Do you know what I'm thinking? Temporal and spatial brain activity during a theory-of-mind task in children with autism.

Highlights • First MEG study of neural underpinnings of theory of mind differences in autism. • Children with autism show decreased LTPJ activity from 300 to 375 and 425 to 500 ms. • Children with autism also show increased RIFG activity from 325 to 375 ms. • Co-incident lower LTPJ and higher RIFG activity implies compensatory use of RIFG. • Executive functions may augment impaired theory of mind in autism. Abstract The social impairments observed in children with autism spectrum disorder are thought to arise in part from deficits in theory of mind, the ability to understand other people's thoughts and feelings. To determine the temporal-spatial dynamics of brain activity underlying these atypical theory-of-mind processes, we used magnetoencephalography to characterize the sequence of functional brain patterns (i.e. when and where) related to theory-of-mind reasoning in 19 high-functioning children with autism compared to 22 age- and sex-matched typically-developing children aged 8–12 during a false-belief (theory-of-mind) task. While task performance did not differ between the two groups, children with autism showed reduced activation in the left temporoparietal junction between 300–375 and 425–500 ms, as well as increased activation in the right inferior frontal gyrus from 325 to 375 ms compared to controls. The overlap in decreased temporoparietal junction activity and increased right inferior frontal gyrus activation from 325 to 375 ms suggests that in children with autism, the right inferior frontal gyrus may compensate for deficits in the temporoparietal junction, a neural theory-of-mind network hub. As the right inferior frontal gyrus is involved in inhibitory control, this finding suggests that children with autism rely on executive functions to bolster their false-belief understanding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]