Search

Many contemporary logicians seek to account for the notion of class in terms of propositional function. Let f signify, for example, “is red” or “is a dog.” Then one has the propositional function f(x) which, x being a variable, has the meaning “x is red” or “x is a dog.” By substituting individual terms for the variable, the propositional function gives rise to propositions which, according to the substitutions which are made, are true or false. One then defines the class as the set of individual terms which, substituted for the variable, confer a value of truth upon the propositions derived from the original propositional function by means of these substitutions.

At the basis of the constitution of the physical sciences since Galileo is a basic circumstance which, to the extent that these sciences have progressed, has become increasingly emphasized: the rigorous separation between the reality of the world as it is constructed by these sciences and the qualitative, perceptual, and therefore “subjective” aspect under which the world presents itself to us so far as we are beings endowed with a psychophysical organization.

The essential characteristic of modern philosophy, as opposed to ancient and medieval philosophy, consists in no longer focusing upon being and objects in the human soul, but in placing the consciousness of objective being in the foreground of one’s interest and in regarding consciousness as a particular domain. The discovery of consciousness was one of Descartes’ notable achievements, and thereafter consciousness became the principal theme of philosophy.

Above we mentioned James’s distinction between “focus” and “margin.” If there is a certain organization in the “field of consciousness,” it must not, according to James, be considered as a primary, original, and authentic feature of experience. Whatever organization exists in conscious life is bestowed and superimposed on it from without. James abided by this tenet throughout all stages of his development.

Applying the method of “historico-teleological” reflection or intentional analysis to the growth of Husserl’s philosophy, Berger disengages predominant motives which, to be sure, are not elaborated and explicitly formulated before the final and definitive phase of Husserl’s evolution (viz., that of transcendental phenomenology) is reached, but which may, and must, be discerned throughout the whole development of Husserl’s thought, though, of course, in a more or less implicit, rather anticipatory and germinal form. The quest of an ultimate and absolute foundation and justification of knowledge, first of logical and mathematical knowledge, later of scientific knowledge at large and even of prescientific experience, has been a persistent occupation of Husserl. From his first beginnings in philosophy, Husserl turned to the realm of subjectivity for his foundation and justification. The problem is to account for the validity of knowledge and the objectivity of the objects of knowledge in terms of acts of consciousness through which the objects are apprehended and knowledge is constituted. It is to this orientation towards both the subjective and objective aspects of experience and knowledge that Farber also calls attention when, in his Foundation of Phenomenology,1 he speaks of the persistence of Husserl’s “dual interest.”

The concept of perceptual adumbration (Wahrnehmungsabschattung) is so central to the phenomenological theory of perception that the discussion of all problems concerning the phenomenology of perception must take its departure from that concept. The doctrine of perceptual adumbration is based on the obvious fact that every particular perception of a thing is relative to a determinate standpoint and occurs under certain circumstances and conditions. The perceived thing is seen from this or that side, appears under the aspect corresponding to the standpoint at which the perceiving subject happens to be placed. Furthermore, the thing presents itself in a certain orientation relative to the observer and his standpoint as near or far, as at the center of the visual field or more toward the periphery, etc. Finally, the manner of appearance of the perceived thing varies according to whether it is seen in bright daylight or at dusk, in a fog, and so forth.

When an object is given in experience, the experiencing subject is conscious of the object and has an awareness of this very consciousness of the object. Perceiving a material thing, listening to a musical note, thinking of a mathematical theorem, etc., we are not only conscious of the thing, the note, the theorem, etc., but are also aware of our perceiving, listening, thinking, etc. Thus every act of consciousness is accompanied by an awareness of itself.

William James’s theory of the “transitive parts” of the stream of consciousness will not be considered here from a historical point of view but will be gauged as a contribution to those problems which are of actual concern to present philosophical thought, especially those questions with which phenomenology deals. This orientation will also prevail in some historical considerations.

Thus far the three orders of existence under discussion have been considered separately. A full account must deal with all of the relations which exist among them, but here we shall confine ourselves to that between our embodied existence and the perceptual world.

In this discussion the term “phenomenology” will be used to refer to Husserl’s constitutive phenomenology and not to later philosophical trends, which, whatever their kinship with Husserl’s phenomenology, have developed in somewhat different directions. First, a brief sketch of the fundamental principles of phenomenology with special regard to the problem of existence will be presented. Next, the terns will be set forth in which ontological problems can be treated in phenomenology. Last, two ontological theses will be submitted.

The third class of facts that present themselves permanently to consciousness, at least in marginal form, pertains to the perceptual world. Whatever the theme of our mental activity, we cannot help being aware of a certain sector of the perceptual world, viz., our present perceptual environment, no matter how unconnected this sector may be, where relevancy is concerned, with that with which we are actually dealing. We may, for instance, remember a certain phase of our past and live in a “world of memory.” Absorbed as we may be in this remembered world of the past, the present perceptual world in which at the moment we happen to find ourselves does not vanish from consciousness altogether.

In the first edition of the Logische Untersuchungen, Husserl did not admit an ego different from the empirical one, and consequently he rejected all theories in which the acts of consciousness are held to spring from a center of conscious life. A highly important class of conscious facts—the intentional acts—have the peculiarity of confronting the experiencing mind with an object, but relatedness to the ego is no essential feature of these acts.2 Certainly an idea or a representation of the ego may appear; it may even easily appear, or, expressed otherwise, there may possibly exist a special disposition or readiness for its appearing. But only if it does actually appear may the act in question be experienced as connected with, or related to, the ego. This is, however, not a general rule. On the contrary, when the subject pays more attention to the object presented to him by the act which he experiences, he becomes more absorbed in dealing with this object, and the more the subject “forgets” himself, i.e., the less the chance that a representation of his ego intervenes in his conscious activity and operations.

The intentionality of consciousness may be defined as a relation which all, or at least certain, acts bear to an object. In this manner, Brentano introduced the notion into contemporary philosophy. Seeking to account for the difference between what he calls “physical phenomena” and what he calls “psychical phenomena,” Brentano found, among other characteristics, that the latter are distinguished by a relation to, or a direction towards, an object.2 This directedness of psychical phenomena is interpreted by Brentano as their containing within themselves an “immanent” object-like entity.

As we know it today, modern psychology originated contemporaneously with the physical sciences and has been more or less connected with them throughout its development. To be sure, it has not known the continuity distinctive of the physical sciences. Nor has it known that series of progressive successes which constitute the prestige of physics and owing to which physics has been and still is called upon to make the major, if not the exclusive contribution to the formation of a scientific conception of the universe. The course taken by the development of psychology is much more sinuous. Its development was frequently interrupted as a result of the fact that psychological studies often took directions which, sooner or later, revealed themselves to be blind alleys. At any event, the beginnings of psychological studies worthy of being qualified as “scientific,” in the modern sense of the term, go back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

In this excellent paper written with much historical comprehension and philosophical penetration, Dr. Fulton discusses Husserl’s claim that phenomenology may be characterized as a Neo-Cartesianism, although nearly all of the doctrinal content of Cartesianism is rejected, and this because of a radical development given to certain Cartesian themes. Is this “doctrinal content” truly accessory, so that, when it is dismissed, the real and essential principles of Cartesian philosophy become all the more manifest and may be set forth even more explicitly than they are in the form in which Descartes brought them out himself? Or is the “doctrinal content” so closely connected with the general orientation of Descartes’ thought that, when those “Cartesian themes” which Husserl retains and endeavors to develop are considered in the light of Descartes’ supreme philosophical aspirations, they cannot be separated from that “doctrinal content”?

When looking at a material thing, for example, a house, it is perceived from the point of observation of the viewer. The house appears as near or remote; these attributes are understood with reference to the place from which the experiencing subject observes. The house appears as being straight ahead or located on the side. The observer may perceive it before him or from some height. Its mode of presentation depends upon the standpoint of the observer. The house may be seen in bright sunshine, at dusk, through fog, etc.

Husserl’s theory of universals as general objects and specific ideal entities very soon acquired widespread notoriety, although often in a grossly misinterpreted and misrepresented form, partly as a result of the not very fortunately chosen term of “intuition of essences” (Wesenserschauung). When Husserl established his theory of ideation for the first time in the Logische Untersuchungen, he hardly went beyond asserting the specific nature and irreducibility of those acts through which universals in contradistinction to particular things are meant and apprehended and, correspondingly, asserting the specific nature and irreducibility of the objects apprehended through the acts in question. For this purpose, Husserl had to engage himself in a thoroughgoing analysis and discussion of the theories of abstraction prevailing in the tradition of classical British empiricism.

To an observer of the contemporary intellectual scene, it may appear that the years following the end of the war have witnessed a triumph of phenomenology on an international scale. Certainly, this impression is correct to some extent. Nonetheless,1 much of what passes for “phenomenology” can thus be taken only in a very broad, not to say extremely loose, sense. Some of the writings about Husserl’s phenomenology are too much colored and determined by views current in contemporary philosophical trends which, though they have undoubtedly developed in the wake of Husserl’s phenomenology, cannot however2 be considered as its continuations, that is, as continuations of Husserl’s work along the lines of his general orientation. Needless to say, thus to continue Husserl’s work is not only compatible with, but might even sometimes demand modifications of, particular theories.

Fringes, “psychic overtones,” “suffusions” are defined by James as conscious counterparts of faint brain-processes. Such counterparts are experienced in the form of some awareness of “relations and objects but dimly perceived.” James also traces the difference between “knowledge about” and “acquaintance” to the presence or absence of fringes. Acquaintance consists in the mere presence of some datum; knowledge about in the appearance of the datum in relation to something else. As far as this characterization goes, fringes belong with “transitive states” in general. An transitive states are, according to James, conditioned by submaximally excited brain-processes. Descriptively, transitive states are to be characterized as vague. Their function in conscious life is to lead from one “substantive part” to another.

According to Husserl, a distinction has to be made between generalizing and formalizing abstraction.2 By means of generalizing abstraction one arrives at notions such as “red,” “color,” “sensuous quality,” or “triangle,” “planimetric figure,” “spatial form,” etc. Each of these notions refers to what Husserl calls a “material region”—that is to say, a region circumscribed and defined by a certain qualitative content of whatever pertains to it. If, therefore, an object, a fact, a phenomenon, can be considered as an instance of one of these notions, it is because of its material and qualitative nature. Each of the notions in question expresses an invariant with regard to variations and varieties. Starting from a certain red, for example, one can vary, if only in imagination, its brightness; one can even vary its shade or hue while taking care that all the resulting variations remain red.

We here undertake a survey of some very general and formal principles of constitutive phenomenology, the phenomenological idealism which Husserl introduced in general terms and in a well-developed form with the Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophie of 19131, and which thereafter he never ceased to elaborate, deepen, and expand.

Scrutinizing the conditions of cognizance or cognition (connaissance), Berger has not in view external conditions, i.e., causal factors upon which cognitive processes might depend. To be sure, cognitive processes may be considered as mundane events connected with real existents ([i.e.,] human beings), occurring at certain places and at certain times, and determined by conditions of different kinds, conditions physical, physiological, social, historical, etc. It is then perfectly legitimate to bring out the intramundane dependencies in which cognitive processes are involved.

Aron Gurwitsch was born January 17, 1901, in Vilna, Lithuania, then a part of Imperial Russia. The Jews of Lithuania were long known for their austere rationalism, and, with the exception of his father, Gurwitsch is descended from rabbinical scholars on both sides. Meyer Gurwitsch exported timber from Russia to Germany before the Great War and westernized himself by reading deeply in English, French, and German literature. After his fortune was destroyed by the war and the Russian Revolution, Gurwitsch’s father came to America.

Professor Farber’s work may well be characterized as a most useful and helpful introduction to phenomenological philosophy. It is, however, an introduction quite unique in character. The reader does not find himself confronted with that well-known type of simplifying, sometimes oversimplifying, presentation by which he is offered formulations of tenets of Husserl’s, and, at the very best, is made acquainted with the results of Husserl’s analytical work. In Farber’s book, it is the analytical work itself that is displayed, and the results are presented within the context of phenomenological research out of which they have grown. Emphasizing, though not confining himself to the logical phase of Husserl’s work, Farber enables his readers to assimilate phenomenological research. Careful study which this book both requires and deserves is rewarded, on the part of the beginner in phenomenology, by an incipient skill to think along phenomenological lines.

That which has rendered Husserl’s name famous, especially among those persons who have devoted the studies necessary to afford a thorough comprehension of it, is Husserl’s assertion that we possess an immediate knowledge of, and a direct access to, essences. This “intuition of essences,” however, is nothing other than a heading for a theory of abstraction which Husserl opposes to those theories advanced by the empiricist philosophers, and which he has laid down in explicit criticism of these theories, particularly that of Hume.

In contrast to the objectivistic trend which, to a large extent, prevails in contemporary philosophy and psychology, phenomenology has insisted upon the orientation toward subjectivity, i.e., consciousness. It is to the defense and, if possible, the elaboration of this orientation that the present discussion is devoted. We propose to discuss a concept which is of central importance in this respect—namely, the concept of what may be called the “subjective object.” Provisionally and roughly defined, it is the concept of the object not as it really is but as it appears to the experiencing subject’s mind through a given act of consciousness. What is meant by this is called noema in Husserl’s terminology.

Heretofore we have considered the inner horizon under the noematic aspect. This phenomenon may also be discussed from the noetic point of view, namely, the point of view of acts rather than noemata.

Both phenomenology and psychology are concerned with consciousness in general as well as with specific acts of consciousness like perception, memory, comprehension of meaning, reasoning, etc. Yet, the theoretical orientation and perspective in which consciousness is studied in psychology is highly different from that of phenomenology.

Among the philosophers and psychologists, who, at the end of the nineteenth-century, started to challenge the theories of classical British empiricism, William James holds a preeminent place. In the school of classical British empiricism, that general conception of consciousness was prevalent which Hume had established when he compared the mind to a “kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations.”