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Both states and private associations have well-established standing to assert claims in federal court based on harm to their constituents. Cities, though they have much in common with both states and associations, are generally denied that very sort of representational standing. That denial unnecessarily squelches local engagement and cities' ability to address issues central to their and their constituents' well-being. This Article contends that denying representational standing to cities is not only unjustified, it is unnecessary--there is ample room for municipalities to sue under the existing doctrine of associational standing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European External Action Service (EEAS) is a crucial innovation of the EU institutional architecture, but some of its legal aspects remain obscure. This article investigates a particularly understudied issue: the EEAS's capacity to be a party to proceedings before EU Courts. The analysis suggests, first, that the Service has standing before the EU judges with respect to administrative issues. At the same time, the EEAS is not autonomous for the purpose of policy management and it can encounter difficulty in bringing proceedings to protect its role in the legislative process. Secondly, the practice of Union bodies relating to the EEAS is inconsistent: EU organs constantly treat the Service as a de facto institution--as far as administrative issues are concerned--but they are unwilling to overtly recognise its autonomy. Despite these difficulties, the EEAS's capacity to stand before EU judges is likely to favour its affirmation as an autonomous political actor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An essay is presented on the analysis of judicial evidence reflecting that the U.S. Supreme Court often use standing doctrine as a method of docket manipulation with reference to decision in various cases issued under the leadership of Chief Justice John G. Roberts. It supports that the fact in context to standing cases including the marriage equality case Hollingsworth v. Perry, the Affordable Care Act case NFIB v. Sebelius and the affirmative action case Fisher v. University of Texas.

An essay is presented on the judicial analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in two standing cases including Clapper v. Amnesty International USA and City of Los Angeles v. Lyons. It informs that these decisions reflect the degree of inconsistency in justiciability doctrines, which determines the role of the judiciary in U.S. constitutional democracy.

The article focuses on constitutional doctrine of the rule of law governing incentivization of public officials departures from the law. Topics discussed an incentive structure designed, maintained and legitimized by courts that enables public officials to resist the law, judicial doctrines such as standing, political question, state secrets that grants public officials discretion to depart from laws, and the U.S Supreme Court's decision in case Olmstead v. United States.

The Supreme Court's 2013 decision in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA dealt with the government's electronic surveillance authority under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments. In a 5- 4 opinion, the Court held that a variety of U.S. persons, including attorneys and media organizations, did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the FISA Amendments because the plaintiffs' fear of future unlawful surveillance was not "certainly impending." Depending on how lower courts choose to interpret Clapper, the decision could have a significant impact on the doctrine of fear-based standing, which allows plaintiffs to establish standing based on fear of future injury. While Clapper could be read as a directive to severely limit the scope of fear-based standing, it could also be reconciled with past precedent or limited to the foreign affairs context. However, the most accurate reading of the decision reveals that the Clapper Court devised a slightly stricter standing doctrine where the "certainly impending" test should be flexibly applied. This theory is supported by footnote five of the opinion, which references an alternative and more lenient "substantial risk"standing inquiry. This Note argues that lower courts should apply the more lenient footnote five test when hearing a constitutional challenge to a statute where the alleged fear of future harm is a threat of prosecution or the "chilling" of First Amendment rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses several developments involving the New York State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) between July 1, 2012 and June 30, 2013, focusing on government regulatory issues, appellate courts in New York, and legal topics such as standing and mootness. U.S. federal preemption is addressed, along with environmental impact statements and legal cases involving the N.Y. City School Construction Authority and the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation.

The article examines the lack of standing for taxpayers in international tax dispute resolution in 2014. Topics include remedies for double taxation, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Model Tax Convention used in double taxation disputes, and if taxpayers should be involved in the resolution process.

Fifty years ago, Alexander Bickel famously suggested that courts use tools like standing ripeness, and the political question doctrine to avoid reaching the merits of difficult cases. Yet despite the increasingly central role of administrative agencies in government, there have been no efforts to date to apply Bickel's insights to the bureaucracy. This Article remedies that deficit. The Article provides a three-part taxonomy of administrative restraint and offers case studies from federal agencies such as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Fish and Wildlife Service. It argues that agencies sometimes use restraint strategically for reasons similar to Bickelian courts: to avoid unnecessary conflict with other institutional actors. Moreover, like the passive virtues in the judicial arena, such agency passivity is often normatively desirable. As long as certain internal agency safeguards exist, passivity should be facilitated rather than undermined by reviewing courts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On the last day of the 2011 Term, the Supreme Court dismissed, as improvidently granted, the writ of certiorari in First American Financial Corp. v. Edwards. The dismissal, seven months after oral argument, was an unusual outcome for a case many expected to be the "sleeper" of the Term. At issue before the Court was whether Article III limits Congress's power to confer standing upon litigants whose only injury is a violation of a statutory right. At oral argument, members of the Court expressed discomfort with the existing formulation--that Article III injury may exist "solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing." This Note takes up where the Court left off. It suggests the existing formulation is incomplete insofar as it permits plaintiffs to bring suits against private parties without showing how their conduct injures the plaintiffs in a differentiated way. This Note argues that Article III requires a plaintiff's injury be "rationally connected" to the offending conduct at issue. It suggests the Court articulate such a "rational connection" requirement to close a doctrinal gap in the test for particularized injury. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the legal rights of passengers in motorized vehicles in the U.S. as of June 2014, focusing on unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and a heightened factual nexus approach to exclusionary evidence. Case law, legal standing, and allegedly unlawful traffic stops by law enforcement are mentioned. Several legal cases are examined, along with the evidence law-related fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.

The article discusses an elective race era which reportedly involves the time period where U.S. antidiscrimination law is being asked to attend to the dignity concerns of individuals. It focuses on a 2007 legal case involving biracial plaintiff Eric Longmire, who alleges that he was subjected to racial discrimination and disparate treatment by his employer. Racial self-identification and phenotypically ambiguous persons are mentioned, along with various legal standing challenges in America.

The article discusses a proposed doctrinal framework to access legal standing for patient plaintiffs in cases involving diagnostic genetic testing as of June 2014, focusing on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's ruling in the case Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad) which deals declaratory judgments and patents for BRCA1/2 related genes. Other topics include third-party plaintiffs, cease-and-desist letters, and isolated DNA molecules.

In Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that private plaintiffs did not have standing to sue in federal court to challenge certain state greenhouse gas (CHC) regulations because the plaintiffs failed to allege that the emissions were significant enough to make a "meaningful contribution " to global CHC levels. By contrast, in Massachusetts v. EPA, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a state government had standing to sue the federal government for its failure to regulate national CHC emissions because states are "entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis. " Massachusetts implied, but did not decide, that private parties might have less standing rights than states do when it declared that "[i]l is of considerable relevance that the party seeking review here is a sovereign State and not...a private individual. " Four years later, in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut ("AEP"), the Supreme Court, by an equally divided four-to-four vote, affirmed a decision finding standing for both state and private plaintiffs in a tort suit seeking CHC reductions. The Court stated that "[flour members of the Court would hold that at least some plaintiffs have Article III standing under Massachusetts." Commentators have speculated that the four Justices who found that the AEP plaintiffs had standing may have agreed only that the state plaintiffs had standing. Justice Kennedy is usually the crucial swing vote in standing cases on the current Court. Based on his questions during the Massachusetts oral arguments, Justice Kennedy may have encouraged the majority to focus on the "special" standing rights of states in that case. He also may be one of the four Justices who supported standing rights for "some" plaintiffs in AEP. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Washington Environmental Council is important because it is the most straightforward federal court of appeals decision involving only private plaintiffs seeking to regulate GHCs. The decision potentially bars all private GHG suits involving a limited number of GHG emitters or quantity of GHG emissions, but the court did not decide the broader question of whether private parties can challenge the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's national regulation of the largest GHG sources, including power plants and motor vehicles. The decision's broad language is arguably mere dicta that went too far in rejecting the possibility of private GHG suits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the U.S. Supreme Court case Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, which dealt with the standing doctrine. Topics include the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, challenges to subject matter jurisdiction, and the plaintiff's burden to produce evidence. Information is provided on the case-or-controversy requirement.

The U.S. Supreme Court has insisted that standing doctrine is a "bedrock" requirement only of Article III. Accordingly, both jurists and scholars have assumed that the standing of the executive branch and the legislature, like that of other parties, depends solely on Article III. But I argue that these commentators have overlooked a basic constitutional principle: federal institutions must have affirmative authority for their actions, including the power to bring suit or appeal in federal court. Article III defines the federal "judicial Power" and does not purport to confer any authority on the executive branch or the legislature. Executive and legislative standing instead depend in large part on the provisions conferring power on those institutions--principally, Article II and Article I. This basic insight has important implications. I argue that the Take Care Clause of Article II helps both to explain the breadth and to define the limits of executive standing. The executive branch has standing only insofar as it has an Article II power and duty to enforce and defend federal law on behalf of the federal government. The Take Care Clause does not, however, confer standing when the executive no longer asserts that law-enforcement interest--when it declines to defend a federal law. Article I, for its part, does not confer any power on Congress to enforce or defend federal laws in court. Accordingly, contrary to the assumption of many scholars, Congress lacks standing to represent the United States in place of the executive. The Supreme Court has entirely overlooked these questions of institutional power in considering issues of executive or legislative standing, including, most recently, in the litigation over the Defense of Marriage Act. Article III cannot confer power on the executive or the legislature that Article II or Article I denies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

American courts have wrestled with the issue of standing in lawsuits where there is a question as to whether the plaintiff has an "injury in fact. " The issue has developed differently depending on the context. The issue arose in mass tort suits where persons exposed to a toxic substance did not have any present adverse physical condition. These cases were variously labeled "exposure- only," "latent manifestation," or, in the class action context, "future claimants" suits. In such suits, state substantive laws vary markedly as to whether there is a cause of action and right to recover damages for fear of future injury. Federal Employers Liability Act cases limit recovery for "fear of cancer" to those cases in which there is evidence of a present condition making cancer more likely. In order to avoid more onerous substantive law standards in tort cases, including class action requirements, plaintiffs in product liability cases gravitated from tort to contract causes of action. Theories based on the "benefit-ofthe- bargain" and "economic harm" have sometimes succeeded in overcoming the "no injury" claim when there is proof of actual economic harm. The Fifth Circuit's decision in Cole v. General Motors, distinguishing its prior decision in Rivera v. Wyeth-Ayers Laboratories, reflects a willingness to find economic harm to be an adequate claim of injury. Two recent cases, In re Cheerios Marketing & Sales Practices Litigation and Lopez v. Southwest Airlines Co., indicate the unsettled parameters ofthat test and are discussed in the context of developing standing law. Statutory penalty and rights cases present special circumstances for standing requirements depending on the intent of the statute. The Supreme Court has recently declined to decide, in First American Financial Corp. v. Edwards, whether a company could be sued for violating certain statutes even if the plaintiff suffered no direct harm from the violation. The full scope of statutory fixed penalty and damages suits where there would be no injury without the statute is still to be fleshed out. Invasion of privacy suits have mushroomed with the cyberspace revolution, leaving many still-unanswered questions as to what degree of actual harm is required to establish standing. Finally, a spate of false labeling and advertising claims suits have been filed under state consumer statutes, many relating to food, with differing results in the courts relating to the question of actual injury. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we aim at highlighting the progress in the regulation of volunteering activity in Romania through the recent adoption by the Parliament of the Law no. 78/2014 on the regulation of volunteering in Romania. The new legislative act, which replaced Volunteering Law no. 195 / 2001 (republished) tries and we believe that it actually succeeds in providing consistent and harmonized solutions at European level to problems of organizations working with volunteers and thus creating a modern legal framework, appropriately adapted to the national and European context in the field of volunteering. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the Romanian Constitutional Court decisions which resolve exceptions of unconstitutionality of provisions of Law no. 554/2004 on administrative contentious regarding the conditions needed to acquire of locus standi in disputes of subjective administrative contentious. Article used as a method of research, the critical study of Constitutional Court decisions and doctrine, aiming at the final the formulation of de lege ferenda proposals. It is done so for the first time a critical analysis of Constitutional Court decisions in this area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author discusses the reported efforts of American landowners to preserve millions of acres of farmland, wetlands, and forests as of April 2014, focusing on the Maryland Court of Appeals' ruling in the case Long Green Valley Ass'n v. Bellevale Farms Inc. which deals with conservations easements, third-party standing, and a charitable trust doctrine. The author argues that legal challenges are inevitable as preserved land is transferred between owners. Fiduciary relationships are examined.

The article discusses U.S. federal legal standing law in relation to the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in the 1938 case Erie Railroad v. Tompkins which deals with American constitutional law and the establishment of the Erie Doctrine, focusing on U.S. federalism, California state laws, and the 2013 same-sex marriage case Hollingsworth v. Perry. Standing to appeal a lower court's judgment is mentioned, along with the "case-or-controversy" provision found in Article III of the U.S. Constitution.

The article focuses on the U.S. court case Charvat v. Mutual First Federal Credit Union, which dealt with the separation of powers under the standing doctrine. Topics include the violation of the U.S. Electronic Funds Transfer Act (ETFA), the precedent set by the U.S. court case Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, and the injury-in-fact standing doctrine.

The American wild horse has long been considered a cultural icon and an integral part of the ecosystem. In recognition of the need for wild horse protection, Congress enacted the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act in 1971. Although the Act instructs Congress to manage the wild horse population by removing "excess" wild horses from public lands, it does not explicitly provide for the use of short- or long-term holding facilities as a means for removal. In considering the legality of the use of holding facilities in the service of wild horse removal programs that the plaintiffs deplore, two district courts have come to opposite conclusions on the standing issue of how directly the plaintiffs' injury must be linked to the particular action being challenged. This Note argues that if the wild horse dispute comes before the Supreme Court in the form of a circuit split, the Court should hear the case to resolve lingering ambiguities in standing causation. Specifically, the Court should apply proximate cause analysis to the standing causation inquiry, as this would promote many of standing's underlying functions and also benefit advocates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on standing doctrine in U.S. justice administration in 2014. Topics include the standing of nontraditional plaintiffs, U.S. common law, and the injury-in-fact requirement. Information is provided on adequate and relative standing, representational standing, and exclusive prosecutorial standing.

The much-awaited judgment in the Inuit case is critical for the application of the new standing conditions for private parties in actions for annulment. The Court defined the crucial concept of "regulatory act" within the meaning of the third limb of art. 263(4) TFEU as an act of general application other than a legislative act. The repercussions of this definition go, however, far beyond the revised locus standi rules applicable to private parties in actions for annulment. Critically, it has a direct bearing upon the right to effective judicial protection and, hence, upon the completeness of the EU system of judicial remedies. Pre-Lisbon, the latter was widely criticised for being prone to gaps. In Inuit, the Court relied upon the new art. 19(1) TEU in order to demonstrate that the EU system of judicial remedies has now been rendered complete. This article will assess whether the systems post-Lisbon architecture has filled the gaps concerning the judicial protection of the individual. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the standing in U.S Supreme Court case Hollingsworth v. Perry that held in line with prior precedent and the official sponsors of a ballot initiative measure. It discusses discusses California Supreme Court's decisions limiting the official designation of marriage to opposite-sex couples violating the equal protection clause and the California ballot initiative process, Proposition 8 put forth as a major part of the 2013 U.S Supreme Court docket.

The article discusses legal standing to appeal an administrative order in Florida in the wake of the Florida First District Court of Appeal's ruling in the 2011 case Martin County Conservation Alliance v. Martin County which deals with prima facie evidence and efforts to challenge an issued development order. According to the article, Florida's environmental statutes provide parties with liberal standing to contest land use approvals and development and environmental permits.

The article discusses the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California's ruling in the 2013 case Center for Food Safety v. Hamburg which deals with American administrative law, standing to sue, and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's alleged failure to promulgate several food safety rules by a congressionally mandated deadline. According to the article, the U.S. Constitution limits the jurisdiction of America's federal courts to "Cases" or "Controversies."

The article discusses the decision of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice (CJEU) which dismissed an appeal by seal hunters who had sought to annul a regulation that regulates the imports of seal products in the European Union (EU) markets on October 3, 2013. It notes the amendment of the criteria for standing under Article 236 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It states that TFEU sets the requirements for a private applicant to bring annulment action.

The article examines the proposal of British government to reform the test of standing in judicial review that would reduce the number of people permitted to bring judicial review claims. The author claims that the consultation document correctly describes the test of sufficient interest developed by courts as expansive. It suggests that the test for standing should be amended to enable a claimant to have more direct and tangible interest in the matter it relates.

The article focuses on the U.S. Supreme Court case United States v. Tohono O'odham Nation, which dealt with the U.S. Court of Federal Claims' (CFC) authority to hear claims pending in another court. Topics include litigants' standing to sue the U.S. or an agent of the U.S., dismissal of actions due to the filing of duplicative claims, and the jurisdiction of the CFC.

An essay is presented on exceptions to the prudential rule against third-party standing in cases involving family-owned corporations in America as of February 2014, focusing on companies that raise religious objections to an insurance mandate under the U.S. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Various U.S. Supreme Court cases are examined, including legal matters involving Hobby Lobby Stores Inc., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., and health insurance coverage for contraceptives.

The article focuses on the Structure of Standing Law. Topics discussed include modern standing doctrine along with its defects, Professor William Fletcher's proposed solution to these problems and congressional grants of standing to enforce constitutional rights. Other topics include "accidental plaintiff" theory of standing and practical court cases against radical reform of standing doctrine.

The rights and remedies of private parties under the three principal global treaties for the protection of intellectual property are restricted to persons having the status of ressortissants under the relevant treaty, and by the general law of diplomatic protection. Two largely neglected issues arise in relation to ressortissants, which the treaties do not expressly resolve. The first concerns whether the obligations which state A assumes towards the nationals of state B can be enforced by states other than B. The second is whether the obligations assumed by a state under one of these treaties extend to that state’s own nationals. It is suggested that the Bananas III and Havana Club decisions have effectively resulted in unlimited locus standi for WTO members to complain of breaches of TRIPs, including the incorporated provisions of the Paris and Berne conventions. The answer to the second question is more tentative, but it is suggested that there may be greater opportunities for arguing that the provisions of TRIPs are binding on states in relation to their own nationals, including incorporated Paris and Berne Articles, than there were under either of those earlier treaties on their own. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines the doctrine of standing as applied to mergers and acquisitions of Delaware corporations with pending derivative claims. Finding the existing framework of overlapping rules and exceptions both structurally and doctrinally unsound, this article proposes a novel reconfiguration under which Delaware courts would follow three blackletter rules: (1) stockholders of the target should have standing to sue target directors to challenge a merger directly on the basis that the board failed to achieve adequate value for derivative claims; (2) a merger should eliminate target stockholders' derivative standing; and (3) stockholders of the acquiror as of the time a merger is announced should be deemed contemporaneous owners of claims acquired in the merger for purposes of derivative standing. Following these rules would restore order to the Delaware law of standing in the merger context and would advance the important public policies served by stockholder litigation in the Delaware courts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has taken a restrictive approach when interpreting the standing requirements applicable to private parties wanting to challenge EU legal measures. The Lisbon Treaty introduced some change, but access to the Court remains overly restricted for private parties. The European Union is by far the most successful regional integration community there is, and it has been widely imitated. This article seeks to explore and compare the standing requirements applicable to private parties before the CJEU and other regional courts in order to see if the CJEU has something to learn from the others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

the article comments on the 2012-13 term of U.S. Supreme Court focusing on the challenging issues involving Fourth Amendment's constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, equal protection clause safeguarding the same-sex marriages, and promotion of racial diversity in higher education in the U.S. It discusses the decision of several cases of the U.S. Supreme Court including United States v. Windsor, Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin , and Maryland v. King.

The mortgage foreclosure crisis raises legal questions as important as its economic impact. Questions that were straightforward and uncontroversial a generation ago today threaten the stability of a $13 trillion mortgage market: Who has standing to foreclose? If a foreclosure was done improperly, what is the effect? And what is the proper legal method for transferring mortgages? These questions implicate the clarity of title for property nationwide and pose a too-big-to-fail problem for the courts. The legal confusion stems from the existence of competing systems for establishing title to mortgages and transferring those rights. Historically, mortgage title was established and transferred through the "public demonstration" regimes of UCC Article 3 and land recordation systems. This arrangement worked satisfactorily when mortgages were rarely transferred. Mortgage finance, however, shifted to securitization, which involves repeated bulk transfers of mortgages. To facilitate securitization, deal architects developed alternative "contracting" regimes for mortgage title: UCC Article 9 and MERS, a private mortgage registry. These new regimes reduced the cost of securitization by dispensing with demonstrative formalities, but at the expense of reduced clarity of title, which raised the costs of mortgage enforcement. This trade-off benefitted the securitization industry at the expense of securitization investors because it became apparent only subsequently with the rise in mortgage foreclosures. The harm, however, has not been limited to securitization investors. Clouded mortgage title has significant negative externalities on the economy as a whole. This Article proposes reconciling the competing title systems through an integrated system of note registration and mortgage recordation, with compliance as a prerequisite to foreclosure. Such a system would resolve questions about standing, remove the potential cloud to real-estate title, and facilitate mortgage financing by clarifying property rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Supreme Court has clearly treated the Constitution's Article III standing requirements as mandatory jurisdictional hurdles that a plaintiff must meet for each form of relief sought before federal courts may consider the merits of a case. But the Supreme Court has never squarely held that prudential standing is a jurisdictional issue that must be decided before the merits in every single case. A 1975 Supreme Court decision suggested in dicta that prudential standing doctrine plays a crucial role in preventing federal courts from addressing political questions, but a 1984 Court decision implied in dicta that prudential standing is less important than Article III constitutional standing. In light of the Court's conflicting dicta about the importance of prudential standing doctrine, it is not surprising that lower federal courts have split over whether prudential standing requirements are jurisdictional or whether such barriers may be waived if a party fails to raise the issue. This Article generally agrees with recent judicial arguments that prudential standing should not be treated as a jurisdictional issue. The greatest weakness of these arguments is that, although they relied in part on the Supreme Court's recent trend to narrow the issues considered jurisdictional, they did not address why the Court has engaged in such a trend. This Article attempts to supplement these arguments by examining the adversarial traditions that underlie the Anglo-American legal system. It further explains that the argument for limiting the scope of jurisdictional rules would have been more convincing if it also pointed out that judges' sua sponte jurisdictional decisions are generally contrary to the Anglo-American legal system's party-controlled adversarial model of legal decision making and, as a result, should only be mandated where absolutely necessary. Indeed, the Court itself has referenced the adversarial model in relation to jurisdictionality, noting that "[b]randing a rule as going to a court's subject-matter jurisdiction alters the normal operation of our adversarial system." After considering various Court dicta on the relationship between prudential and Article III standing, this Article concludes that prudential standing is not so closely entwined with Article III jurisdiction to require an exception to our adversarial traditions of party autonomy in a free society. Furthermore, this Article maintains that where jurisdictionality is a close question, courts should give significant weight to the impact of mandatory sua sponte jurisdictional decisions on the fundamental principle of adversarial party control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reflects on the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the 2010 case Bond v. United States as a means to explore constitutional jurisprudence regarding individual plaintiffs, particularly individuals' use of structural constitutional issues. Topics addressed include the promotion of individual liberty with structural constitutional litigation, differences in constitutional rules and individual rights, and the legal concept of standing.

The article discusses the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in the 2013 case Clapper v. Amnesty International USA which deals with limits to federal court jurisdiction under Article III of the U.S. Constitution and challenges to government surveillance activities and policies. According to the article, the court determined that the plaintiffs, a group of attorneys and human rights organizations, lacked standing to challenge Section 702 of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.

The article discusses the U.S. Supreme Court's 2012-2013 term, focusing on various issues related to court access in America, a standing requirement in order to file a lawsuit, and the legal concept of mootness. The preemption legal doctrine is mentioned, along with judicial deference and the enforcement of arbitration agreements. Other topics include statutory construction, the U.S. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, and sovereign immunity.

The article discusses several legal developments involving data security breach liability in the U.S. as of November 2013, focusing on issues such as personal information protection from hacking, class action litigation, and the legal rights of consumers in America. Legal standing to file a lawsuit is addressed in relation to Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Various American statutes are examined, including the U.S. Wiretap Act and the nation's Stored Communications Act.

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Their jurisdiction is limited by subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and, to an uncertain extent, standing. While it is well established that Article III standing is jurisdictional, the federal circuit courts are divided on whether judge-made prudential standing is jurisdictional, and the Supreme Court has not directly weighed in. The jurisdictional status of a doctrine has two important procedural consequences. First, litigants cannot forfeit a defense for lack of jurisdiction, meaning that such a defense can be raised for the first time on appeal. Second, federal courts have a sua sponte obligation to ensure that jurisdiction is proper. This Comment contends that prudential standing should not be considered jurisdictional but that federal courts should nevertheless have the discretion to raise the issue sua sponte. Prudential standing should not be considered jurisdictional because considering a court-created doctrine as jurisdictional violates the basic principle that only the Constitution and Congress hold the power to set federal courts' jurisdiction, because a recent line of Supreme Court cases reinforces that court-created doctrines cannot be jurisdictional, and because prudential standing concerns litigants' lack of rights on the merits, not federal courts' adjudicatory authority. Federal courts, however, should have a discretionary sua sponte ability to raise the issue because prudential standing is an inherently flexible doctrine, and because federal courts raise in their discretion three other non-jurisdictional doctrines--the requirement that habeas corpus petitioners exhaust state remedies, Pullman abstention doctrine, and prudential ripeness doctrine--that, like prudential standing, originated as judge-made doctrines designed to protect interests beyond the litigants' individual interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on post-conviction trial fitness under the New Zealand Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act of 2003 (CPMIP). Topics include late appeals against conviction, retrospective assessments, and judicial review of trial standing. Information is provided on legal capacity and admissibility of evidence.

Information about several papers discussed at the 106th Annual Meeting sponsored by the American Association of Law Libraries (AALL) held in Seattle, Washington, on July 13-16, 2013, is presented. Topics discussed were the report on elections, adoption of the standing rules, and treasurer's report. The symposium featured several officials of the AALL including Jean M. Wenger, President at the Cook County Law Library, Chicago, Illinois, treasurer Susan Lewis, and executive director Kate Hagan.