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The increasing globalization of markets witnessed in recent years has been paralleled by growing research attention upon the internationalization of small and medium sized firms. In industrialized nations, a significant degree of dormant export potential has been identified in this firm size sector. The proliferation of extant literature can explain structural, behavioural and process-based aspects of export expansion. However, it remains that limited conceptual and empirical insights exist that explain the phenomena underlying pre-export decision making and behaviour. The present inquiry addresses this issue and investigates those obstacles that act upon domestic firms' intentions to enter overseas markets via the export channel. Specifically, the empirical study documented here establishes significant differences in the extent to which exporting obstacles discourage export engagement amongst varied groups of domestic firms considered in terms of their export intention. It also draws a similar comparison between such groups of non-exporting firms and those already engaged in export operations. The findings are interpreted and discussed in the light of current knowledge and attention is paid towards pertinent implications for export management and future research. Key words - exports, implementation, interfirm comparisons, internationalization, marketing, strategy

Three models are employed to analyze the concept that if governments submit to conditions where markets failed, reintroducing markets by backdoor of systems will again lead to market failure. The first model is focused on congestion-prone public goods and indicates that fiscal competition may be dangerous for the governments. The second, which emphasizes insurance function of redistributive taxation, suggests that adverse selection may affect systems competition. Finally, the last focuses on the role of quality regulation, indicating that systems competition may be a competition of laxity leading to incompetently low quality standards.

We consider a common-property resource sold in imperfectly competitive markets. There is a dynamic externality (current harvests lower future stocks, raising future harvest costs) and a static (crowding) externality. Increasing industry size raises costs but lowers prices; thus, it has ambiguous welfare effects. The optimal industry size typically changes over time, so that a first-best outcome cannot be obtained with a fixed number of firms. Single-firm exploitation is optimal only under special circumstances. The socially optimal open-loop steady-state industry size corresponds to the static optimum; both generally differ from the closed-loop steady-state optimum.

Entrepreneurial action, information intensity and market transformation Introduction 'Organizations of the world unite!' proclaim the theorists of the long-awaited, yet much anticipated information revolution and its comrade-in-arms, the global business [...]

Hayek saw markets as producing unintended results though actions were intentional. Hayek was sceptical about the potential for economic order in imposing intended results. His central insight was that there is insufficient knowledge to carry out intervention. There is a need to redefine the economic powers of modern states. Weber's ideas of the state can help in providing a concept to analyze this issue and assess the impact of government intervention.

This paper contrasts an auction and a dealership market. In the latter, parallel to the public market, market makers are allowed to trade with each other in a separate inter-dealer market. Since market makers are assumed to be risk averse, variations in asset holdings induced by trades with outside investors generate portfolio hedging trade. We find that the price at which market makers trade with each other in the inter-dealer market determines the prices quoted in the public market for outside investors. It is shown that an investor gets a better price in the dealership market as long as the market makers and speculators are imperfectly competitive and the delay between executing the customer's order and trading in the inter-dealer market is not too large. Keywords: Auction market; Dealership market; Inter-dealer trading

The Islamic and Western approaches to the unification of knowledge are examined and compared. The analysis focuses on the epistemologies of Abu Hamid Muhammad Ghazzali and Immanuel Kant, two excellent representatives of the differing schools of thought. Ghazzali's problematique of fana' and Kant's problematique of heteronomy are examined and critiqued by means of evolutionary 'Tawhidi' epistemology.

This essay assesses communitarian and democratic critiques of capitalist economies. Distinguishing them are sharply contrasting evaluations of markets and private property. Communitarian critics of capitalism trace its moral failure to [...]

The increase in earnings inequality is primarily caused by greater marketization rather than by the interplay of globalization and technology. Marketization eliminates institutions that fostered wage stability and equality. Aside from workforce training and education, the process contributing to wage inequality can be reversed by curbing several factors including globalization, high unemployment and manufacturing-to-services shift.

Non-cooperative tax policies imposed by independent jurisdictions in a chain of markets result to a decrease in trade volume, assuming that the different organizations set taxes at levels that maximizes their net revenues. A similar level of revenue and increased trade volume, however, could be achieved by monopolization of the chain of markets and sharing of revenues.

I. INTRODUCTION Allocative efficiency is the ratio of the actual to the potential gains from trade, which are equal to the sum of Marshallian consumer and producer surplus.(1) Allocative efficiency [...]

Studies have revealed that technical trading rules produce profits only in periods of intervention, when monetary authorities are trading to influence exchange rates and are willing to lose money in pursuit of their objectives. It has been found that in international financial markets, investors usually focus their sights on the stocks and bonds of their own country since they have better knowledge of the financial markets in their home country than in foreign assets. This bias among investors prevents them from diversifying internationally., Asset pricing - the study of markets for financial assets including stocks, bonds, foreign currencies, and derivatives - is a field in which there is an intense and fruitful interaction [...]

Politics has been tagged as the 'art of compromise.' Voters tend to vote for politicians who share their views, while diverging officials are less likely to garner higher votes. However, such a vote-reward system actually prevents politicians from total and honest compromise. The opposite situation is true for the private markets, as more people are willing to bargain for desired products or services.

The equilibria of general economic models with incomplete asset markets or GEI can be calculated by utilizing an algorithm based on the existence of a route of zeros of a homotopy. The domain of the homotopy includes a Grassmann Manifold and the price simplex. Relocalization may be necessary after localization and following diffeomorphic pieces in Euclidean space.

The existence of a general equilibrium in a two-period economy with infinite-dimensional space and incomplete financial markets presents no problem, as long as securities are purely financial. The assumption is that trading occurs in the sequence of spot markets and futures markets for securities payable in units of account, with unlimited short-selling permitted. The existence of such an equilibrium is proved for an economy with Mackey continuity, weak convexity, strict monotonicity, complete preferences and strictly positive endowments.

Dynamics of price disequilibrium caused by demand asymmetries in hierarchically organized spatial markets fail to produce an adjustment of the prices in duopolistic corporations. A corporation varies its prices in a decision-making process due to changes in urban market demand and original prices. Analytical models of spatial competition show that prices should converge towards an equilibrium. Moreover, the possibility of organizing the prices on the basis of knowledge of demand conditions is contrary to the concept of oligopolistic competition.

The complete characterization of quality choices in a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation is presented, where firms choose the quality of the product and then compete in prices. Market outcomes at the price stage are shown as endogenous outcomes of equilibrium quality choice. The distribution of consumers' tastes is considered as the decisive factor in product differentiation.

A theory is developed on ambiguous property rights in which property owners have to contest the actual control right in all situations. The highly successful non-state sector of China is a prime example of ambiguous property rights, which arise because of a market environment that is imperfect. It was suggested that in China's undeveloped market environment, ambiguous property rights are more efficient than clearly defined private property rights.

A direct test on the equality of variance-covariance matrices and correlation matrices is used to study the intervalling effect on the intertemporal stability in stock return relationships in six emerging Asian markets and four developed markets. Empirical analysis indicates that diversifying into the Asian emerging markets is beneficial and that correlation matrices of stock returns are more stable than variance-covariance matrices. The patterns of stock market co-movement are more stable as the time period considered becomes shorter.

Jean-Baptiste Say was well-known among his contemporary economists and even nowadays several of his ideas continue to wield influence. The reason for this tenacity is that every time one constituent [...]

This paper re-examines the relationship between the R & D intensity of an industry and its level of concentration, from the perspective of the Bounds approach to market structure. In so doing, it proposes an index which summarises those aspects of technology and tastes that are relevant to the determination of a lower bound to concentration. Keywords: Technology; Market structure; Industrial structure

The heart of modern economics is the study of 'the market,' eventually ensuing in the General Equilibrium model. J. M. Keynes ignored this line of inquiry but from 1907, when he was at the India Office, to the 1940s, when he made proposals for the post-war reconstruction of the financial system, he often addressed himself to the functioning of markets. He is critical of many markets for promoting instability, and especially for embodying low values (greed, fears). It is suggested that Keynes' views on markets were shaped by his personal experiences as an investor; by his realistic, non-theoretical approach; by his anti-Benthamite values and by his sensitivity to the unemployment and 'chaos' they often caused.

Prices can still disclose all information pertinent to agents under specific preference restrictions even though asset markets are not complete and the level of uncertainty is more than the assets in the economy. The restrictions, which are highly narrow, require that agents' preferences possess linear and parallel Engle curves for each state of the world. For fully revealing prices, investors should have preferences of the linear-risk-tolerance class.

The three concepts of organizations, markets and institutions are analyzed together with their structural properties to gain a better understanding of how free market economies work. A mathematical model is employed to compare the structures of these concepts and analyze how they are related to each other. Results indicate that it is important to maintain distinct concepts to accurately determine how economies emerge and stabilize.

There are several factors that influence the capability and willingness of a firm to acquire and process information. These include the nature of the firm's strategic markets, the cost involved in its transactions, the level of competition offered by rivals and the coordination and cooperation among the firm's key officials. All of these factors determine the policy of a firm with regard to information acquisition and use.

Organizations are an inseparable part of the market driven capitalist economies but the classical and neo classical economic theories largely ignore this aspect. Even the new institutional economics explain organizational behavior solely in terms drawn from neoclassical economics such as agency, asymmetric information, transaction costs and opportunism. The explanation is incomplete as it ignores organizational mechanisms like authority, identification and coordination. The study examines issues related to organizations and markets.

An analysis of Chapter 5 of Carl Menger's 'Principles of Economics' reveals the originality in his approach to market economics. Among the topics addressed are his methodologies, notions of equilibrium, the formation of product prices in a decentralized economy, competition among buyers for a single unit of a monopolizing good, active monopoly pricing and full competition with special reference to seller's competition. Menger's analysis of price formation is unique as he ignores the Walarasian assumption of interdependence of markets and analyzes price in a single market.

Three established empirical generalizations have been identified, namely, a negative relationship between order of market entry and market share exists, that the entrant's market share divided by the first entrant's share is equal to one divided by the square root of order of market entry for consumer packaged goods and prescription anti-ulcer drugs, and that market pioneer share advantages slowly decline over time. Four emerging generalizations have also been presented, but these lack additional research support.

This paper is concerned with decentralized models of market equilibrium in which the primary interest lies in the nature of the institutions that govern trade. There are two separate branches in this literature. In the first, the institutions that govern trade are taken to be given exogenously. The primary motivation for models in this class is essentially the study of comparative institutions. In particular the papers are interested in whether there are specific institutions that will generate Walrasian prices and allocations approximately when transactions costs are small. In the second branch of the literature, the institutions that govern trade themselves are made endogenous. These models characterize the nature of these endogenously generated institutions and examine their efficiency in environments where transactions costs are small.

It is commonly accepted that 'free markets' existed at least to some extent in the USSR during the New Economic Policy (NEP). Support for this notion comes from Lenin, Trotsky, Bukharin, Preobrazhenskii, and a whole host of other participants and commentators on the 1920s. Despite this, there is little empirical analysis of markets, free or otherwise, which can be called upon to support or refute the notion, in either Soviet or western literature. Thus the purpose of this article is to begin to investigate market behaviour in the USSR in the 1920s by focusing on commodity markets such as those for grain and manufactures, and to see to what extent they could be called 'free' markets. Correlation and regression techniques are commonly used for analysing the degree of development of markets. By subjecting price data from different regions of a country to correlation analysis a judgement can be made about whether such markets are unified, based on the axiom that in a single market similarity of price movement for a given good prevails. However, it is clearly problematic to take such a measurement as an indicator of the degree of 'freeness' of markets. Nevertheless, as capitalism requires national markets in order to function, it is one step towards an analysis of the 'freeness' of markets to analyse their degree of integration. It is certainly the case that non-integrated markets cannot be free markets in the capitalist sense, and therefore integration is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 'freeness'. It could be argued that non-capitalist free markets could exist at a local level, and thus that integration is not a necessary condition for 'freeness'. This may be logically possible, but it is clear that when Lenin, Trotsky, and all the other commentators speak of allowing the 'free market' to exist in NEP they actually mean free markets in a capitalist sense, that is where the market mechanism operates. For this to happen, it would seem reasonable to argue that higher levels of market integration are required than the purely local. Thus, this article focuses on correlation analysis of commodity price movements in the USSR during NEP as a first step towards a more rigorous analysis of NEP markets. A perennial problem with correlation analysis is to determine what numerical result justifies the conclusion that the markets under analysis are indeed unified. To overcome this difficulty, correlation coefficients for commodity markets in the USSR are compared with corresponding coefficients for markets in the US. If Soviet markets are close to the integration levels found in the US (which is regarded as the paradigm of free trade capitalism) it seems reasonable to conclude that they were indeed unified. A danger with correlation analysis is that the presence of autocorrelation in datasets - when successive values of a time series are related rather than independent - may lead to detected correlation levels being exaggerated. To overcome this problem, differencing of the price series is used together with tests for autocorrelation. Another problem encountered is the nature of the available Soviet price data. If fixed state prices were analysed a high correlation coefficient might be expected, since the state sets these prices at a national level, but this would not mean that free or integrated markets existed in the capitalist sense. However, data are available for free, or private, markets in the USSR in the 1920s, published by bodies such as the Conjuncture Institute headed by N. D. Kondrat'ev. This was closed by the Soviet authorities towards the end of the 1920s, and thus should not be regarded as being politically biased in favour of the Soviet government. Such data were collected in good faith, and no problem arises regarding deliberate falsification for political ends, although this does not mean, of course, that the data are necessarily totally accurate. However, data for comparison are available from institutions such as Gosplan, and thus checks are possible. This investigation relates to what is usually taken to be the 'big issue' of NEP in the existing historiographical literature - the viability of a mixed economy alternative to Stalin's centrally planned industrialization policy. If no level of market integration is detected in the actual NEP economy, then an industrialization drive based on a mixed economy would have required much development of market infrastructure and culture. If, on the other hand, NEP markets were reasonably integrated, then some basic level of all-Union market infrastructure could be said to exist. This would have aided industrialization within the NEP framework. Of course, the question of whether integrated markets could have been politically acceptable to a Bolshevik leadership cannot be answered by the use of statistics. Section I tries to relate the concept of free markets to the USSR in the 1920s, while section II attempts to define a standard of comparison for correlation coefficients, and section III explores how geography might influence integration. The next section examines Soviet work on this topic written during NEP, after which section V presents an original statistical analysts of NEP price data, and section VI raises the question of the quantity of goods traded on free markets at this time. Since price data suitable for correlation analysis were difficult to locate, this article can only be a first step towards analysing NEP markets.

Credence goods are goods which are sold be people who decide what the needs of clients are, for example medical services. These markets should be analysed since they are often licensed by public authorities. Fraud may be present in these markets even though there is also competition. Experts who also sell in these markets are able to set prices, and can benefit from higher prices, and expected customer surplus is not maximised by equilibrium.

Monte Carlo simulations were used to estimate monopsony power via a structural model and a derivative of Hall's nonstructural technique. Hall's approach does not need as much data and as explicit assumptions as the structural model, but requires production to have constant returns to scale assumptions. On the other hand, the structural model uses the production function's returns to scale to identify certain market structures. In general, Hall's method can be applied more easily and its functional specifications are well defined.

Edward Phelps, in his new book 'Structural Slumps,' deviates from the traditional treatment of the determinants of employment and economic activity, particularly the Keynesian and monetarist. For instance, real factors, not monetary, are emphasized. It also highlights the determinants of aggregate supply rather than aggregate demand. The overall structure of the theory is also solely concerned on the equilibrium explanations.

Market structure models are useful for identifying submarkets or for investigating the existence of submarkets in cases where within-group competition is more prevalent than across group competition. A model is developed that is based on a subset selection methodology that uses brand switching data to examine competitive market structures. This model has many uses, including testing for the existence of structure in the market and identifying a possible structure at the same time. It also tests for notable variety-seeking effects that can be found in the market and relates a degree of statistical confidence with the identified submarkets. This approach can by very useful to managers with unrealiable market structure information and also for conducting other types of analyses.

Agents possessing finite sets of transactions comprise a market. Statistical equilibrium can be derived from the distribution of agents over the offer sets which can be attained in the largest number of ways. It exists if there is a Gibbsian canonical distribution and a feasible market transaction. Pareto-efficiency is estimated by statistical equilibrium and requires the modification of the First and Second Theorems.

Transactors and markets can be studied in both anthropology and economics, and interdisciplinary studies could provide a new view of higgling. Higgling originated as the process of bargaining in a marketplace, but its application in economics is limited. Anthropology can make greater use of higgling because the list of bargainer qualities is open-ended. However, theoretical and methodological differences between anthropology and economics make interdisciplinary work a difficult prospect.