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The article discusses a court case of King v. The Queen wherein the plaintiff was convicted for culpable driving leading into death. The issues related to criminal negligence were considered along with lesser alternative verdict and the considerations by the trial jury. The decisions made by the Court of Appeals wherein the court dismissed the plaintiff's application for leave to appeal are also discussed.

The article discusses the court cases Williams & others v Fred Olsen Cruise Lines Ltd. and Sewell v Saga Holidays wherein the principle res ipsa loquitur in the law of negligence of duty was applied in both cases. The court held that the defendants are liable for their failure to provide passenger safety and accident prevention measures. It considers the incident of the Costa Concordia cruise ship which suggests that the cruise industry should set safety standards and risk management strategies.

Government intrusion into the homes of the working-classes gained momentum through the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. One hitherto unexamined piece of legislation that sought to regulate behaviour was a clause in the Children Act 1908 pertaining to the use of domestic fireguards. This transpired because of the outcry of coroners who conducted inquests into the deaths of children fatally burned in their homes, supposedly a safe refuge, a space constructed as a maternal responsibility. Coroners increasingly believed such accidents were a result of either maternal carelessness or negligence, especially those involving unguarded fires and absent mothers. Yet, limited by inadequate laws and unwilling juries, the coroner could do little but admonish the mother. However, growing Government concern over the abilities of working-class mothers and the health of the nation finally brought the issue of absent fireguards and burnt children to Parliamentary debate, culminating in a provision which appeared to have been aimed more at prevention than punishment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the Australian court case R. v. Patel, which dealt with criminal negligence in a case of medical manslaughter. Topics include the burden of proof required to prove criminal negligence, the legal accountability placed on health care workers, and if medical manslaughter remedies are effective as a means of deterrence.

The article provides a brief description and history of the "insanity defense", which is a legal defense on which the mentally disordered may rely and is now referred to as "not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder" (NCR). It further states that recklessly exacerbating one's own mental disorder with the resulting injury or death of another should be considered criminal negligence and elaborates on the possible forms of punishment which should accompany the proposed offence.

Doug Husak suggests that sometimes an actor should be deemed reckless, and not merely negligent, with respect to the risks that she knowingly created but has forgotten at the moment of action. The validity of this conclusion, he points out, depends crucially on what it means to be aware of a risk. Husak's 'neutral prompt' and 'counterfactual actual belief' criteria are problematic, however. More persuasive is his suggestion that we understand belief, in this moral and criminal law context, as a concept whose meaning is determined by its function as a culpability standard. Husak concludes that inadvertent actors are often less culpable than knowing-but-later-forgetful actors; this is plausible, but there are also numerous counterexamples. Holly Smith focuses on negligence cases in which an agent's failure to notice a risk stems, not from a prior culpable choice, but from an objectionable attitude or set of attitudes. She is right to emphasize that genuine moral culpability does not depend on conscious choice. However, Smith also asserts that decisions that flow from an actor's objectionable attitudes are only rarely culpable, because they often do not arise from a reasonably full configuration of the actor's motives. This last requirement is, I fear, an unrealistic and unnecessarily demanding criterion of culpability. Even when many of the actor's evaluative attitudes are 'inactive' in Smith's sense, the actor might deserve blame for not bringing them to bear on his decision. Michael Moore and Heidi Hurd thoroughly explore, and find deficient, H.L.A. Hart's 'unexercised capacity' theory of negligence. They are correct that that theory requires a further judgment: an actor's inadvertence is culpable only if he had the capacity to have adverted 'if X' where X is the source of the actor's moral desert. They overstate, however, in suggesting that the capacity issue falls out of the picture once we identify that underlying desert basis. The authors also worry that if desert is grounded on an underlying vice, we lack a reliable way of ranking the different vices that might explain the actor's inadvertence; this is not a fatal objection, however, because negligence determinations are quite feasible even in the absence of clear rankings. Moore and Hurd conclude by identifying eight distinct categories in which criminal liability for negligence is justifiable. Negligence is indeed a surprisingly complex and pluralist concept. The three articles in this symposium brightly illuminate some of the most fundamental conceptual and normative issues in the debate over whether it is just to blame and punish the negligently inadvertent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Negligence is a problematic basis for being morally blamed and punished for having caused some harm, because in such cases there is no choice to cause or allow-or risk causing or allowing-such harm to occur. The standard theories as to why inadvertent risk creation can be blameworthy despite the lack of culpable choice are that in such cases there is blame for: (1) an unexercised capacity to have adverted to the risk; (2) a defect in character explaining why one did not advert to the risk; (3) culpably acquiring or failing to rid oneself of these defects of character at some earlier time; (4) flawed use of those practical reasoning capacities that make one the person one is; or (5) chosen violation of per se rules about known precautions. Although each of these five theories can justify blame in some cases of negligence, none can justify blame in all cases intuitively thought to be cases of negligence, nor can any of these five theories show why inadvertent creation of an unreasonable risk, pure and simple, can be blameworthy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: This study searched for gender differences in filicidal offense characteristics and associated variables. Methods: In this binational register-based study all filicide perpetrators (75 mothers and 45 fathers) and their crimes in Austria and Finland 1995–2005 were examined for putative gender differences. The assessed variables were associated with the offense characteristics, the offenders’ socioeconomic and criminal history, and related stressful events. Results: Mothers had previously committed violent offenses less often than fathers (5% vs. 28%, p <0.001) and they were less often employed (27% vs. 49%, p <0.05). Mothers’ victims were on average younger than those of fathers; median ages of the victims were 3.4 and 6.1 years, respectively (p <0.001). Fathers were more often intoxicated during the offense (11% vs. 42%, p <0.001) and also used shooting as the method of operation more often than mothers (5% vs. 27%, p <0.001). Mothers used drowning, criminal negligence, and poisoning more often than fathers. Fathers’ motives were more impulsive in nature (13% vs. 41%, p <0.001). After the killing, mothers tried to get rid of the body more often than fathers (25% vs. 7%, p <0.05). Conclusions: Fathers who commit filicide may represent at least two subgroups, the one not unlike the common homicide offender; the other, the overloaded, working and suicidal father. Mothers may include several types of offenders, one of which is the neonaticide offender. More detailed descriptions and, therefore, more research are needed. Practice implications: Distressed parents and families need support and health care personnel, social work and other officials need to be alert to notice fatigued parents’ signs of despair, especially when several stressful experiences amass. Straightforward enquiry to the situation and even practical and psychological help may be needed for enhanced protection of children. The role of employers should also be discussed in relation to the welfare of working parents. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The article discusses the tortious liability of misfeasance in public office and its relationship with constitutionality in the context of Great Britain's Crown Proceedings Act 1947. It mentions the struggles between public and private litigants and courts in determining the extent to which a public authority has to be treated as any other party wherein it has been in the torts of breach of negligence and statutory duty. The notion of misfeasance in public office is a form of tort which will apply to public officials in the law enforcement sector involved in improper collusion, improper disclosure of criminal records, and refusal to stop violence.

Copyright of Romanian Journal of Compulsory Execution / Revista Română de Executare Silită is the property of Universul Juridic Publishing House and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article discusses the use of immunity by a state officer to protect himself from civil litigation from violation consistent under the Brady versus (v.) Maryland. It discusses the extent of use of immunity and states that despite violating the Due Process Clause for hiding evidences, it offers chances to resolve conflict of circuits' decision and that state actor should be protected when they fail to do their duties in prosecutorial function. It says that immunity limits civil litigation of police error under Brady, but alternative liability is held for intentional concealment of evidences. It also mentions the Daniels v. Williams case, wherein Brady violation was allowed and rules of immunity by state officers was rejected due to carelessness and negligence.

The High Court has reserved judgment in an appeal against the decision of the Western Australian Court of Appeal in Miller v Miller (2009) 54 MVR 367. This appeal calls into question the defence of joint illegal enterprise, which is an answer to liability in the tort of negligence. It is with this appeal that this article is concerned. Two main arguments are presented. The first is that the defence is framed in a highly unsatisfactory way. It is governed by nonsensical rules, many of which are inconsistent with fundamental principles of tort law. Accordingly, should the High Court retain the defence, it is submitted that it should reformulate it so that it blends in with the legal environment in which it resides. The second and more fundamental argument is that the defence should be abolished. It is a stain on the law of torts. Not only are there no convincing arguments in support of it, but there are powerful reasons against its existence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the criminal negligence under clean water act (CWA) with reference to the case United States v. Edward Hanousek. Edward Hanousek discontinued the preventive measures in the pipeline construction, which led to accidental discharge of around 1000 to 5000 gallons of oil in Skagway River. It is stated that for any environmental criminal investigation, charges should be filed in such a manner that if proven guilty the perpetrator can not find a legal escape.

The article focuses on the legal liability of National Football League (NFL) head coaches for the health-related death of a football player. It explores the NFL culture, the prevalence of heat-related deaths among Americans and football players, and the likelihood of NFL head coaches to be charged with criminally negligent homicide. It also discusses criminal and employment law applied when the death of player was caused by heat stroke and prevention program for heat-related illness.

The study, first published in 2004, looks at databases on clinical negligence litigation, what kind of claims for clinical negligence there have been, and studies cases in different settings such as general practice, general surgery and medicine, psychiatry and obstetrics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista de Derecho Penal y Criminologia is the property of Editorial UNED and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article discusses the court case R. v. Evans involving Gemma Evans and her mother, Andrea Townsend, who were convicted of the gross negligence manslaughter of the former's 16-year-old half sister, Carly Townsend. Carly died due to a heroin overdose at Andrea's home. Evans, who received a four-year custodial sentence, appealed based on the grounds that the trial judge was wrong to have directed the jury that it was a situation capable of giving rise to a duty of care.

Copyright of Revista Ciência & Saúde Coletiva is the property of Associacao Brasileira de Pos-Graduacao em Saude Coletiva and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista de Derecho Penal y Criminologia is the property of Editorial UNED and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The changing doctor-patient relationship and commercialization of modern medical practice has affected the practice of medicine. On the one hand, there can be unfavorable results of treatment and on the other hand the patient suspects negligence as a cause of their suffering. There is an increasing trend of medical litigation by unsatisfied patients. The Supreme Court has laid down guidelines for the criminal prosecution of a doctor. This has decreased the unnecessary harassment of doctors. As the medical profession has been brought under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, the patients have an easy method of litigation. There should be legal awareness among the doctors that will help them in the proper recording of medical management details. This will help them in defending their case during any allegation of medical negligence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Internet Services Provider(ISP) can be divided into Internet Content Provider( ICP), Internet Access Provider( IAP) and Internet Platform Provider( IPP). ICP should be responsible for what contents it provides, and IAP can' t be convicted as an auxiliary criminal. It follows that the relevant judicial interpretation is questionable. As to the IPP, what it did should not be regarded as an auxiliary criminal, since the help it provides usually belongs to a neutral behavior without the danger impermitted by law. The behavior of any companies who provide P2P softwares and other related services usually belongs to normal business operation, and it is improper to consider such a behavior as a danger which should be convicted insomuch as an auxiliary criminal to be punished. The proper way is to deny that their help behavior is guilty and they are auxiliary criminals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the prosecutorial trend in aviation accident investigations to transform airline employees with negligent conduct into criminal conduct. The author questions what is accomplished by these procedures. Does it cause airline passengers to be safer by trying to understand the reasons why accidents occur or by threatening aviation executives and workers with jail? Many believe this practice is counterproductive.

The persistence of strict criminal liability for child sexual abuse is attributable, at least in part, to the shortcomings of the existing alternatives, namely, the recklessness and criminal negligence standards. These two standards require juries to define the acceptable level of risk on a case-by-case basis. Juries are ill-equipped to make this calculation in sexual abuse cases, however, and their efforts to do so almost invariably are skewed by evidence of the victim's unchastity. This Article first explores the shortcomings of the recklessness and criminal negligence standards in this setting, and then attempts to develop a viable alternative. Under the proposed alternative, the legislature, not the jury, would define the acceptable risk of sexual imposition. It would calculate this invariant probability threshold in much the same way that juries calculate the acceptable risk in recklessness and criminal negligence cases-by assigning values to the gravity of the potential harm and to the social utility of the conduct. Under this scheme, the jury would be responsible only for deciding whether the risk of sexual imposition exceeded this invariant probability threshold in the defendant's case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the criminal liability of juristic persons in Estonia based on the Penal Code of 2002. It is stated that 2002 Penal Code increased the number of crimes imposed on juristic persons and the sanctions include pecuniary punishment and compulsory dissolution. It notes that a legal person may be responsible for both intentional and negligent acts and the Supreme Court indicated that a legal person may be responsible for an act executed by an employee, which is ordered by the legal person. It also mentions that the crimes in the Estonian criminal law are punishable in the European Union (EU) acts, but the problem lies in the identification of persons whose acts can be imputed to a legal person.

As criminal offences against the person's life and health can be performed both intentionally and by negligence, this article deals with problems of distinguishing between intent and negligence in lawsuits of this category. The specialized section of the Criminal Code includes separate constitutions for premeditated murder and manslaughter (CC Art. 129 and 132), and structures of intentional and negligent bodily injury, both severe and light (CC Art 135 and 137; CC Art 138 and 139). Therefore, most problems both in pretrial and trial hearing of the case arise during proving the subjective evidence of criminal action in lawsuits of these categories. As it is known, both forms of culpability, i.e. intention and negligence, differ one from another according to their content of will and intellectual moments. On this basis, a distinction is made between direct and indirect intention, whereas negligence is divided into recklessness and conscious (advertent) negligence. Discussing direct and indirect intent and problems distinguishing between them, the article pays a lot of attention on a person's perception of inevitability of the dangerous outcomes. It is considered that only in case of direct intention the perpetrator perceives that dangerous outcomes will inevitably arise, whereas in indirect intention -- it is only a probability. It can be noted that courts often make a faulty determination of indirect intention of a person's actions, even though objective circumstances of the case confirm that the culprit wanted to kill another person or disturb his/her health. The author of the article doubts whether indirect intention in crimes against person' s life and health is possible. In her opinion, it is difficult to imagine how, in case of indirect intent, a person may not want to take another person's life or disturb his/her health, if he/she understands that a certain conduct will inevitably lead to a specific result. However, the major problems in court practice concern the difficulty distinguishing between intention and conscious negligence, when a person is killed by striking a single blow by a hand on another person's head. In these cases it is difficult to determine if the offender understood that by striking a blow on a head he/she can take another person's life. In court practice such action is usually qualified according to CC Art. 129 as premeditated murder, or according to CC Art. 132, as manslaughter. However, the author considers that qualification of the action according to one of the above articles is not sufficient and suggests qualifying the action according to CC Art. 132 and 135 as concurrence of manslaughter and intentional severe and light bodily injury. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is necessary to pay attention objectively to the understanding of the constituent elements when accusing a crime due to doing no report or doing false report of a safety casualty, such as "the fact that one didn't report or did false report", "conditions of a safety casualty" and "delaying the rescue and/or salvage in casualty". The principle of concurrent punishment for several crimes is regarded as reasonable if the crime of safety casualty correlated with other similar crimes done by the same one (s). However, the relevant criminal(s) should be accused just according to the crime of safety casualty itself if it correlated with the guilt of misuse of authority and/or ignoring one' s duty. Now the crime is legally and usually attributed to the case of involuntary violation of law, but in the case there are some complicated internal contradictions to a certain extent. So, defining simply the crime as a case of involuntary violation of law is a legislative oversight, and it is necessary to modify one of the law provisions to the case, i.e. , change "the cases of gross violation" to "the cases of causing severe event". It implies that perfecting legislatively the relevant provisions for the crime by getting rid of the degree of violation but by the severity of the actual result of the criminal act. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an analysis of the European Court of Justice's (ECJ) judgment regarding the Framework Decision on ship-source pollution. A summary of the case wherein the European Commission took legal action under Article 35(6) EU, to strengthen an existing criminal law involving the enforcement of ship-source pollution, is also presented. The Framework Decision is intended to ascertain approximate criminal laws of European Union (EU) Member States through a provision requiring member states to provide for criminal penalties, in order to fight the intent or extreme negligence of ship-source pollution. The court's judgment regarding the "Ship-Source Pollution" case follows a similar ruling in 2005 legal case "Environmental Crimes."

This article discusses the mental state of uncertain (reckless) knowledge of material element of an offense and its treatment in criminal law. The mental state of reckless knowledge is common in criminal cases, especially in cases of smuggling, drug trafficking, sexual coercion and rape of a person under eighteen years of age, pickpocketing and etc. This state of mind is described as situation, when a person receives incomplete or contradictory information about element of an offense but suspects the real facts. However, notion of reckless knowledge of material element of an offense is still unknown in Lithuanian theory of the criminal law. Lithuanian theory of the criminal law operates only with notions of knowledge and ignorance, and also with general notion of perception. Lithuanian courts do not use notion of uncertain knowledge either. In most cases they treat uncertain knowledge as case of ignorance of a circumstance. In contrast, German, English, American criminal law and some Russian authors treats uncertain knowledge as case of perception, not as ignorance or mistake. This article contends, that this point of view is grounded better. This article discusses whether uncertain knowledge of circumstance could suffice for dolus eventualis. On the other hand, it is discussed, whether dolus eventualis could suffice conviction for offenses, which have not consequences as their material element (offenses with formal corpus delicti). Lithuanian criminal law traditionally rejects positive answers to these questions. German, most English and American (as far, as question concerns recklessness) and some Russian authors hold opposite point of view. This article contends, that traditional Lithuanian attitude does not hold critic from psychological and normative point of view and should be changed. However Lithuanian Criminal Code does not provide definition of dolus eventualis for offenses with formal corpus delicti, therefore author proposes to fill this gap temporarily by judicial practice and doctrine. The need to supplement Lithuanian Criminal Code with definition of dolus eventualis, applicable for offenses with formal corpus delicti is also highlighted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, through its judgment in Jean Mpambara case, outlined the significance of culpable omissions, outlining three broad offences under which it could be used as evidence. While it is clear that an omission may be considered as evidence of aiding and abetting or joint criminal enterprise, it is still not clear whether omission of failure of duty to prevent or punish will be considered as part of Article 6(1) of the statute as done by the other trial chambers, or will it be considered as a different species of crime as concluded by the trial chamber in this case? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Until recently, New Zealand law set a very low threshold for culpability under criminal nuisance or criminal negligence -- namely carelessness -- and this threatened to impact negatively on the provision of adventure recreation. In 2004, a new interpretation of criminal nuisance -- recklessness -- was introduced and this, too, is potentially damaging for adventure recreation by raising the bar to criminal culpability too high. In this paper, we consider the implications of the law of criminal nuisance for New Zealand recreation in general, and we take risk recreations (also known as adventure recreations) as particular cases in which the threshold could have far-reaching detrimental consequences for recreation provision and participation. Comparison with interpretations of criminal negligence (and civil in Australia) in other common law jurisdictions and a review of the New Zealand adventure recreation culture shows that the swing from a low jump to a high jump for culpability is not in the best interests of recreation in New Zealand, and that gross negligence or a major departure from accepted standards is the appropriate threshold. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1988 in Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire, the House of Lords denied a duty of care was owed by police to a victim of a serial murderer. The case was interpreted as immunity from negligence actions for police when involved in the suppression and investigation of crime'. Recent cases in Australia and the United Kingdom have confirmed that while blanket immunity from negligence actions for police involved in investigatory functions does not exist, plaintiffs alleging negligence will face considerable difficulties establishing a duty of care was owed. The recent cases provide an opportunity to re-examine the appropriate tests to apply in determining the existence and scope of police duty of care and to reassess the policy grounds underlying the decisions. In doing so the article argues that Australian courts should avoid the UK approach of applying a broad exclusionary rule particular to police, as sufficient safeguards already exist in the Australian High Court's duty of care formulation for public authorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the means by which crime-related risks are discursively framed by practitioners and supporters of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED). It will argue that crime-related risks are framed in three interrelated ways: first, as forms of foreseeable danger; second, as depoliticized potentialities; and third, as potentialities that require complete responsibilization. It is argued that these discursive practices constitute the means by which practitioners legitimate their area of professional expertise while at the same time providing them with an opportunity to exercise pastoral control over their client(s). Furthermore, it is argued that these frames demonstrate how "risk" has become an important discourse through which neo-liberal governmentalities (Foucault 1991) with respect to crime control are actualized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analyzes the case R versus Lavender regarding the involuntary manslaughter by criminal negligence in New South Wales. Facts of the case; Arguments raised by the defendant; Decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal.

The Senate Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife is considering an amendment to the Clean Water Act (CWA) that would require human endangerment for a finding of criminal negligence under section 309(c). This proposal is in reaction to United States v. Hanousek and United States V. Hong, seen by some as overly harsh punishment for mere "accidents," contrary to the intent behind the CWA. Others have defended the decisions, arguing that requiring human endangerment for section 309(c) violations would unjustifiably excuse negligent conduct harmful to the environment and the public welfare. This Note reviews the criminal negligence standard under section 309(c), its application in Hanousek said Hong, and the major arguments proffered by the amendment's proponents and opponents. It concludes that the amendment is ill-advised, risking failure to capture significant environmental harms and depriving prosecutors of leverage in plea-bargaining. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Definitional problems in the law of rape prompted the recommendation by the Home Office Sex Offences Review Team (Setting the Boundaries: Reforming the law on sex offences, 2000) that the ‘defence’ of mistaken belief in the victim's consent should be denied to defendants unable to show that they took reasonable procedural care to establish consent: such failure would have amounted to recklessness. This article contends that this proposal did not go far enough in recognizing the moral culpability of those who make unreasonable mistakes in this context, but went too far in characterizing all those making such mistakes as reckless. It contends that the mens rea of rape should be defined in terms of three degrees of culpability: first degree rape would require knowledge as to the absence of consent, whilst second degree rape would need proof of recklessness as to whether the victim consents. Third degree—i.e. negligent—rape would be subject to a defence of mistaken belief in consent, provided it could be shown that the mistake was neither procedurally nor substantively negligent. The provisions of the Government's Sexual Offences Bill, 2003, are also found wanting; they will create a law in danger of generating miscarriages of justice whilst failing to perform the law's educative function of registering the wrongness of rape. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

People who knowingly engage in risky behavior but fail to think through why their actions are "risky" or "bad" or "dangerous," may not be subject to any criminal responsibility. Yet, by their choices to engage in dangerous actions, these people have shown themselves to be culpable, and thus deserving of punishment, as well as deferrable, since they know the dangerousness of their acts and therefore can decide whether to commit those acts. The law in its current state, presents the danger that opaquely reckless people are being treated as purely reckless and hence, our criminal justice system may be treating them as more culpable than they actually are. For theorists who believe that results do not matter for blameworthiness and punishability, responsibility rests upon the actor's choice. While many theorists advance this argument in the context of attempts and completed crimes, few focus on the result that this argument would have for reckless actors. That is, such a theory commits one to holding that the reckless driver who does not kill someone should be held as responsible as the reckless driver whose conduct results in death.

Discusses ways that nurses can ward off patient complications and avoid negligence lawsuits arising from intravenous therapy. Compound risks to watch out for; Documentation issues; Team effort required; Ways for coming to terms with testimony in case of lawsuits; Positive outcomes. INSET: Experts speak out.

The article examines the issue of human rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, based on the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case Osman v. the United Kingdom, delivered at Strasbourg, France on September 23, 1998. The applicant claimed that the State had failed to take adequate and appropriate steps to protect the lives of the second applicant, Ahmet Osman and his father, Ali Osman, from danger. The Court concluded that the applicant failed to show that there was criminal negligence on the part of the police that led to the manslaughter of Ali Osman.