'Preface' to Quentin Lauer, The Triumph of Subjectivity (New York: Fordham University Press, 1958), pp. V–Viii

To an observer of the contemporary intellectual scene, it may appear that the years following the end of the war have witnessed a triumph of phenomenology on an international scale. Certainly, this impression is correct to some extent. Nonetheless,1 much of what passes for “phenomenology” can thus be taken only in a very broad, not to say extremely loose, sense. Some of the writings about Husserl’s phenomenology are too much colored and determined by views current in contemporary philosophical trends which, though they have undoubtedly developed in the wake of Husserl’s phenomenology, cannot however2 be considered as its continuations, that is, as continuations of Husserl’s work along the lines of his general orientation. Needless to say, thus to continue Husserl’s work is not only compatible with, but might even sometimes demand modifications of, particular theories.