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Torture, as structural violence, can be inflicted slowly, routinely, and undramatically. It implicates, instrumentalizes, and entangles both individual and institutional agents, and must be viewed as emerging from a complex apparatus responsible for its instigation and infliction. Failing this, we fail to attend to torture’s totality, particularly for the purposes of its socio-legal analysis. Leaving directness or explicitness of torturous acts of the individual behind (although equally important), a focus on the insidious and structural is warranted. This requires looking beyond individual and toward institutional logics, thus turning to systemic and systematic aspects. This article will discuss the implications emerging from such doctrinal individual centricity, as epitomized by the element of intentionality, a constitutive element of torture under Article 1 of the UN Convention against Torture. Then, it will endeavor to shift perspective from perpetrating individuals to perpetrating institutions, taking the denial of health care in Egyptian prisons as a case study through which to illustrate these dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper presents a philosophical proposition of elucidating creativity by means of distinguishing the category of intentionality. The intentional dimension of cognitive content encompasses predispositions for constructing sign systems. Such an intellectual modification of sign systems forms the foundation of dynamic creative acts. However, creative processes are not restricted to the sphere of intellectual operations, but also remain under the influence of object categories. For this reason, the results of creative processes must allow for the potential determinants of sensual matter. A transition between the subjective sphere of possibility and the objective sphere of potency indicates the dynamism of the process. A crucial component of the emergence of intentional relations is formulating the criterion of a creative process. It determines the rules of constructing sign systems, the forms of acceptable transformations as well as the possible modes of allowing for the results of this process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This paper argues for the conjunctive thesis of naïve realism and phenomenal intentionalism about perceptual experiences. Naïve realism holds that the phenomenology of veridical perceptual experience is (at least in part) constituted by environmental objects that the subject perceives. Phenomenal intentionalism about perceptual experience states that perceptual experience has intentionality in virtue of its phenomenology. I first argue that naïve realism is not incompatible with phenomenal intentionalism. I then argue that phenomenal intentionalists can handle two objections to it by adopting naïve realism: the first objection is that phenomenal intentionalism cannot explain how a veridical perceptual experience is directed at a particular object rather than any other object of the same kind. The second objection is that phenomenal intentionalism cannot explain how a perceptual experience is directed at a type of external object rather than other types of objects without appealing to a resemblance relation between a perceptual experience and an external object, which is considered to be problematic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista de Filosofía (0034-8244) is the property of Universidad Complutense de Madrid and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article explains the effect of the common-law category of malice in the U.S. Model Penal Code (MPC) on the fairness and coherence of criminal law. It traces the history of malice including the replacement of the inquiry into the motives of the actor with intentionality. It describes the case United States v. Gray highlighting the key competing contemporary interpretations of malice. It cites the importance of moral inquiry presented by malice to the communal sense of justice.

The purpose of this study is to examine the phenomenological method as it applies to the philosophy of history. This leads me to divide my inquiry into two parts. I shall begin by examining the phenomenological method in a general way, explaining how I view the essential features of the method and its status in the context of philosophy generally conceived. Then, in a second part, I shall turn to its application to the philosophy of history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research presents a comprehensive conceptual model of the dynamics of goal revision over multiple periods. First, based on an integrative literature review, we derive four principles that govern how individuals update their goals over time (monotonicity, diminishing sensitivity, aspiration maximization, and performance satisficing). We then integrate these principles logically as well as mathematically into a goal-discrepancy response function. Next, we advance existing cybernetic models of self-regulation by synthesizing the four principles and the response function info a Test-Operate-Test-Adjust-Loop (TOTAL) model, which captures the dynamics of goal revision in self-regulation. We report four laboratory experiments that demonstrate initial support for the postulates of our model and conclude with a discussion of limitations and future directions [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the advent of studies in the area of mise-en-page and the increased interest in the relationships among text, image, and material structures in medieval manuscripts, the inherent problems of interpretation and "intentionality" have often been concentrated in critics' assignment of meaning and cultural "readings" to medieval illuminators. Yet numerous sources, especially the instructions to illuminators that remain still visible in unfinished manuscripts, confirm that methods of work in the illustrating of medieval texts were guided by very different criteria than interpretation. Instead, the material and mechanical realities of reproducing medieval texts, among them Dante's Commedia, were often subject more to production efficiency, cost effectiveness, taste, and scribal and cultural norms. Examining the instructions to the illuminator of an unfinished copy of a uniquely edited Veneto copy of the Commedia, initially produced in the 1340s (Codex Italicus 1 of the University Library and Archives of Eötvös Loránd University in Budapest), this essay investigates the systems and constructions imposed on the Commedia by a new scribal culture in the reproduction and "visual glossing" of the poem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I intend to discuss the question in philosophy of mind called "Prior's Puzzle" within a hylomorphic, that is, a broadly Aristotelian‐Thomistic, context. After laying the groundwork explaining hylomorphism in natural philosophy and basic psychology in Part I, I will examine Prior's puzzle about nonexistent mental objects in Part II. The connection between these two issues will become clear as the paper progresses, but the fundamental principle that will guide my presentation is that of intentionality, or "directedness." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article describes the concept of intentionality and how it relates to human services education and training. The focus is on how the incorporation of intentionality into human services training curriculum can enhance the knowledge, skill, and competence of trainees. Several examples are given to show how human service educators can integrate activities within a basic helping skills course. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to an idea which is widespread among philosophers, linguistic entities derive their intentionality from the intentionality of mental entities by virtue of some relation between them. Typically, it is some kind of intention on the speaker's part – e.g., an intention to produce in the hearer a belief with a certain content – that is supposed to endow words with content. This paper argues that the concept of the derivation of content from one entity to another, if understood realistically, is flawed: derived intentionality, I will argue, is merely ascribed intentionality, not a real property of its possessor (one which is independent of any stance or interpretation). Irrealistic-ascriptivist senses are suggested for the ideas of content derivation, of original intentionality, and of the mind as the source of linguistic (and other forms of non-mental) intentionality. Thus, endorsing the idea that mental intentionality is the source of non-mental intentionality need not tempt one to intentional realism. In an intentional irrealistic framework, what forms of intentionality are original and what are derived is a deeply contingent matter, determined by our practice(s) of content ascription. But while intentional irrealism accommodates all those ideas, this paper defends "content-derivation irrealism" but not thoroughgoing intentional irrealism – the idea that there is real original (that is, un-derived) intentionality is not ruled out. Still, assuming that some entities possess real intentionality, what can make them endow intentionality upon other entities is also our practice of content ascription. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A naturalistic theory of intentionality (in the sense of 'aboutness') is proposed that differs from previous evolutionary and tracking theories. Full-blown intentionality is constructed through a series of evolvable refinements. A first, minimal version of intentionality originates from a conjectured internal process that estimates an organism's own fitness and that continually modifies the organism. This process produces the directedness of intentionality. The internal estimator can be parsed into intentional components that point to components of the process that produces fitness. It is argued that such intentional components can point to mistaken or non-existing entities. Different Fregian senses of the same reference correspond to different components that have different roles in the estimator. Intentional components that point to intentional components in other organisms produce directedness towards semi-abstract entities. Finally, adding a general, population-wide means of communication enables intentional components that point to fully abstract entities. Intentionality thus naturalized has all of its expected properties: being directed; potentially making errors; possibly pointing to non-existent, abstract, or rigid entities; capable of pointing many-to-one and one-to-many; distinguishing sense and reference; having perspective and grain; and having determinate content. Several examples, such as 'swampman' and 'brain-in-a-vat', illustrate how the theory can be applied. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Heidegger on Concepts, Freedom, and Normativity, Sacha Golob criticizes and offers an alternative to the standard interpretation of intentionality in Being and Time. According to Golob, the dominant reading's derivation of propositional intentionality from practical intentionality fails on textual and philosophical grounds, so he develops a different approach that involves deriving propositional intentionality from prototype intentionality. In this essay, I offer an overview of dominant reading of intentionality in Being and Time and Golob's alternative account, and then I criticize them both for attempting to derive propositional intentionality for some form of non-propositional intentionality. Finally, I offer my own ontological interpretation of intentionality by arguing that Heidegger's aim in Being and Time is not to derive one form of intentionality from another but to describe the basic aspects of human existence that make any and all forms of intentionality possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I explore the "we-mode," a concept under investigation by social cognition researchers that emerged from John Searle's concept of collective Intentionality. Wemode thinking captures the viewpoints of individuals engaged in social interactions and expands each individual's potential for social understanding and action. This access to the knowledge and understandings of those with whom they collaborate creates shared knowledge and understandings that may lead to collective Intentionality or we-mode. The discussion begins with a look at how living and working in groups affects identity formation, using Paul Gilroy's notion of planetary humanity as an example of we-mode thinking. As Searle explains, collective Intentionality emanates from the Background (similar to Bourdieu's habitus), which thus allows for the possibility of collective Intentionality or we-mode thinking and action. The article concludes by querying the potential for developing we-mode thinking in music education within an anti-racism framework, followed by an introduction to the four articles published in this issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Third space theory has been applied with progressive frequency to teacher education, partnerships, and clinical practice. This review of literature addresses how the application of third space theory has manifested in partnerships, clinical practice, and the associated stakeholders. Since moving towards third space is a process, it requires a continual embracing of tensions. It is within these tensions related to the application of the principles of third space theory within partnerships and clinical practice that three themes came to the surface. They include (a) diffusing hierarchy, embracing collaboration; (b) rejecting binaries, embracing democracy; and (c) overcoming borders, spanning boundaries. I address implications for moving forward and furthering third space partnerships and provide recommendations regarding intentionality and future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My aim in this programmatic paper is to explore the relationship among three important notions: intentionality, disposition and artefact. There wouldn't be artefacts without what I call "intentional work," a sustained activity directed to the production of some good. I first present contextualism as a method. Then I use it to delimit the problematic concept ARTEFACT, with the intention to apply it to repertoires of mental dispositions that affect directly our personal identity. The unavoidable but loose criterion of human intervention is used, at least to some degree. Attitudes are intentional states with conceptual content, and concepts are dispositions. We acquire concepts during our lives, sometimes unconsciously, sometimes explicitly through definition of some kind, and each cognitive agent has a unique repertoire of concepts and a unique idiolect as well. The idea that our mental representations (at least some of them) are artefacts might sound strange at first sight, but I shall try to show that it makes full sense. Most of our mental dispositions -those provided with a conceptual content- are themselves artefacts. At the end, we are all different psychologically and culturally because our idiolects and repertoires of concepts are different. For a large part, what makes our species so special is an ongoing process through which homo sapiens makes itself what it is. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A total of 97 monolingual and multilingual users of English participated in an adaptation of a matched-guise design to investigate the effect of visual cues (co-speech gestural intensity and facial expression) on perception of emotional intensity of the same speaker in two video stimuli in which verbal and vocal emotional information was kept constant. Participants included 41 adults British first language (L1) users of English and 56 highly proficient adult foreign language (LX) users of English. Statistical analysis revealed that gestural intensity was significantly linked to perceptions of emotional intensity by all participants. However, LX users perceived both the low and medium gesture video as significantly more emotional than L1 users. We suggest that LX users may have relied more on the visual channel over the vocal and verbal channels compared to L1 users. The difference between both groups might also be the consequence of overcompensation for the detachment effect of LX emotion speech. The number of languages known, gender, LX users' English proficiency and length of stay in the UK turned out to be unrelated to perceptions of emotional intensity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditionally, transfer is described as interference and consequently as an unintentional mechanism. More recently, however, the perception of control in transfer has changed and it is now commonly accepted that transfer can occur both automatically and strategically. Studies have previously employed think-aloud protocols during writing tasks to establish the degree of intentionality in transfer. However, this method does not let us distinguish between instances of transfer that are truly unintentional and instances that were simply not commented on due to the constraints imposed by the think-aloud protocol. The present study, therefore, conducted a stimulated recall interview in direct succession of the think-aloud protocol in order to categorise also those instances of transfer that were not commented on initially. With data from highly multilingual adult learners of Catalan, the study examines the proportion of unintentional and intentional transfer in relation to (1) different types of transfer, (2) different source languages of transfer and (3) different word classes in transfer. The data indicates that some of these aspects of transfer tend to occur unintentionally, whereas others are more prone to be used intentionally. The theoretical implications of the results, as well as their limitations, are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers a review of Michel Henry's phenomenology of life and its relation to Husserl's concept of intentionality. It begins with the latter's view of the phenomenology of life before passing to an examination of Henry's concepts of life, selfdonation, self-revelation, truth, originary or absolute body, etc. The thesis is that Henry does not offer an inversion of intentionality, in the strict sense, but rather an "absorption in itself". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to offer a basic analysis of the peculiar kind of intentionality involved in the experience of joy. First, I deal with the two meanings of joy. Secondly, I point out some questions related to the object of joy and with the rightness or legitimacy of this experience. Thirdly, I refer to the so-called "laws of joy." Lastly, I offer some thoughts on the relation between joy and alterity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies affective intentionality in Max Scheler, showing that the "phenomenology of values" does not only deal with values but also includes a complete theory of the good. In this theory, Scheler performs a genetic analysis that begins with the Sache (understood as wertvolles Ding, valuable thing) in order to define the notions of Ding (theoretical thing) and Gut (the good), understood as Wertding (thing of value). This approach indicates the possibility of improving on classic descriptions of the good and offers an interesting alternative to current "pragmatist" proposals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Brentano's introduction of the concept of intentionality into contemporary philosophy was indebted to scholastic sources. Among these, Suárez has not been sufficiently addressed, even though his idea of transcendental relation is relied upon by Brentano to describe the intentional relation. In addition, in his examination of being as truth in Suárez, Brentano manifests his assumption of the principle of immanence. Finally, this article argues that, even in his reist period, Brentano continued to understand knowledge as a relation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Causal theories of content, a popular family of approaches to defining the content of mental states, commonly run afoul of two related and serious problems that prevent them from providing an adequate theory of mental content—the misrepresentation problem and the disjunction problem. In this paper, I present a causal theory of content, built on information theoretic tools, that solves these problems and provides a viable model of mental content. This is the greatest surprise reduction theory of content, which identifies the content of a signal as the event the surprisal of which is most reduced by that signal. Conceptually, this amounts to the claim that the content of a signal is the event the probability of which has increased by the largest proportion, or the event that the signal makes the most less surprising to us. I develop the greatest surprise reduction theory of content in four stages. First, I introduce the general project of causal theories of content, and the challenges presented to this project by the misrepresentation and disjunction problems. Next, I review two recent and prominent causal theories of content and demonstrate the serious challenges faced by these approaches, both clarifying the need for a solution to the misrepresentation and disjunction problems and providing a conceptual background for the greatest surprise reduction theory. Then, I develop the greatest surprise reduction theory of content, demonstrate its ability to resolve the misrepresentation and disjunction problems, and explore some additional applications it may have. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of a particularly difficult challenge that remains to be addressed—the partition problem—and sketch a path to a potential solution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay aims to show that a phenomenological account of animal behavior can shed light on an ethological approach to alterity, and vice versa. The interface between ethology and phenomenology -which, as it is argued, is intelligible only with reference to a shared dimension of affection- is framed by means of the phenomenological concept of intentionality (Intentionalität), which appears as a generative force (Bildungstrieb) of the organism, its behavior and surrounding world (Umwelt). This means that intentionality does not shape stable structures, but plastic and dynamic processes that bound both the genesis of an organism and its surrounding world. Formation is thus understood as an epigenetic development, which suggests that natural forms are the result of a movement that goes from the general to the particular, from the most broad and regular structures of experience, to the multifarious proliferation of perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines Japanese moral philosopher Tetsuro Watsuji's discussion and rich characterization of intentionality which also refers to the capacity of conscious states to be about things. Topics covered include an analysis of his view on the social character of intentionality and the dynamics of betweenness and the relevance of his characterization of intentionality in phenomenological psychopathology.

The noema is one of the most daring and controversial concept of the Husserlian theory of intentionality. It was first introduced by Husserl in 1912, within some research manuscripts, but was only fully developed in Ideen. In this paper I claim that the noema is an ambiguous notion, the result of a theoretical operation, the epoché, whose aim is contradictory. In an effort to keep open the epoché, and therefore maintain distance with respect to every transcendent object, Husserl is forced to multiply intentional objects and complicate the notions of sense and noema. Given that, I propose to overcome the paradoxes of noema through the language of game theory. Game theory offers a very fruitful descriptive model that allows us to save the original Husserlian approach without the contradictions of the epoché. For this reason, I propose to re-interpret intentionality as social game, and the noema as Nash equilibrium. By replying to possible objections, I will show that this approach gives us many theoretical advantages. The general aim of the paper is a global reformulation of the phenomenalogical method. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kriegel described the problem of intentional inexistence as one of the 'perennial problems of philosophy' (Kriegel Philosophical Perspectives 21(1), 307–340, 2007: 307). In the same paper, Kriegel alluded to a modal realist solution to the problem of intentional inexistence. However, Kriegel does not state by name who defends the kind of modal realist solution he has in mind. Kriegel also points out that even what he believes to be the strongest version of modal realism does not pass the 'principle of representation' and thus modal realism is not an adequate solution to the problem of intentional inexistence. In this paper, I respond to Kriegel by defending a modal realist solution that he did not consider in 2007, called 'extended modal realism' (EMR). EMR is a version of modal realism where possible worlds are not completely isolated as they are under the Lewisian model. Rather, under EMR worlds are, in a way, spatiotemporally related. The fact EMR worlds are related allows EMR to sufficiently pass the principle of representation and thus can be deemed a legitimate solution to the problem of intentional inexistence. I conclude that either EMR can pass the principle of representation in some cases or, and I think the more sensible option, we give up on the principle of representation altogether. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Therefore, I conclude that Dancy's argument here does not warrant the conclusion that reasoning leads to bodily action in the same way in which reasoning leads to belief or intention. Most theorists have remained doubtful about the possibility of genuine practical reasoning to action, Dancy argues, because they let their view of practical reasoning be embarrassed by mistaken conceptions of theoretical reasoning. Many believe that the mental activity of reasoning, through which we form, revise and discard attitudes like beliefs and intentions, is the weighing of and responding to normative reasons. Dancy argues that Broome's account primarily targets reasoning to prior intentions, and that Broome denies - "or at least is very close to denying" - reasoning to intention-in-action, because he denies reasoning that concludes in action and we cannot distinguish between an action and the relevant intention-in-action, for the act intended "is not a mere bodily motion" (167-168). [Extracted from the article]

In a response to critics, R.S. Peters acknowledged that a more general concept of education exists than the 'school‐related' one he analysed and defended his decision to ignore it by saying that it 'indiscriminately' marks out the 'mundane, instrumentally oriented operations' involved in rearing children. In this paper I sketch in the portion of the educational landscape that Peters left out of the picture. Once seen, it becomes apparent not only that he staked out just one small part of a vast domain but also that he rendered invisible some of the most basic philosophical issues and problems that confront humankind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is acknowledged by proponents of the Artifactual Theory of Fiction that literary works sometimes involve real or immigrant characters. However, their conception of cross-fictional identity faces serious difficulties. In this paper, we set the problem in the context of a modal framework, in relation to quantification across a plurality of possible worlds. Quantification is explained in terms of Hintikka's notion of world lines; i.e. the possible values of bound variables are individuals that are not reduced to their manifestations. We finally offer another understanding of identity across weakly impermeable domains, in a way compatible with the Artifactual Theory of Fiction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many think that expressivists have a special problem with negation. I disagree. For if there is a problem with negation, I argue, it is a problem shared by those who accept some plausible claims about the nature of intentionality. Whether there is any special problem for expressivists turns, I will argue, on whether facts about what truth-conditions beliefs have can explain facts about basic inferential relations among those beliefs. And I will suggest that the answer to this last question is, on most plausible attempts at solving the problem of intentionality, 'no'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Yli-Vakkuri (2018) offers a deductive argument for Content Externalism that primarily appeals to two main principles he says should be adopted by all parties to the debate. Sawyer (2018) criticizes this argument on the grounds that there are internalist theories that are not consistent with the two principles he offers, although she takes no issue with the derivation itself. While Sawyer's critique is insightful and largely correct, there is a more fundamental problem with the original argument. The formal proof given in the original paper begs the question. The informal argument is enthymematic, and all the possible valid reconstructions require assumptions that can be legitimately rejected by content internalists. This is significant to point out as someone might think that the internalist views that Sawyer says are not consistent with the two principles that drive Yli-Vakkuri's argument can be successfully challenged and thereby the original argument defended. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I focus on proxy acts' plural agency and argue that it is a particular case of plural agency, irreducible to that of collective agency. I start from Reinach's phenomenological account of proxy acts, according to which they are an eidetic modification of social-speech acts. I point out that as social-speech acts, proxy acts are also spontaneous acts and at least second-degree position-takings; but I argue that, unlike social-speech acts, their agency is modified. Such modification involves different agents at different times, different degrees of authorship, and different extensions of efficacy. I conclude that proxy acts' plural agency is constituted by several layers of agency that are bound together in the temporally expanded unity of the proxy act as a whole. • Spontaneous-social-acts: position-takings, agency as authorship, uptake. • The agency of proxy-social acts: eidetic modification of the heterotropic agency. • Qualitative modification of the agency: degrees of authorship. • Grounds and layers of the spontaneous agency of the proxy. • Proxy social acts vs. collective social acts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The kind of collective improvisation attained by free jazz at the beginning of the sixties appears interesting from the perspective of contemporary debates on collective intentionality for several reasons. The most notable of these, is that it holds a mirror up to what analytical philosophers of action identify as "the complexly interwoven sets of collective intentions" that make a group more than the sum of its parts. But at the same time, free jazz poses a challenge to these philosophical theories of collective intentionality, because what happens is not planned in advance but arises from spontaneous interactions in the group. The second and no less decisive reason is that jazz musicians act together in a very distinctive way, which casts into clear relief the interplay between togetherness and agonism, individual freedom and group commitment, which is contained in every human interaction. In other words, in free jazz we find what Hannah Arendt calls the "paradoxical" or "twofold" character of "human plurality." Starting with the analysis of two paradigmatic case studies—Charles Mingus's Folk Forms No. 1 and Ornette Coleman's Free Jazz: A Collective Improvisation—my main concern in this paper is to provide a phenomenological account of the individual-yet-plural intentionality that emerges and runs through the improvisatory process in the free jazz case. After having made the negative point that this phenomenon represents a challenge to the analytical theories of collective intentionality, I shall argue that it can be accounted for from a phenomenological perspective. My basic thesis is that the overall cohesiveness of the improvisatory process must be regarded as a meaningful realization of an overall feeling, shared and shaped together by musicians over time—and not as the execution of an advanced plan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]