A Non-Egological Conception of Consciousness

In the first edition of the Logische Untersuchungen, Husserl did not admit an ego different from the empirical one, and consequently he rejected all theories in which the acts of consciousness are held to spring from a center of conscious life. A highly important class of conscious facts—the intentional acts—have the peculiarity of confronting the experiencing mind with an object, but relatedness to the ego is no essential feature of these acts.2 Certainly an idea or a representation of the ego may appear; it may even easily appear, or, expressed otherwise, there may possibly exist a special disposition or readiness for its appearing. But only if it does actually appear may the act in question be experienced as connected with, or related to, the ego. This is, however, not a general rule. On the contrary, when the subject pays more attention to the object presented to him by the act which he experiences, he becomes more absorbed in dealing with this object, and the more the subject “forgets” himself, i.e., the less the chance that a representation of his ego intervenes in his conscious activity and operations.