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An in-depth comparison of plume calculations from the Quick Urban and Industrial Complex (QUIC) dispersion model to street- and roof-level concentration measurements for a daytime and night time release taken during the Joint Urban 2003 field experiment held in downtown Oklahoma City is presented. A number of improvements to the empirical-diagnostic wind solver to better account for high-rise buildings and dense urban areas will be discussed. Traditional plume statistical performance measures reveal that the code is performing as well as computational fluid dynamics models and meets the criteria proposed by Hanna and Chang (2012) for urban dispersion models. Statistics for the day and night release are fairly similar, and model performance drops slightly after the release is turned off in the flushing phase. Scatterplots indicate that rooftop measurements were generally well predicted, although the percentage of outliers (false negatives, large over predictions) was greater as compared to street-level measurements. Using all tracer data within a kilometre of the release, including rooftop samplers, from 39 to 46% of the model-computed concentrations were within a factor of two of the observations when broken up into four cases stratified by day or night and release on or off. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Source term information is required for to reconstruct a device used in a dispersed radiological dispersal device. Simulating a radioactive environment to train and exercise sampling and sample characterization methods with suitable sample materials is a continued challenge. The Idaho National Laboratory has developed and permitted a radioactive response training range (RRTR), an 800 acre test range that is approved for open air dispersal of activated KBr, for training first responders in the entry and exit from radioactively contaminated areas, and testing protocols for environmental sampling and field characterization. Members from the Department of Defense, Law Enforcement, and the Department of Energy participated in the first contamination exercise that was conducted at the RRTR in the July 2011. The range was contaminated using a short lived radioactive Br isotope (activated KBr). Soil samples contaminated with KBr (dispersed as a solution) and glass particles containing activated potassium bromide that emulated dispersed radioactive materials (such as ceramic-based sealed source materials) were collected to assess environmental sampling and characterization techniques. This presentation summarizes the performance of a radioactive materials surrogate for use as a training aide for nuclear forensics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Considerable attention is focused on plans for sheltering or evacuating the population of the US national capital region in response to a regional emergency such as a terrorist attack or natural disaster. Such planning engages multiple disciplines spanning infrastructure engineering, emergency management, health care, mass communication, water and food supply, logistics, and others. Knowledge of population behaviors should influence the many dimensions of protection, prevention, response, and recovery. Of particular interest are the behaviors and needs of the resident and non-resident populations in the aftermath of a regional disaster, including those at home, at work, and traveling. The authors deployed a 30-min telephone survey to 2700 residents of the region to gain knowledge of their intended behaviors in the event of a variety of potential dirty bomb attacks. The survey provides a unique foundation for the current paper. The paper will identify and model the assumptions of population behaviors that most affect agency priorities for emergency planning including regional sheltering and evacuation following a radiological disaster such as a dirty bomb. The technical approach assessed several planning initiatives across performance criteria derived from strategic plans and applied combinations of behavioral assumptions to vary the relative importance of each criterion. The results reveal the behavioral scenarios that are most significant to the prioritization of planning initiatives and identify the highest and lowest priority initiatives across the criteria used. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Terrorist attacks using radiological dispersal devices (RDD) are important threats that can lead to major environmental, economic, and public health concerns. In a simulation using a Gaussian model, we sought to determine dose curves as a function of distance from the explosion core site and from these data to determine the relative risk of developing tumors as well as the probability of causation (i.e., the statistical correlation between occurrence of malignancies and previous exposure to radiation). Calculation confirmed the cause dependence on age at exposure and the probability of tumor causation. This study aimed at emphasizing the importance of responding rapidly and efficiently, with a user-friendly user methodology that initially may help to guide the response from basic actions to the complete decision process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following a radioactive dispersal device (RDD) incident, it may be necessary to evaluate the internal contamination levels of a large number of potentially affected individuals to determine if immediate medical follow-up is necessary. Since the current laboratory capacity to screen for internal contamination is limited, rapid field screening methods can be useful in prioritising individuals. This study evaluated the suitability of a radiation portal monitor for such screening. A model of the portal monitor was created for use with models of six anthropomorphic phantoms in Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport Code Version 5 (MCNP) X-5 Monte Carlo Team (MCNP—A General Monte Carlo N-Particle Transport Code Version 5. LA-CP-03-0245. Vol. 2. Los Alamos National Laboratory, 2004.). The count rates of the portal monitor were simulated for inhalation and ingestion of likely radionuclides from an RDD for each of the phantoms. The time-dependant organ concentrations of the radionuclides were determined using Dose and Risk Calculation Software Eckerman, Leggett, Cristy, Nelson, Ryman, Sjoreen and Ward (Dose and Risk Calcuation Software Ver. 8.4. ORNL/TM-2001/190. Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 2006.). Portal monitor count rates corresponding to a committed effective dose E(50) of 10 mSv are reported. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: As a part of the preparedness and response to possible radiological terror events, it is important to model the evolution of the radioactive cloud immediately after its formation, as a function of time, explosive quantity and local meteorological conditions. One of the major outputs of a cloud rise models is the evaluation of cloud top height, which is an essential input for most of the succeeding atmospheric dispersion models. This parameter strongly affects the radiological consequences of the event. Most of the cloud rise models used today, have been developed according to experiments were large quantities of explosives were used, within the range of hundreds of kilograms of TNT. The majority of these models, however, fail to address Radiological Dispersion Devices (RDD) events, which are typically characterized by smaller amounts of TNT. In this paper, a new, semi-empirical model that describes the vertical evolution of the cloud up to its effective height as a function of time, explosive quantity, atmospheric stability and horizontal wind speed, is presented. The database for this model is taken from five sets of experiments done in Israel during 2006–2009 under the “Green Field” (GF) project, using 0.25–100 kg of TNT. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials is a particularly relevant concern if we take into account the potential threat of terrorist groups using these materials to make radiological dispersion devices (RDDs). RDDs, commonly known as ‘dirty bombs’, combine conventional chemical explosives and radioactive materials. The main purpose of a dirty bomb is to generate panic and chaos among the population. This type of turmoil ensues from the detonation of a dirty bomb because of the traumatic psychological effects following the detonation and the significant financial ramifications involved in decontaminating the affected areas (from 1 million to 300 million per km2). To understand this threat more thoroughly, it is important to note that, since the 1990s, hundreds of incidents of nuclear trafficking, such as theft, smuggling and orphan sources have been officially reported by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The threat posed by inadequate control of radioactive materials has strengthened international cooperation in order to implement interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary collaboration to keep nuclear and radioactive materials safe and to thus reduce the danger of dirty bombs and other types of weapons falling into the hands of terrorists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ian Bellany, an Emeritus Professor of Politics at Lancaster University, died in July 2011 at the age of 70, after a long and painful struggle with myelofibrosis, a rare and invariably terminal blood cancer. Between early 2009 and August 2010, under contract to Hurst & Co., he worked intermittently on a book about nuclear terrorism, which he provisionally entitled Before the Storm. The editor and I are grateful to Michael Dwyer at Hurst & Co. for releasing the draft. What is published here is an edited version of that draft. It may seem presumptuous to speak for Ian, but I am sure he would also have liked to thank the doctors and nurses of the NHS Morecambe Bay Universities Hospital Trust, whose skill, knowledge, and flair for improvisation kept him alive and writing for much longer than anyone expected. Alastair Bellany, Rutgers University, New Jersey, USA. In the past, terrorists have tended to eschew acts of extreme violence for fear of alienating those whom they wish to persuade and attract to their cause. The first to discard this philosophy was the Aum group in Japan, which sought to use anthrax and acquire a nuclear weapon. Since then, attitudes have changed, spurred on by the impact on public perception of the successful Al Qaeda 9/11 attack on New York and Washington. By crossing the line between moderation and extreme violence, terrorist groups retain one valuable capability: they are much less easily deterred and have few inhibitions. This article considers the three nuclear options open to terrorists – produce a radiological contaminant bomb; build a nuclear bomb; or steal or get given a nuclear device. It examines the possibilities and probabilities of each option and considers how the implementation of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) provisions might impose some constraints on terrorists’ nuclear ambitions. By examining the doubtful nuclear security practices of different states and providing statistical evidence of an increase in levels of international terrorist violence, this article points to determined terrorists in time acquiring the means to acquire one or other variants of a nuclear weapon. It concludes that it is not a matter of “if” but “when.” [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Field experiments with a Radioactive Dispersion Device (RDD) were performed by the National Radiation Protection Institute (NRPI) of the Czech Republic. We present the results of computer simulations of these experiments using a new microscale model, Charles University Large Eddy Microscale Model (CLMM). The model was first validated using wind tunnel data for the dispersion of continuous passive scalar release around a building with a similar aspect ratio to the building used in the experiments. The results for surface contamination by deposition are highly sensitivity to the particle size distribution, which in the present case has a large scatter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: Terrorist use of a radiological dispersal device (RDD, or ''dirty bomb''), which combines a conventional explosive device with radiological materials, is among the National Planning Scenarios of the United States government. Understanding employee willingness to respond is critical for planning experts. Previous research has demonstrated that perception of threat and efficacy is key in the assessing willingness to respond to a RDD event. Methods: An anonymous online survey was used to evaluate the willingness of hospital employees to respond to a RDD event. Agreement with a series of belief statements was assessed, following a methodology validated in previous work. The survey was available online to all 18,612 employees of the Johns Hopkins Hospital from January to March 2009. Results: Surveys were completed by 3426 employees (18.4%), whose demographic distribution was similar to overall hospital staff. 39% of hospital workers were not willing to respond to a RDD scenario if asked but not required to do so. Only 11% more were willing if required. Workers who were hesitant to agree to work additional hours when required were 20 times less likely to report during a RDD emergency. Respondents who perceived their peers as likely to report to work in a RDD emergency were 17 times more likely to respond during a RDD event if asked. Only 27.9% of the hospital employees with a perception of low efficacy declared willingness to respond to a severe RDD event. Perception of threat had little impact on willingness to respond among hospital workers. Conclusions: Radiological scenarios such as RDDs are among the most dreaded emergency events yet studied. Several attitudinal indicators can help to identify hospital employees unlikely to respond. These risk-perception modifiers must then be addressed through training to enable effective hospital response to a RDD event. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: A new rapid method for the determination of actinides in emergency concrete and brick samples has been developed at the Savannah River Site Environmental Lab (Aiken, SC, USA) that can be used in emergency response situations or for routine analysis. If a radiological dispersive device (RDD), Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) or nuclear accident occurs, there will be a urgent need for rapid analyses of many different environmental matrices, including building materials such as concrete and brick, to support dose mitigation and environmental clean-up. The new method for actinides in concrete and brick method utilizes a rapid sodium hydroxide fusion method, a lanthanum fluoride matrix removal step, and a column separation process with stacked TEVA, TRU and DGA Resin cartridges. Alpha emitters are prepared using rare earth microprecipitation for counting by alpha spectrometry. The method showed high chemical recoveries and effective removal of interferences. The determination of actinides in concrete and brick sample analysis can be performed in less than 8h with excellent quality for emergency samples. The rapid fusion technique is a rugged sample digestion method that ensures that any refractory actinide particles are effectively digested. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Radioactive sealed sources have a long history and a much wider worldwide distribution than do weapons-usable fissile materials. This article compares the mechanisms for controlling radioactive sources with those of weapons-usable materials and makes the case for improved policy making on the safe and secure management of radioactive sources (often referred to simply as 'sources'). Such sources have been widely distributed with commercial and government support to nearly every country, yet there are no legally binding, international agreements or regulations to control any aspect of their life cycle. This is problematic because some sources that are disused, abandoned, or otherwise fall out of regulatory control could be used in the form of a radiological dispersal device (RDD, or dirty bomb). An RDD could pose significant economic and psychological impacts with the potential for detrimental effects on public health. The lack of international measures to control sources is troubling for several reasons: creating an RDD is much easier than fashioning a nuclear weapon from scratch or from stolen fissile materials; given the many incidents involving diversion from regulatory control and the misuse of sources, an RDD attack would be one of the more likely scenarios; materials security for sources is generally weak and inconsistent; it is nearly impossible to determine the total amount of sources manufactured and distributed; used sources are frequently found uncontrolled and transiting borders, and penalties are light at best; the market-based supply and demand of sources facilitates their rapid and loosely regulated distribution; and the 'peaceful uses' aspect of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons along with norms that began developing around the time of Atoms for Peace have promoted the nearly unchecked global distribution of sources. Several immediate and long-term actions are suggested to reduce the threat posed by radiological sources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the keypoints which medical toxicologists and authorities need to focus to manage radiological dispersal device (RDD) infected population. It discusses the 2006 London 210Polonium (Po) incident and states that radiation experts must focus to identify isotopes as it is helpful for antidote creation. It mentions the importance of screening and treatment of internal contamination and suggests use of reasonable alternatives if specific treatments do not exist.

Abstract: The capacity for surgical teams to respond appropriately to the consequences caused by the detonation of a radiological dirty bomb will be determined by prior knowledge, familiarity and training for this type unique terrorist event. This paper will focus on the surgical aspects of this scenario with particular emphasis on the management of combined trauma-radiological injury. The paper also describes some of the more serious explosion-contamination incidents from nuclear industrial sources, summarises learning points and parallels taken from these scenarios in relation to subject of a radiological dirty bomb and describes the likely radioactive substances involved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The capacity for surgical teams to ensure their own safety when dealing with the consequences caused by the detonation of a radiological dirty bomb is primarily determined by prior knowledge, familiarity and training for this type of event. This review article defines the associated radiological terminology with an emphasis on the personal safety of surgical team members in respect to the principles of radiological protection. The article also describes a technique for use of hand held radiation monitors and will discuss the identification and management of radiologically contaminated patients who may pose a significant danger to the surgical team. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Identification of a low-level point radioactive source amidst background radiation is achieved by a network of radiation sensors using a two-step approach. Based on measurements from three or more sensors, a geometric difference triangulation method or an N-sensor localization method is used to estimate the location and strength of the source. Then a sequential probability ratio test based on current measurements and estimated parameters is employed to finally decide: (1) the presence of a source with the estimated parameters, or (2) the absence of the source, or (3) the insufficiency of measurements to make a decision. This method achieves specified levels of false alarm and missed detection probabilities, while ensuring a close-to-minimal number of measurements for reaching a decision. This method minimizes the ghost-source problem of current estimation methods, and achieves a lower false alarm rate compared with current detection methods. This method is tested and demonstrated using: (1) simulations, and (2) a test-bed that utilizes the scaling properties of point radioactive sources to emulate high intensity ones that cannot be easily and safely handled in laboratory experiments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on unique empirical data, including interviews with smugglers of radiological materials and the investigators who track them, this article discusses nuclear smuggling trends in the former Soviet republic of Georgia. Smuggling in Georgia mainly involves opportunist smugglers and amateurs, as opposed to professional criminals and terrorists; however, this does not mean that radiological smuggling is devoid of professionalism or organization. The article demonstrates that professional criminals are rarely involved in smuggling due to the unreliable nature of the market for radiological materials and the threat radiological smuggling could pose to professional criminals' ability to wield political power and operate legal commercial enterprises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Radiological dispersion devices, also known as dirty bombs, represent a new and complex threat category. While radiological hazard and events involve multi-expert assessment and intervention, only a based prior multi-hazard- strategy will efficiently remove effects. Highly specialized persons, supported by latest technological detectors able to recognize the radionuclide composition of the device, will be able to initiate the appropriate procedure. Present review paper focuses only on essential and qualitative aspects regarding radioisotopes that could be used in dirty bombs manufacturing, their detection by modern technology and on principal aspects of interventional procedure in case of an attack. It addresses just general issues that will contribute to a better view on present terrorist possibilities, while taking act that on the 14th of September 2005, Romania signed the Convention on nuclear terrorism and assumed proper actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Criminal acts such as an attack utilizing a radiological dispersal device (RDD or dirty bomb), the manufacture of such a device, or the illicit trafficking of radioactive materials would warrant a criminal investigation. This could involve the collection, transportation, and analysis of radiologically contaminated trace evidence. But are law enforcement agencies and forensic scientists capable of dealing with this? This research investigates the decontamination efficacy of two decontamination techniques (chemical and physical) designed for the removal of radiological material from documents of forensic importance. The impact that these procedures have on the development of latent fingermarks and the forensic analysis of the inks on these documents is also studied. It was found that slight changes in the color and chemical composition of a variety of document inks and a destruction of fingermark ridges occurred after chemical decontamination. Physical decontamination had no impact on these parameters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a lesson plan which teaches concepts on radiological science by linking radiological dispersion devices (RDD), or dirty bombs, and its associated health effects to motivate the students on the subject.

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A radiological dispersion device, or 'dirty bomb', is created by combining radioactive material and conventional explosives with the aim of causing both blast injuries and the psychological fear of lingering radiation. Future use of such a device by terrorist organizations operating in the UK is not unlikely. Both surgical and accident and emergency nursing staff may become involved in the management of patients involved in this type of disaster. This article summarizes the likely sequence of events, defines the nursing tasks emergency department personnel can expect to become involved with, and highlights specific issues of personal safety for this disaster scenario. Up-to-date, accurate information, and skills and training in this type of event can not be underestimated. Nursing teams equipped with the appropriate safety and procedural skills are more likely to respond positively to this type of event. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Planning for and managing radiological terrorism incidents that involve the release of radionuclides from a dirty bomb requires considering the potential lifesaving impact of protective radionuclide decorporation countermeasures (e.g., lung lavage). Lung lavage therapy could prevent deaths via the pulmonary mode (which involves radiation pneumonitis and fibrosis) by reducing the radiation dose to the lung from inhaled radionuclides. The risk avoidance (RAV) assessment framework introduced in a related paper is used to evaluate the pulmonary-lethality-mode RAV due to lung lavage and the associated risk avoidance proportion (RAP) for hypothetical inhalation-exposure scenarios. The lethality RAV is a measure (on a scale from 0 to 1) of the actual risk reduction associated with the applied protective countermeasures. The lethality RAP is the lethality RAV divided by the lethality risk when no protective countermeasures are employed and is a useful measure of the efficacy of the countermeasures applied. Examples of pulmonary-mode lethality RAV and RAP calculations are presented for hypothetical scenarios involving lung lavage to remove beta and/or gamma-emitting radionuclides that are inhaled in highly insoluble forms. The approach presented could be used to develop optimal schemes for applying lung lavage therapy following a terrorist incident involving a dirty bomb. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This paper presents the application of three publicly available biota dose assessment models (the ERICA Tool, R&D128/SP1a and RESRAD-BIOTA) to an assessment of the Drigg coastal sand dunes. Using measured 90Sr, 99Tc, 137Cs, 238Pu, 239+240Pu and 241Am activity concentrations in sand dune soil, activity concentration and dose rate predictions are made for a range of organisms including amphibians, birds, invertebrates, mammals, reptiles, plants and fungi. Predicted biota activity concentrations are compared to measured data where available. The main source of variability in the model predictions is the transfer parameters used and it is concluded that developing the available transfer databases should be a focus of future research effort. The value of taking an informed user approach to investigate the way in which models may be expected to be applied in practice is highlighted and a strategy for the future development of intercomparison exercises is presented. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: The ARGOS decision support system is currently being extended to enable estimation of the consequences of terror attacks involving chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological substances. This paper presents elements of the framework that will be applied in ARGOS to calculate the dose contributions from contaminants dispersed in the atmosphere after a ‘dirty bomb’ explosion. Conceptual methodologies are presented which describe the various dose components on the basis of knowledge of time-integrated contaminant air concentrations. Also the aerosolisation and atmospheric dispersion in a city of different types of conceivable contaminants from a ‘dirty bomb’ are discussed. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: The RESRAD-RDD methodology was applied to model the short- and long-term radiation exposures after a hypothetical radiological dispersal device (RDD) event in an urban environment. It was assumed that an RDD event would result in outside surface contamination of the exterior walls and roofs of surrounding buildings, as well as associated paved areas and lawns. The contaminants also might move inside the buildings and deposit on floors and interior walls. Some important input parameters include occupancy factors, building characteristics, and weathering of surface contamination. The modeling results include predicted external dose rates, relative contributions from important surfaces, annual and cumulative doses, and radionuclide concentrations. Potential countermeasures evaluated include grass removal, soil removal, and washing of paved areas. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Radiation dispersal devices (RDDs), or dirty bombs, are terrorist weapons designed to scatter radioactive materials in large urban areas. Although the main intent of a RDD is to produce general panic and chaos, other impacts such as health, environmental, property and economical damage may also occur. Although one certain method of reducing health risks from a RDD event is to remove the radioactive contaminants from the environment immediately, rapid cleanup after a RDD event may be impossible in many cases. However, preventing the migration of the radioactive contaminant is crucial. Although it may be necessary to allow the contaminant to remain in place, preventing its migration is still essential. Fixatives can reduce or eliminating migration potential of a contaminant introduced by a RDD. This paper reviews the significance of fixatives in response to a RDD event and some of the products which have been identified for such a purpose. Many of the products are promising for application. However, many reports lack quantitative information to allow for effective comparative evaluation. Further, key parameters, such as shelf life and product toxicity, are not typically evaluated. We recommend that standardized performance parameters be established to allow for better comparative evaluation. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This paper provides theoretical health-risk-assessment tools that are designed to facilitate planning for and managing radiological terrorism incidents that involve ingestion exposure to bone-seeking radionuclides (e.g., radiostrontium nuclides). The focus is on evaluating lethality risk avoidance (RAV; i.e., the decrease in risk) that is associated with radionuclide decorporation countermeasures employed to remove ingested bone-seeking beta and/or gamma-emitting radionuclides from the body. To illustrate the application of tools presented, hypothetical radiostrontium decorporation scenarios were considered that involved evaluating the hematopoietic-mode-lethality RAV. For evaluating the efficacy of specific decorporation countermeasures, the lethality risk avoidance proportion (RAP; which is the RAV divided by the total lethality risk in the absence of protective countermeasures) is introduced. The lethality RAP is expected to be a useful tool for designing optimal radionuclide decorporation schemes and for identifying green, yellow and red dose-rate zones. For the green zone, essentially all of the lethality risk is expected to be avoided (RAP = 1) as a consequence of the radionuclide decorporation scheme used. For the yellow zone, some but not all of the lethality risk is expected to be avoided. For the red zone, none of the lethality risk (which equals 1) is expected to be avoided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, the concern for protection of urban populations against terror attacks involving radiological, biological or chemical substances has attracted increasing attention, It sets new demands to decision support and consequence assessment tools, where the focus has traditionally been on accidental exposure. The aim of the present study was to illustrate issues that need to be considered in evaluating the radiological consequences of a 'dirty bomb' explosion. This is done through a worked example of simplified calculations of relative dose contributions for a specific `dirty bomb' scenario leading to atmospheric dispersion of 90Sr contamination over a city area. Also, the requirements of atmospheric dispersion models for such scenarios are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Triggered by the events of September 11, 2001, the Finnish Government took the initiative to promote radiation measurement techniques for counter terrorist activities. Consequently, the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority developed an advanced mobile unit for radionuclide source finding. The key design requirement was the capability to measure, analyze and communicate the results in real-time. A vehicle was built with mean response time. The in-situ gamma-spectrometric measurement start to alarm the operation center in 8 seconds. In-situ gamma-spectrometric data from both test and surveillance missions are presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses roles of medical health physicists in a medical radiation emergency. During a response to a radiological or nuclear emergency, medical health physicists must evaluate radiological contamination levels of victims, help the medical staff to understand the levels of radioactivity with which they are dealing, help staff to understand principles of dealing with radioactive contaminants, and provide guidance on decontamination of patients, facilities and vehicles. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control is developing training materials for hospitals and medical health physicists.

Radiological dispersion devices (RDDs), commonly called "dirty bombs," utilize a conventional explosive to deliberately disperse non-fissile material as an aerosol. This analysis models total effective dose equivalent (Sv) at various locations down-wind from the detonation site subsequent to terrorists detonating a 241Am, 137Cs, 60Co, 192Ir, or90Sr RDD. A source term for each isotope equaling 3.7 × 1013 Bq with an instantaneous release by either high explosives or low explosives at street level is assumed in order to evaluate total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) under various meteorological scenarios for intentional releases of non-fissile materials by terrorists. The inhalation pathway on average contributes most to TEDE. The inhalation pathway accounts for 96% (0.22 Sv) of the mean exposure estimate of 0.2321 Sv and occurs over an extremely short time frame (i.e., a few minutes). Ground shine, on average, contributes the second most to TEDE estimates accounting for approximately 4% (0.009 Sv) of the estimate. A cautionary note with regard to ground shine is warranted, however, because Hotspot estimates for this pathway are based on the assumption that a person is exposed for 4 days (96 hours). The TEDE for submersion (i.e., passing through the plume without inhaling particles) is negligible for the scenarios evaluated contributing less than 1% (5.2 × 10-6 Sv) to the TEDE estimate averaged across all 140 model runs (5 nuclides × 2 rainfall scenarios × 2 explosive scenarios × 7 wind and atmospheric stability scenarios). The TEDE value for 241Am from inhalation is much greater, on average, than the inhalation TEDE value for 60Co, 137Cs, 192Ir, or 90Sr. This underscores the potentially high risk to human health posed by exposure to 241Am. Ground shine is the primary exposure pathway for 60Co and 137Cs due to the energetic and penetrating gamma rays those radionuclides emit. 192Ir and 90Sr have relatively low mean TEDE values for all of the pathways examined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the threats posed by dirty bombs. According to the authors, dirty bombs have been the paradigm for radiological dispersion devices because they consist of a radioactive source mixed with high explosive, and aim to kill and injure by using the conventional explosion to spread radioactivity. The radioactive materials in a dirty bomb play no part in creating the explosion itself unlike a nuclear weapon which is much more powerful. The authors add that it is possible, but expensive, to decontaminate an area following a small dirty-bomb attack, however, after a larger attack it might prove necessary to raze whole city blocks, remove topsoil and bury the debris.

This article discusses methods for determining realistic hazard boundaries and the ramifications and consequences for early management decisions in response to radiological dispersal of explosive devices. The authors provide first responders with boundaries established by the Sandia National Laboratories based on tests of aerosolization of these devices. They review countermeasures and appropriate actions and discuss whether evacuation or sheltering in place are the appropriate response to protect life and property. They argue that many of the critical decisions to minimize exposure need to be taken in the first hour.

This article analyzes possible terrorist attacks on the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach using a radiological dispersal device (RDD, also known as a “dirty bomb”) to shut down port operations and cause substantial economic and psychological impacts. The analysis is an exploratory investigation of a combination of several risk analysis tools, including scenario generation and pruning, project risk analysis, direct consequence modeling, and indirect economic impact assessment. We examined 36 attack scenarios and reduced them to two plausible or likely scenarios using qualitative judgments. For these two scenarios, we conducted a project risk analysis to understand the tasks terrorists need to perform to carry out the attacks and to determine the likelihood of the project's success. The consequences of a successful attack are described in terms of a radiological plume model and resulting human health and economic impacts. Initial findings suggest that the chances of a successful dirty bomb attack are about 10–40% and that high radiological doses are confined to a relatively small area, limiting health effects to tens or at most hundreds of latent cancers, even with a major release. However, the economic consequences from a shutdown of the harbors due to the contamination could result in significant losses in the tens of billions of dollars, including the decontamination costs and the indirect economic impacts due to the port shutdown. The implications for countering a dirty bomb attack, including the protection of the radiological sources and intercepting an ongoing dirty bomb attack are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the Exercise Maritime Response (EMR), which was designed to test the Canadian federal, provincial, and municipal response to a terrorist attack using radioactive materials. The EMR was held at Slemon Park (formerly Canadian Forces Base Summerside) on Prince Edward Island in February-March, 2006. Participants included the Human Monitoring Laboratory, Ottowa, Ontario. The structure and schedule of the exercise is described, as is the procedure for screening volunteer subjects for radioactivity. Topics evaluated in the article include contamination control, crowd control, decontamination, communications, identification of team members, manpower, monitoring protocol, signage, and software.

A potential terrorist attack utilizing a Radiological Dispersal Device would spread fear and panic on a massive scale, in addition to creating a widespread, severe, and long-lasting economic burden. The main purpose of the present study is to make some assessments of the radiological impact of such an incident, with a primary focus on the public health risk. We discuss the possibility of utilizing radioactive sources or nuclear fuel in such an incident and make a comparison of the relative impact associated with each source. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article looks into the ways in which popular images of the bomb and its resultant radiation were presented as clean and dirty, depending on whether Americans or Soviets owned the bomb in Nevada. It notes that the people who lived, or served their country beneath the clouds of nuclear weapon tests were presented with an alternative image of the bomb. The bomb that the down-winders and the atomic soldiers shared the horizon with was not really clean. The author contends that what was clean, what was sanitized, was the image of the bomb that they were shown. The difference between clean and dirty bombs was primarily one of rhetoric.

Abstract: Recent world events have increased concern that hospitals must be prepared for radiological emergencies. Emergency departments (EDs) must be ready to treat patients suffering from injuries in combination with radiation exposure or contamination with radioactive material. Every hospital should have a Radiological Emergency Medical Response Plan, tested through periodic drills, which will allow effective handling of contaminated and injured patients. Treatment of life-threatening or severe traumatic injuries must take priority over radiation-related issues. The risk to ED staff from radioactive contamination is minimal if universal precautions are used. The likelihood of significant radiation exposure to staff under most circumstances is small. Educating medical staff on the magnitude of the radiological hazards allows them to promptly and confidently provide the necessary patient care. Measures must be taken to prevent the “worried well” and uninjured people with radioactive contamination from overwhelming the ED. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

In an event of a nuclear or dirty bomb explosion and a radiological accident, there is a need for self-indicating instant radiation dosemeter for monitoring radiation exposure. The self-indicating instant radiation alert dosemeter (SIRAD) is a credit card size radiation dosemeter for monitoring ionising radiation from a few hundredths of a Cray to a few Cray. It is always active and is ready to use. It needs no battery. The dosemeter develops colour instantly upon exposure, and the colour intensifies with dose. It has a colour chart so that the dose on the active element may be read by matching its colour with the chart that is printed next to it on the card. However, in this work, the dose is measured by the optical density of the element. The dosemeter cannot be reset. The response changes by <1% per °C from -20 to +60°C. The shelf-life is >3 y at room temperature. It contains no hazardous materials. The dosemeter would meet the requirements of instantly monitoring high dose in an event of a nuclear or dirty bomb explosion or a radiation accident. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many believe the British don't come to the table unless you bomb them there. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper shows a panoramic about the development and evolution that had got the National Center for Nuclear Safety at its fifteen years of work, as the competent authority in the matter of nuclear and radiological safety and accountability and control of nuclear materials in the Republic of Cuba. To presents the principal tasks on a legislative level and the regulatory control and the main results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The July 2005 terrorist attacks in London demonstrated the resilience of Western society in the face of low-level conventional terrorism. But the psychological damage from the London bombings would likely pale next to the severe, unpredictable, long-lasting effects of a radiological attack. One unique hazard of radiation exposure beyond the obvious physiological effects is that it is colorless, odorless, and tasteless, making it difficult for ordinary citizens to evaluate, quantify, and rationally understand the dangers confronting them. Radiological weapons stand out among the tools available to terrorists for their capacity to inflict far-reaching psychological damage to civilian populaces well beyond the immediate victims. A possible solution to mitigate the psychological consequences is to build a “resilience culture,” an interlocking set of beliefs, attitudes, approaches, and behaviors that help people fare better in any disaster or extraordinary circumstance. The “all-hazards approach,” which emphasizes the identifiable similarities among the “disaster triad”—that is, natural, accidentally man-made, and intentionally man-made disasters—extends to acts of terrorism and could help demystify the fears associated with radiological terrorist weapons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nuclear terrorism in all its forms is the common enemy of all mankind. Given the emergence of global, non-state terrorism, China must be prepared to confront such threats. A terrorist attack using a functional nuclear device would be devastating. A radiological dispersion device or “dirty bomb” is another form—much less deadly and easier to build than even a crude nuclear device. China believes that to combat nuclear terrorism, it is vital to enhance the security of nuclear materials. Beijing has taken substantial steps in this direction, as well as in increasing the protection of its nuclear facilities, but much work remains to be done, including improving its management and control of radioactive sources and clarifying the design basis threat for critical installations. Ultimately, however, the most effective security will come from strengthening the international nonproliferation and nuclear control regimes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the present materials cycle for radioactive 137Cs in the U.S. The materials cycle for 137Cs which is a low-level radioactive material of concern from a security view likewise as for its wide industrial and medical uses. Radioactive 137Cs is completely anthropogenic with production results from whatever incidence of nuclear fission and the current production magnitude is large compared to the amount that is commercially utilized. The present production of radioactive 137Cs is the form of high-level waste material and can also be presented into environment through nuclear weapons.

A radiological dispersion device (RDD) or “dirty” bomb is a conventional explosive wrapped in radiological material. Terrorists may use an RDD to disperse radioactive material across a populated area, causing casualties and/or economic damage. Nearly all risk assessment models for RDDs make unrealistic assumptions about public behavior in their health assessments, including assumptions that the public would stand outside in a single location indefinitely. In this article, we describe an approach for assessing the risks of RDD events incorporating both physical dispersion and behavioral response variables. The general approach is tested using the City of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as a case study. Atmospheric models simulate an RDD attack and its likely fallout, while radiation exposure models assess fatal cancer risk. We model different geographical distributions of the population based on time of day. We evaluate aggregate health impacts for different public responses (i.e., sheltering-in-place, evacuating). We find that current RDD models in use can be improved with the integration of behavioral components. Using the results from the model, we show how risk varies across several behavioral and physical variables. We show that the best policy to recommend to the public depends on many different variables, such as the amount of trauma at ground zero, the capability of emergency responders to get trauma victims to local hospitals quickly and efficiently, how quickly evacuations can take place in the city, and the amount of shielding available for shelterers. Using a parametric analysis, we develop behaviorally realistic risk assessments, we identify variables that can affect an optimal risk reduction policy, and we find that decision making can be improved by evaluating the tradeoff between trauma and cancer fatalities for various RDD scenarios before they occur. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stresses that a radiological dispersal devices (RDD) attack could lead to both domestic and international trade damage in the form of reduced trade and trade relations, job losses and possibly reduced human productivity. Sources for radiological material; Merits in using radiological materials versus biological agents; Impacts of using RDD against agriculture; Attack of U.S. allies to hurt U.S. strategic plans.

The article discusses the nature and likelihood of several forms of nuclear and radiological terrorism and ways to prevent it. There are two terrorist groups that standout from perspective of nuclear terrorism, they are Aum Shinrikyo which is headquartered in Japan and Al-Qaeda, an Islamic terrorist network. According to the authors, terrorism prevention should be a global effort since the United States is not the only nation targeted by such kind of attacks.

The demand for installation and use of radiation monitors at border crossing points , and other locations in a country has significantly increased due to the fact that terrorist threats may involve the use of radiation dispersal devices (RDDs, dirty bombs). One of the problems that customs officers and security forces experience is a high frequency of "innocent" radiation alarms caused by airport passengers who have undergone a medical treatment. Since the half-life of the isotopes that are used for medical treatment ranges from hours to several days, the dose-rate for days and even weeks after the treatment is high enough to trigger a radiation alarm of a border monitor. In this paper we describe the development and testing of a real time gamma spectrometer based on a commercially available large volume NaI-detector and a computer-coupled multichannel analyzer (MCA) with fast data collection, stabilization of the energy scale, and isotope identification software. The system is capable of measuring a burst of gamma spectra in second intervals, to identify the isotopes and to produce a "green" alarm in real time when a medical isotope is present and a "red" alarm in other cases. The system has successfully been tested under laboratory conditions, as well as at an international airport and on patients in the radiation ward of hospitals. This work has been performed under IAEA Research Agreements with the Atom Institute of the Austrian Universities, the Austrian Research Center Seibersdorf, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article focuses on radiation dispersal devices (RDD) which are more likely to be deployed by terrorists than true nuclear weapons. While RDD are not military weapons in the classic sense, they could be coercive and could trigger enormous political reactions within host countries or among allies in a coalition. The consensus appears to be that RDD would be better termed weapons of mass disruption rather than mass destruction.