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Reports on the vaccination policy for the smallpox by the U.S. government to fight against the bioterrorist attacks. People who will be vaccinated for the disease; Reaction of the public health community; Eruption of the smallpox attacks.

Reports on the progress of research on the illnesses of Persian Gulf War veterans in the United States. Common health complaints of veterans; Possible causes of the syndrome; Results of efforts to link medical problems to specific exposures. INSETS: Congress Explores the Scientific Fringe, by M.E.;Restoring Faith in the Pentagon, by M.E..

The article focuses on the balancing of personal privacy and public health during outbreaks of infectious disease. Topics include the increase in the emergence of contagious disease between 1995 and 2015 and the World Health Organization's (WHO) recommendations on disease outbreaks. Information is provided on medical ethics and physicians' protection of their patients.

The article discusses the potential for developing a vaccine to address the 2009 emergence of swine influenza. While the virus is predicted to reach pandemic levels, a vaccine could be the most important aspect of addressing the disease’s severity. Discussions taking place among vaccine manufacturers, regulatory agencies, and the World Health Organization (WHO) have reached the consensus that there will not be enough vaccine produced to protect all of the world’s citizens. Beginning with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), a seed stock of the virus was produced. A study conducted by Adam Sabow of the consulting company Oliver Wyman, which was funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, examined how many flu vaccines can be produced annually.

The article reports on the Asian tiger mosquito or Aedes albopictus and its existence in the United States. The Asian tiger mosquito came from East and Southeast Asia wherein they lived in tree holes at the edges of Asian forests. It was first discovered by Paul Reiter on 1983 in Memphis, Tennessee during his study of mosquito behavior and ecology. Its existence in the United States was caused by the trade of secondhand tires and exotic plant called Lucky bamboo. It also resulted to the outbreak of the disease called chikungunya in the Indian Ocean and Italy.

The article reports on bioterrorism and its prevention. The 9/11 terrorist attacks and the anthrax letters triggered a vast program to protect the U.S. from bioterrorism. More than 750 U.S. microbiologists complaining that the current spending spree in biodefense is threatening the very foundation of microbiology. While budgets have skyrocketed for exotic agents such as plague, anthrax, and tularemia--each of them negligible as human health threats--research on widespread and perhaps mundane pathogens is falling by the wayside, the letter says, as is work with traditional model organisms. INSET: Microbiologist on a Mission.

On May 1, the Czech Republic and seven other former communist nations, along with Malta and Cyprus, will join the European Union (EU), marking a stunning historic transition that began with the rise of Poland's Solidarity movement in the mid-1980s. Scientists across Europe are hailing this year's May Day as a milestone for science. There are recent debates about the creation of a European Research Council that would make quality its main criterion when doling out money, rather than, say, equity among European regions. At the same time, researchers in the 15 current member states worry that bringing a clutch of cash-strapped countries into the EU will siphon money from the top-notch research that could help Europe gain a competitive edge against the United States and Japan. INSET: Outwitting TB on the E.U.'s Eastern Frontier.

Focuses on the development of biowarfare program in Washington D.C. Provision of bioterrorism funds; Identification on the potential sources of anthrax; Development of biological weapons.

Reports the efforts of the government to combat the smallpox attack in the U.S. Accounts on the smallpox outbreak; Side effects of the smallpox vaccine; Review of the government on the policy on smallpox vaccination.

Focuses on the efforts of scientists to identify genetic fingerprints in anthrax bacteria in the United States. Development of fingerprinting systems for potential biological weapons; Description of anthrax spores; Prerequisites for the collection of strains for distinctive genetic differences. INSETS: Can Lab Sleuths Clinch the Case?;A Second Anthrax Genome Project..

Focuses on whether officials in the United States are doing enough to prevent mad cow disease or bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). Safeguards established by various U.S. agencies; Proposed legislation to increase border inspections and other controls; Potential sources of BSE; Question on how much the country is willing to invest to prevent BSE. INSET: America's Own Prion Disease?, by M.E..

Focuses on the efforts of the United States to prevent the entry of foot-and-mouth disease from Great Britain. Declaration to be made by international travel agencies regarding the bringing of animal products in the mainland; Use of dogs in detecting agricultural products inside travel bags; Disinfection of shoes of incoming travelers; Previous history of the hoof-and-mouth epidemics in the U.S.

Focuses on West Nile virus. Details of the migratory pattern of the virus along the east coast of the United States and the District of Columbia; Explanation of how the virus spreads; Inability to predict where and when the virus will spread.

Focuses on the increasing number of biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) laboratory facilities in the United States. Viruses contained in BSL-4 facilities; Existing and proposed BSL-4 labs; Concerns over the number of proposed laboratories.

Presents information on a center for the study of emerging tropical and infectious diseases called the Center for Tropical Diseases at the University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB) in Galveston, Texas. Plans of UTMB; History of the center; Cooperation among researchers at UTMB; Problem with UTMB.

The article presents an interview with virologist Ron Fouchier. He discusses his research paper that prompted concerns over the biosecurity of influenza studies, the 2012 declaration of a moratorium on research modifying the H5N1 avian influenza virus to increase its transmissibility among mammals, and his reaction to the position of the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) on the public health benefits of his work.

The article reports that in December 2011 the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) asked that two research teams redact information papers on papers to be published in "Science" and "Nature" about methods for the engineering of the H5N1 influenza virus to increase its transmissibility between mammals. Critics of the move fear that increased government oversight will hamper vital research and information sharing on a global health concern, while proponents point to the importance of restricting access to sensitive data for bioterrorism prevention. The development of a system for the U.S. government to evaluate the safety of future dual-use scientific research is discussed.

The article discusses the October 2010 outbreak of cholera in Haiti and controversy regarding its etiology, whether indigenous or imported by peacekeepers from Nepal where the disease is considered to be endemic. Though not implicating Nepal specifically, DNA forensics conducted by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) suggested that the outbreak was related to cholera strains imported from South Asia. U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF) cholera scientist Rita Colwell is cited regarding cholera epidemiology. Haiti's outbreak is linked to the El Tor cholera biotype.

The article discusses scientific controversy regarding a possible causal link between chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS) and xenotropic murine leukemia virus-related virus (XMRV), noting the postponement of associated research publications. The article describes opposing opinions on the role of XMRV between researchers representing the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and a team representing the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA).

The article discusses an AIDS vaccine research study that showed positive results for participants in Thailand and follow-up research on the nature of the immune response attributable to the vaccine. Gary Nable, who directs the Vaccine Research Center at the U.S. National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), is cited regarding planned research that will evaluate the results of the vaccine-research project. Actual exposure to HIV among vaccine trial participants is said to be an important element of determinations regarding cause and effect.

The article focuses on the H1N1 influenza strain. It states that the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention initially reported an unusual swine flu outbreak on April 21, 2009 in a dispatch to "Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report." Former Secretary of Health of Mexico, Julio Frenk, said that in the wake of avian influenza outbreaks, there has been an effort to prepare for influenza outbreaks. It mentions that reports of the H1N1 influenza virus in Mexico, where the disease is believed to have first appeared, was slow because it overlapped with the end of the Mexican flu season. It states that the World Health Organization suggested that vaccine manufacturers should prepare H1N1 vaccines for the 2009-2010 flu season.

The article reports on the issues relative to the microbial forensic examination of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on the anthrax letters sent to the Congress. FBI alleged that the letters were sent by scientist Bruce Ivins working at the laboratory of the Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Disease. The agency believes that no special additives were mixed to the spore preparation, and Ivins has produced the letters using standard laboratory equipment. Scientists question the credibility and basis of the claim of the FBI.

The article reports on the scientific evidence against Bruce Ivins, the 62-year-old Army scientist who killed himself while about to indicted for anthrax murders. Using a full-genome sequencing method, scientists from the FBI have discovered a way to traced the spores from the anthrax letter down to its probable source. However, the investigation still fails to determine liable suspects for the spreading of the letters in 2001. The bureau also fails to distinguish several scientific details that may lead to the true source, suspect, in the anthrax case.

This article presents information on the increasing importance of flu drugs due to the threat of a pandemic. Researchers had long known that amantadine and rimantadine, drugs that block a viral protein called M2, easily trigger resistance in the flu virus and that resistant strains can spread from person to person. At the Second European Influenza Conference held during September 11-14, 2005 researchers reported disheartening data showing that the most aggressive of the circulating human flu strains has become resistant to an older class of flu drugs, rendering the drugs all but useless in the yearly battle against seasonal flu and deflating hopes they might be used to fight a pandemic. For H3N2, the most virulent of the three strains that return each winter, a dramatic pattern emerged. Until 2002, no country had resistance rates higher than 10%. But in 2003, the rate shot up to 58% in China, then jumped to 74% in 2004. Hong Kong, South Korea, and Singapore followed with similar explosions, and samples taken during the 2005 flu season in Europe and the United States show that resistance has climbed to 14.3% and 11.5%, respectively.

The article presents information on the new National Research Agency (ANR) that in October 2005 will start handing out money to research groups across France. Its modus operandi--selecting research projects based on scientific excellence--is standard elsewhere in the world. But in France, where funds are traditionally given in block grants to institutions and labs and then distributed to individuals, and where being a scientist often means having a lifetime government job, the notion is revolutionary. Many researchers worry that ANR, with a starting annual budget of $420 million that's set to grow rapidly, will eventually cannibalize vaunted government strongholds of French science such as the much larger National Center for Scientific Research and the similarly sized National Institute for Health and Medical Research. Moreover, some say that the agency--modeled on long-established outfits like the U.S. National Science Foundation and the German Research Foundation--introduces a type of personal competition that simply isn't right for France.

This article focuses on two modeling studies published online this week in the journal "Nature," and "Science," which attempts to estimate the power of the antiviral drug oseltamivir to quash a pandemic influenza. As experts point out, the models, both of which chose Thailand as the presumptive ground zero, are based on several untested assumptions: that the runaway virus isn't highly infectious, for instance, and that large quantities of drugs can be distributed rapidly to the right people, even in remote villages. The researchers, one team led by Ira Longini of Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia and the other by Neil Ferguson of Imperial College London, hope their work will lead to concrete actions because until now, there's been little if any official commitment to such a plan. Given influenza's history, most experts peg the chance that the world will be hit by another pandemic at 100%. A bold new idea is to use oseltamivir to battle a potentially pandemic virus at the source, before it becomes a global threat, using an internationally run stockpile. INSET: A Drug Makes It Big--But Can It Deliver?.

The article reports that while moves in the U.S. to make scientific research results available at the click of a mouse have generated intense debate, European research organizations have quietly been forging ahead. Slowly but surely, they are starting to build and connect institutional and even nationwide public archives that will, according to proponents, be the mega libraries of the future, allowing anyone with an Internet connection to access papers that result from publicly funded research. In France, the government's four major research institutes, 6 weeks ago jointly declared their intention to move toward open archives.

The article reports that by adding a last-minute amendment to a massive intelligence reform bill, Representative Pete Sessions has made it illegal for most U.S. researchers to synthesize the smallpox virus, variola, from scratch. Some virologists said that the law is ambiguous on what exactly is banned, and it could be interpreted to include some research on closely related poxviruses. By international agreement, only two labs in the world, one in Russia and one in the United States, can store and study variola.

The avian influenza outbreak in Asia, already one of the worst animal-health disasters in history, has flared up in four countries. In 2000, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, Georgia, started experiments to create crossovers between the H5N1 strain isolated during a 1997 outbreak in Hong Kong and a human flu virus adapted for the lab. The study was suspended when CDC's flu researchers became overwhelmed by SARS and the new H5N1 outbreak, both in 2003, says CDC flu expert Nancy Cox, who led the work. Virologist Albert Osterhaus of Erasmus University in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, is eager to try not just H5N1 but also other bird flu strains, such as H7N7. The studies have been discussed widely with scientists in WHO's global flu lab network and at a recent flu meeting in Lisbon, he says, and have met with nothing but overwhelming agreement.

A mistake that may have exposed several lab workers in Oakland, California, to live anthrax is inflaming an already heated debate over the safety of the nation's rapidly burgeoning biodefense program. The problem, announced last week, began several months ago when a Frederick, Maryland, lab supplier shipped an anthrax sample that it thought had been heat-killed but that actually contained live bacteria. Luckily, says Children's Hospital Oakland Research Institute director Bert Lubin, the live anthrax came in a relatively benign form, no one has yet shown signs of infection, and the incident was dealt with swiftly.

When the U.S. government wheeled out an aggressive timetable for implementing a new antibioterrorism law last year, research lobbyists warned that it couldn't be done. Over the past half-year, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has been choking on thousands of newly required security checks for researchers, by early this week, not a single laboratory had received the official go-ahead that the rules required by November 12, 2003. As a research shutdown loomed, the government announced on Monday that researchers can continue working without a background check, for now, as long as they have submitted the appropriate paperwork. Under the current interpretation of the law, all laboratories possessing or working with select agents had to submit comprehensive security, training, and record-keeping plans in order to be registered by either the Department of Health and Human Services or the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

Experts wonder if the U.S. scientists will soon have to ask the government for permission to perform certain potentially dangerous biological experiments. That's the question swirling around lab benches in the wake of a much-anticipated National Academy of Sciences report that calls on scientists to do more to self-regulate research that could aid bioterrorists. The report makes a strong pitch to keep the government out of research labs.

Two watchdog groups want to prevent the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) from expanding its biodefense research. Nuclear Watch of New Mexico and Tri-Valley CAREs of California have asked a federal judge to halt construction of two biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) laboratory (labs) claiming that the department has not conducted adequate environmental and non-proliferation studies. The BSL-3 spaces now under construction at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California would enable the agency to work with agents such as anthrax and plague. The two groups have charged that DOE glossed over site-specific risks, such as how the labs might deal with an accidental spill or an earthquake and failed to tally the potential broader impacts of its entire bioterror program.

With the resurgence of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in Toronto, Ontario providing a sobering backdrop, a meeting was organized at Bethesda, Maryland to help set a research agenda to fight this emerging threat. Instead of a coherent research agenda, participants came up with a plethora of questions about the outbreak and the virus that causes it. Some researchers worry that a vaccine might actually worsen SARS through an interaction with the immune system. If the market for a SARS vaccine turns out to be small, says Thomas Monath, chief scientific officer of the British-American vaccine company Acambis, industry may also need a guaranteed purchase of its product or some other sort of carrot to stay in the race.

The U.S. President George W. Bush Administration's ambitious plan to vaccinate between 5 million and 10 million citizens against smallpox has failed. Fewer than 35,000 people have received the vaccine and many states have halted vaccination waiting further guidance from the federal government. At a meeting of an Institute of Medicine panel, several state and local health officials sharply criticized the campaign and urged the government to cancel its small pox vaccination second phase, which has begun in only one state, Florida. The Administration spent months deliberating the magnitude of the preparedness campaign, unveiled on 13 December 2002. Up to 437,000 medical personnel expected to help contain an outbreak would be vaccinated within a month, starting in late January 2003, top Administration officials said at the time, followed by another 5 million to 10 million other medical personnel, law enforcement agents, and firefighters in the next few months. Separately, the Department of Defense revealed a plan to immunize about half a million armed services members. With 422,000 military personnel vaccinated, the latter goal is almost reached, says John Grabenstein, deputy director for military vaccines for the Army's surgeon general. Many expressed concern because even the modest first phase has drained resources and time from other public health programs.

Reports on the meeting of scientists in San Antonio, Texas on a microbe methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA). Resistibility of MRSA to antibiotics; Diseases caused by MRSA.

Reports on shortcomings of the smallpox vaccination program to be implemented by the U.S. Center for Disease Control and Prevention according to the Institute of Medicine panel. Phases of the vaccination program; Issues to be handled by the government before implementing the progam; Solution to include a compensation plan in the program.

Reports the revelation of details on secret weapons tests made under the U.S. chemical and biological warfare program during the Cold War. Reaction of veterans; Coverage of the tests; Effort of the government to track down participants of the tests.

Focuses on the state of academic researches after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S. Amount needed for the science building project of the University of Louisville in Kentucky; Effect of the attacks on researchers; Regulations for science laboratories.

Examines the risk associated with hormone replacement therapy (HRT) for postmenopausal women in the U.S. Prescription of estrogen and progestin to postmenopausal women; Evidence supporting long-term hormone therapy; Benefits of HRT.

Focuses on the controversies over the smallpox outbreak as a bioweapon in the U.S. Views of physician Alan Zelicoff on the use of smallpox strains; Necessity of creating drugs and vaccines against smallpox strains; Aims of the worldwide smallpox eradication campaign.

Reports the proposals of U.S. President George W. Bush to combat terrorist attacks. Increase in research funds; Proposal to create Homeland Security Cabinet-level agency; Development of drugs, vaccines and diagnostics.

Analyzes the genome strain of anthrax in the U.S. Comparison on microbial genomes for future outbreaks; Variations on genome sequences; Effort of the FBI in determining the culprits of the attack.

Reports the plans of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services in buying anthrax vaccines. Search for vaccine bidding by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease; Request of a budget for the vaccine project by President George W. Bush; Availability of the anthrax vaccine adsorbed.

Reports the spate of anthrax attacks in the U.S. Discussion on the inadequate amount of doses for aging smallpox; Evaluation on the testing and efficacy of vaccines; Efforts of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases in testing the Aventis vaccine.

Reports developments related to science as of February 2002. Information on the foot-and-mouth diseases epidemic in Great Britain; Risk of Lou Gehrig's disease occurrence in the U.S. veterans; Symptoms of the disease; Discussion for banning human reproductive cloning.

Reports hindrances to efforts in the setup of a national defense against biological terrorism in the United States. Impact of the anthrax threats; Complaints of scientists to the inadequacy of tests; Need for speed, accuracy and ease of use in the tests.

Reports the effects of an antiterrorism law on laboratory worker screening in the United States. Prevention of non-resident aliens from possessing a select agent; Breeding of anthrax and potential bioweapons from natural sources; Creation of a national registry to track select agents.

Reports on the effects of the outbreak of chronic wasting disease on deer and elks in the United States. Closure of Canada's borders to US deer and elk; Quarantine of nine ranches; Need for an eradication program for elk farms.