Search

Since several years, the fragility of global supply chains (GSCs) is at historically high levels. In the same time, the landscape of hybrid threats is expanding. This paper aims to assess the economies' foreign input reliance and foreign market reliance, identify possible vulnerabilities by simulating shocks to GSCs in presence of uncertainty. We stress test supply chains by simulating most demanding circumstances and crystallise relevant, effective and efficient policy solutions. Conceptually, we employ a newly developed modelling framework, which is specially designed to account for the increasingly inter-dependent GSCs and study resilience and robustness in presence of hybrid shocks. The scalable data model is parameterised by combining World-Input Output Tables with those from the Inter-Country Input-Output. We study how the decision of a GSC input sourcing diversification changes in the presence of uncertainty and what are the implications for supply chain robustness and resilience. Model-based simulations facilitate decision making by providing interoperable and directly comparable quantifications of counterfactual resilience and robustness strategic choices and allow to identify policy solutions towards baseline resilience requirements.

In 2020, EU companies imported intermediate products worth 2.4 trillion euros, which made up more than half of total merchandise imports of the EU. Compared to the pre-crisis year 2019, imports of intermediates decreased by 13 percent, partly driven by the lower fuel prices. A detailed analysis of trade in value added shows that in most EU countries more than half of the imported intermediate products come from other EU member states. Extra-EU sources of value added in domestic final demand and exports are particularly important in the smaller economies like Luxembourg and Malta, but also in the biggest EU member states Germany, France, Italy and Spain. Among the Non-EU countries, especially the USA, UK, China, and Russia contribute substantially in terms of value added to the production process of EU member states. The USA are the most important source of value added outside the EU for several countries like Ireland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, France, Spain, etc. The UK is the top non-EU-provider of value added for Cyprus. China delivers the largest share of non-EU value added in some countries from Central and Eastern Europe like Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Poland. Russia is particularly important for the Baltic countries, Bulgaria and Slovakia. Among the EU member states, Germany is the most important source of value added for the domestic final demand and exports in most of the other EU countries - notable exceptions are Belgium and Ireland, where more value added comes from France than from Germany. The corona crisis has revealed the fragility of global value chains. Industries are increasingly and asymmetrically connected with each other. Value chains were internationalized to achieve efficiency and economies of scale. Outsourcing, offshoring and lean production lines with low inventory stocks, however, have made the European economy vulnerable to disruptions and shortages of supply chains. A disruption caused by an event such as the corona crisis can propagate along supply chains affecting direct and indirect suppliers as well as customers of disaster-stricken firms. Hence, the perceived trade-off between low prices of intermediate products and the increased risk of being dependent on complex global supply chains has gained new attention in the context of the pandemic. European policymakers are thus calling for a larger role of reshoring in some industries. However, the actual size and dimensions of reshoring in Europe and Germany in the past have been limited as this is only one of many possible strategies to increase resilience of value chains. This indicates a misalignment between the perspective of companies and priorities of policy makers. The design of the value chain network is a matter of economic decision-making and a potential structural change can only be initiated by companies in the course of reassessing the above-mentioned trade-off and of reconsidering the risks of international supply chains. Besides reshoring, other potential measures to increase resilience concern the diversification of supply chains, increasing stockkeeping, or adjusting delivery times. In terms of economic policy, state interventions are only reasonable for industries producing essentials (e.g. certain medicines or personal protective equipment). However, it is crucial that supply chains, which are already disrupted, are not further affected by additional trade conflicts. Protectionist measures covered in the strategy of restructuring supply chains motivated by the current crisis hence entail the danger of reversing the achievements in trade liberalization and specialization of the last decades.

Wir analysieren, ob die Gründung der Eurozone und die Eurokrise einen Einfluss auf die sportliche Leistung professioneller Fußballvereine in europäischen Nationen hatten. Wir finden ein signifikant positives Vorzeichen für die Mitgliedschaft in der Eurozone auf Punkte der UEFA. Allerdings ist dieses positive Ergebnis nicht robust über die Zeit und verschwindet in Modelle mit mehr Kovariaten. Wahrscheinlich handelt es sich um einen Größeneffekt, doch zumindest brachte die Euroeinführung keine Nachteile im Fußball., We analyse whether the creation of the eurozone and the euro crisis had an effect on the sportive performance of professional football teams in European nations. We find a significantly positive sign of membership in the eurozone on UEFA points. However, this positive finding is not robust over time and disappears in models with more covariates. It is probably a size effect but at least the adoption of the euro brought no disadvantages in football.

Using the measures proposed by Mink et al. (2012), we reexamine the coherence of business cycles in the euro area using a long sample period. We also analyze the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on business cycle coherence and examine whether our measures for business cycle coherence indicate a core versus periphery within EMU. Our results suggest that business cycle coherence did not increase monotonically. The COVID-19 pandemic made that the signs of the output gaps of euro area countries became more similar, but we find large differences in the amplitude of the output gaps across countries.

Der Begriff der Abhängigkeit findet in jüngerer Zeit immer mehr Eingang in politische Debatten. Sei es die Abhängigkeit der deutschen Wirtschaft von Exporten, die militärische Abhängigkeit Europas von den USA und nicht zuletzt die Abhängigkeit der Deutschen vom russischen Gas - Abhängigkeiten scheinen politisch allgegenwärtig und gleichzeitig kaum lösbar. Dabei werden Abhängigkeiten immer erst dann zu einem Problem, wenn sich Beziehungen zwischen Staaten neu konfigurieren oder scheinbar unvorhergesehene Ereignisse die Handelsströme plötzlich stören. Wie aber genau lassen sich Abhängigkeiten definieren, wann bestehen sie und wann werden sie zu einem Problem? In dieser Studie werden wir uns dem Begriff der Abhängigkeit nähern, in dem wir eine breite Definition vorschlagen, die neben geoökonomischen Abhängigkeiten auch politische Abhängigkeiten umfasst. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die deutschen wirtschaftlichen Abhängigkeiten im internationalen Vergleich zwar gering ausfallen können, im Bereich der Abhängigkeit von mineralischen Brennstoffen und Rohstoffen aber hingegen große Abhängigkeiten bestehen. Zudem können Abhängigkeiten von bestimmten Ländern problematischer sein als andere, sodass es auch qualitative Unterschiede gibt. Darüber hinaus gibt es Phasen, in denen gewisse Abhängigkeiten problematisch werden, weil Konflikte zwischen den Ländern entstehen und wirtschaftliche Abhängigkeiten als politische Druckmittel verwendet werden. Politisch hat sich Deutschland in eine intendierte Abhängigkeit zu den anderen EU-Mitgliedstaaten sowie der USA begeben und steht beim Klimaschutz aufgrund der international gegenseitigen Abhängigkeiten vor großen Herausforderungen. The concept of dependency has been at the center of most recent policy debates. The German economy's dependence on exports, Europe's military dependence on the USA and, not least, the Germans' dependence on Russian gas - dependencies seem omnipresent and at the same time hardly solvable. However, dependencies only become a problem when relationships between states are reconfigured, or unforeseen events suddenly disrupt the geoeconomic order. In this study, we try to define different types of dependencies and ask when do they exist and when do they become a problem. Therefore, we will approach the concept of dependency by proposing a broad definition that includes political dependencies in addition to geoeconomic dependencies. The results show that while Germany's economic dependencies may be relatively small in international comparison, major dependencies can be identified in the area of mineral fuels and raw materials. Moreover, dependency can only unfold its full problematic nature in its absolute dimension. In addition, there are phases in which certain dependencies become problematic because conflicts arise between countries and economic dependencies are used as political weapon. Politically, Germany has placed itself in an intentional dependency on the other EU member states and the USA and faces the necessary challenge of global coordination of the climate protection due to the international interdependence in this area.

This study describes trade margins (intensive and extensive) and establishes determinants of the mid-point export and import growth during the global financial crisis (GFC) and COVID-19 pandemic by relying on Kenya's monthly customs transaction data (at 6-digit level of Harmonized System) for the period January 2006-June 2020. Exports fell during the two crises, of which the intensive margin was responsible for the drop during GFC while the extensive margin dominated the COVID-19 era. Imports are mainly driven by the extensive margin which grew during GFCbut declined during the pandemic. However, the fall in the intensive and extensive margins was near symmetrical during the pandemic. Estimates from the fixed-effects regression model reveal that the decrease in export and import mid-point growth was larger during the COVID-19 pandemic than GFC and it was determined by several factors: firm-, product- and partner-country characteristics. Overall, addressing both supply- and demand-side shocks can help countries adjust better to future crises.

Especially with the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, Asian countries have advocated a profound reform of the international financial architecture. Their proposals focused on two main axes: a reform of the global financial system and stronger regional monetary integration in Asia. There are here significant parallels with the ideas of Robert Triffin (1911-1993). Triffin became famous with trenchant analyses of the vulnerabilities of the international monetary system, especially his book Gold and the Dollar Crisis. Triffin put forward several proposals for reforming the global monetary system, but he also developed proposals for regional monetary integration. These were very much based on his experience with the European Payments Union, and focused on the creation of a (European) Reserve Fund and a (European) currency unit. In this paper we focus on Triffin's proposals for an Asian payments union in the late 1960s, giving special attention to Japan (in Triffin's time the biggest Asian economy).

The formation of a customs administration framework based on the digital economy in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) requires the application of fundamentally new technologies. The successful implementation of digital technologies in the information space of the EAEU presupposes the solution of a number of problems associated with the ensuring the implementation of the concept of sustainable development of the EEU member states in the new economic reality and transition to a new paradigm of customs administration based on the digitalization of the processes of regulation of foreign economic activity. Based on this paradigm, we set the following tasks: to identify trends and substantiate the need for digitalization of the customs administration mechanism in the Eurasian Economic Union based on the use of new technologies; to reveal the meaningful features of digital technologies that are promising for the development of the mechanism of customs administration of the EAEU; consider the applied aspects of the latest information technologies used in the course of EAEU customs administration system digitalization; and assess the prospects for their use, analyze the prospects of organizational, legal and managerial support of this process in the EAEU at the supranational and national levels. The article concludes that within the framework of the digital transformation of the EAEU, new opportunities are opening up for the customs regulation framework, based on the introduction of technologies for analyzing large amounts of data, immersive technologies, blockchain, the use of innovative methods for obtaining and processing customs information (satellite tracking, radio frequency identification), and the introduction of artificial intelligence technologies in customs control processes.

This paper uses a survey among students at European universities to explore whether Russia's invasion of Ukraine has affected attitudes toward European integration. Some respondents completed the survey just before Russia's assault on February 24, 2022, and some did so just afterwards, thus delivering a quasi-experimental design situation, which we exploit. Our results suggest that the ominous news about the Russian attack increased the participants' interest in EU politics, consolidated their attachment to the EU, and made them more mindful and appreciative of the benefits of deeper European integration. In effect, the war so close to the EU Eastern border provoked a rally around the supranational EU flag, with convergence of public opinion toward shared European values.

This paper analyzes whether the propensity to secede by subnational regions responds mostly to differences in income per capita or to distinct identities. We explore this question in a quantitative political economy model where people's willingness to finance a public good depends on their income and identity. Using high-resolution economic and linguistic data for the entire globe, we predict the propensity to secede of 3,003 subnational regions in 173 countries. We validate the model-based predictions with data on secessionist movements, state fragility, regional autonomy, and conflict, as well as with an application to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Counterfactual analysis strongly suggests that identity trumps income in determining a region's propensity to secede. Removing identity differences reduces the average support for secession from 7.5% to 0.6% of the population.

We construct a new global commodity-level export dataset to analyze the persistence of export patterns as proxies of productive capabilities across the first and the current waves of global- ization. We find that productive capabilities are path-dependent and historical capabilities are powerful predictors of countries’ incomes today. This is robust to controlling for persistence in geography, institutions, and colonial status, and confirmed by instrumenting past capabilities with asymmetric reductions in travel times following the switch from sailing to steamboats. We also show that the “great specialization” in primary goods and manufacturing goods exporters coincided with a great polarization in global diversification levels.

Adam Smith finalised his magnum opus An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations between 1773 (Boston Tea Party) and 1776 (Declaration of Independence), and in its final paragraph Britain should “endeavour to accommodate her future views and designs to the real mediocrity of her circumstances”. The Wealth of Nations was “aimed to influence British MPs [Members of Parliament] to support a peaceful resolution to the American colonies’ War of Independence”, A. Smith “urged legislators to awaken from the “golden dream” of empire and avoid “a long, expensive and ruinous war”“, and “rejection of the protectionist Corn Laws in favour of opening up to the world economy marked the start of an era of globalization which contributed to Britain’s prosperity”, as Yueh (2019, p. 16f) puts it. Over the years, industrialization brought about by the Industrial Revolution has been challenged by deindustrialization, globalization by deglobalization. So with the “Brexit issue” at stake, what has been the “Brexitologic of Competitiveness”? In an earlier relevant series of analyses published by Čiderová et al. between 2012-2014 our focus was on the Global Competitiveness Index (alias the GCI by the World Economic Forum) in a spectrum of territorial and temporal perspectives related to the European Union. Now, in this follow-up comparative study zooming out to globalization and zooming in to competitiveness, our focus is streamlined to the “openended Brexit issue” on the background of updates of the GCI (alias GCI 4.0) and the KOF Globalisation Index (the latter by ETH Zürich).

Cross-border capital flows are expected to lead to increased international risk sharing by facilitating borrowing and lending in global financial markets. This paper examines risk-sharing outcomes of various types of capital flows (foreign direct investment, portfolio equity, debt, remittance, and aid flows) in a large sample of emerging market and developing economies. The results suggest that remittances and aid flows are associated with increased international risk sharing. Other types of capital flows are not consistently correlated with better risk-sharing outcomes. These findings are robust to the use of different econometric specifications, country-specific characteristics, and other controls.

The study investigates the imperative of corporate governance on profitability of privatized cement industry in Nigeria. The variables studied were Rate of Returns as dependent variables and fourteen Corporate Governance proxies as independent variables. Data was collected from secondary sources, and the statistical tools employed in the Methodology were descriptive statistics and Pooled OLS regressions. The study aimed at bridging literature gap on studies that relate corporate governance and privatization policy in Nigeria. The results suggest that, no remarkable improvement of profitability post privatization due to challenges of exogenous factors such as macroeconomic environment instability and weak private sector. The industry witnessed changes in corporate governance such as adopting effective cost management and proactive business strategies, exposure to competition, withdrawal of Government subsidy and special grant post privatisation. Board Size and Workforce have positive and significant impact on Cement industry’s profitability, while, State Ownership, Institutional Ownership, Minority ownership, Percentage of Executive Directors and Privatization with time have negative and significant impact on company’s profitability. Conversely, Foreign Investors, Percentage of Non-Executive Directors and Percentage of Management Staff have positive and insignificant impact on the Cement industry’s profitability. Thus, it will be pertinent to conclude that the result has accepted Alternative Hypothesis that corporate governance has significant impact on the Cement industry’s performance (AROA), despite the challenges of microeconomic environment instability. The study recommends that, Government needs to stabilize macroeconomic environment and strengthen private sector. The Cement Industry needs to ensure right procedure of the selection of Non-Executive Directors, create incentive for foreign investor participation, ensure Payment of dividend, less government interference and accountability. Mechanisms such as efficient and independent audit committee, competent executive directors and professional management team need to be put in place to address the negative and insignificant impact of management staff on the industry.Keywords. Corporate governance, Profitability, Privatization, Cement industry.JEL. C01, C50, E10, E60, F02, F30, F41.

The objective of this work is to study the exchange rate policy and its impact on sectoral competitiveness in Morocco. For this issue we used a VAR econometric model with annual data covering a period from 1990 to 2020. As a result of this study, we found that the exchange rate policy adopted and applied by the Moroccan monetary authorities showed that the real effective exchange rate experienced an appreciation that is, a loss of competitiveness. Thus, the monetary authorities have chosen the second course of action which is the gradual flexibility of the exchange rate regime and the improvement of the weak performance of exports. This is done through the diversification of production structures on the one hand and the diversification of exports on the other. Indeed, the overvaluation of the national currency results in a loss of competitiveness towards foreign countries, which means that domestic goods cost more than they should. Conversely, when the domestic currency is undervalued, this allows a gain in competitiveness.Keywords. Competitiveness, Exchange rate policy, VAR, Production structures, Diversification of exports..JEL. C01, C50, E10, E60, F02, F30, F41.

The statistical challenges of globalization are profound. We cannot rely solely on national statistics to understand how economies work and how to create industrial policies focusing on competitiveness. It is necessary to see the whole. National statistics build pictures based on relationships between producers and consumers and the rest of the world. But these relationships, especially those with the rest of the world, have become increasingly more complex. There is an increasing need to consider global production within a global accounting framework. This implies a departure from the traditional role of international organizations as compilers of internationally comparable national statistics to bring together the national tables to create a global table.

Since “Belt and Road initiative” (BRI) has been launched, the major volume of academic studies focus on the consideration of Eurasian land and maritime transport routes. Experts on Chinese foreign policy and geopolitical strategy emphasize possible positive and negative aspects of the initiative for the states involved. The business and political circles from Eastern Baltic Sea region are looking for possible ways to attract cargo to its ports. Yet, the possible transformations of Chinese foreign trade flows in the context of BRI are now under academic consideration. We focus on the evaluation of ports’ possibilities to handle Chinese cargo. The key issues of our study include the choice of cargo transportation routes and opportunities to attract Chinese investment to expand port and logistics infrastructure. The methodology of the research is based on statistical data analysis for the further comparison of transport routes. Our empirical results demonstrate that Eastern Baltic Sea ports can attract little part of Chinese trade flows.

A neglected aspect of regional trade agreements (RTAs) is their protectionist potential. In times of a stagnating World Trade Organization (WTO), growing economic nationalism and skepticism about the merits of free trade and trade agreements, the paper examines to what extent recently signed RTAs really promote genuine free trade or rather foster sneaky protectionism under the guise of free trade. For this, the paper proposes an ideal-type free trade agreement benchmark model based on a classical liberal perspective and applies it in a multiple case study approach to assess three cases of recently concluded mega-RTAs: the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the renegotiated North American trade agreement USCMA, and the Canada–European Union (EU) agreement CETA. The article shows that all of them are far from the classical liberal ideal of totally free trade and have a high content of back door protectionism suitable to raise trade barriers when politically opportune. In particular, the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) includes many clear protectionist provisions that might even outweigh its liberalizing stipulations, whereas CPTPP and CETA can be deemed net liberalizing. It concludes that given political economy constraints, RTAs can nevertheless remain a second-best solution to the classical liberal ideals of completely unhampered trade and unilateral liberalization provided that they remove more impediments to free exchange than they cement or create.

The objective of this paper is a presentation of results of an analysis of the Three Seas Initiative (TSI), whose participating countries (except Austria) treat it as a method of: a) reducing their dependence on crude oil and natural gas imports from Russia, thus increasing their energy security; b) accelerated filling of the persisting civilisation gap between the initiative participants and more developed EU countries owing to the improved quality and maturity of the transport and digital North‑South infrastructure; and c) the actual implementation of the “vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace.” The analysis has assumed the following research hypothesis: The CEE states’ joining the EU has not markedly changed those states’ development, as material differences do still exist in this respect between the new EU states and the old ones, which was verified positively. Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie wyników analizy Inicjatywy Trójmorza, którą kraje je tworzące (z wyjątkiem Austii) traktują jako metodę na: a) zmniejszenie uzależnienia energetycznego w zakresie importu ropy i gazu z Rosji, b) szybsze nadrobienie nadal istniejących różnic cywilizacyjnych względem bardziej rozwiniętych krajów EU dzięki poprawieniu jakości i rozwoju infrastruktury transportowej i cyfrowej z Północy na Południe, c) realnemu urzeczywistnieniu „wizji całej, wolnej i pokojowej Europy”. W analizie przyjęto następującą tezę badawczą: Przystąpienie krajów ESW do UE nie przyczyniło się w istotny sposób do zmiany ich statusu rozwojowego, ponieważ w dalszym ciągu istnieją znaczące różnice w poziomie rozwoju pomiędzy krajami nowej i starej Unii, która została zweryfikowana pozytywnie.

The aim of the paper is to identify and assess the role of economic sciences in relation to competitiveness and globalisation, two basic concepts of the market economy. This role is to explain and interpret their essence but also to determine their potential practical usefulness, primarily in the context of economic policy development. The considerations mentioned in the article are, as a rule, of a general and universal nature and do not relate especially to any particular countries or groups of countries. The basic method employed in the study is a critical analysis of the subject literature. The paper consists of an introduction, three sections, and conclusions. Section 1 contains a basic discussion of the subject of economic sciences and describes their four features: cognitive productivity, practical usefulness, dismal nature and beauty. Section 2 presents the contribution of economic sciences to understanding and interpreting the phenomenon of competitiveness. Section 3 focuses on defining and elucidating the idea of globalisation and an examination of its most important aspects. The paper ends with eight conclusions formulated on the basis of this discussion.

Against the background of various European crises, this study looks into the determinants of ‘European Identity’. After a conceptual clarification of terminology, the article describes ongoing trends both in European identity and EU support. The subsequent survey comprehensively summarizes the existing literature’s insights on significant positive and negative determinants of European identity and summarizes findings from a recent study based on Eurobarometer data. These insights help identify target groups and aspects that may guide strategies that foster a European perspective. We elaborate six proposals in more detail: transnational party lists, an EU Citizens’ Assembly, EU consular offices, Pensioners’ Erasmus, a ‘European Waltz’ program and an EU public service broadcaster.

This study aims at examining the integration impact of the five ASEAN Islamic capital markets on asymmetric information for ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) development. Utilizing samples of market and financial panel data from 2009 to 2015 among the five ASEAN Islamic capital markets, and applying two-country portfolios of the Islamic capital markets among the five ASEAN countries to measure the different levels of Islamic capital market integration, this study suggests that the different levels of the Islamic capital market integration between Indonesia and Malaysia are found to result in asymmetric information negatively. The strongest Islamic capital market integration between Indonesia and Malaysia affect reduced asymmetric information more consistently than the other two-country portfolios, while the weakest level of integration between the Philippines and any other four Islamic capital markets that affects asymmetric information inconsistently is also supported. These results confirm an interplay between a modern portfolio theory, Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), contract theory, and general economic theory, and also provide new insights for stakeholders in investment decisions and strategies, cross-border regulation of economic resources, and other plentiful benefits.