Clandestine Service (NCS). The authors explain that CMOs specialize in the collecting of intelligence gathered from clandestine sources. CMOs then distribute their information to the policymaker. The author details several other roles and responsibilities of CMOs. The article lists the criteria CMOs are responsible for meeting, including the required use of foreign intelligence. The article also discusses asset validation, which is how the NCS determines whether an agent is loyal and trustworthy.

A partir de un planteamiento histórico se presenta el reciente origen de las fuentes abiertas de información dentro y fuera de Internet. Asimismo, se tratan las cuestiones epistemológicas relativas a la terminología para fijar este concepto. Se contrastan algunas definiciones surgidas recientemente y se establecen los criterios para una definición óptima. Se realiza un análisis comparativo entre fuentes convencionales, alternativas y abiertas. Se expone el concepto de recurso abierto y su tipología. Se explican las fuentes y recursos de carácter relacional. Se argumenta la utilidad de estas fuentes para los servicios de inteligencia. Se exponen las habilidades profesionales para la correcta explotación de estos recursos. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The discovery of many cases of wrongful conviction in the criminal justice system involving admissions from innocent suspects has led psychologists to examine the factors contributing to false confessions. However, little systematic research has assessed the processes underlying Human Intelligence (HUMINT) interrogations relating to military and intelligence operations. The current article examines the similarities and differences between interrogations in criminal and HUMINT settings, and discusses the extent to which the current empirical literature can be applied to criminal and/or HUMINT interrogations. Finally, areas of future research are considered in light of the need for improving HUMINT interrogation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This history of intelligence contracting in the United States is in many ways the story of American intelligence itself. For all the current criticism of this “new post-9/11 industry,” intelligence contracting pre-existed the creation of formal intelligence bureaucracies and gradually developed from alliance-based intelligence sharing and ad-hoc individual agreements into the increasingly private and corporate companies of today. Most of the criticisms of the field are similarly rooted in history: over the ages, some have been legitimate and others less so. Ultimately, when viewed in context, however, intelligence contracting is not nearly as dark or nefarious as is typically portrayed, but rather has been and continues to be a pillar of American intelligence production. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

In this paper we design and implement a home surveillance system based on an embedded system with multiple ultrasonic sensor modules to enhance the system `s reliability. Each ultrasonic sensor module includes a transmitter and a receiver, and the modules are placed in a line direction. Because the ultrasonic transmission will spread at a beam angle, we use multiple ultrasonic receivers to receive the ultrasonic transmission. If any intruder passes through the ultrasonic sensing area, the ultrasonic transmission will be blocked by the human body. As the receivers will not receive any transmission from the ultrasonic transmitter, the system will sense when someone is passing through the surveillance area. We use a Majority Voting Mechanism (MVM) for a group of sensors. If over half the sensors in a sensor group sense a signal blocking, the majority voting program starts the Web camera. The mathematical equation and the sensing experiment show that we improve the system's reliabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper treats terrorism as an economic phenomenon— as a way to understand it and to control it. It uses the tools of substitution, innovation, and cycles and concludes by noting the importance of intelligence and that the most valuable approach to defeating terrorism is that of denying resources to the terrorists rather than attempting to protect assets at risk. It notes that we are probably not any safer than before the implementation of the post–9/11 strategies and emphasizes that new initiatives must be undertaken to prevent terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several recent amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) will sunset on December 31, 2009. Section 600 1(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act (IRTPA), also known as the "lone wolf" provision, changed the rules regarding the types of individuals that could be targets of FISA-authorized searches. It permits surveillance of non-U.S. persons engaged in international terrorism, without requirmg evidence linking those persons to an identifiable foreign power or terrorist organization. Section 206 of the USA PATRIOT ACT amended FISA to permit multipoint, or "roving," wiretaps by adding flexibility to the degree of specificity with which the location or facility subject to electronic surveillance under FISA must be identified. Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT ACT enlarged the scope of documents that could be sought under FISA, and lowered the standard required before a court order could be issued compelling the production of documents. While these provisions will cease to be prospectively effective on December 31, 2009, a grandfather clause permits them to remain effective with respect to investigations that began, or potential offenses that took place, before the sunset date. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress has focused considerable attention on how intelligence is collected, analyzed, and disseminated in order to protect the homeland against terrorist threats. Prior to 9/11, it was possible to make a distinction between "domestic intelligence"—primarily law enforcement information collected within the United States—and "foreign intelligence"— primarily military, political, and economic intelligence collected outside the country. Today, threats to the homeland posed by terrorist groups are now national security threats. Intelligence collected outside the United States is often very relevant to the threat environment inside the United States and vice versa. Although the activities involved in homeland security intelligence (HSINT) itself are not new, the relative importance of state, local, and private sector stakeholders; the awareness of how law enforcement information might protect national security; and the importance attached to homeland security intelligence have all increased substantially since the events of 9/11. There are numerous intelligence collection disciplines through which the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) collects intelligence to support informed national security decision-making at the national level and the allocation of tactical military and law enforcement resources at the local level. The collection disciplines are generally referred to as those which fall within national technical means or non-technical means. Technical means include signals intelligence (SIGINT), measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT), and imagery intelligence (IMINT). Nontechnical means include human intelligence (HUMINT) and open source intelligence (OSINT). Each of these collection disciplines is source-specific—that is, a technical platform or human source, generally managed by an agency or mission manager, collects intelligence that is used for national intelligence purposes. HSINT, however, is generally not source specific, as it includes both national technical and nontechnical means of collection. For example, HSINT includes human intelligence collected by federal border security personnel or state and local law enforcement officials, as well as SIGINT collected by the National Security Agency. Reasonable individuals can differ, therefore, with respect to the question of whether HSINT is another collection discipline, or whether homeland security is simply another purpose for which the current set of collection disciplines is being harnessed. Homeland security information, as statutorily defined, pertains directly to (1) terrorist intentions and capabilities to attack people and infrastructure within the United States, and (2) U.S. abilities to deter, prevent, and respond to potential terrorist attacks. This report provides a potential conceptual model of how to frame HSINT, including geographic, structural/statutory, and holistic approaches. Given that state, local, tribal, and private sector officials play such an important role in HSINT, the holistic model, one not constrained by geography or levels of government, strikes many as the most compelling. The report argues that there is, in effect, a Homeland Security Intelligence Community (HSIC). Although the HSIC's members are diffused across the nation, they share a common counterterrorism interest. The proliferation of intelligence and information fusion centers across the country indicate that state and local leaders believe there is value to centralizing intelligence gathering and analysis in a manner that assists them in preventing and responding to local manifestations of terrorist threats to their people, infrastructure, and other assets. At the policy and operational levels, the communication and integration of federal HSINT efforts with these state and local fusion centers will likely remain an important priority and future challenge. This report will not be updated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The history of science is replete with instances of constant sociological and economic challenges posed by technical breakthroughs. On the other hand, one could equally argue that it had been sociological factors which fomented such breakthroughs. Both interpretations lead to the same effect, the increased complexity of the information sphere confronting us everyday. A number of researchers such as Shannon have argued an entropic effect for information. Some psychologist have suggested that our history from the standpoint of information dexterity could be interpreted by the degree of interaction of individual intelligence with collective intelligence as represented by institutions, such as universities or constructs, such as the web. Social Network Tools could be seen as just another challenge in dealing with complexity of our information sphere. The primary question is whether there is a criticality of information mass that leads to discovery and whether it is still a process driven by individuals or communities? A Human Intelligence (HUMINT) approach would mean designing modalities for the information worker to serve as an agent for such discovery. The Web Intelligence (WEBINT) approach would mean designing modalities for communities in which a complex system is constructed to ensure an expected, and therefore, quantifiable level of discovery. Borrowing heavily from the concept of Multiple Intelligences, the paper indicates that perhaps new pedagogical models need to be defined to address the issue as well as a mixed approach to information handling to facilitate such discovery within organizations, especially technical universities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article talks about the regulation of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning into various businesses and products. It describes AI as the science and engineering of making intelligent machines especially intelligent computer programmes which perform human intelligence task; and also highlights its programming focuses on cognitive skills such as learning, reasoning and self-correction.

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An interview with former U.S. Secretary of the Navy, John F. Lehman, Jr., is presented. When asked about his military career, he refers to a childhood ambition which he rowed competitively with several degrees. Lehman thinks that the Defense Commission has made the country safer. Lehman urges to rebuild the human intelligence and special operations.

The article presents the discussion on technological change long being an important characteristic of industrial évolution in the Western world. Topics include chip technology being différent from the previous technological innovations adopted in practically all sectors of the economy; and jobs in manufacturing required human intelligence now be performed with machine intelligence.

The article discusses an interview published in a previous edition of the journal between interviewer Douglas Naquin and interviewee Hamilton Bean on subjects including the Intelligence Community (IC), open source intelligence (OSINT). The author discusses his use of all-source intelligence in Afghanistan, his perspective on what he calls the liberation of the Open Source Center (OSC) from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and his thoughts on OSINT as human intelligence (HUMINT).

The article discusses the role of human observation in the world of technological innovations and also correlates it with the James Bond films. It informs that technology can be used only to collect information but the analyzing those data is not possible without human intervention and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security regularly provides funds for the research works related to intelligence agencies.