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The subject of this analysis was the provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court devoted to the leadership requirement of the crime of aggression. The crime in question is the successor of crimes against peace. This paper employed normative and formal dogmatic legal methods in analyzing the particulars of the leadership clause. Besides, this analysis also took into consideration the case-law of certain judicial bodies. This paper aimed to examine whether the leadership requirement of the crime of aggression has been properly constructed for the Statute. The main focus was on the meaning of the conditions stemming from the leadership clause that each perpetrator ought to fulfill to incur criminal responsibility for the crime of aggression. Additionally, this research addressed the criminal responsibility of public and private actors and the modes of participation in the crime in question. The article established that the leadership requirement concerning the crime of aggression has been aptly incorporated in the Statute since this requirement, at the same time, embraces the post World War Two standards concerning crimes against peace and the contemporary notion of aggression as one of the core crimes under international law.

Am 2. März 2021 hat die türkische Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Ermittlungen gegen die Demokratische Partei der Völker (HDP) eingeleitet, am 17. März die Klageschrift auf deren Verbot beim Verfassungsgericht eingereicht. Der Generalstaatsanwalt hat ferner beantragt, 687 Funktionären der Partei zu verbieten, sich in den nächsten fünf Jahren poli­tisch zu betätigen. Das würde auf den Ausschluss fast aller HDP-Politiker von der Politik hinauslaufen und so die politischen Kanäle für die Diskussion und Lösung der Kurden­frage auf Jahre verschließen. Zwar hat das Verfassungsgericht am 31. März die Klageschrift wegen verfahrensrechtlicher Mängel zurückgewiesen. Doch am 6. Juni teilte die Generalstaatsanwaltschaft mit, dass sie einen weiteren Vorstoß zum Verbot der Partei unternommen hat. Damit besteht die Gefahr, dass die Verhinderung ziviler und gewaltfreier kurdischer Politik Wasser auf die Mühlen der illegalen Arbeiter­partei Kurdistans (PKK) ist und sich der Kurdenkonflikt erneut per­petuiert. Der Vor­gang wirft ein Schlaglicht auf die Verschränkung von Politik und Justiz in der Türkei und macht strukturelle Mängel der türkischen Verfassungsordnung deutlich. (Autorenreferat)

Bangladesh continues to face a threat from Islamic terrorism. However, the drivers of this phenomenon remain under-studied. Research has traced terrorism in Bangladesh to wider processes of Islamization; a political context marked by conflict between the country’s two main political parties and by authoritarian governance; the institutional weakness of the Bangladeshi security and justice system; and international factors, such as the Afghanistan War, influences from the Gulf, and more recently the Rohingya refugee crisis, as well as the increased interest of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in South Asia. Based on an analysis of the literature and interviews, I argue that while the growth of terrorism in Bangladesh has been a complex process in which all of these factors have interacted, different constellations of them have been decisive at different historical stages.

One of the current issues of criminal law, in general, is the issue of execution of a criminal judgment sentenced by the international criminal court (ad hoc or permanent international criminal court). The issue is ongoing because international criminal courts do not have their institutions for the enforcement of criminal sanctions they impose, but are, in that regard, instructed to cooperate with states that express readiness to execute criminal sanctions - imprisonment sentences imposed by an international criminal court in their prison facilities. Among the numerous issues related to this issue, the paper analyzes only those related to the legal basis for standardization, conditions, and manner of execution of a prison sentence imposed by an international criminal court.

There are about 2.2 million prisoners in the USA. It is generally viewed that this number is a result of a too severe penal system connected with the introduction of the absolute intolerance for drug crimes policy. But not only gang members and drug dealers are doing time in prison, this system also applies to war veterans. In 2012, there were 181,500 veterans behind bars, especially participants of the recent wars. Most of them face problems with addiction or struggle with permanent unemployment, homelessness or psychological disorders. This phenomenon is alarming because veterans as a privileged group have a social, medical, education cover and all capabilities not to break the law. Veterans as former soldiers, disciplined and well familiar with criminal law, who received ethics and international humanitarian law training courses, from practical point of view should not break the rules stated by the legal system. The image of former veterans who served their country, totally disagree with penitentiary statistics. Recent years have shown that military service, especially in the area of conflict, may become a double-edged sword, and in fact veterans may pose a threat to society., W Stanach Zjednoczonych osadzonych w zakładach karnych jest około 2,2mln osób. Utrwalił się pogląd, że jest to wynik zbyt surowego systemu wymierzania kar związany z wprowadzeniem polityki bezwzględnej nietolerancji dla narkotyków. Wyroki odsiadują nie tylko członkowie gangów czy handlarze narkotyków, inkarceracja dotyczy również weteranów wojennych. W 2012 r. z powyższej liczby osadzonych penalizacja dotknęła 181,5tys. byłych mundurowych, zwłaszcza uczestników ostatnich wojen. To głównie weterani pozbawieni stałego zatrudnienia, dachu nad głową lub uzależnieni, zmagający się z problemami natury psychologicznej. Zjawisko jest o tyle niepokojące, że weterani jako grupa uprzywilejowana pod względem socjalnym, osłony medycznej czy edukacji posiadają wszelkie możliwości i narzędzia do tego, aby nie wchodzić w konflikt z prawem. Weterani jako byli żołnierze, zdyscyplinowani i doskonale znający przepisy karne, szkoleni z zasad etyki i prawa humanitarnego konfliktów zbrojnych, z praktycznego punktu widzenia nie powinni łamać zasad dyktowanych przez wymiar sprawiedliwości. Wizerunek byłego funkcjonariusza publicznego, pełniącego służbę na rzecz własnego kraju, kłóci się zupełnie ze statystykami penitencjarnymi. Wydarzenia ostatnich lat pokazały, że służba wojskowa, zwłaszcza w rejonie konfliktu może się stać obosiecznym mieczem, a weterani stanowić mogą zagrożenie dla społeczeństwa.

International law had had a profound impact and influence on the domestic legal system in the contemporary world. However, the status of international law within the domestic legal system is not properly defined in many of the jurisdictions including Sri Lanka. In the absence of such a constitutional provision, the judiciary as the last bastion of hope has a responsibility of interpreting domestic law in light of the international standards that have been agreed upon by the country through ratification of international treaties and those principles of customary international law that has become binding on the country. However, too much judicial activism could jeopardize the constitutional fundamentals of separation of powers and the rule of law. Therefore, this study argues that the best way to resolve this issue is by providing a constitutional provision for the role of the judiciary in the recognition and implementation of international law in a domestic context. Using a qualitative methodology with a comparative analysis of the constitutional provisions of the selected jurisdictions of India and South Africa a proposal is made for a constitutional provision for the judicial role in the recognition and implementation of international law in Sri Lanka. The results have revealed that a constitutional provision would help to advance the separation of powers and the rule of law and to well define the role of the judiciary in absorbing international treaty law to the domestic sphere, making the law more certain and predictable and upholding the rights and duties of individuals in a domestic context while fulfilling international obligations of a country under the domestic legal system.

This paper reviews the assistance of a psychologist expert in the justice bodies to protect minors in Kosovo. Research data on the study of normative acts (laws and international acts) regarding the role of the expert psychologist have been analyzed since from September 1999 until 2019. The purpose of this study is to assess the role of an expert psychologist, conforming to national and international legal norms in the protection of minors at the police, prosecution and court organs, where the analysis of these legal norms has been used over the years. In the case of looking at the protection of minors the expert psychologist is involved in all stages of criminal and civil proceedings before the competent authorities. The results show that the role of the psychologist expert in justice bodies in Kosovo is based on national and international law, but in this highly sensitive work Kosovo psychologist experts must have their own association to represent their requests as good as possible to the competent authorities and for the delegation of the name of the expert psychologist at the request of the judge. Moreover, it has been found that until now the determination of the expert psychologist hired has been made with the will of the judge. This paper contributes to existing scientific literature, especially in the fields of criminology, victimology and forensic psychology. Moreover, this paper is likely to contribute to the work of the Association of Psychological Experts, the Victims' Association and in the work of various minors' protection associations.

Free movement of people, goods, services, and capital in Europe requires well-functioning cross-border dispute resolution mechanisms. Many initiatives have been taken over time by the EU institutions and Member States, both introducing legal instruments and developing information and e-justice technologies to support cross-border judicial litigation and cooperation. Unfortunately, the results so far achieved do not seem to be adequate to the needs of our increasingly inter-connected society. Adding to this, the first wave of COVID-19 emergency measures brought court-based dispute resolution to a grinding halt. All around Europe, court buildings have been closed to the public, hearings suspended, and only emergency cases carried out. Some hope though seems to come from this bleak moment. The breakdown of existing practices, and the need to ensure the justice service provision required for our societies' functioning, resulted in many local and national initiatives to reconfigure the justice service. It provided the occasion to experiment with remote justice service provision and explore possibilities to reconfigure technologies and tools, which in many cases had been available for years, to permit remote working, hearings and legal communication. While most of the experiences have been carried out within the national boundaries, they provide the occasion for rethinking cross-border judicial procedures outside their traditional schemas. Building on this, taking stock of pre-COVID-19 EU cross border judicial services situation, this paper explores EU Member States e-justice emergency measures and attempts to stimulate the discussion on their potential for innovation in cross border judicial proceedings.

Aboriginal youth are overrepresented within Victoria’s criminal justice system (Cunneen, 2020). Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander youth are diverse people with diverse needs: It is imperative to understand what those needs are and how they can be supported within Victoria’s youth justice centres. Research has identified that Aboriginal youth in Victoria’s justice system have higher rates of psychopathology (Shepherd et al., 2018), higher rates of recidivism (Cunneen, 2008), higher pre-custody rates and post-release rates of substance abuse (Joudo, 2008) and lower rates of rehabilitation (Thompson et al., 2014) than non-Indigenous counterparts. It is critical to explore how the Victorian youth justice system identifies and implements the provision of services that consider lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, queer, sistergirl and brotherboy (LGBTIQSB+) identities of Aboriginal youth in custody. This is because additional levels of systemic disadvantage, discrimination, stigma, and social exclusion that impact LGBTIQ+ youth specifically (Cunneen, Goldson, & Russell, 2016) as well as Aboriginal identity, further compound and jeopardize the social and emotional wellbeing of those embodying intersectional identities. This article will examine the services available to Aboriginal LGBTIQSB+ youth in the Victorian criminal justice system. Aboriginal, Torres Strait Islander, Indigenous and First Nations People will be used interchangeably throughout this document.

The international community has significantly increased its focus on the improvement of justice systems around the world, in recent years. With the increase in effort and interventions in the sector, there has been a need to create tools to assess justice systems, to identify the main elements affecting the workings of the justice machinery. In a context of increasing interest and engagement in justice systems reform, the ability of citizens to access justice institutions to address their needs has come to be seen as an essential element of development, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. The Republic of North Macedonia has been dedicated in a certain amount to improving the access to justice following these global trends. However, the pandemic has brought to the surface many obstacles in the realization of these efforts and imposed serious issues that need to be further solved. In this paper, we will elaborate on the present situation in North Macedonia from the personal experience of law clinics and civil society organizations that work and contribute closely on this issue. Furthermore, we will identify particular points that need to be advanced and relevant stakeholders to be engaged, to improve the situation, and bring justice closer to everyone.

Historiker und Historikerinnen, zumal jene der jüngeren deutschen Geschichte, beschäftigen sich am liebsten mit Recht, wenn es nicht weh tut. Der Boom der Menschenrechtshistoriographie steht dieser Diagnose ebensowenig entgegen wie die Flut an Behördengeschichten der NS-Zeit. Beide Trends bestätigen vielmehr den Befund, versteckt sich hinter den Etiketten doch nicht selten eine klassische Politik­historie, oft in der Gestalt einer Gesetzgebungsgeschichte, aufgelockert durch und verwoben mit ideen- und diskurshistorischen Elementen. Dies erlaubt es einerseits, sich von der etablierten, meist juristisch definierten Rechtsgeschichte abzusetzen, der vorgeworfen wird, zu einer sterilen Dogmengeschichte erstarrt zu sein. Andererseits hält man an tradierten Arbeitsteilungen fest: Die lästige, wiewohl notwendige Pflichtaufgabe, sich in die technischen Einzelheiten des Rechts zu vertiefen, darf aus der eigenen Zuständigkeit entlassen werden. Entsprechend begrenzt bleibt der wissenschaftliche Austausch: Rechtswissenschaftler/innen lesen historiographische Arbeiten als leichte Lektüre für den Hintergrund; Historiker/innen rezipieren die Studien ihrer juristischen Kolleg/innen als sprödes Fußnotenfutter. Dass der fächerübergreifende Kontakt zuletzt vor allem durch regierungsseitig initiierte Projekte über die NS-Belastung einzelner Ministerien und Behörden vorangetrieben wurde, bestätigt diese Beobachtung eher, als dass sie widerlegt würde.

It is said that William Brennan, the great US Supreme Court Justice, liked to greet his incoming law clerks with a bracingly simple definition of constitutional doctrine: five votes. 'You can't do anything around here', Brennan would say, wiggling the fingers of his hand, 'without five votes.' While memorable, Brennan’s definition was not entirely original. Seventy-five years before Brennan's elevation to the high court, the jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. famously wrote: 'The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience [...]. The law […] cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.' Some years later, Holmes returned to this idea, writing: 'The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.' Statements such as Brennan's and Holmes’ found elaboration in the American jurisprudential movement known as 'legal realism'. One of its most influential and articulate exponents was the law professor Karl Llewellyn (1893-1962). Trained at Yale Law School, and on the faculty of Columbia, Llewellyn had a foot in the two institutions most prominently associated with the realist movement.

Ernst Fraenkels Buch "Der Doppelstaat", 1941 in den USA erschienen und erst 1974 auf Deutsch publiziert, weist trotz seiner zentralen Stellung in der Forschung zur NS-Herrschaft eine lückenhafte Rezeptionsgeschichte auf. Der Aufsatz plädiert dafür, das Werk als Rechtsgeschichte zu verstehen. Am Beispiel des Arbeitsrechts wird aus einer praxeologischen, Fraenkel folgenden Perspektive deutlich gemacht, wie und warum sich die Grenzen zwischen Normen- und Maßnahmenstaat verschoben. Diese Kategorien bezeichnen nicht etwa den Gegensatz zwischen Staat und Partei; vielmehr ist genauer nach dynamischen Grenzüberschreitungen und Rechtsaneignungen zu fragen. Dargelegt wird, wie das privatrechtliche Gepräge des Arbeitsrechts staatlich durchdrungen wurde, sodass sich Arbeitgeber und Arbeitnehmer von Subjekten zu Objekten des Rechts der Arbeit wandelten. Möglich wurde dies nur durch das maßnahmenstaatliche Handeln sämtlicher Instanzen aus Verwaltung, Justiz und Polizei. "Treuhänder der Arbeit" und Gestapo dehnten das System der "Arbeitserziehungslager" immer weiter aus. Das Recht verlor sukzessive seine herrschaftsbeschränkende Funktion und geriet zu einem Herrschaftsmittel. Nicht mehr die Gerichte kontrollierten die Verwaltung, sondern die Behörden lenkten die Gerichts- und Rechtspraktiken., Despite its central relevance for our understanding of the Nazi regime, Ernst Fraenkel's book The Dual State, first published in the United States in 1941 and (re)translated into German in 1974, has received unequal attention from various historical angles. The article argues that Fraenkel's work should be understood as a history of law. With a focus on labour law and using a praxeological approach that follows Fraenkel's perspective, it illustrates how and why the boundaries between the normative state and the prerogative state shifted. However, we should not regard Fraenkel’s categories as describing a strict opposition between state and party; rather, we must investigate more thoroughly the dynamics and appropriations beyond these boundaries. The article shows how the state penetrated the private realm of labour law, thereby transforming employers and employees from subjects to objects of labour law. This was only possible because all entities - including administrative, judicial and police authorities - acted together. 'Trustees of Labour' and the Gestapo continued to expand the system of 'corrective labour camps'. As a consequence, the law gradually ceased to limit those in power and became instead an instrument of domination. In the end, the courts no longer controlled the administration; it was now the authorities that controlled the judicial and legal practices.

Im März 1933 überfiel die SA das Amts- und Landgericht in Breslau. Jüdische Richter und Anwälte wurden, zum Teil unter schweren Misshandlungen, aus dem Gebäude getrieben und in den nächsten Tagen an der Ausübung ihrer Berufe gehindert. Die Justiz reagierte, indem sie ein sogenanntes Justitium verhängte: Für die Dauer von fünf Tagen wurden alle Termine abgesagt und alle Verfahren ausgesetzt. Im Rückblick stilisierten Zeitzeugen dieses Ereignis zum Streik. Der Beitrag skizziert zunächst die jahrhundertelange Rechtsgeschichte des Justitiums, das sich noch heute in der Zivilprozessordnung findet. Untersucht werden dann die näheren Umstände und Folgen der Breslauer Vorgänge von 1933. Dabei zeigt sich, dass der "Stillstand der Rechtspflege" tatsächlich kein Akt des Widerstandes gegen äußere Repression ist, sondern vielmehr ein juristischer Selbstbetrug: Auf die Gefahr von Rechtlosigkeit antwortet das Recht einfach mit dem Rekurs auf vorhandenes juristisches Vokabular, um eigene Handlungsfähigkeit zu suggerieren und selbst rohe Gewalt als Rechtszustand zu definieren., In March 1933 the SA raided the Local Court and the District Court in Breslau. Jewish judges and lawyers were driven out of the building, some of them brutally mistreated, and prevented from exercising their professions over the next few days. The judiciary responded by imposing a 'Justitium': all appointments were cancelled for a period of five days and all proceedings were suspended. In retrospect, contemporary witnesses portrayed this event as a strike. The article begins by outlining the centuries-old legal history of the Justitium, which can still be found today in the Code of Civil Procedure. The specific circumstances and consequences of the events in Breslau in 1933 will then be examined. It becomes apparent that the ›standstill in the administration of justice‹ is in fact not an act of resistance against external repression, but rather a form of legal self-delusion: At the risk of lawlessness, the law simply responds with recourse to existing legal vocabulary in order to give the impression of its own capacity to act and to define even brute force as a state of law.

Judges of the German Federal Constitutional Court can be seen as both judicial and political elites. Yet, up to now there is no systematic work on the Court's' judges and especially their careers prior to their appointments. Using sequence analysis, I identify four relatively distinct clusters of career characteristics: academia, administration (and administrative courts), ordinary jurisdiction and politics. Judges whose career background is limited to the judicial sphere mostly advance from a level below the Länder to the Länder and then on to the federal level, while those with a background in politics or administration switch less often among them. Furthermore, I find little evidence to suggest that differences in the judges' career paths can be explained by reference to the body that elected them (Bundestag or Bundesrat) or the party that nominated them (CDU/CSU or SPD). The article also illustrates the possibilities of sequence analysis for elite studies.

Judge and Jurisconsult – Coercive and Persuasive Authority in Islamic Law (Richter und Rechtsberater- Zwingende und überzeugende Autorität im Islamischen Recht) Wer spricht das Recht in der islamischen Rechtsprechung? Die islamische Rechtsgeschichte konzentrierte sich lange auf den Einzelrichter (qadi) als Inbegriff der Rechtsprechung. Der Richter handelte jedoch nicht als einzige Verkörperung der Rechtsprechung. Ein Justizpersonal unterstützte seine und arbeitete von einer ihm unterstellten Position aus. Darüber hinaus hat der gelehrte Rechtsberater (mufti) die Rechtsprechung durch übereinstimmende und abweichende Meinungen vor Gericht in vielerlei Hinsicht geprägt. Die Arbeit konzentriert sich auf zwei Autoritäten am Gericht – qadi und mufti – in der frühen Abbasidischen Rechtsgeschichte (2. und 3. Jahrhundert nach der islamischen Zeitrechnung bzw. 8. und 9. Jahrhundert der gregorianischen Zeit), die miteinander kooperiert oder auch konkurriert haben. Die Grundlage ihrer Beziehung ist das islamische Prinzip der gerichtlichen Beratung von Experten in Rechtsfragen. Die islamische Rechtslehre ermutigt einen Richter, der mit Rechtsunsicherheiten konfrontiert war, einen gelehrten Rechtsberater (mufti) zu konsultieren, bevor er eine gerichtliche Entscheidung trifft. Die islamische Rechtsprechung entstand somit aus einem Verhältnis von Kooperation, Konfrontation und Kooptation zwischen Richtern und (außer-gerichtlichen) gelehrten Rechtsberatern., Judge and Jurisconsult – Coercive and Persuasive Authority in Islamic Law Who dispenses justice at court? Islamic legal historians have long focused on the single judge (qadi) as the embodiment of the administration of justice. The judge, however, did not act alone in dispensing justice. A judicial staff supported his work, working from a position subordinate to him. In addition, evading a clearly demarcated judicial hierarchy, the learned jurisconsult (mufti) shaped adjudication in many distinct ways through concurring and dissenting opinions at court. This contribution focuses on two authorities—the qadi and the mufti—who cooperated or competed with each other at court in early Abbasid legal history (2nd-3rd century A. H. / 8th-9th century C.E.). Fundamental to their relationship is the Islamic principle of judicial consultation of experts on legal questions. Islamic legal doctrine encouraged a judge confronted with legal uncertainties to consult a mufti before issuing a judicial decision. Islamic adjudication thus emerged out of cooperation, confrontation and cooptation between judge and (extra-judicial) legal experts.

verfasst von: Sandra Hutter, Universität Innsbruck, Diplomarbeit, 2020, (VLID)5347571

Im 23. Jahr der Erhebungsreihe zur Situation in den sozialtherapeutischen Einrichtungen ergeben sich eine weitere Stabilisierung der strukturellen Gegebenheiten sowie die Fortsetzung einiger Trends. Die Zahl der Haftplätze reduziert sich abermals, was nahelegt, dass eine allgemeine Sättigungsgrenze der Versorgung erreicht wird. Auch die Zahl der Gefangenen, die versorgt werden, hat sich zum Stichtag 2019 reduziert. Der Trend der Alterung der Gefangenen wird auch dieses Jahr weiter fortgesetzt, so dass ein Drittel der nach Allgemeinem Strafrecht verurteilten Männer 50 Jahre oder älter sind. Sexualstraftäter/innen stellten auch in diesem Jahr gut die Hälfte der Inhaftierten in der Sozialtherapie. Die Fachdienstausstattung bleibt auf gleichbleibend günstigem Niveau mit lediglich 5,8 Haftplätzen auf einer Fachdienststelle.

Esta investigación plantea que la estabilidad precede a cualquier otra característica del diseño institucional al momento de evaluar los resultados económicos de los países. Trasladando esta propuesta teórica general al campo de las políticas judiciales en este artículo proponemos que a) la estabilidad judicial es un determinante del crecimiento económico y que b) dicho crecimiento económico se verifica de forma autónoma a los desempeños de la independencia judicial. Luego de observar empíricamente el impacto de ambas variables sobre el crecimiento económico en dieciséis países latinoamericanos durante el siglo XX, los resultados revelan que hay suficientes indicios tanto para sustentar la hipótesis propuesta como para profundizar en el estudio de las diferencias entre estabilidad e independencia judicial., We argue that when it comes to assessing a country's economic performance, institutional stability is more important than specific institutional design features. Applying this general framework to the subfield of judicial politics, we contend that a) judicial stability is a determinant of economic growth, and b) this result is autonomous of judicial independence. After empirically evaluating the impact of judicial stability and judicial independence on the rate of economic growth in sixteen Latin American countries over the twentieth century, our findings show that there is sufficient evidence to support our hypotheses and to encourage further research on the differences between judicial stabi lity and judicial independence.

International Organizations such as the Council of Europe and the United Nations have developed several legal provisions on prisoners' rights. These liberal rules are intended to improve how various actors handle incarcerated offenders in the criminal justice system. Local legislations have similarly been developed by various countries to protect and safeguard the right of prisoners. This review will examine various international legal provisions and the local statutory requirements available under the Kenyan justice system. In particular, the requirements of the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (UNSMR) will be examined and compared to various local legal provisions in the Penal code and the Prisons Act (CAP 90 of the Laws of Kenya). Additionally, the examination will cover some of the challenges that hinder the effective implementation of local and international rules on prisoners' rights in the Kenyan context.

The paper aims to evaluate the direct and indirect determinants of the system for administrative legal protection efficiency in the Republic of North Macedonia. For this purpose, the paper analyzes the legal and institutional framework of administrative authorities i.e. the second instance administrative commissions that act on the appeal against the decisions of the first instance administrative bodies, as well as the legal and institutional framework of the Administrative and Higher Administrative Court that provide administrative-judicial protection against administrative acts. The paper assesses internal efficiency determinants for three second instance state commissions that provide legal protection in administrative procedure in the country, independently, as well as the two administrative courts: staff (administrative staff, number of elected members of second instance commissions, number of judges), number of newly formed cases, number of resolved cases and number of unresolved cases at the end of a year.

Este artículo es un primer paso hacia la comprensión del uso de los medios sociales por parte de las cortes constitucionales y supremas de América Latina. Algunas de estas cortes se han destacado a nivel mundial como precursoras en el uso de tales medios. Se realizó un análisis sistemático y comparativo de 17 cortes durante el lapso de un año, con el foco en dos cuestiones: por un lado, en la intensidad con que utilizaron las plataformas más relevantes -Twitter, Facebook y YouTube- y, por otro, en el nivel de influencia de cada corte. Como resultado, se presenta una clasificación de las cortes que enfatiza que existen diferencias de desempeño: las cortes más influyentes no son necesariamente las más activas, pero hacen un uso muy diferenciado de las redes sociales. En cambio, las menos influyentes muestran gran dispersión en torno al nivel de actividad. Asimismo, exploramos de manera preliminar la relación entre el nivel de confianza en los poderes judiciales y la intensidad del uso e influencia de las cortes en las redes. Observamos que las cortes que enfrentan mayor desconfianza son moderadamente más activas y tienden a tener menos influencia. Dos motivos podrían explicar este comportamiento: la búsqueda de autopromoción estratégica; y un ideal de transparencia institucional., In this article we take a first step towards understanding the use of social media by constitutional and supreme courts in Latin America. Some Latin American courts stand out worldwide for their active online presence. We present the first comparative evaluation of the social media presence of 17 Latin American high courts. We evaluate the intensity of the current use of the most relevant online platforms - Twitter, Facebook and YouTube - and explore the level of influence each court has developed in these networks. As a result, we present a classification of the courts that emphasizes that there are performance differences: the most influential courts are not necessarily the most active ones, but they make a very differentiated use of social media. In contrast, the least influential ones show great dispersion around the level of activity. Additionally, we present a preliminarily evaluation of the relationship between the level of trust in the judiciaries and both the intensity of the use and the level of influence of courts in social networks. We see that courts with higher levels of distrust are moderately more active and tend to have less influence. Two motivations could explain the court behavior in social media: First, the search for strategic self-promotion. Second, an ideal of institutional transparency.

When the European Union was founded, it was assumed that all Member States admitted as consolidated democracies would maintain their constitutional commitments. In recent years, Hungary and Poland have challenged this premise as elected autocratic governments in those countries have captured independent institutions and threatened long-term democracy. The judiciaries of these countries have been hard hit. In this paper, we trace what has happened to the judiciaries in Hungary and Poland, showing how first the constitutional courts and then the ordinary judiciary have been brought under the control of political forces so that there is no longer a separation of law and politics. We also explore why the European Union has so far not been able to stop this process. In the end, the European judiciary, particularly the Court of Justice, is attempting a rescue of national judiciaries, but the results are so far unclear.

The massive mobility restrictions in the Schengen zone that were imposed to control the Corona pandemic are to be lifted from mid-June onwards. If a second wave of infec­tions does not follow suit, the German EU Council Presidency may oversee the end of all remaining internal border controls. The reform of the Schengen regulation, which has been overdue since the migration crisis, can be relaunched. The link between secure external borders and internal freedom of movement should have already been reappraised. Looking forward, targeted checks on persons for reasons of public health must be better coordinated. The forthcoming EU pact on migration and asylum will be even more difficult to agree on, however. Access to asylum procedures must be guaranteed without fail, despite national responsibility for public health. (author's abstract)

Die massiven Mobilitätsbeschränkungen in der Schengen-Zone, die die EU-Staaten infolge der Corona-Pandemie verhängt haben, sollen ab Mitte Juni aufgehoben werden. Wenn in der Zeit danach keine zweite Infektionswelle ausbricht, kann unter deutscher Ratspräsidentschaft der Ausstieg aus allen verbliebenen Binnengrenzkontrollen ge­lingen. Die Reform der Schengen-Verordnung, die seit der Migrationskrise überfällig ist, kann neu angestoßen werden. Der Zusammenhang zwischen sicheren Außen­gren­zen und interner Freizügigkeit ist spätestens seit diesem Frühjahr neu zu bewer­ten. Zudem müssen gesundheitlich begründete Personenkontrollen besser abgestimmt werden. Es dürfte jedoch schwerer werden, für den kommenden EU-Pakt für Migra­tion und Asyl einen Kompromiss zu finden. Der Zugang zu Asylverfahren ist trotz der nationalen Verantwortung für die öffentliche Gesundheit unbedingt zu gewährleisten. (Autorenreferat)

Georgien, Armenien und Aserbaidschan bilden einen Teil des EU-Kooperationsraums der Östlichen Partnerschaft. Europäische Außen­politik ermuntert und unterstützt die Partnerstaaten dabei, ihre Regierungs­führung (governance) zu verbessern. Für die Bewertung, wie gut das gelingt, spielt das Thema Korruption und ihre Bekämpfung eine gewichtige Rolle. In keinem anderen Teil Osteuropas und Eurasiens klafften das Ausmaß der Korruption und die Bilanz der Gegenmaßnahmen so weit auseinander wie im Südkaukasus. Unter den postsowjetischen Staaten hat nur Georgien seine Position in der Korruptionsstatistik seit Mitte der 2000er Jahre nachhaltig verbessert. Auf dem Korruptionswahrnehmungs-Index von Transparency Inter­national liegt es weit vor seinen Nachbarn, doch seine Reformbilanz wird in den letzten zwei Jahren von heftigen innenpolitischen Querelen gefährdet. In Armenien leitete die Samtene Revolution im Frühjahr 2018 den Sturz der Republikanischen Partei ein. Unter deren Herrschaft hatte sich in zwei Jahrzehnten eine Oligarchie etabliert, und die Korruption blühte. Die neue Führung unter Premierminister Nikol Paschinjan erklärte Korruptionsbekämpfung zur Priorität für den politischen Neustart. Aserbaidschan weist das höchste Ausmaß an Korruption auf. Seine "Beamtenoligarchie" bildete bislang eine machtvolle Verbindung zwischen Staat und Wirtschaft. 2019 sagte Präsident Ilham Alijew Schattenwirtschaft und Korruption den Kampf an und ersetzte einige langjährige Regierungsmitglieder. Experten bezweifeln allerdings, dass damit ein politischer Systemwandel in die Wege geleitet wurde. (Autorenreferat)

The place of the Criminal Justice System (CJS) in ensuring and sustaining social order in any country has been long established especially with the understanding that norms, rules, and laws act as social adhesives for society. However, some countries in the developing world seem to be grappling with significant challenges associated with criminal justice delivery as a consequence of the real and perceived inefficiency of the CJS in dealing with deviant issues. This to a large extent tend to undermine social order and by extension the collective conscience of the people. In Nigeria, criminal justice issues have attracted strong theoretical and practical affronts with the dominant perspective being that the poor are often denied justice in favour of the rich with adverse implications for social order. As a result, this paper examined the issue of the CJS in order to show how this affects social order in Nigeria. The paper adopts the content analysis method for data gathering and the qualitative approach to data analysis. Also, the Marxist Political Economy perspective is adopted as the theoretical framework as well as a complementary method of analysis. The paper submits that in a society like Nigeria where criminal justice is significantly defined by the politics of corruption, social order will be largely elusive and in its place, there will be an obvious consistency in criminal activities in the country. The paper recommends among others that the government should strengthen the criminal justice system and provide an enabling environment for it to function effectively if social order is to be achieved in Nigeria.

This article aims to investigate the legal and political evolution of the institution of Conditional release in Romania between 2000 and 2019 with a special focus on the abrupt changes during the mentioned period. The aim of this research consists in bringing together the redefining of the regulatory framework of Conditional release in relation to the dynamic political context and personal strategies used by the right-holder of individual liberation. Two important episodes need to be recalled for the redefinition of this concept: the establishment of the National Anticorruption Directorate; and the reform of criminal legislation, after Romania’s accession to the European Union. The general objective is to explain and understand the different stages in which liberation committees and courts of law have made use of the prerogative of dispensing conditional release, given the social role that the complementary institution of Conditional release within the institutional, territorial and functional scheme of the rule of law. I will show that amendments to criminal law, along with changes in court practice, have led to a reduction in the level of consistency between the decisions of the liberation committees and courts of law. Different legitimating strategies used by right holders are the main unexpected result of this research, as restrictive legal provisions apply to both decision levels.

Im Zuge von Massenprotesten kam 2018 der Oppositionspolitiker Nikol Paschinyan in Armenien an die Macht. Angetreten war er mit einer ambitionierten Reformagenda, die bei der Bevölkerung hohe Erwartungen geweckt hat. Zwei Jahre später lautet die Bilanz "Work-in-Progress". Covid-19 durchkreuzt aber nun die (wirtschafts-)politischen Vorhaben der Regierung. Die Krise lässt sowohl negative als auch positive Rahmen­bedingungen für die Umsetzung zentraler Reformen erkennen. (Autorenreferat)

Analysing disputes between the US and the EU under GATT and the WTO respectively, the paper demonstrates that the judicialization (or legalization) of international dispute settlement procedures can contribute to states’ compliance with these dispute settlement mechanisms. The paper compares four sets of pairwise similar disputes with US had with the EU: the so-called Domestic International Sales Corporations (DISC) case (which arose under GATT) and the Foreign Sales Corporations case (which was settled through WTO procedures), the Steel case (GATT) and the Patents case (WTO), the two Hormones cases under GATT and the WTO respectively, and the Citrus case (GATT) and the Bananas case (WTO). In each of the four comparisons the US acted more in accordance with the judicial WTO dispute settlement procedures than with the diplomatic GATT procedures. We can therefore say that contrary to realist assumptions, the judicialization of dispute settlement procedures can contribute to their effectiveness. However, contrary to idealist assumptions the effectiveness of international dispute settlement procedures does not automatically follow from their judicialization. Yet, as assumed by institutionalists, judicialized dispute settlement procedures are better than diplomatic dispute settlement mechanisms in sustaining states’ compliance with these procedures precisely because of their normative and strategic effects.

Korruption und Straflosigkeit sind zwei zentrale Probleme des Rechtsstaats in Latein­amerika und damit auch von Qualität und Stabilität der Demokratie in dieser Region. Weil ihre eigenen Handlungs­möglichkeiten erschöpft waren, versuchten einige Regie­rungen, gemeinsam mit internationalen Organisationen dagegen vorzugehen. Dafür wurden Sondermechanismen eingerichtet, die außerhalb staatlicher Ermittlungs- und Strafverfolgungsbehörden, aber zugleich mit ihnen ver­schränkt daran arbeiten, Netz­werke der Korruption aufzudecken. In Guatemala, Honduras, Mexiko und Nicaragua sind solche Bemühungen zur Durchsetzung von Recht und Menschenrechten vor Kurzem abgebrochen worden, in Ecuador und El Salvador stehen vergleich­bare Ver­suche noch am Anfang. Nur wenn sie umfassend lokal eingebettet und (zivil)gesell­schaftlich verankert sind, werden sie erfolgreich sein können. (Autorenreferat)

The issue of the military order is a very complex one. When giving or executing an order, one should always take into account the necessity to make choices. The decisions taken may in the future imply criminal liability as a consequence of the order that is contrary to legal norms, or executing it. The purpose of the article is to present the problem of giving an order from the perspective of the crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia, with a detailed account of the R. Krstic’s case. The author tried to answer the questions: What is the scope of the commander's liability? Is he liable only for the orders he has given? Does this liability extend to the behavior of his subordinates as well? In the presented article an analysis of selected court cases important from the point of view of the problem of giving an order was carried out. For this purpose, the regulations of International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg were analyzed. Subsequently, an analysis of selected court cases being investigated under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. In conclusion are indicated the regulations of International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the regulations of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.