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Theory of mind (ToM) reasoning refers to the process by which we reason about the mental states (beliefs, desires, emotions) of others. Here, we describe an open dataset of responses from children who completed a story booklet task for assessing ToM reasoning ( n  = 321 3-12-year-old children, including 64 (neurotypical) children assessed longitudinally and 68 autistic children). Children completed one of two versions of the story booklet task (Booklet 1 or 2). Both versions include two-alternative forced choice and free response questions that tap ToM concepts ranging in difficulty from reasoning about desires and beliefs to reasoning about moral blameworthiness and mistaken referents. Booklet 2 additionally includes items that assess understanding of sarcasm, lies, and second-order belief-desire reasoning. Compared to other ToM tasks, the booklet task provides relatively dense sampling of ToM reasoning within each child (Booklet 1: 41 items; Booklet 2: 65 items). Experimental sessions were video recorded and data were coded offline; the open dataset consists of children's accuracy (binary) on each item and, for many children ( n  = 171), transcriptions of free responses. The dataset also includes children's scores on standardized tests of receptive language and non-verbal IQ, as well as other demographic information. As such, this dataset is a valuable resource for investigating the development of ToM reasoning in early and middle childhood., (© 2023 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc.)

An important part of our Theory of Mind—the ability to reason about other people's unobservable mental states—is the ability to attribute false beliefs to others. We investigated whether processing these false beliefs, as well as similar but nonmental representations, is reliant on language. Participants watched videos in which a protagonist hides a gift and either takes a photo of it or writes a text about its location before a second person inadvertently moves the present to a different location, thereby rendering the belief and either the photo or text false. At the same time, participants performed either a concurrent verbal interference task (rehearsing strings of digits) or a visual interference task (remembering a visual pattern). Results showed that performance on false belief trials did not decline under verbal interference relative to visual interference. We interpret these findings as further support for the view that language does not form an essential part of the process of reasoning online ("in the moment") about false beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates how children leverage intonational and gestural cues to an individual’s belief state through unimodal (intonation-only or facial gesture-only) and multimodal (intonation + facial gesture) cues. A total of 187 preschoolers (ages 3–5) participated in a disbelief comprehension task and were assessed for Theory of Mind (ToM) ability using a false belief task. Significant predictors included age, condition and success on the ToM task. Performance improved with age, and was significantly better for the multimodal condition compared to both unimodal conditions, suggesting that even though unimodal cues were useful to children, the presence of reinforcing information for the multimodal condition was more effective for detecting disbelief. However, results also point to the development of intonational and gestural comprehension in tandem. Children that passed the ToM task significantly outperformed those that failed it for all conditions, showing that children who can attribute a false belief to another individual may more readily access these intonational and gestural cues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the Sandbox Task, participants indicate where a protagonist who has a false belief about the location of an object will look for that object in a trough filled with a substrate that conceals the hidden object’s location. Previous findings that participants tend to indicate a location closer to where they themselves know the object to be located have been interpreted as evidence of egocentric bias when attributing mental states to others. We tested the assumption that such biases occur as a result of reasoning about mental states specifically. We found that participants showed more egocentric bias when reasoning from a protagonist’s false belief than from their own memory, but found equivalent levels of bias when they were asked to indicate where a false film would depict the object as when they were asked about a protagonist’s false belief. Our findings suggest that that egocentric biases found in adult false belief tasks are more likely due to a general difficulty with reasoning about false representations than a specialised difficulty with reasoning about false mental states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Highlights • First MEG study of neural underpinnings of theory of mind differences in autism. • Children with autism show decreased LTPJ activity from 300 to 375 and 425 to 500 ms. • Children with autism also show increased RIFG activity from 325 to 375 ms. • Co-incident lower LTPJ and higher RIFG activity implies compensatory use of RIFG. • Executive functions may augment impaired theory of mind in autism. Abstract The social impairments observed in children with autism spectrum disorder are thought to arise in part from deficits in theory of mind, the ability to understand other people's thoughts and feelings. To determine the temporal-spatial dynamics of brain activity underlying these atypical theory-of-mind processes, we used magnetoencephalography to characterize the sequence of functional brain patterns (i.e. when and where) related to theory-of-mind reasoning in 19 high-functioning children with autism compared to 22 age- and sex-matched typically-developing children aged 8–12 during a false-belief (theory-of-mind) task. While task performance did not differ between the two groups, children with autism showed reduced activation in the left temporoparietal junction between 300–375 and 425–500 ms, as well as increased activation in the right inferior frontal gyrus from 325 to 375 ms compared to controls. The overlap in decreased temporoparietal junction activity and increased right inferior frontal gyrus activation from 325 to 375 ms suggests that in children with autism, the right inferior frontal gyrus may compensate for deficits in the temporoparietal junction, a neural theory-of-mind network hub. As the right inferior frontal gyrus is involved in inhibitory control, this finding suggests that children with autism rely on executive functions to bolster their false-belief understanding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two studies are presented to examine whether and why 3–5-year-olds in Pakistan display limited social understanding. Study 1 tested 71 preschoolers on Lillard and Flavell’s (1992) test of desires, pretence and beliefs, plus two false belief tasks, and showed very limited understanding across these measures even though almost half were over 5 years old. Study 2 replicated this effect with 35 preschoolers, and also conducted home observations of mother–child interaction at two time points. It tested three competing explanations of the role of adult-conversation in the preschooler’s developing understanding of the mind: the quality of the caregiver’s references to mental states, the child’s grasp of mental state language in such conversations, and the connectedness of adult–child talk. These factors are usually highly correlated in Western cultures. In Pakistan, with a delay in the acquisition of social understanding skills, Study 2 showed that maternal and child references to mental states were rare (2% of maternal and 1% of child utterances). Analyses of the relationship between mother–child conversation and the children’s test performance suggested that the measures of social understanding were not predicted uniquely by the connectedness of talk within the dyad, or maternal use of mental state terms. However, the children’s concurrent (and to a lesser extent previous) use of mental state terms was related to their grasp of mental states. Thus, the data support previous analyses, which suggests that the child’s construction of mental state terms is more crucial in their grasp of the social world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To predict and explain the behavior of others, one must understand that their actions are determined not by reality but by their beliefs about reality. Classically, children come to understand beliefs, including false beliefs, at about 4-5 y of age, but recent studies using different response measures suggest that even infants (and apes!) have some skills as well. Resolving this discrepancy is not possible with current theories based on individual cognition. Instead, what is needed is an account recognizing that the key processes in constructing an understanding of belief are social and mental coordination with other persons and their (sometimes conflicting) perspectives. Engaging in such social and mental coordination involves species-unique skills andmotivations of shared intentionality, especially as they aremanifest in joint attention and linguistic communication, as well as sophisticated skills of executive function to coordinate the different perspectives involved. This shared intentionality account accords well with documented differences in the cognitive capacities of great apes and human children, and it explains why infants and apes pass some versions of false-belief tasks whereas only older children pass others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bilingual children often show advanced executive functioning (EF) and false belief (FB) understanding compared to monolinguals. The latter has been attributed to their enhanced inhibitory control EF, although this has only been examined in a single study which did not confirm this hypothesis. The current study examined the relation of EF and language proficiency on FB reasoning in bilingual and monolingual preschoolers to answer two questions: (1) Are there differences in bilinguals’ and monolinguals’ FB, language proficiency, and EF? If so, (2) is there a differential role for language proficiency and EF in predicting FB reasoning in these two groups? Thirty-two Spanish–English bilinguals and 33 English monolinguals (three to five years old) were compared. While monolinguals outperformed bilinguals on language proficiency, after controlling for this, bilinguals outperformed monolinguals on FB reasoning, and marginally on EF. General language ability was related to FB performance in both groups, while short-term memory and inhibitory control predicted FB only for monolinguals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous studies have suggested sentential complementation is the crucial ingredient of language that relates to false-belief (FB) reasoning, while the role of relative clauses (RCs) is less clear. Nevertheless, under the hypothesis that clausal embedding has a meta-representational effect, arguably implied in FB, one expects a link between FB and not only complementation but also relativization. Seventeen children with ASD (6 to 16 years, mean age 9;2) were assessed for RCs and FB. Comprehension of RCs significantly predicted FB performance, while none of the controlled factors played a predictive role (comprehension of simple sentences, vocabulary, morpho-syntax and working memory). Findings suggest that clausal embedding, common to both sentential complements and RCs, serves as a bootstrap for FB reasoning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This study examines the spontaneous use of embodied egocentric transformation (EET) in understanding false beliefs in the minds of others. EET involves the participants mentally transforming or rotating themselves into the orientation of an agent when trying to adopt his or her visuospatial perspective. We argue that psychological perspective taking such as false belief reasoning may also involve EET because of what has been widely reported in the embodied cognition literature, showing that our processing of abstract, propositional information is often grounded in concrete bodily sensations which are not apparently linked to higher cognition. In Experiment 1, an agent placed a ball into one of two boxes and left. The ball then rolled out and moved either into the other box (new box) or back into the original one (old box). The participants were to decide from which box they themselves or the agent would try to recover the ball. Results showed that false belief performance was affected by increased orientation disparity between the participants and the agent, suggesting involvement of embodied transformation. In Experiment 2, false belief was similarly induced and the participants were to decide if the agent would try to recover the ball in one specific box. Orientation disparity was again found to affect false belief performance. The present results extend previous findings on EET in visuospatial perspective taking and suggest that false belief reasoning, which is a kind of psychological perspective taking, can also involve embodied rotation, consistent with the embodied cognition view. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, infants younger than 2 years have been shown to display correct expectations of the actions of an agent with a false belief. The developmental trajectory of these early-developing abilities and their robustness, however, remain a matter of debate. Here, we tested children longitudinally from 2 to 4 years of age with an established anticipatory looking false belief task, and found a significant developmental change between the ages of 3 and 4 years. Children anticipated correctly only by the age of 4 years, and performed at chance at the ages of 2 and 3 years. Moreover, we found correct anticipation only when the agent falsely believed an object to be in its last rather than a previous location. These findings point towards the fragility of early belief-related action anticipation before the age of 4 years, when children start passing traditional false belief tasks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The interpretations of infants’ non-verbal responses in violation-of-expectation (VOE) false belief scenarios are subject to intense theoretical debate. In Experiment 1, adults provided online narratives for VOE scenarios meant to tap understanding of false beliefs about object location, perception and identity. Adults provided cognitively-oriented narratives for the location scenario when instructed to track beliefs and, for this scenario only, participants evaluated the unexpected outcome as unexpected and the expected outcome as expected. Adults had mixed views about the perception scenario, and judged the identity scenario where the agent acted in violation of his belief as being reasonable. Experiment 2 confirmed that when the identity scenario was turned into an action task that was time-pressured, adults failed to act in a belief-based manner. We should be cautious in drawing firm conclusions about mentalizing in infancy when adults’ narratives and estimates of the expectedness of outcome events suggest that only certain VOE scenarios were interpreted in their intended fashion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A growing body of infant studies with various implicit, non-verbal measures has suggested that Theory of Mind (ToM) may emerge much earlier than previously assumed. While explicit verbal ToM findings are highly replicable and show convergent validity, systematic replication studies of infant ToM, as well as convergent validations of these measures, are still missing. Here, we report a systematic study of the replicability and convergent validity of implicit ToM tasks using four different measures with 24-month-olds (N = 66): Anticipatory looking, looking times and pupil dilation in violation-of-expectation paradigms, and spontaneous communicative interaction. Results of anticipatory looking and interaction-based tasks did not replicate previous findings, suggesting that these tasks do not reliably measure ToM. Looking time and new pupil dilation measures revealed sensitivity to belief-incongruent outcomes which interacted with the presentation order of outcomes, indicating limited evidence for implicit ToM processes under certain conditions. There were no systematic correlations of false belief processing between the tasks, thus failing to provide convergent validity. The present results suggest that the robustness and validity of existing implicit ToM tasks needs to be treated with more caution than previously practiced, and that not all non-verbal tasks and measures are equally suited to tap into implicit ToM processing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

False belief understanding in infancy can be measured through helping tasks. However, there has been controversy surrounding the interpretation of such data. In order to better understand the nature of infants’ false belief understanding, replication of the original findings is critical. The objective of the present study was to conduct a conceptual replication of the helping task designed by Buttelmann, Carpenter, and Tomasello (2009). In Experiment 1, 41 18-month-olds were tested using the false belief task. A larger sample (n = 97) was tested in Experiment 2 with this task in order to increase statistical power. Additionally, 33 infants were tested on a true belief task. Results from both experiments failed to replicate those from the original study. The discussion addresses the potential reasons for this lack of replication, as well as the implication of these findings regarding the debate on the interpretation of infants’ behavior in this prompted-action task. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mental files theory explains why children pass many perspective taking tasks like the false belief test around age 4 (Perner & Leahy, 2016). It also explains why older children struggle to understand that beliefs about an object depend on how one is acquainted with it (intensionality or aspectuality). If Heinz looks at an object that is both a die and an eraser, but cannot tell by looking that it is an eraser, he will not reach for it if he needs an eraser. Four- to 6-year olds find this difficult (Apperly & Robinson, 1998). We tested 129 35- to 86-month olds with a modified version of Apperly and Robinson's task. Each child faced four tasks resulting from two experimental factors, timing and mode of information. Timing: Children saw Heinz learn the die's location either before or after they learn that the die is an eraser. Mode of information: Heinz learns where the die is either perceptually or verbally. When Heinz' learning is verbal, he never perceives the die at all. We found that Apperly and Robinson's problem occurs only in the seen-after condition, where Heinz sees the die afterchildren had learnt that it was also an eraser. It vanishes when Heinz learns where the die is before children learn that it is also an eraser. The problem also vanishes when Heinz learns where the die is purely verbally (e.g., "The die is in the red box") and never sees it. This evidence lets us refine existing mental files theory, and eliminate several alternatives from the literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We infer the thoughts and feelings of others by taking their perspectives. Similar processes could be used to understand how we will be affected by future events, by allowing us to take the perspective of our future self. In this paper, we test this idea using a previously presented framework for guiding predictions. The framework proposes that a shared neural mechanism is involved in controlling egocentric bias, both while shifting our perspective away from self and towards others, and while shifting our perspective from immediate to future perspectives. To test this framework, 36 adults performed an intertemporal choice task. They were then scanned using 3T functional magnetic resonance imaging while completing a false-belief “localizer” task, which requires egocentric bias control. A positive correlation was observed between the right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) response during the false-belief task, and preferences for delayed rewards in intertemporal choices. A subset of participants performed the intertemporal choice task again in the scanner, which revealed that the response of the same rTPJ cluster, individually localized during the false-belief task, was higher during delayed over immediate reward choices. In addition, functional connectivity between the rTPJ and ventromedial prefrontal cortex was found to differ between immediate and delayed choices. The current results indicate an overlap in processes of egocentric bias control and those that determine preferences in intertemporal choices, offering a social cognitive explanation for why rewards are devalued with delay in temporal discounting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Influential studies showed that 25-month-olds and neurotypical adults take an agent's false belief into account in their anticipatory looking patterns (Southgate et al. 2007 Psychol. Sci. 18, 587–592 (doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01944.x); Senju et al. 2009 Science 325, 883–885 (doi:10.1126/science.1176170)). These findings constitute central pillars of current accounts distinguishing between implicit and explicit Theory of Mind. In our first experiment, which initially included a replication as well as two manipulations, we failed to replicate the original finding in 2- to 3-year-olds (N = 48). Therefore, we ran a second experiment with the sole purpose of seeing whether the effect can be found in an independent, tightly controlled, sufficiently powered and preregistered replication study. This replication attempt failed again in a sample of 25-month-olds (N = 78), but was successful in a sample of adults (N = 115). In all samples, a surprisingly high number of participants did not correctly anticipate the agent's action during the familiarization phase. This led to massive exclusion rates when adhering to the criteria of the original studies and strongly limits the interpretability of findings from the test phase. We discuss both the reliability of our replication attempts as well as the replicability of non-verbal anticipatory looking paradigms of implicit false belief sensitivity, in general.

Humans are often considered egocentric creatures, particularly (and ironically) when we are supposed to take another person's perspective over our own (i.e. when we use our theory of mind). We investigated the underlying causes of this phenomenon. We gave young adult participants a false belief task (Sandbox Task) in which objects were first hidden at one location by a protagonist and then moved to a second location within the same space but in the protagonist's absence. Participants were asked to indicate either where the protagonist remembered the item to be (reasoning about another's memory), believed it to be (reasoning about another's false belief), or where the protagonist would look for it (action prediction of another based on false belief). The distance away from Location A (the original one) towards Location B (the new location) was our measure of egocentric bias. We found no evidence that egocentric bias varied according to reasoning type, and no evidence that participants actually were more biased when reasoning about another person than when simply recalling the first location from memory. We conclude that the Sandbox Task paradigm may not be sensitive enough to draw out consistent effects related to mental state reasoning in young adults.

Using a novel eye-tracking test, we recently showed that great apes anticipate that other individuals will act according to false beliefs. This finding suggests that, like humans, great apes understand others' false beliefs, at least in an implicit way. One key question raised by our study is why apes have passed our tests but not previous ones. In this article, we consider this question by detailing the development of our task. We considered 3 major differences in our task compared with the previous ones. First, we monitored apes' eye movements, and specifically their anticipatory looks, to measure their predictions about how agents will behave. Second, we adapted our design from an anticipatory-looking false belief test originally developed for human infants. Third, we developed novel test scenarios that were specifically designed to capture the attention of our ape participants. We then discuss how each difference may help explain differences in performance on our task and previous ones, and finally propose some directions for future studies.

In search of a deeper understanding of perspective-taking, the paper aims at isolating the basic components of complex perspectivization tasks. Based on the assumption that perspective is a relational concept constituted by the dynamic relation between a conceptualizer’s point of view and a conceptualized object and, as such, a concept which is shared by both language and cognition, the paper draws a comparison between the developmental stages of cognitive perspectival capabilities, grammatical perspectivization, and viewpoint comprehension in narrative discourse. This comparison leads to a multi-stage model of degrees of perspectival complexity, whereby the most complex tasks in both language and cognition are characterized by a three-point constellation that integrates contrasting internal vs. external perspectives under a superordinated monitoring viewpoint. As a result, the paper argues that a concept of perspective ‘taking’ is not sufficient to capture the specific aspects of L(anguage)-perspectivization, but has to be complemented by a concept of ‘confronting’ perspectives.

Theory of mind (ToM) gradually develops during the preschool years. Measures of ToM usually target visual experience, but auditory experiences also provide valuable social information. Given differences between the visual and auditory modalities (e.g., sights persist, sounds fade) and the important role environmental input plays in social-cognitive development, we asked whether modality might influence the progression of ToM development. The current study expands Wellman and Liu’s ToM scale (2004) by testing 66 preschoolers using five standard visual ToM tasks and five newly crafted auditory ToM tasks. Age and gender effects were found, with 4- and 5-year-olds demonstrating greater ToM abilities than 3-year-olds and girls passing more tasks than boys; there was no significant effect of modality. Both visual and auditory tasks formed a scalable set. These results indicate that there is considerable consistency in when children are able to use visual and auditory inputs to reason about various aspects of others’ mental states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]